11 June 2001
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/fr-cont.html
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[Federal Register: June 11, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 112)]
[Notices]
[Page 31362-31363]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr11jn01-116]
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Alert and Notification
AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: FEMA is considering whether it should continue to require
State and local emergency management agencies to characterize and to
identify the appropriate Emergency Classification Level (ECL) when
initially notifying the public of incidents at nuclear power plants. We
also are considering whether to leave to the discretion of State and
local emergency management agencies what, if anything, to say about
protective action recommendations. We invite your views on these issues
and on any other concerns that you may have about the content of
initial notification messages.
DATES: Please submit your comments on or before August 10, 2001.
ADDRESSES: Please submit your comments to the Rules Docket Clerk,
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500
C Street, SW., room 840, Washington, DC 20472, or send them by e-mail
to rules@fema.gov. Please refer to the ``REP Alert and Notification
Notice'' in the subject line of your e-mail or comment letter.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa Quinn, Chief, Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Branch, Chemical and Radiological Preparedness
Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20472; (202) 646-3664, or (e-mail)
vanessa.quinn@fema.gov, or Nathan S. Bergerbest, Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW.,
Washington DC 20472, (202) 646-2685, or (e-mail)
nathan.bergerbest@fema.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), through its Radiological Emergency Preparedness program (REP),
reviews the emergency response plans of Offsite Response Organizations
(OROs), which are the State and local emergency management agencies
responsible for responding to incidents involving nuclear power plant.
FEMA also conducts exercises to test the capability of OROs to perform
in accordance with the provisions of their plans. These activities are
undertaken pursuant to FEMA regulations, which appear in Part 350 of
Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations and a Memorandum of
Understanding between FEMA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission which
appears at 44 CFR Part 353, Appendix A.
FEMA recently completed a strategic review of the REP program. In
the course of the strategic review, questions were raised regarding
what information should be included in the initial message informing
the public that an incident has occurred at a nuclear power plant.
FEMA requires that OROs demonstrate their ability to communicate
effectively with the public following an incident at a nuclear power
plant. We address how this initial notification should be given to the
public in several guidance documents. These include the joint FEMA/
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/REP-1, Rev. 1), dated November 1980
\1\, FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual (REP-
14), dated September, 1991 \2\, FEMA's Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology (REP-15), dated September,
1991 \3\ and FEMA's Guidance for Providing Emergency Information and
Instructions to the Public for Radiological Emergencies Using the New
Emergency Alert System (EAS), dated February 2, 1999.\4\
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\1\ Planning Standard F, evaluation criterion E.7
\2\ Objective 11.
\3\ Objective 11.
\4\ Attachment ``B'' to Memorandum for FEMA Regional Directors
and Regional Assistance Committee Chairs from Kay C. Goss, Associate
Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercises. The attachment
can be viewed at htpp://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm. (viewed May
30, 2001). This document is referred to as the ``February 2, 1999
Guidance'').
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FEMA regulations require that planning standards and evaluation
criteria in NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1,\5\ and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's emergency planning rule \6\ are to be used in
evaluating ORO plans and capabilities. While both the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's emergency planning rule and NUREG-0654/FEMA
REP-1, Rev. 1 contemplate that initial notification messages will be
made in a timely manner, neither prescribe the content of the initial
notification message.\7\
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\5\ 44 CFR 350.5.
\6\ 10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix E) and Part 70.
\7\ Planning Standard ``E'', evaluation criteria E.7 provides
that ``Each [ORO] shall provide written messages intended for the
public, consistent with the [nuclear power plant's classification
scheme. In particular, draft messages to the public giving
instructions with regard to specific protective actions to be taken
by occupants of affected areas shall be prepared and included as
part of the State and local [emergency response plans]. Such
messages should include the appropriate aspects of sheltering, ad
hoc respiratory protection, e.g., handkerchief over mouth, thyroid
blocking or evacuation * * *''
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[[Page 31363]]
REP-14 Objectives 11.1 \8\ and 11.2, interpret NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-
1, Rev. 1 as it pertains to notification messages. Objective 11.1
requires that public notifications reflect official decisions made by
responsible public safety agencies. Objective 11.2 requires that the
information in these messages be understandable to the public and
facilitate initiation of recommended protective actions by the public.
Notwithstanding that Objective 11.2 seems to favor non-technical
language, the explanatory material for Objective 11.2 suggests that
``the plant status should be described by reference to both the
potential for or actual release of radioactivity and the ECL,'' \9\
even if no protective action recommendation is made.
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\8\ REP-14 Objective 11.1 refers to Objective 11, Demonstration
Criterion 1. This classification system will be used throughout this
notice.
\9\ See, Page D.11-2 of REP-14 (September 1991).
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On February 2, 1999, the Associate Director of FEMA for
Preparedness, Training & Exercises issued guidance indicating that
initial messages transmitted through the EAS must contain the following
five items:
1. Identification of the State or local government organization and
the official with the authority for providing the EAS alert and
message.
2. Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant,
appropriate [ECL] and current status of radiological conditions at the
plant (e.g., no release, potential for release or actual release and
wind direction);
3. Call attention to REP-specific emergency information (e.g.,
brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general
public during an emergency.
4. Call attention to the possibility that a protective action may
need to be taken by affected populations; and
5. Include a closing statement asking the affected and potentially
affected population to stay tuned to [the] EAS station(s) for
additional information. This additional information, when necessary
could be in the form of a ``Special News Broadcast'' that would, as
soon as possible, follow the EAS message.
FEMA is considering a proposal that emerged from the strategic
review of the REP program, which would require the following items in
the initial message:
1. The information presently required in points 1, 3 and 5 of the
February 2, 1999 guidance;
2. Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a
statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant, in place of
the information required by point 2 of the February 2, 1999 guidance;
3. Deletion of point 4 of the February 2, 1999 guidance.
The effect of this proposal would be to no longer require that OROs
refer to the ECL, characterize the nature of the emergency situation in
the initial message or warn the public that a protective action
recommendation may be subsequently issued in the initial message.
The proposal does not prevent the ORO from including this
information in the initial message, at its discretion, or from using
the limited time available in the initial message \10\ to provide other
information that supports public health and safety objectives. The
proposal would not require that the ORO transmit a protective action
recommendation in the initial message if none has been formulated or
none is immediately warranted. Nor would the proposal in anyway affect
the OROs obligation to provide candid information, including a plain
language explanation of the situation at the plant, including the ECL,
to the news media. It addresses only what information must be
disseminated in the initial notification message.
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\10\ Initial messages using the EAS may be limited to two
minutes in length. See, Background on the Emergency Alert System
(EAS) at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm (viewed June 4,
2001).
