26 September 2000. Thanks to Michael P.
See the full 254-page report:
http://para64.org/vsb1999-en.pdf (in English, 2.4 MB)
http://para64.org/vsb1999-de.pdf (in German, 4.8MB)
[Excerpt, pp. 194-211.]
Table of Contents
I. Overview
II. Intelligence and Security Services of the Russian Federation
1. Current Situation and Tasks of the Services; Personnel Changes
2. Intelligence Targets and Methods of the Russian Intelligence Services
3. Direct Control of Intelligence Activities from Moscow
4. Legal Residencies of Russian Intelligence Services
III. Intelligence and Security Services of Other CIS Members
IV. Activities of Intelligence Services of Near East/Middle East Countries
1. Iranian Intelligence Services
2. Syrian Intelligence Services
3. Iraqi Intelligence Services
V. Activities of Far East Intelligence Services
1 Chinese Intelligence Services
2. North Korean Intelligence Services
VI. Proliferation
VII. Arrests and Convictions
_________________________________
Espionage
and Other Intelligence Activities
Accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO
As a result of the efforts aimed at achieving a durable peace order in Europe, a number of formerly political and tradecraft adversaries turned into allies. After the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the spring of 1999172), these countries have, in the meantime, entered into negotiations on their accession to the European Union (EU). Other countries -- e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia -- intend to follow suit.
Germany continues to be the preferred intelligence target
However, the end of the Cold War and the positive developments in some countries of the former Eastern Bloc must not blind anybody to the fact that, as before, Germany continues to be a preferred target of the intelligence services of a number of foreign nations. This is exemplified, for instance. by the following current intelligence:
Russia
In late July, intelligence acquired by counterespionage services led to the arrest of two German nationals -- a self-employed businessman and a diploma'd engineer -- in Lower Saxony and in Bavaria, respectively; they are accused of having provided a Russian intelligence service with documents from the defence industry sector against payment of large sums of money.
Following preliminary investigations by agencies for the Protection of the Constitution, another two German nationals were unmasked as agents; they had, for remuneration, supplied documents from their respective area of activity first to the KGB and, after its dissolution, to a Russian intelligence service. In mid-December, they were sentenced by the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal to prison terms of one year and ten months and of eight months, respectively. Execution of the sentences was suspended (on probation).
Iran
Also in July, an Iranian national was arrested in Berlin. As established by counterintelligence agencies, he is said to have spied, on behalf of an Iranian intelligence service, on Iranians living in Germany who are in opposition to the regime of their country of origin. Most of these are reported to be supporters of the organization "People's Mujahiddin of Iran" (MEK).
Syria
Following investigations by counterintelligence agencies, a Syrian national was arrested in Northern Germany in May. In October, he was finally convicted by the Hamburg Higher Regional Court of Appeal to two years' imprisonment on the charge of secret service activity as an agent for Syria; the sentence was suspended on probation.
In addition to a number of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)173), countries of the Near and Middle East (including Iran, Iraq, Syria, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), in particular, pursue intelligence activities against the Federal Republic of Germany.
Wider spectrum of counterintelligence tasks
While the intelligence interest of Russia and of other GUS Republics essentially covers the "classical" fields of espionage -- politics, the military, industry, science, and technology -- the activities of other countries are also aimed at investigating persons and at infiltrating organizations in Germany which are in opposition to the regime in the respective home country, and at the area of proliferation174).
Berlin, seat of Government
The move of diplomatic missions from the Cologne/Bonn region to the Berlin area also has an impact on the counterintelligence functional spectrum. While previously the intelligence footholds of the services of foreign nations at the official/quasi-official missions of these countries (legal residencies) were, for the major part, located in the Cologne/Bonn region, a shift to Berlin can be expected to occur in this regard. However, their move to Berlin will not have the result that in future legal residencies would be established in Berlin only. According to available hard information, the intention is to have already existing consular posts of foreign nations, which are not located in the Berlin area, and the intelligence staff employed at those posts, stay at their present locations. Moreover, after the relocation of Missions to Berlin, some countries plan to establish additional consular posts in other cities in Germany where -- as previous experience has shown -- also personnel of foreign intelligence services are employed on cover functions.
