21 November 2000
The 1973 military coup which overthrew the Allende government of Chile is well-known. Less known is a short-lived, deep cover attempt of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger to arrange a military coup to prevent Allende from taking office. While the US Senate Church Committee in the mid-70s reported on this and other covert activities by US intelligence agencies, many of the documents provided to the committee for its investigation remained classified until their release on November 13, 2000, over protests of the CIA that the documents would reveal intelligence means and methods. See the Chile Collection: http://foia.state.gov/search2.htm
The 1970 covert action commenced within days after Allende's election on September 3, and had two parts, designated Track I and Track II.
Track I aimed at persuading and supporting Chilean opponents of Allende to prevent his taking office as president using political and constitutional means. It involved the CIA, the State Department, Defense Department and the US ambassador to Chile.
Track II (also called codeword FUBELT) was a special organization set up by the CIA at President Nixon's request to foster a military coup, and it involved only the CIA, Henry Kissinger and Kissinger's staff. Track II was kept secret from the agencies executing Track I and it used Track I to cloak its activities. Track II was headed by Thomas Karamessines, CIA Deputy Director of Plans.
The CIA claims that Track II was terminated after the assassination of Chilean General Schneider on October 22, 1970, when a planned military coup failed to materialize. However, the Church Committee alleged that it was never terminated and probably assisted the military coup of 1973 by going deeper under cover.
The CIA Track II document below is one of several dozen in the Chile Collection (search on "Track II," FUBELT, "false flag," machine guns") which describe means and methods, these among them:
1. Kept secret from other US government agencies and their oversight committees by presidential order.2. Deployed CIA "false flag" officers ("illegals") who pretended to be from non-US countries.
3. Arranged anti-Allende press coverage: "15 journalist agents from 10 different countries, supplemented by 8 more journalists from 5 countries under the direction of high level agents who were, for the most part, in managerial capacities in the media field."
4. Concealed the existence of Track II after its mission failed until exposed during the Church Committee hearings.
Many redactions in the document can be filled in by reference to other documents in the collection.
Source: http://foia.state.gov/documents\PCIA3\00009123.pdf (668KB)
[23 pages.]
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[Probably SECRET/SENSITIVE
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(439) XXXXXXX
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Approved for Release
July 2000
18 November 1970
SUBJECT: Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
15 September to 3 November 1970
1. General
a. On 15 September 1970, CIA was directed to try to prevent
Marxist Salvador Allende's assent to the Chilean presidency on
3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors
being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee,
Department of State, and Ambassador Korry.
b. Briefly, the situation at that time was the following:
-- Allende had attained a plurality of only some 40,000
in the Chilean popular vote for president. Jorge
Alessandri, a conservative and the runner-up, would
face Allende in a Congressional run-off on 24 October.
The run-off winner would be invested as president on
3 November.
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-- Allende's designation as president by Congress was
very probable given all known factors in the Chilean
political equation.
-- Given the dismal prospects of a political formula
being worked out to prevent Allende's designation
as president by Congress, remaining alternatives
centered around overcoming the apolitical, constitu-
tional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military.
-- U. S. Government intentions were highly suspect,
particularly in Allende and certain government
sectors. Suspicions extended to all Americans in
Chile for whatever declared purpose. In addition,
the Chilean military were being monitored quite
closely by the Allende forces for warning signals
of any interventionist proclivities.
2. Special Organization
a. A Chilean Task Force was assembled and functioning three
days after CIA was assigned the mission. It was headed XXXXXX
and highly-qualified CIA XXXXXXXXXXXXXX recalled from their
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XXXXXXXX posts specifically for this purpose. A special communi-
cations. channel was set up simultaneously to Santiago, Chile, and
Buenos Aires, Argentina, to handle sensitive cable traffic for the
Task Force.
b. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXX It consisted of four CIA officers with the appearance,
language, and experience to sustain the fiction of various foreign
nationalities. They were recalled from their overseas posts to
Washington, briefed, and inserted individually into Chile XXXX
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nationals. In Santiago, their only U.S. contact was a CIA officer who
had resided in Santiago XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX established contact with
Chilean intermediaries or principals interested in promoting a
military coup.
c. By a special (and unique) arrangement requested by CIA,
the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago was placed under operational
direction of the CIA Chief of Station there. His assistance and
Chilean military contacts were invaluable in this program.