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FEMA believes that there may be merit in such a proposal. Some OROs
have expressed concern that despite public education campaigns, people
outside of the radiological emergency preparedness community are not
likely to understand or recall the meaning of an ECL. Concern also has
been expressed that the brief characterization of an incident, in a
two-minute initial notification, might lead people to take action on
their own, prior to and perhaps in conflict with the OROs announced
protective action recommendation. We are interested in hearing your
views.
Coordination With the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
FEMA conducts the REP program in part under authority of a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The
text of the current Memorandum of Understanding is published in
Appendix A to 44 CFR Part 353. Section E of the Memorandum of
Understanding provides that the each agency will provide an opportunity
for the other agency to review and comment on emergency planning and
preparedness guidance (including interpretations of agreed joint
guidance) prior to adoption as formal agency guidance. FEMA has
transmitted a copy of this document to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and requested their comments no later than the date upon
which the public comment period closes.
Dated: June 5, 2001.
Archibald C. Reid III,
Acting Executive Associate Director, Preparedness, Training & Exercises
Directorate.
[FR Doc. 01-14638 Filed 6-8-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-06-P
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[Federal Register: June 11, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 112)]
[Notices]
[Page 31341-31362]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr11jn01-115]
[[Page 31341]]
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Part IV
Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology;
Alert and Notification; Notices
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation
Methodology
AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) proposes to
revise the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual (REP-14)
dated September 1991 by adopting the six Exercise Evaluation Areas
described in this notice in place of the 33 REP-14 Objectives that are
set out in Section D of REP-14. If the Exercise Evaluation Areas
described in this notice are adopted, Radiological Emergency
Preparedness exercises conducted pursuant to 44 CFR 350.9 will be
evaluated against the criteria set out in this notice. The proposed
frequency with which each of the proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas
will be evaluated is also contained in this notice. Adoption of the
proposed changes to REP-14 will render a companion manual entitled
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology
(REP-15) dated September 1991 obsolete. If the proposed changes to REP-
14 are adopted, FEMA plans to rescind REP-15 and utilize a new form
entitled ``Evaluation Module'' to document evaluations. We invite
comments on the Exercise Evaluation Areas and the proposed frequency
for exercising each area and the Evaluation Module form.
DATES: FEMA must receive comments on or before August 10, 2001.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments to the Rules Docket Clerk,
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500
C Street, SW., room 840, Washington, DC 20472, or send them by e-mail
to rules@fema.gov. Please reference ``REP Exercise Evaluation Areas''
in the subject line of your e-mail or comment letter.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa Quinn, Chief, Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Branch, Chemical and Radiological Preparedness
Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20472; telephone: (202) 646-3664, or e-mail:
vanessa.quinn@fema.gov, or Nathan S. Bergerbest, Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20472, telephone: (202) 646-2685, or (e-mail)
nathan.bergerbest@fema.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) proposes to revise the Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Exercise Manual (REP-14) \1\ dated September 1991 by adopting the six
Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice and deleting the
thirty-three REP-14 Objectives that are set out in Section D of REP-14.
If the Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice are adopted,
Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercises conducted pursuant to 44
CFR 350.9 will be evaluated against the criteria set out in this
notice.\2\
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\1\ FEMA is planning to consolidate REP-14 into a new reference
book. The contents of REP-14, including any changes resulting from
final action on the issues discussed in this notice, will be
incorporated into this new reference book. At this time, we are
proposing to revise not withdraw REP-14. We expect to formally
withdraw REP-14 when the new reference book is available.
\2\ Adoption of the proposed Evaluation Criteria will also
render much of Sec. C.2 of REP-14 obsolete. Pages C.2-3 and C.2-4 of
REP-14 speak to the frequency with which particular REP-14
objectives will be exercised. FEMA proposes to adopt the Federal
Exercise Evaluation Matrix, which appears later in this document as
Table 2 in place of the exercise objective groupings which appear on
Pages C.2-3 and C-2.4 of REP-14.
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Adoption of the proposed changes to REP-14 will render a companion
manual entitled Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation
Methodology (REP-15) dated September 1991 obsolete. If the proposed
changes to REP-14 are adopted, FEMA plans to rescind REP-15 and utilize
a new form entitled ``Evaluation Module'' to document evaluation
activities. The rescission will be effective on the same date upon
which the changes to REP-14 are effective and the Evaluation Module
form will be effective on the same date. We invite comments on the
Exercise Evaluation Areas and the proposed frequency for exercising
each area and the Evaluation Module form.
Background on Exercise Evaluation
FEMA, through its Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)
conducts exercises to evaluate the ability of Offsite Response
Organizations (OROs) to respond to an emergency involving a commercial
nuclear power plant. These exercises are conducted in accordance with
FEMA regulations, which appear in 44 CFR part 350.\3\ Although
Sec. 350.9 is the portion of Part 350 that primarily speaks to
exercises, it does not specifically address the standards under which
exercises are to be conducted and performance is to be evaluated. These
standards are addressed in 44 CFR 350.5(a) which states:
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\3\ The preamble to 44 CFR part 350 is published at 48 FR 44332
(September 28, 1983).
Section 50.47 of [the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's] Emergency
Planning Rule [10 CFR Parts 50 [Appendix E] and 70 as amended and
the joint FEMA-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Criteria for
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plants and
Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/FEMA
REP-1, Rev 1 November, 1980) * * * are to be used in reviewing,
evaluating and approving State and local radiological emergency
plans and preparedness and in making any findings and determinations
with respect to the adequacy of the plans and the capabilities of
state and local government to implement them. Both the planning and
preparedness standards and related criteria contained in NUREG-0654/
FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 are to be used by FEMA and the [Nuclear
Regulatory Commission] in reviewing and evaluating State and local
government radiological emergency plans and preparedness.\4\
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\4\ See also, 44 CFR 350.13(a) which states in relevant part
``The basis upon which [FEMA] makes the determination for withdrawal
of approval [of a State or local radiological emergency plan] is the
same basis used in reviewing plans and exercises, i.e. the planning
standards and related criteria in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.''
Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 addresses the
conduct of exercises. The Planning Standard states that ``Periodic
exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of
emergency response capabilities * * * and deficiencies identified as a
result of exercises * * * are (will be) corrected.'' Evaluation
criterion 1.a defines an exercise as ``an event that tests the
integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements
existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations.''