No precise estimates yet for the increase in the number of foreign intelligence personnel in Berlin
While, in the last analysis, it may be assumed that the presence of staff
members of foreign intelligence services in Berlin will increase, the ultimate
extent of this increase cannot yet be assessed.
1. Current Situation and Tasks of the Services; Personnel Changes
Firm integration in the political system
The important status and the tasks of the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation were uncontested in 1999. They are firmly embedded in the political system; no trenchant structural changes were made.
KGB as a role model
The Russian intelligence services are convinced of their qualifications and skills. The civilian services, as before, consider themselves the legitimate successors of the KGB of the former Soviet Union and thus see themselves in line with the KGB's tradition. Thus for instance, in mid-1999, on the birthday of the former KGB chief Andropov who died in 1984, flowers were laid at his grave, and tribute was paid to his contribution to the development of the Soviet state security system of that time.
Filling of important leadership posts in government and industry with intelligence service officers
Also, the fact that recently a number of top executive positions in important government agencies, in the defence industry and in government-controlled industrial undertakings and press agencies were filled from among the high ranks of the Russian intelligence services, can be seen as an indication proving that the political leadership of the Russian Federation places trust in the key personnel of the intelligence services and also credits them with political qualifications.
Russian intelligence and security services
In 1999, essentially the following intelligence and security services were available to the Russian Federation:
2. Intelligence Targets and Methods of Russian Intelligence Services
Intelligence targets essentially unchanged
The most important intelligence targets of the Russian foreign intelligence services continue to be politics, economy, science and technology, and the military complex.
In April, the chief adviser to SVR chief TRUBNIKOV, the former SVR Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr GOLUBYOV, gave his views on the tasks of intelligence services to the Russian military journal "Krasnaya Zvezda" ("Red Star"). He said that -- due to the given political situation - there may be changes in intelligence requirements and shifts of priorities.
Changing priorities and permanent tasks
Thus, the present intelligence focus was on the economic sector and on science and technology. Nevertheless, the intelligence sector had, in addition, the continuing and unchanged task of providing the Government, on a continuous basis, with information required for decision-making in all areas.
Intelligence target: industry
In late December 1998, the then press spokesman of the SVR, Yuri KOBALADSE, said to the Russian news agency "ITAR TASS" -- with regard to economy as an intelligence target -- that while the economic sector had become a preferred field of action of the Russian secret services, this had not been to the detriment of the other work priorities of the SVR.
In February, the new head of the SVR's public information office, Boris LABUSOV, also commented, in an interview with the government mouthpiece "Izvestiya", on SVR activities in the economic sector:
"The SVR is called upon to create favourable conditions abroad for asserting and enforcing Russian economic interests and to draw foreign investors to our country."
Intelligence target: NATO
Particular priority has been given by the Russian foreign-intelligence services to NATO as an intelligence target. The reasons for this were the admission of several countries of the Warsaw Pact to membership of the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO's activities in connection with the Kosovo conflict. The Russian intelligence interest focused on NATO's strategy for resolving the Balkan crisis; the differing views of NATO partner states on ending the Kosovo conflict; German participation in NATO operations, and the resultant tension within the German government coalition; and the respective positions taken by the Federal Government at NATO summits.
Intelligence collection methods
The Russian intelligence services procure information both from open sources and covertly - i.e. by clandestine collection - and, in addition to human sources, also use technical means. For overt collection, they make use, inter alia, of specialized information centres, libraries, databases, the Internet, or they go to fairs and exhibitions, lectures and symposiums so as to obtain information from conversations with unwitting sources.
Use of human sources
For clandestine collection -- where the fact that the contact is exploited for eliciting information is to be concealed -- use is often made of intelligence service officers who work, on cover jobs, with Russian diplomatic or consular missions, correspondents' offices of Russian media, state-controlled branch offices of firms, or companies with Russian equity participation or majority shareholding. To cover up their true intentions, these intelligence service officers will present a cover story to their target persons. In addition, many uncovered former or presumed former staff members of Russian intelligence services try to obtain entry visas for Germany -- allegedly for private or business reasons. It can be inferred from available intelligence that at least part of these visa requests are based on intelligence motives. Also, Russian services recruit persons in Germany as agents who are to procure intelligence, and employ so-called illegals (deep-cover agents) who, using a false identity, are infiltrated into Germany to carry out intelligence assignments.