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3. The Dual Approach: Constitutional and Coup
a. Prospects for inducing Congress to vote for Alessandri
rather than Allende were never bright and, they all focused on
inspiring a reluctant, indecisive President Frei to assume an out-
of-character role: dynamic leadership within his own party, with
the "persuadables" in Congress, and with the military. Frei was
under no illusions about Chile's fate under an Allende regime.
"Chile has a very short future, he said, "and after 4 November it
will only have a past."
b. Initially, Frei was willing to consider and even advocate a
constitutional solution: the so-called Frei re-election gambit. The
question was whether he would be willing to commit his prestige
completely in following through on such a difficult political maneuver
with the outcome, at best, unassured. The basic gambit consisted
of marshalling enough Congressional votes to elect Alessandri over
Allende with the understanding Alessandri would resign immediately
after inauguration and pave the way for a special election in which
Frei could legally become a candidate. As a preliminary step, Frei
coordinated Alessandri's post-election statement that if he were
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selected for the presidency by Congress, he (Alessandri) would
resign. The thrust of CIAs endeavors, then, was to use every
plausible pressure combined with inducements to move Frei down
this path. To this end, virtually overnight CIA mobilized an inter-
locking political action and propaganda campaign designed both to
goad and entice Frei into following through on the re-election
gambit.
c. At the same time, recognizing the fallibilities of Frei, CIA
focused on provoking a military coup. This undertaking was segre-
gated from that of the Frei re-election gambit with the intention that
it be pursued independently of Frei if necessary, but with his acqui-
escence if possible. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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4. Propaganda Campaign
a. The propaganda campaign was tailored to generating concern
about Chile's future in terms which would condition the thinking and
actions of the three key elements in the Chilean political equation:
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Frei himself, the Chilean political elite, and the Chilean military
(the latter two of which could well bring collateral influence to bear
on Frei). Each of these elements had hastened to rationalize its
acceptance of an Allende presidency. Their palliative was the built-
in checks and balance of Chile's demonstrated reverence for democ-
racy and constitutionality, sweetened by Allende's promise to honor
these traditions.
b. After the 4 September popular vote, the world press had
tended to treat the prospect of witnessing the first freely-elected
Marxist head of state take office as a curious aberration of democ-
racy rather than a politically significant event. Press interest and
coverage was relatively light until the Allende-forces fortuitously
provided an attractive issue which could be exploited. By
15 September, it became apparent that Allende was conducting a
rather blatant campaign to intimidate the Chilean information media
through threats of assassination and violence, takeovers by so-called
worker organizations, and ultimatums to the management of news-
papers and radio stations. Allende's purpose was to smother any
opposition to his election by Congress and to take advantage of that
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peculiarly Latin and pronounced Chilean, propensity to jump on an
accelerating bandwagon -- ideals and the country's welfare to the
contary. A major target of Allende was "El Mercurio", the most
prestigious newspaper in Chile and the major opposition voice to
Allende up to that time. CIA mounted a propaganda campaign
centered around "El Mercurio" and the issue of Allende brazenly
taking his-first step in "communizing" Chile by attacking freedom
of the press and, worse, with the election still unsettled. Covert
action resources were used to launch:
-- Cables of support/protest from leading newspapers
throughout Latin America to "El Mercurio".
-- A protest statement from the International Press
Association XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXX "Freedom of the press in Chile is being
strangled by Communist and Marxist forces and
their Allies.")
-- World press coverage of the International Press
Association protest and, on the details of the
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Communist efforts to seize control of the Chilean
press.
-- A program of journalists -- actual agents and other -
wise -- travelling to Chile for on-the-scene reporting.
(By 28 September, CIA had in place in, or enroute to,
Chile 15 journalist agents from 10 different countries
This cadre was supplemented by 8 more journalists
from 5 countries under the direction of high level
agents who were, for the most part, in managerial
capacities in the media field.)
As a result of the ensuing furore, Allende -- sensitive to world
opinion and attempting to project the image of a moderate, non-
dogmatic socialist -- decided to become more circumspect. By
25 September, heavy-handed intimidation of the press had virtually
ceased.
c. Allende's show of strength had made its point however; the
Chilean press, including "El Mercurio", never did regain its
resiliency and remained thoroughly muted from thereon out. Lack-
ing the usual forums for spontaneous generation and replay of
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propaganda inside Chile, CIA had to rely increasingly on its own
resources: [Underline emphasis by hand.]
-- an underground press dependent upon direct mail
distribution;
-- placement of individual news items through agents
against the resistance of a cowed management;
-- financing of a new, albeit small, newspaper;
-- subsidy of an anti-Allende political group and its
radio programs, political advertisements, and
political rallies; and,
-- direct mailing of foreign news articles to Presi-
dent Frei, Mrs. Frei, selected military leaders,
and the Chilean domestic press.