The Planning Standard N criteria contain several requirements for
exercises. All exercises must simulate an emergency that results in
offsite radiological emergency releases, which would require response
by offsite authorities. Scenarios should be varied from year to year
and conducted under various weather conditions; some exercises or
drills should be unannounced.\5\ In other respects, the Planning
Standard N criteria contemplate that exercises will be conducted as set
forth in Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA rules and in exercise
evaluation guidance.\6\
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\5\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a and 1.b
\6\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a (rules)
and 3 (exercise evaluation guidance).
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In September 1991, FEMA published the current exercise evaluation
guidance, which is REP-14. REP-14
[[Page 31343]]
established a series of 33 objectives (REP-14 Objectives) that
interpret and apply the guidance contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1,
Rev. 1. A companion document, REP-15 contained a series of forms and
checklists keyed to the 33 REP-14 Objectives for use by exercise
evaluators in documenting performance. FEMA circulated both documents
for public comment.\7\
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\7\ On March 27, 1991, FEMA noticed the availability for REP-14
and REP-15 for public comment in the Federal Register [56 FR 12734].
It responded to public comments in a third publication, REP-18. See,
57 FR 4880 (February 10, 1992) corrected by 57 FR 10956 (March 31,
1992).
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REP-14 also established the frequency with which each of the
objectives would be demonstrated in exercises. The 33 REP-14 Objectives
were divided into three groups. Thirteen objectives in the first group
would need to be demonstrated in every exercise. Nine objectives in the
second group should be demonstrated in every exercise by some but not
all responding organizations as the scenario dictates, provided that
all responding organizations must demonstrate the objective once every
six years. Another eleven objectives must be demonstrated once every
six years.\8\
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\8\ See, REP-14, pages C-2.3 to C-2.4.
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Strategic Review Process
In June 1996, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency initiated a strategic review of the REP Program. This review was
announced in the Federal Register in June 1996 and suggestions for
improvement in the REP Program were solicited from the public. The
respondents raised 180 issues. Seventy comments specifically addressed
the conduct of exercises. Many commenters suggested that FEMA make
exercise evaluation criteria outcome-based and less prescriptive. These
commenters, representing States, local governments, and industry,
suggested that evaluations should stress successful completion of basic
health and safety objectives, with the specifics of accomplishing this
left up to the OROs.
The comments were turned over to a Strategic Review Steering
Committee for review.\9\ Due to the large number of comments received
on the conduct of exercises, the Strategic Review Steering Committee
commissioned a concept paper on exercise streamlining. The concept
paper was released to the public \10\ and comments were received at
stakeholder meetings in St. Louis, San Francisco and Washington DC in
1997.\11\
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\9\ The Strategic Review Steering Committee was composed of
federal employees from FEMA headquarters, FEMA regional offices and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
\10\ The concept paper can be reviewed at http://www.fema.gov/
pte/rep/exercise.htm (viewed on May 22, 2001).
\11\ The transcripts of the three public meetings can be
reviewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/trans.htm (viewed on May 22,
2001).
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The concept paper identified several key issues for further
consideration.
REP-14 and REP-15 should be revised to support a ``results
oriented'' exercise evaluation process.
REP exercises should concentrate on radiological issues.
REP-14 and REP-15 could be streamlined by combining
similar objectives and points of review without harming the evaluation
process.
REP-14 and REP-15 are out of date due to changes in
federal regulations, guidance and terminology.
The required demonstration frequency of objectives should
be reevaluated. Some objectives should be demonstrated more frequently
and others less frequently.\12\
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\12\ FEMA is proposing to address each of these issues through
the changes described in this notice. Other issues identified in the
concept paper will not be addressed through this notice. The concept
paper observed that some aspects of radiological emergency
preparedness can be demonstrated separate and apart from the
exercise. It suggested that FEMA should provide guidance on when
``out of sequence'' demonstrations are permissible. FEMA has issued
a policy statement on this issue which was made effective October 1,
1999. The policy statement may be viewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/
rep/fnlpl-3.htm (viewed May 30, 2001). The concept paper also
observed that some aspects of radiological emergency preparedness
are satisfactorily demonstrated by actual responses to disasters and
emergencies or through other exercises in which OROs participate and
credit should be given for demonstrated performance outside of a REP
exercise. FEMA is still considering this issue. The concept paper
suggested that FEMA should explore alternative approaches to
evaluating emergency preparedness in addition to exercises. For
example, it is suggested that maintenance and calibration of
equipment that must be maintained under a radiological emergency
response plan, can and should be verified separate and apart from an
exercise. FEMA currently requires that OROs certify that various
aspects of the radiological emergency response plans are functional
through an ``Annual Letter of Certification.'' FEMA reserves the
right to audit an ORO's representations in the Annual Letter of
Certification. Some of the evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-
0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 will not be exercised under the proposed
Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice. This is because
these criteria are most appropriately verified, in FEMA's judgment,
through the Annual Letter of Certification and audits pursuant
thereto. The concept paper recommended that FEMA expand its program
of staff assistance visits to regularly provide feedback on
emergency preparedness issues. FEMA is expanding this program.
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On September 9, 1998, FEMA published the draft final
recommendations of the Strategic Review Steering Committee for public
comment. Recommendation 1.1 addressed the 33 REP-14 Objectives. The
Strategic Review Steering Committee noted:
Exercises are currently evaluated in an ``objective based
format.'' * * * This system is very structured and leaves little
latitude for satisfying the objective by alternate means.
Stakeholders have identified the obvious similarities between
objectives. Experience in exercise evaluations indicates that
several objectives can easily be combined, and others deleted,
without weakening the evaluation process. * * * [We recommend] the
consolidation of current objectives into * * * six Evaluation Areas
* * * These Evaluation Areas would be established to support a
``results oriented'' evaluation process. Results oriented evaluation
allows FEMA to focus on the outcome of actions taken by players in
the implementation of their plans and procedures. This approach will
give the exercise players more latitude to reach the desired
results. Evaluators would then concentrate on the results of an
exercise activity, not on the steps taken to arrive at a result.
Within each Evaluation Area, objectives would be combined and
duplicative Points of Review would be eliminated.'' \13\
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\13\ 63 Fed. Reg. 48225 (September 9, 1998).