Use of technical aids
In investigation by means of covert spy activities, the use of technical means also plays a role, e.g. intelligence collection through radio-electronic and communication-electronic installations. Obviously, the GRU is particularly active in this field. This can also be inferred from statements by the Russian Chief of Staff KVASHNIN who described the GRU as the most secret of Russian intelligence services which uses satellites, spy ships (intelligence collection ships), aircraft and electronic monitoring/interception devices for intelligence collection. At the same time, however, he pointed out that the GRU agents continued to be the most important sources of the Service since information provided by people could be assessed as to their intrinsic value and authenticity in the most reliable and fastest way.
3. Direct Control of Intelligence Activities from Moscow
"Home advantages" on the national territory
Direct control, also on Russian territory, of intelligence activities from the services' headquarters in Moscow provides the Russian intelligence services with an excellent opportunity for obtaining information of intelligence relevance without having to take any risks.
The central headquarters of the Russian intelligence services directly handles agents whose control in their countries of assignment, e.g. through legal residencies, does not appear necessary. This applies, in particular, to so-called illegals (deep-cover agents) who might be unnecessarily put at risk by any contacts made in connection with agent handling in the country of assignment
Moreover, on their own territory, the Russian intelligence services can observe and monitor persons of interest to them, who stay in Russia on official business or for private reasons. Thus, for instance, the interest of the FSB is focused mainly on the staff of German diplomatic and consular missions in Russia, but also on individuals who, in their firms, have promising access to information or who, as businessmen, can procure products of intelligence interest. Since the Russian intelligence services are in an advantageous position as regards the targeted category of persons, they can take a focused approach to look for opportunities for recruitment approaches and single out individuals who appear suitable. It is in this area, in particular, that the Russian services do not mandatorily have to disclose their intelligence intentions but, instead, can veil their activities and develop them under the guise of business contacts.
Espionage in the field of basic scientific research
In mid-December, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced a former employee of a company doing basic research, to imprisonment for one year and ten months (suspended on probation) for having engaged in secret service activity as an agent for the KGB and, after its dissolution, for a Russian intelligence service. The accused had been recruited in the early 1980s by a member of the Soviet Consulate-General in Hamburg. In the subsequent years, he passed material from his field of activity on to his handler at operational meetings in what then was East-Berlin, and later on in Prague.
A female codefendant, a former employee of a scientific institute for microstructure technology, was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment (suspended on Probation); since 1989, she had Provided material, from her workplace and from areas to which she had access, to that agent although she was aware of his intelligence affiliation. The agent passed that material on to the Soviet, subsequently Russian, intelligence service and paid her for the information Provided. In 1993, at a clandestine meeting in Prague, he brought her to the Russian intelligence service which continued to handle her as an agent until 1995.
4. Legal Residencies of Russian Intelligence Services
Unchanged presence of large numbers of Russian intelligence service staff in Germany
As established by the counterintelligence agencies, the Russian intelligence services continue to use the official and quasi-official missions of their country in Germany as intelligence footholds (legal residencies). Large numbers of intelligence staff are employed on cover posts at these government offices of Russia on German territory. For the major part, they have diplomatic status and thus enjoy special rights, especially diplomatic immunity. Although a markedly larger number of intelligence service personnel have been assigned to legal residencies in Germany than to most other European countries, the Russian side endeavours to dispatch additional intelligence service officers to their diplomatic representations in Germany and in this way attempts to provide for even greater augmentation of the already existing legal residencies. The high percentage of cover positions at the Russian diplomatic representations in Germany underlines both the importance attached to legal residencies in the intelligence concept of Russian secret services and the significance of Germany as a target country.
Embassy's move to Berlin
Parts of the Russian Embassy moved from Bonn to Berlin already in the course of 1999 and were co-located there with its previous Berlin field office to form the new Russian Embassy (RE). However, with the establishment of a Russian Consulate General (RCG), Bonn continues to be a diplomatic site.