This effort did not, and could not, replace a Chilean press, fully
operative and free of restraint. Virtually alone, it did keep the
voice of public opposition alive inside Chile for coup purposes
during the final weeks of this period.
d. The magnitude of the propaganda campaign mounted during
this six week period in the Latin American and European media --
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aside from the U. S., the two "outside" areas with, by far, the
greatest influence on Chile -- is evident from the fact that only
partial returns show 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and
similar items as a direct result of agent activity. Just how many
of these items were replayed is not known XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Nor, has CIA any idea of the scope of the
immeasurable multiplier effect -- that is, how much its "induced"
news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated
additional coverage -- except that, even by conservative standards,
this contribution must have been both substantial and significant.
e. Special intelligence and "inside" briefings were given to
U.S. iournalists in deference to the international influence of the
U.S. media. Particularly noteworthy in this connection was the
Time cover story which owed a great deal to written materials and
briefings provided by CIA. The Time correspondent in Chile who
was providing much of the background material for the siory
apparently accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and
constitutionality at face value. CIA briefings in Washington XXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX changed the
basic thrust of the story in the final stages according to another
Time correspondent. It provoked Allende to complain on
13 October, "We are suffering the most brutal and horrible pres-
sure, both domestic and international," singling out Time in
particular as having "openly called" for an invasion of Chile.
5. Political Action
a. The political action program had only one purpose: to
induce President Frei to prevent Allende's election by the Congress
on 24 October and, failing that, to support -- by benevolent neutrality
at the least and conspiratorial benediction at the most -- a military
coup which would prevent Allende from taking office on 3 November.
Idealistically, the task was one of attempting to recast Frei, as a
political personality, in a role demanding decisiveness and
"machismo" to a degree that, thus far, had eluded him. Pressures
from those whose opinion and/or approval he valued -- in combination
with adequate propaganda orchestrations -- represented the only hope
of converting Frei.
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b. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- Allende as president would be an unparalleled
disaster for Chile (Frei agreed).
-- Frei had both the power and obligation to prevent
this.
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- In the event Frei' s re-election gambit succeeded,
the U. S. Government would be prepared to provide
substantial support for Frei's presidential campaign.
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c. In Europe and Latin America, prominent and influential
members of the Christian Democratic movement as well as the
Catholic Church were prompted to visit Frei or send personal
messages to him urging that he save Chile. Some of these endeavors
were the following:
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- The West German Christian Democratic Party
which enjoyed special equities with Frei by virtue
of generous support to the Christian Democrats in
Chile over a range of many years -- dispatched
several top-level emissaries to Chile. Thev con-
tacted Frei and other Christian, Democratic leaders
in Chile XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX one of the international figures
in Catholicism most respected by Frei, sent a
personal message indicating that Frei and his
party must oppose Marxism.
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX of the Italian
Christian Democratic Party which had good
fraternal relations with Frei and his party --
refused to intervene. (He said it was a hopeless
situation and he saw no point in risking his reputa-
tion in a lost cause.
Collateral efforts were made to influence Frei or those c1ose to
Frei, such as:
-- Influential lay Catholics sent messages to or
visited the Vatican.
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX through a series of lay
and clerical pressures from other countries, was
dissuaded from ceding an Allende victory prior to
his Congressional election actually taking place.
-- Telegrams were sent Mrs. Frei from women's
groups in other Latin American countries.
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-- Foreign press items were mailed directly to Frei,
Mrs. Frei, and Christian Democratic Congressmen
in Chile.
-- Intelligence was surfaced indicating that once in
power, the Communists intended to denigrate Frei
as the first step in the dissolution of his party.
d. In spite of everything Frei never asserted himself. Indeed,
he failed to attend or to influence otherwise the 3-4 October Congress
of his party at which time it was decided by a substantial margin to
make a deal with Allende. With that decision, the Frei re-election
gambit died and constitutional alternatives had been exhausted. Sub-
sequently, Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military
officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication
he might even welcome one. Yet, when a coup opportunity and
situation presented itself upon the assassination of Army Commander
in Chief Schneider, Frei moved quickly away fromm it.