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The Strategic Review Steering Committee recommended the
consolidation of 29 of the 33 REP-14 Exercise Objective into six
Exercise Evaluation Areas with sub-criteria. It also recommended the
elimination of four of the REP-14 Objectives.\14\
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\14\ These were REP-14 Objectives 23, 31, 32 and 33. FEMA is
proposing to eliminate REP-14 Objectives 23 and 31 in their
entirety. Objective 23 tested the ORO's ability to identify and
utilize federal and voluntary agency resources. FEMA plans to take
lead responsibility for identifying available federal resources. The
decision on whether to use these resources belongs to the ORO. A
determination of whether the ORO is effectively utilizing voluntary
agency resources is more appropriately made in reviewing the ORO's
plans. Objective 31 tested the ORO's ability to evacuate non-
essential personnel from the nuclear power plant site. We have
concluded that the emergency preparedness benefit of evaluating this
capability separate and apart from the capability to evacuate
members of the general public is negligible. However, Objectives 32
(demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response
functions in an unannounced exercise or drill) and 33 (demonstrate
the capability to carry out emergency response functions during an
off-hours drill or exercise) are not proposed for elimination. These
REP-14 Objectives would be folded into Exercise Evaluation Area
5.a.2, which provides for an unannounced drill of an incident
requiring urgent response action by ORO's (also known as a ``fast
breaker''). The drill may occur during off-hours.
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Recommendation 1.2 addressed the frequency of demonstrations.
The frequency for exercising each of the evaluation areas and sub
criteria was set out in a table which accompanied Recommendation
1.2.\15\
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\15\ 63 Fed. Reg. 58226-58227 (September 9, 1998).
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Respondents to FEMA's request for public comment generally
favored Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.\16\ On March
[[Page 31344]]
25, 1999, the strategic review recommendations, including
Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2 were turned over to the REP Program by
Kay C. Goss, CEM, Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and
Exercises for further consideration. This notice addresses the
proposed implementation of Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.
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\16\ A compilation of comments and the Strategic Review Steering
Committee's response appears on the REP Internet site, http://
www.fema.gov/pte/rep/finalrecc10 99.doc (visited May 22, 2001).
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Implementation of Strategic Review Steering Committee Recommendation
1.1
FEMA proposes to implement Recommendation 1.1 through adoption
of the Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice. Two
drafts of the Exercise Evaluation Area have already been released
for public comment on the REP website. The first draft was released
in November 1999. These comments and responses from the drafting
group have been placed on the REP website.\17\ A second draft was
released in March 2000.\18\
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\17\ http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/comments.doc (viewed May 22,
2001).
\18\ http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/recini.htm (viewed May 22,
2001).
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During the fall of 2000, FEMA conducted pilot tests of the six
draft Exercise Evaluation Areas at four nuclear power plants in
different FEMA regions. A Pilot Evaluation Team, comprised of REP
Regional Assistance Committee Chairs and FEMA headquarters REP
staff, observed and assessed the pilot exercises. The team was
instructed to identify any evaluation areas that needed revision. It
was also asked to consider whether the new evaluation methodology
provided an equal if not more robust review of State and local
emergency response plans and procedures than the objective
``checklist approach.''
The conclusions drawn by the Pilot Evaluation Team are
consistent with the comments FEMA has received since the inception
of the strategic review process. Based upon these comments and
reports from the Pilot Evaluation Team, FEMA has concluded:
The current REP-14 and REP-15 evaluation methodology
resulted in predictable exercises, judged against checklists;
exercises under the proposed criteria will be based on emergency
response plans, not the checklists, and should facilitate better
coordination, communication, decisionmaking and implementation.
Utilization of the new methodology will facilitate the
introduction of more challenging scenarios geared to the particular
community being evaluated. It will reduce the artificiality of
exercises and more closely replicate responses to real incidents.
The proposed methodology, which focuses on results,
will increase ORO enthusiasm for exercise participation and
substantially reduce the perception that the evaluators are nit-
picking performance.
The proposed methodology is more demanding on
evaluators than the current checklists. It requires that they
explain in narrative form what was observed and whether performance
was adequate. This will result in more effective communication
between evaluators and OROs about exercise issues and plan
shortcomings. It will also provide the REP Program with better data
from which to draw conclusions about emergency preparedness on a
national level.
Emergency preparedness can be significantly enhanced
through better focused exercise evaluation criteria, coupled with
FEMA's renewed emphasis on the Annual Letter of Certification and
more frequent staff assistance visits.
Highlights of the Proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas
Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management
Evaluation Area 1 has five sub-elements: (a) mobilization, (b)
facilities, (c) direction and control, (d) communications equipment
and (e) equipment and supplies to support operations.
Criterion 1.a.1 requires that the OROs use effective procedures
to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate
facilities in a timely manner. One of the more difficult issues to
arise from the strategic review is how OROs demonstrate their
twenty-four hour staffing capability in an exercise. The evaluation
criteria associated with Planning Standard ``A'' of NUREG-0654/FEMA
REP-1, Rev. 1 require that ``each principal organization shall be
capable of continuous (twenty-four-hour) operations for a protracted
period.'' \19\ These criteria also require that each State and local
response organization be capable of twenty-four-hour emergency
response.\20\
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\19\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.4.
\20\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.1.e
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REP-14 Objective 30.1, which implements these criteria,
presently requires all agencies responsible for providing twenty-
four-hour staffing demonstrate a shift change once every six years.
The shift change is demonstrated by providing a ``one-for-one
replacement . . . of key staff responsible for communications,
direction and control of operations, alert and notification for the
public and the media, radiological monitoring, protective response
and medical and public health support.'' \21\
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\21\ REP-14 page D.30-1
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REP-14 Objective 30.2 requires that outgoing staff members
should demonstrate their capability to brief their replacements on
the current status of the simulated emergency. The purpose of this
demonstration is to assure that the transition from the outgoing to
incoming shift is accomplished without discontinuity in operations.
The dissatisfaction within the REP community about Objective 30
seems to stem from time constraints associated with the exercise.
OROs will bring a second shift (often composed of volunteers who
must take time away from other responsibilities) in for the
exercise, only to discover that there is little time left in the
exercise for the second shift to actually demonstrate their
capabilities.
FEMA is sympathetic to the dissatisfaction with the present
approach. However, we are equally uneasy about simply eliminating
the shift change requirement. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1,
requires that we verify that response organizations have sufficient
trained people in the key positions to perform twenty-four-hour
operations. Moreover, we are concerned that our present approach
offers those on the second and the third shift little opportunity to
train for a real emergency through exercise participation.
Our proposed criterion 1.a.1 eliminates the requirement that
OROs demonstrate a shift change once every six years. In order to
assure that OROs have sufficient staffing to support twenty-four
hour operations, we propose that the exercise evaluators inspect the
procedures for twenty-four hour staffing at each facility and a
staff roster to determine whether the response organization has
identified the necessary personnel to carry out critical functions.