Cover posts give access to target persons
Thanks to their supposed (official) functions, the legal residents serving with Russian diplomatic representations enjoy excellent conditions which enable them to perform their intelligence tasks or greatly facilitate performance of such tasks. Their diplomatic status and cover positions provide them with many and various opportunities for getting to know target persons of intelligence interest from all priority subject areas as well as representatives of public authorities, journalists or diplomats from other countries. Without arousing any suspicion, these residency members can then, through open conversations, elicit information from their (unwitting) contact persons on their professional scope for obtaining access and on their private backgrounds. In this way, intelligence service officers who give their interlocutors the wrong impression of having a mere exchange of views, will receive first hand information, e.g. on development trends in industry or in the research and technology sectors and on opinion-forming processes in the fields of politics and security policy. Findings of intelligence relevance can then be selected from the overall information thus obtained.
Change from overt to clandestine contacts
Often, therefore, there is no need for residency members, in order to obtain information, to burden existing contacts with a conspiratorial manner which would be perceived by the interlocutor as an intelligence-oriented approach. However, the counterintelligence agencies have information indicating that often residency officers, despite their opportunities for overt intelligence collection, later will change over to clandestine continuation of contacts which they initially conducted in an overt fashion.
Major tasks of residencies
This approach is patterned on "classical residency work", and its ultimate
objective is to approach, recruit and, if and where possible, handle new
agents. In addition, one of the major tasks of legal residencies - apart
from overt intelligence collection - is to support already existing intelligence
contacts which, for instance, are controlled by the services' headquarters
in Moscow. Cases in point are, for example, depositing and removal of mail
from so called dead letter drops (DLD's) which have been set up as caches
(e.g. in the ground) to exchange material or transfer money between the agents
and the controlling office. For DLD operations, legal residency members in
instances even involve family members in intelligence activities as a cover-up.
Since DLD's, for security reasons, can be used only for a short period of
time and will then be replaced by new caches in other places, one of the
basic tasks of residency members who are operatives, when travelling, is
to be on the look-out for suitable caches.
New services in the other CIS Republics
Apart from the Russian Federation (RF), also the other CIS Republics have their own intelligence and security services which, as a rule, have developed from the earlier structures of what formerly was the Soviet KGB. By and by, the Russians still active in these newly established services have, at varying rates, been replaced by nationals of the respective Republic.
Close co-operation with Russia
The services of the other CIS Republics closely co-operate, in particular, with the Russian intelligence services and, through this co-operation which is laid down in a number of agreements, fully utilize the existing opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of their work. For instance, a data exchange agreed by the CIS services covers mutual information on entries and exits of persons of intelligence interest. This may also concern Western businessmen and firms' representatives also engaged in Eastern Europe business relations, whose data -- obtained, for instance, from visa applications -- can be used for operative activities.
Co-operation with the Russian intelligence services also covers support measures, e.g. assistance given by Russia in the fields of technical equipment and training of staff. In addition, there are exchanges of official representatives. For instance, a high-ranking member of the Belorussian service is accredited as an official representative to the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB (Federal Security Service). Since the co-operation practised so far obviously yields positive results for the services of the CIS Republics, efforts were made in 1999 to intensify such co-operation. To this end, the heads of the Russian FSB and of the Ukrainian SBU in August signed a number of agreements designed to achieve even closer co-operation.
Situation of services in non-Russian republics
The services of the CIS Republics other than Russia seem, for the major part, to have overcome the difficult phase of consolidation. This is borne out by what the former head of the Russian security service FSB, KOVALYOV, said about the Ukrainian service SBU:
"The SBU is one of the most efficient services. We have very good co-operation with them; especially in countering the intelligence activities of foreign services operating on the territories of Russia and of the Ukraine. Prospects are that the SBU might be among the elite services in 10 to 15 years from now."
Different tasking of the services in the non-Russian CIS Republics
The assignment of specific tasks to the services in the non-Russian CIS Republics is laid down in the various -- and quite different -- national legal provisions.
Most of the non-Russian CIS Republics only maintain a domestic intelligence service responsible for counterintelligence and security. As a rule, these services have an intelligence collection component only to the extent that they monitor diplomatic or consular missions of foreign nations in their country and try to elicit intelligence from members of those missions or to recruit staff members as agents.