6. Military Coup
a. After early October absent any evidence that Frei was
responding, politically speaking, to artificial respiration -- a
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military coup increasingly suggested itself as the only possible
solution to the Allende problem. Anti-Allende currents did exist
in the military and the Carabineros, but were immobilized by:
-- the tradition of military respect for the Constitution,;
-- the public and private stance of General Schneider,
Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated
strict adherence to the Constitution;
-- fear of the reaction of non-commissioned officers
who tended to harbor pro-Allende sympathies; and,
-- a strong propensity to accept Allende blandishments
to the effect that the military had little to fear from
him.
Although individual officers among the top leadership of the military
and Carabineros were pre-disposed to take action, they felt the Army
was central to a successful coup, and, as long as General Schneider
remained the head of the Army, the Army could not be counted upon.
General Schneider's attitude could only be changed through the
personal intervention and forceful advocacy of a coup by President
Frei; something, it became obvious, the latter was most unlikely to
bring himself to do.
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b. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX had a wide range of
excellent contacts among the military with whom he enjoyed
unusually close, frank, and confidential relationships. XXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX As a general rule,
members of the "illegal" team initiated and picked up those contacts
with the highest risk potential, that is, those individuals whose
credentials, reliability, and security quotient were unproven and
unknown.
c. Between 5 October and 20 October, the CIA Station XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX made XXXX
contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. These contacts
required a high degree of overt plausibility or clandestinity since,
by that time, Allende was acutely aware that only the military
remained between himself and the presidency, and, accordingly,
monitored the activities of key military figures quite closely.
Through direct contact, the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX and the XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX advised
of the U. S. Government desire to deny Allende the presidency and
its willingness to support a coup attempt. The XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX and the XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX were made
privy to the U. S. position through trusted high-level military inter-
mediaries.
d. During this same period in October, the "illegals" estab-
lished direct contact and conducted negotiations with the leadership
of the two incipient coup "movements" involving the greatest risk:
-- XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to
have 4, 000 men organized in the greater Santiago
area. He requested arms and ammunition from his
"illegal" contact. When it developed that XXXXXXXX
was somewhat eccentric and had little, if any,
organization of the scope claimed, contact was
dropped. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- All activities of retired Army General Viaux
were being carefully scrutinized by both Allende
and General Schneider during this period because
having led the unsuccessful Tacna regiment revolt
in October 1969 -- he was a known dissident with
some residue of influence in the Army. Viaux
was contacted by several "illegals" at different
points of negotiation with him. He requested a
sizeable airdrop of arms and anununition in the
countryside (which was denied as unrealistic under
the circumstances), substantial financial support
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XXXXXXXXXX life insurance policies for his princi-
pals (up to $250,000 in coverage was agreed upon),
and paralyzing gas grenades (which were not
immediately available), Finally, it became evident
that Viaux did not have the organization or support
to carry out a successful coup, but might trigger
prematurely an action that would spoil the better
chance's of doing so from within the active duty
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military itself. Direct contact was suspended
and an alternate channel of emergency communi-
cation was established.
e. Eventually, the best prospects for a successful coup were
developed among the high-level military contacts. On 18 October,
General Valenzuela, who was in command of the Santiago Garrison,
advised that he, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXX were prepared to sponsor a coup on 19 October. The plan was to:
-- kidnap General Schneider;
-- have the command of the Army pass to the next
in line, General Pratts who at least was not
dogmatically opposed to a coup XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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-- most of Frei' s cabinet would resign and be replaced
by military and Carabinero members;
-- Frei would renounce the presidency and leave the
country; and,
-- a military junta would be installed.
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Indications were that Frei was aware of the main elements of this
plan as were a few cabinet members. The only assistance requested
by Valenzuela to set the plan in motion through Schneider's abduction
was several sub-machineguns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades,
and gas Masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses
(which was ready to be passed upon demand).
f. On 22 October, General Schneider was mortally wounded on
his way to work. General Pratts was appointed to command the
Army in place of Schneider. Frei made a strong statement denouncing
the assassination and declared a state of emergency; as a result
thereof, General Valenzuela assumed control of the Santiago area.
In effect, the military were in control of Chile and in an excellent
position to follow through with a successful coup irrespective of Frei's
actions or inactions. They did not probably because of the strong
reaction of Frei and the public to the Schneider affair and lack of any
positive encouragement from Frei. Their rationale is not certain at
this stage, nor, for that matter, is it certain who or what group was
ultimately responsible for Schneider's assassination. The Valenzuela
group claimed, that it was not and that all materiel passed to it is still
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in its possession unused. In any event, the opportunity for a coup
soon passed, and, Allende was easily elected by Congress on
24 October and quietly inaugurated on 3 November.
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