These critical functions are the same functions named in REP-14
Objective 30.1. The inspection would occur during each exercise.\22\
This approach is consistent with Planning Standard ``A'' of NUREG-
0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1. and its associated criteria. Neither
requires the demonstration of a shift change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Additional assurance that OROs have sufficient trained
personnel to support twenty-four-hour response and operations is
contained in the Annual Letter of Certification. FEMA may audit the
ORO's representations in the Annual Letter of Certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However our consideration of the shift change issue leaves us
mindful of the need to assure that key personnel on the off-hours
shifts can perform as well as the primary responders. Without an
opportunity to observe the performance of these personnel in an
exercise, we are uncertain about whether the key personnel on the
off-hours shifts can perform up to the standard that those who
regularly exercise do. Moreover, we are concerned that our present
exercise approach denies those in key positions on off-hours shifts
an opportunity to train through meaningful exercise participation.
For this reason, FEMA is inclined to require that OROs
demonstrate their twenty-four hour response capability by
alternating the personnel that participate in the biennial exercises
from among the shifts.\23\ For example, the first biennial exercise
of each six year cycle might involve personnel from the first
twelve-hour shift. The second biennial exercise in the six year
cycle would involve personnel from the second twelve-hour shift. The
third biennial exercise in the six year cycle would involve
personnel from the third shift (if the ORO uses three shifts in its
plan) or the first shift (if the ORO uses two shifts in its plan)
This would provide an opportunity for the key personnel on all
shifts to have an opportunity to train by participating in an
exercise as well as an opportunity for FEMA to evaluate the
performance of all of the individuals who will play key roles in an
actual response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ We define key positions in this proposal in the same way
that they are defined in REP-14 Objective 30.1, i.e. communications,
direction and control of operations, alert and notification of the
public, accident assessment, information for the public and the
media, radiological monitoring, protective response, and medical and
public health support functions.
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[[Page 31345]]
We recognize that a limited number of key personnel, such as a
county Emergency Management Director, intend to remain involved in
an actual emergency response on a twenty-four-hour basis until the
incident is resolved. We are prepared to accommodate the
participation of these individuals in every exercise, but expect
that each will have their designated successor participate in the
exercise. An exercise scenario might provide that a county Emergency
Management Director is unable to perform his or her duties and an
alternate must step in to take over the operation.
FEMA believes it is crucial for all personnel expected to
perform key roles in a radiological emergency response to exercise
in their roles. However, we are not prepared to move forward with a
definitive plan to achieve this objective without your comments. If
you do not agree with the proposal described above, we would
appreciate your identification of alternative means through which
FEMA can assure that the key personnel who are expected to work the
off-hours shifts are as well trained as those who work the shift
that most often exercises. We are interested in your comments about
whether FEMA needs to make any changes in the way it conducts
exercises, i.e. commencing exercises on weekends, holidays or off-
hours, to facilitate participation from those who would serve on the
off-hours shifts in the event of an actual emergency. We also seek
your views on whether or not this proposal will result in a net
benefit to emergency preparedness.
Our review of the issues associated with the shift change also
leads us to believe that the briefing required by Objective 30.2,
which presently needs to be demonstrated only once every six years,
should be demonstrated at every exercise in the future. This
provision has been written into proposed criterion 1.a.1. We propose
to give OROs the option of bringing in a second shift of key
responders to receive the briefing or to provide the briefing to the
evaluators.
Criterion 1.b.1 requires that the ORO demonstrate that its
facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. Under
the proposed exercise methodology, facilities will only be evaluated
if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission.
It seems redundant to require the re-evaluation of a facility every
two years if the facility has not changed. This change does not
affect the current requirement that OROs certify in the Annual
Letter of Certification that their facilities are available and
adequate to meet emergency response needs. FEMA reserves the right
to audit the representations made in the Annual Letter of
Certification.
Criterion 1.c.1 requires that key personnel with leadership
roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the
overall response for which they are responsible. This requirement is
identical to that in Objective 3.1 \24\ of REP-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ References to the REP-14 Objectives will appear in this
form throughout this notice. REP-14 Objective 3.1 is Objective 3,
Criterion 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criterion 1.d requires that communications capabilities are
managed in support of emergency operations with communication links
established and maintained with appropriate locations. The proper
functioning of communications equipment is essential to success in
any exercise, just as it is essential to success in any response.
FEMA expects that both the primary and backup communications
systems, which are required by Planning Standard F, Evaluation
Criteria F.1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Rev. 1, will be fully
functional at the commencement of an exercise. Under REP-14 the
functionality of these systems were tested at each exercise.
Consistent with the spirit of the proposed Exercise Evaluation
Areas, FEMA will not verify that the primary and backup
communications systems are operational as a stand-alone evaluation
item. However, we will craft exercise scenarios which call for the
use of the primary system and scenarios which assume the failure of
the primary system and require the use of the backup system. The ORO
will not know prior to the start of the exercise whether one or both
systems will be tested as part of the scenario. While an ORO may not
be penalized if a communications system fails, so long as the other
is operational, FEMA will take note of all communications system
failures. They will be reported to Director of the REP Program and
to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director and Regional Assistance
Committee Chair as a planning issue.\25\ The ORO is expected to
correct any communication systems failure within 60 days of the
conclusion of the exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See, pages B.12 and B.21 of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
Standard Exercise Report Format (October 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criterion 1.e requires that equipment, dosimetry, supplies of
potassium iodide and other required supplies are sufficient to
support emergency operations. The requirements are similar to those
in REP-14 Objectives 2.1, 5.1, 8.2 and 14.2. FEMA may or may not
verify that these items are available and in good repair as a stand-
alone item in every exercise. However, our exercise scenarios
ordinarily require that the equipment and supplies be put to use. If
equipment and supplies are unavailable or non-functional then the
ORO may not be able to perform the emergency response activity at an
acceptable level. Equipment and supplies that are not checked during
an exercise will be checked during a staff assistance visit.
Additional assurance that equipment and supplies are available in
appropriate quantities and are properly maintained will be obtained
in the Annual Letter of Certification. The representations contained
in the Annual Letter of Certification are subject to audit.
Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decisionmaking
Evaluation Area 2 assesses the ORO's ability to render decisions
about what protective actions members of the public and emergency
workers need to take in the wake of an incident. It has five sub-
elements: emergency worker exposure control, radiological assessment
and protective action recommendations and decisions for the plume
phase of the emergency,\26\ protective action decision
considerations for the protection of special populations,
radiological assessment and decisionmaking for the ingestion pathway
exposure\27\ and radiological assessment and decisionmaking
concerning relocation, re-entry and return.
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\26\ The plume phase of the emergency focuses on preventing
exposure of a population to radiation through direct contact with
the plume.