But various services of non-Russian CIS Republics also have their country's diplomatic or consular missions abroad included in the services' responsibilities and station their staff members at those missions.
Other non-Russian CIS Republics have, in addition to domestic
counterintelligence, explicitly assigned statutory responsibilities regarding
foreign intelligence to their services. Examples are the Ukrainian Act on
the Security Service and the Belorussian Act on the Work of State Security
Organs. Both Republics have an autonomous military foreign-intelligence service
subordinate to the respective Ministry of Defence.
Also, the services of several Near/Middle East countries continue to pursue intelligence activities in, and against, Germany. Their intelligence interest covers the classical areas of espionage - politics, the military, industry, science and technology - and, to a particular extent, infiltration of, and spying on, organizations or persons in Germany which/who are in opposition to the government of their respective country of origin. In order to achieve these ends, they are also prepared to use force which may even include acts of (state-sponsored) terrorism. Also, they are interested in the subject of proliferation.
1. Iranian Intelligence Services
Priority aim: spying on regime opponents
As before, the priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence Service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Iranian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violent approach taken until the mid-1990s -- inter alia, attempts on the lives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign countries, including Germany175) - VEVAK activities were, as in the previous years, focused on the political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime activities. The "People's Mujahiddin of Iran" (MEK) and its political arm which is active worldwide, the "Nationaler Widerstandsrat Iran" (NWRI - "National Resistance Council of Iran"), continued to be the focus of the intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service.
"Culture Associations" and anti-MEK publications
In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makes use of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organizations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance with Iran's interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization.
Severe harassment as a lever
For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also recruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals. Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians to Iran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK and, in instances, under threat of massive harassment against themselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operate with the intelligence service.
On 24 November, the trial began in the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal against a 36-year old Iranian national living in Germany for a number of years and arrested in Berlin in July. He was under strong suspicion to have spied, as a supposed MEK supporter, on leading functionaries and activities of that organization in Germany on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service*).
____________________
* On 19 January 2000, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the accused to 18 months' imprisonment (suspended on probation) and to a fine of 5,000 DM.
2. Syrian Intelligence Services
Also the Syrian intelligence services continued their intelligence collection activities in Germany.
Residencies control the source and informant network
For the development and control of the source and informant network set up to this end, they run undercover bases established at the official and quasi-official missions (legal residencies). The latter include the Syrian Embassy.
The main tasks of the Syrian intelligence service officers operating from these missions under diplomatic cover are intelligence collection, and spying on and monitoring of compatriots living in Germany who are critical of the political system in their home country. The primary observation sites of Syrian secret services include the Islamic Centres and mosques whose frequenters are considered to be among the political opponents. With the help of sources and informants, the services attempt to gather information on the living conditions, contacts and political aims of these persons so as to induce them, by using the information thus obtained, to abandon their dissident stance.
A case in point concerns a 43-year old Syrian who, after his asylum application had been turned down in August 1995, as a walk in volunteered co-operation with the Syrian intelligence service. Since then, he had maintained intensive intelligence contacts with the resident of the civilian Syrian intelligence service who held the cover post of attach6 in the Consular Division of the Syrian Embassy. In this context, he procured, and delivered to his handler, personal data on a large number of ethnic Syrians and Lebanese living in Germany. For this purpose, he increasingly made use of clandestine methods and means.
This intelligence contact ended in May 1999 when he was arrested. In early October, he was sentenced by the Hamburg OLG (Higher Regional Court of Appeal) to two years' imprisonment (suspended on probation) on the charge of intelligence activity on behalf of Syria.
At the instigation of the Foreign Office, the agent controller of the Syrian Embassy left the Federal Republic of Germany on 24 July.