\27\ The ingestion pathway phase focuses on preventing exposure
of a population to radiation through ingestion of foods that may
have been exposed to radiation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The criteria in Evaluation Area 2 are generally similar to those
in REP-14. We believe that proposed criterion 2.e.1 improves upon
REP-14 Objectives 28.1 and 28.3 by eliminating the cumbersome
standard and optional approaches to re-entry and relocation
decisionmaking in REP-14. Criterion 2.e.1 contains a single approach
to evaluating decisions in these areas
Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation
Evaluation Area 3 assesses the ORO's ability to implement
protective actions, including evacuation. It contains six sub-
elements: implementation of emergency worker exposure control,
implementation of potassium iodide decisions, implementation of
protective actions for special populations, implementation of
traffic and access control, implementation of ingestion pathway
decisions and implementation of relocation, re-entry and return
decisions.
Criterion 3.a.1 requires that emergency workers demonstrate
their ability to read dosimetry and understand the protective
actions that they must take in response to specified levels. This
requirement is similar to Objectives 5.1 and 5.2 in REP-14. Under
the former evaluation methodology, emergency workers were subjected
to the equivalent of a ``closed book examination'' on these matters.
The proposed methodology makes it clear that emergency workers can
refer to published procedures and confer with co-workers in
responding to evaluator inquiries, just as they would, if necessary,
in a real incident.
Criterion 3.b.1 tests the capability to distribute potassium
iodide and appropriately instruct recipients on its use, in
accordance with the ORO's emergency response plan. Potassium iodide
is a non-prescription thyroid-blocking agent, which has been found
effective in preventing thyroid cancer in those exposed to radiation
during a nuclear plant incident. Criterion 3.b.1 also requires OROs
to demonstrate their ability to maintain records on the
administration of potassium iodide. Criterion 3.b.1 does not require
that potassium iodide actually be administered. It requires only
that OROs be able to demonstrate the functionality of this aspect of
the plan.
Criterion 3.c.1 evaluates the protective action decisions that
are implemented for special populations other than schools within
areas subject to protective actions. OROs must demonstrate a
capability to alert and notify special populations, transportation
providers (including special resources for people with
disabilities), and
[[Page 31346]]
establish reception facilities. The availability of resources to
transport special populations out of the plume exposure pathway is
key. For this reason, proposed criterion 3.c.1 requires that OROs
actually contact at least \1/3\ of their transportation providers
during each exercise to determine whether buses and drivers would be
available if the exercise were an actual emergency.
Criterion 3.c.2 evaluates the capability to implement protective
action decisions for schools. The proposed criterion requires that
OROs contact each public school system, licensed day care provider
and participating private school which would be required to
implement a protective action decision if the exercise scenario were
an actual emergency. Simulation of these calls is not allowed.
REP-14 Objective 16.2 presently requires that a single school
bus be mobilized to drive an evacuation route as part of an
exercise. FEMA does not believe that this demonstration achieves any
significant emergency preparedness objective and is proposing to
delete it. We do reserve the right to interview bus drivers to
determine their familiarity with evacuation routes.
Criterion 3.d.1 evaluates the capability to establish and
maintain appropriate traffic control and access points. REP-14
Objective 17.2 requires an actual deployment to test staffing
capabilities. The proposed new criterion would not require an actual
deployment. Capability could be established through an evaluative
interview with appropriate public safety personnel. The decision to
no longer require actual deployment stems from the recognition that
public safety agencies regularly establish traffic and access
control points in response to non-radiological incidents. The new
criterion does not deprive FEMA of the ability to request a
demonstration of actual deployment capability where appropriate. It
simply establishes that actual deployment will not be required as a
matter of course.
Criterion 3.d.2 evaluates the capability to remove impediments
to evacuation. REP-14 Objective 17.4 required that actual telephone
calls be placed to resources which might assist in removing the
impediments, e.g., tow truck contractors. However, REP-14 did not
require that tow trucks actually respond and remove the impediments.
While there is some value in determining whether OROs maintain an
accurate list of telephone numbers, it is not necessary to mandate
regular testing of the ability to telephone a tow operator. The tow
operators that might be relied upon in a nuclear power plant
incident are similar to those who might be called upon in a traffic
accident. Emergency dispatchers can reasonably be presumed to know
how to contact tow operators.
Criterion 3.e.1 tests the availability and appropriate use of
adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and
agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway zone
for implementation of protective actions. REP-14 Objective 27.1
requires that various maps and information sources required by
Planning Standard J of NUREG-0654/REP-1 Rev 1 be available. The
proposed criterion does not change the requirement that these
information sources be available. However, it does not require that
an evaluator specifically check off that they are present. Ingestion
pathway exercises will be evaluated based upon whether OROs
effectively use the information that must be available in addressing
the exercise scenario. If the information is not available, OROs may
not be able to meet the new ``results oriented'' criterion.
Criterion 3.e.2 evaluates measures, strategies and pre-printed
instructional material for implementing protective action decisions
for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural
production. REP 14 Objective 11.4 requires that evaluators check off
whether a distribution list is maintained and Objective 27.3
contains specific instructions on how implementation of ingestion
pathway decisions should be evaluated. Through its level of detail,
REP-14 established a single correct way to implement ingestion
pathway decisions, notwithstanding that alternative approaches would
also adequately protect public health and safety. FEMA believes that
it is appropriate to give OROs the flexibility to implement
ingestion pathway decisions in a way that they deem prudent. OROs
will be evaluated on the basis of whether their decisions adequately
protect public health and safety.
Criterion 3.f evaluates decisions regarding controlled re-entry
of emergency workers and relocation and return. This criterion
consolidates REP-14 Objectives 29.1, 29.2, 29.3 and 29.4.
Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement and Analysis
Evaluation Area 4 assesses the ability of OROs to conduct and
analyze field radiation measurements. It has three sub-elements:
plume phase field measurement and analysis, post plume phase field
measurements and sampling, and laboratory operations. The evaluation
criteria are similar to those that appear in REP-14. The proposed
evaluation criterion encourages OROs to utilize resources offered by
federal agencies, where appropriate.
Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information
Evaluation Area 5 looks at the ORO's ability to notify the
public of an incident and to effectively communicate protective
action recommendations. It contains two sub-elements: activation of
the prompt alert and notification system and emergency information
and instructions for the public and the media.
Proposed criteria 5.a.1, 5.a.2 and 5.a.3 address activation of
the prompt alert and notification system. We believe that the
proposed criteria represent a significant improvement in exercise
methodology over REP-14. Plume exposure exercises under the REP-14
methodology have followed a familiar pattern--they all involved a
scenario that incrementally escalates from a situation requiring no
action by the public to a situation requiring urgent action by the
public. The REP-14 methodology did not test the ability of ORO
decisionmakers to reach a decision on activating the prompt alert
and notification system in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The
scenario left no discretion to the decisionmakers.
Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 remedy this artificiality by
requiring that alert and notification decisionmaking be tested under
two different scenarios--one in which urgent action is not
immediately required and one in which it is. Proposed criterion
5.a.1 addresses the situation in which urgent action by the public
is not immediately required. Proposed criterion 5.a.2 addresses the
situation in which urgent action by the public is immediately
required due to quickly deteriorating conditions at the plant. This
second scenario is known as the ``fast breaker.''
Proposed criterion 5.a.1 requires that the alert and
notification system be activated in a timely manner following
notification to the ORO by the nuclear power plant of an incident
that requires activation of the alert and notification system but
does not immediately require urgent action by the public. Whether
decisionmakers initiate the alert and notification system in a
``timely manner'' will be judged in relation to the scenario. We
will also evaluate the quality of the public notification.
Proposed criterion 5.a.2 requires that activities associated
with the alert and notification system in a ``fast breaker''
situation must be completed within fifteen minutes of the time that
the ORO has received verified notification from the nuclear power
plant of a situation that immediately requires urgent public action.
The fifteen-minute requirement derives from Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations which appear at 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix
E.IV.D. Since fast breaking situations are by their nature
unpredictable, FEMA proposes to evaluate the ``fast breaker''
response in an unannounced drill, separate and apart from regular
exercises. OROs will be notified of the week in which the drill will
occur, but not the specific day or time. The ``fast breaker'' drill
can occur during off-hours. In formulating criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2,
FEMA considered comments made at ``fast breaker workshops'' during
the April 2000 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Conference \28\ as well as comments submitted in the strategic
review. We are especially interested in receiving written comments
on proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 from those interested in ``fast
breaker'' issues.
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\28\ The National Radiological Preparedness Conference is an
annual meeting of individuals with an interest in radiological
emergency preparedness. The conference is sponsored by an
independent non-profit organization and is open to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 do not address what
information must be contained in an initial instructional memorandum
to the public. Under current FEMA guidance, \29\ an initial
instructional message must contain five elements at a minimum. These
five elements include a coded ``Emergency
[[Page 31347]]
Classification Level'' \30\ and a protective action recommendation.
Concerns have been expressed in the strategic review process that
disclosure of an Emergency Classification Level in an initial
message does not provide the public with useful information. Serious
questions have been raised about when a protective action
recommendation must be made, particularly if evacuation routes need
to be cleared and reception facilities need to be opened to support
a safe and orderly evacuation. For these reasons, FEMA is requesting
comments in a notice, which appears in the same edition of the
Federal Register as this one about whether its current guidance
should be changed. We hope to complete our review of this guidance
contemporaneously with our decision on whether to implement the
proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas so that any changes concerning
the content of initial messages can be incorporated into criteria
5.a.1 and 5.a.2.
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\29\ The current guidance entitled ``Radiological Emergency
Preparedness (REP) Guidance To Support Implementation of the
Emergency Alert System (EAS)'' dated February 2, 1999 can be viewed
at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm (viewed May 31, 2001). The
guidance is contained in Attachment ``B'' to the memorandum entitled
``Background on the Emergency Alert System (EAS).''
\30\ Emergency Classification Levels are a standard way through
which nuclear power plants communicate the severity of incidents
with onsite and offsite responders and regulatory agencies. See,
Planning Standard D, NUREG-0654/REP-1, Rev. 1.
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Proposed criterion 5.a.3 addresses notification of people living
in very remote areas, also known as ``exception areas,'' who are not
reached by alert sirens or tone alert radios. People who reside in
exception areas are notified of an incident by mobile teams called
``backup route alerting teams.'' Proposed criterion 5.a.3 is similar
to the REP-14 criterion with respect to notification of people in
``exception areas.''
Proposed criterion 5.a.3 also addresses backup alerting and
notification of the general public in the event of a failure in the
primary alert and notification system. Criterion 5.a.3 requires that
the completion of backup alerting and notification within 45 minutes
of the decision by offsite emergency officials to notify the public
of an emergency situation. REP-14 required completion of the
notification within ``approximately'' 45 minutes after the decision.
The proposed criterion more closely conforms to the requirement set
forth in Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
Proposed criterion 5.b.1 tests whether OROs provide accurate
emergency information and instructions to the public and the news
media in a timely fashion. While FEMA is considering whether
technical information such as Emergency Classification Levels should
be included in alert and notification system messages, it believes
that this information should be made available to the news media
with a plain Language explanation. The ORO should be prepared to
explain the Emergency Classification Level and related technical
information in plain Language during an exercise.
Evaluation Area 6: Support Operations/Facilities
Evaluation Area 6 assesses the ability of OROs to account for,
monitor and decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and emergency
worker equipment, to provide temporary care of evacuees and to
assure that capabilities exist for transporting and treating injured
individuals who have been exposed to radiation. These competencies
are tested in the four sub-elements associated with Evaluation Area
6. The proposed Criteria are consistent with REP-14. While REP-14
establishes a series of prescriptive procedures that must be
followed by the ORO, the proposed criteria describe the result which
must be obtained, without instructing the ORO on how to obtain it.
Table 1.--Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas With NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP
14/15 Objectives and Criteria
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluation area/Sub-element/
Criterion NUREG 0654 Criteria REP-14/15 Objective and Criterion
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Emergency Operations ...................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 30
Management.
1.a--Mobilization
1.a.1: OROs use effective A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4.............. 1.1, 1.2; 30
proceduresto alert, notify,
and mobilize emergency
personnel and activate
facilities in a timely
manner.
1.b--Facilities
1.b.1: Facilities are H.3................................... 2.1
sufficient to support the
emergency response.
1.c--Direction and Control
1.c.1: Key personnel with A.1.d; A.2.a, b....................... 3.1
leadership roles for the ORO
provide direction and
control to that part of the
overall response effort for
which they are responsible.
1.d--Communications Equipment
1.d.1: At least two F.1, 2................................ 4.1
communication systems are
available and at least one
operates properly, and
communication links are
established with appropriate
locations. Communications
capabilities are managed in
support of emergency
operations.
1.e--Equipment and Supplies to
Support Operations
1.e.1: Equipment, maps, H.7; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a........ 2.1; 5.1; 8.2; 14.2
displays, dosimetry,
potassium iodide (KI), and
other supplies are
sufficient to support
emergency operations.
2--Protective Action Decision ...................................... 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28
Making.