3. Iraqi Intelligence Services
Residency staff members and alleged asylum seekers spy on dissidents
Spying on, and infiltration of, Iraqi dissidents living abroad continue to be the priority intelligence targets of the Iraqi intelligence service in Germany. Its primary interest is in obtaining information on the whereabouts, in other countries, of specific critics of the regime, officers having fled the country or other persons cleared for access to classified information. In addition to undercover intelligence-service staffers at the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn, it increasingly uses agents who, posing as asylum seekers, attempt to obtain information on the German asylum procedure and to infiltrate Iraqi dissident groups. For facilitation of entry, the Iraqi intelligence services make use of professional clandestine immigration rings which, against payment, smuggle the agents concerned from a neighbouring country to Germany.
As regards the direction and control of agents who have already been active
for some time -- so-called 'asset sources' -- the Iraqi services increasingly
channel their contacts with them either directly through the services'
headquarters in Baghdad or through a residency in a neighbouring country
of the German area of operations.
Intelligence services from a number of Far East countries also continue to pursue intelligence activities in Germany. In this regard, the People's Republics of China and of North Korea are the primary countries involved.
1. Chinese Intelligence Services
Intelligence services are to contribute to the achievement of China's envisaged great-power position
The intensive espionage activities of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to be based on the objective of drawing level with leading industrial nations economically and in terms of armaments technology In the political area, too, the PRC, as an emerging great power, wants to obtain all essential information. To this end, with major staffing and funding inputs, it has, for a number of years, been operating six intelligence and security services, of which primarily the "Ministry for State Security" (civilian intelligence service - MSS) and the "Main Directorate 'Intelligence' of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army" (military intelligence service - MID) are responsible for foreign-intelligence tasks.
Use of intelligence service staff as members of official missions and business enterprises
The primary base of Chinese espionage activities are the legal residencies at the diplomatic and consular missions where intelligence service officers work under cover. In addition, however, use also is made, for intelligence purposes, of airlines, import/export firms, press agencies, Chinese companies and German/Chinese joint-venture firms by Chinese intelligence collection agencies, where intelligence staffers are also employed as undercover agents.
"Vacuum-cleaning principle" and long-term source recruitment
The aim of the operational activity of the Chinese services -- which, as available intelligence indicates, is often based on a recruitment long-term concept -- is to elicit information from interesting people, to collect all information overtly available -- "vacuum-cleaning principle" -- and, ultimately, also to recruit sources. In this regard, the Chinese services traditionally take an ethnic approach. Primarily, they will recruit Chinese people living abroad, mostly students, scientists or businessmen.
2. North Korean Intelligence Services
On account of its chronically straitened financial condition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PRK) has, since 1998, closed down fourteen of its missions abroad and, as a result, has significantly scaled down its activities regarding procurement of goods of all types.
The "Office" has the largest staff of all PRK representations in Europe
While -- as before -- the PRK does not have diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, it has an interest group established in Berlin, the Office for the Protection of the Interests of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, for which the PR of China provides diplomatic protection. This interest-representing office also in 1999 had the largest staff of all North Korean representations in Europe -- which goes to show Germany's importance as regards the North Korean procurement efforts in Germany and Europe, especially with regard to goods subject to export controls.
Existence of residencies at the "Office" confirmed by defectors
In early 1999, it was confirmed once more that North Korea operates intelligence residencies at its Protection of Interests Office in Berlin:
On January 13, a member of the North Korean intelligence service "Unification Front Department"176) (UFD) who was accredited as Assistant Secretary at the Berlin "Office", and his wife entrusted themselves to the protection of the United States of America.
During the subsequent questioning, the defector confirmed that there had been such activities.
Procurement methods
As regards North Korea's intelligence collection methods, there were again efforts at covert transfer of goods subject to export controls via a third country to North Korea by means of manipulated declarations regarding the ultimate user or by their export via a third country.
Unchanged high priority is given to the procurement of goods for the Second
Economic Committee and/or for the People's Armed
Forces177.
Unabated Interest in WMD and the related carrier technology
Various countries, primarily in the Near/Middle and Far East -- e.g. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea -- for varying motives endeavour to provide their armed forces with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and with the required long-range vectors. India and Pakistan are at enmity with each other. Iran strives for hegemony in the Gulf region; other countries simply wish to avoid being relegated to the background in military matters. All of them, however, share the unabated strong interest in owning such weapons of mass destruction and the related launching systems.
Already decades ago, with the enactment of the War Weapons Control Act (KWKG) and of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG), the Federal Republic of Germany has provided instruments designed to prevent such countries from making use of German state-of-the-art technology (high tech) when implementing their armaments programmes. Both Acts are aligned to established international legal bases which are aimed at effectively countering proliferation.
Adjustment to strict export controls
However, countries interested in weapons of mass destruction have in the meantime adjusted to the strict European export control mechanisms. Therefore, it is to be expected that their purchases from Western markets will in future be confined to urgently needed material that cannot, in the desired quality, be obtained elsewhere. Also, the methods used in the purchase and transport of, and payment for, goods of proliferation relevance are getting more and more clandestine. Moreover, it is to be expected that the countries directing their efforts at proliferation will in the near future co-operate even more closely and provide mutual support. North Korea, for instance, has for some time presented itself as a co-operation partner in the development of carrier rockets. Iran is making efforts to build up its own industries for rocketry-related production -- also with the aim of subsequently selling these products at a profit. For projects, the implementation of which exceeds a country's capabilities, assistance can be provided also by other countries, such as a number of republics of the former USSR, but also by the PR of China.
Co-operation among the agencies involved in fighting proliferation
Proliferation can be fought effectively only by means of close cooperation among all agencies involved in anti-proliferation activities. These include the [Federal and Land] Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA), the Federal Exports Office (BAFA) and the Federal Office of Criminal Police (BKA). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution endeavours to identify clandestine procurement methods also through exchanges of information with the intelligence services of foreign countries. Due to the narrow limitation of their statutory anti-proliferation responsibilities, involvement of the agencies for the Protection of the Constitution is possible to a limited extent only.
Conviction for treason on a proliferation charge
The problems related to proliferation in mid-1999 once more was increasingly
in the centre of public attention. On June 29, the Bavarian Higher Regional
Court of Appeal (BayObLG) sentenced a German entrepreneur to five years'
imprisonment and to a fine of 60,000 DM on the charge of treason (against
the external security of the State). The convicted person had in 1989 sold,
to Iraq, design drawings for the construction of a gas ultracentrifugation
plant required for uranium enrichment. This enabled Iraq to produce weapons-grade
uranium.
In 1999, the Federal Public Prosecutor General initiated 63 preliminary investigations for suspected intelligence agent activities. Criminal prosecution authorities detained five persons, and arrest warrants were issued against all of them. Of these persons, one had worked for a Syrian intelligence service, one is said to have worked for an Iranian service, and two of them are charged with having acted on behalf of a Russian service. The fifth detainee had, until late 1989, been a staffer of the "Ministry of State Security" (MfS, or "Stasi") of the former GDR. He is accused of having had contacts with a Russian intelligence service since the early 1990s.
During the same period, courts in the Federal Republic of Germany sentenced
ten suspects for criminal offences constituting "treason [against the external
security of the State] and endangerment of external security" (Penal Code,
ss. 93 - 101a), of whom one was sentenced on a charge of treason.
Notes
172) The instruments of accession of the three States were deposited with the Truman Library of the American town of Independence (U.S. State of Missouri) on 12 March 1999. This library also is the depository of the NATO Treaty and Agreements and of the instruments of accession of the other NATO members. Independence is the home town of Harry S. Truman who, at the time of NATO's establishment, was the President of the United States.
173) The CIS consists of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
174) "Proliferation" is defined as the transfer, to an additional number of countries, of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, and of the carrier systems required to deliver these weapons.
175) A case in point is the attack on the Berlin restaurant "Mykonos" on 17 September 1992 when four exiled Iranian-Kurdish politicians were shot to death. On 10 April 1997, after a trial of more than three and a half years' duration, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the two main defendants on trial to life imprisonment.
176) In German: "Abteilung Wiedervereinigungsfront" ["Division Reunification Front").
177) The "Second Economic Committee", which is directly responsible to the Central Committee of the North Korean "Party of the Working Classes", coordinates and controls, in close co-ordination with the organizations of the People's Armed Forces, the measures to meet the requirements of the entire North Korean defence industry -- including the products and information required for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles. The "2nd Economic Commission" also has responsibility for the funding of these programmes which is achieved, inter alia, by exports of a broad range of goods of all types.
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