2.a--Emergency Worker Exposure
Control
2.a.1: OROs use a decision J.10.e, f; K.4........................ 5.1, 5.3; 14.1
making process, considering
relevant factors and
appropriate coordination, to
insure that an exposure
control system, including
the use of KI, is in place
for emergency workers
including provisions to
authorize radiation exposure
in excess of administrative
limits or protective action
guides.
2.b--Radiological Assessment and
Protective Action
Recommendations and Decisions
for the Plume Phase of the
Emergency
2.b.1: Appropriate protective I.8,10; Supp. 3....................... 7.1
action recommendations are
based on available
information on plant
conditions, field monitoring
data, and licensee and ORO
dose projections, as well as
knowledge of on-site and off-
site environmental
conditions.
2.b.2: A decision-making J.9; J.10.f, m........................ 9.1; 14.1
process involving
consideration of appropriate
factors and necessary
coordination is used to make
protective action decisions
(PADs) for the general
public (including the
recommendation for the use
of KI, if ORO policy).
2.c--Protective Action Decisions
for the Protection of Special
Populations
2.c.1: Protective action J.9; J.10............................. 9.1; 15.1
decisions are made, as
appropriate, for special
population groups.
[[Page 31348]]
2.d--Radiological Assessment and
Decision-Making for the
Ingestion Exposure Pathway
2.d.1: Radiological J.11.................................. 26.1, 26.2
consequences for the
ingestion pathway are
assessed and appropriate
protective action decisions
are made based on the ORO
planning criteria.
2.e--Radiological Assessment and
Decision-Making Concerning
Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
2.e.1: Timely relocation re- M.1................................... 28.1, 28.2, 28.3, 28.4, 28.5
entry, and return decisions
are made and coordinated as
appropriate, based on
assessments of radiological
conditions and criteria in
the ORO's plan and/or
procedures.
3. Protective Action ...................................... 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29
Implementation.
3.a--Implementation of Emergency
Worker Exposure Control
3.a.1: The OROs issues K.3.a, 3.b............................ 5.1, 5.2
appropriate dosimetry and
procedures, and manage
radiological exposure to
emergency workers in
accordance with the plan and
procedures. Emergency
workers periodically and at
the end of each mission read
their dosimeters and record
the readings on the
appropriate exposure record
or chart.
3.b--Implementation of KI
Decision
3.b.1: KI and appropriate J.10.e................................ 14.1, 14.3
instructions are made
available should a decision
to recommend use of KI be
made. Appropriate record
keeping of the
administration of KI for
emergency workers and
institutionalized
individuals (not the general
public) is maintained.
3.c--Implementation of Protective
Actions for Special Populations
3.c.1: Protective action J.10.c, d, g.......................... 15.1, 15.2
decisions are implemented
for special population
groups within areas subject
to protective actions.
3.c.2: ORO/School officials J.10.c, d, g.......................... 16.1, 16.2, 16.3
decide upon and implement
protective actions for
schools.
3.d--Implementation of Traffic
and Access Control
3.d.1: Appropriate traffic J.10.g, j............................. 17.1, 17.2, 17.3
and access control is
established. Accurate
instructions are provided to
traffic and access personnel.
3.d.2: Impediments to J.10.k................................ 17.4
evacuation are identified
and resolved.
3.e--Implementation of Ingestion
Pathway Decisions
3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates J.9,11................................ 27.1
the availability and
appropriate use of adequate
information regarding water,
food supplies, milk and
agricultural production
within the ingestion
exposure pathway emergency
planning zone for
implementation of protective
actions.
3.e.2: Appropriate measures, E.; J.9,11............................ 11.4; 27.2; 27.3
strategies and pre-printed
instructional material are
developed for implementing
protective action decisions
for contaminated water, food
products, milk, and
agricultural production.
3.f--Implementation of
Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
Decisions
3.f.1: Decisions regarding M.1, 3................................ 29.1, 29.2, 29.3, 29.4
controlled re-entry of
emergency workers and
relocation and return of the
public are coordinated with
appropriate organizations
and implemented.
4--Field Measurement and Analysis ...................................... 6, 8, 24, 25
4.a--Plume Phase Field
Measurement and Analyses
4.a.1: The field teams are H.10, I.8, 9.......................... 6.1; 8.1, 8.2
equipped to perform field
measurements of direct
radiation exposure (cloud
and ground shine) and to
sample airborne radioiodine
and particulates.
4.a.2: Field teams are I.8,11; J.10.a........................ 6.3, 6.4
managed to obtain sufficient
information to help
characterize the release and
to control radiation
exposure.
4.a.3: Ambient radiation I.9................................... 6.4, 6,5; 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6
measurements are made and
recorded at appropriate
locations, and radioiodine
and particulate samples are
collected. Teams will move
to an appropriate low
background location to
determine whether any
significant (as specified in
the plan and/or procedures)
amount of radioactivity has
been collected on the
sampling media.
4.b--Post Plume Phase Field
Measurements and Sampling
4.b.1: The field teams I.8; J.11............................. 24.1
demonstrate the capability
to make appropriate
measurements and to collect
appropriate samples (e.g.,
food crops, milk, water,
vegetation, and soil) to
support adequate assessments
and protective action
decision-making.
4.c--Laboratory Operations
4.c.1: The laboratory is C.3; J.11............................. 25.1, 25.2
capable of performing
required radiological
analyses to support
protective action decisions.
5--Emergency Notification and ...................................... 10, 11, 12, 13
Public Information.
5.a--Activation of the Prompt
Alert and Notification System
[[Page 31349]]
5.a.1: Activities associated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; E.5, 6.... 10.1
with primary alerting and
notification of the public
are completed in a timely
manner following the initial
decision by authorized
offsite emergency officials
to notify the public of an
emergency situation. The
initial instructional
message to the public must
include as a minimum: (1)
identification of the State
or local government
organization and the
official with the authority
for providing the alert
signal and instructional
message; (2) identification
of the commercial nuclear
power plant and a statement
than an emergency situation
exists at the plant; (3)
reference to REP-specific
emergency information (e.g.,
brochures and information in
telephone books) for use by
the general public during an
emergency; and (4) a closing
statement asking the
affected and potentially
affected population to stay
tuned for additional
information.
5.a.2: Activities associated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; E.5, 6.... 10.1
with primary alerting and
notification of the public
are completed within 15
minutes of verified
notification from the
utility of an emergency
situation requiring urgent
action (fast-breaking
situation). The initial
instructional message to the
public must include as a
minimum: (1) identification
of the State or local
government organization and
the official with the
authority for providing the
alert signal and
instructional message; (2)
identification of the
commercial nuclear power
plant and a statement than
an emergency situation
exists at the plant; (3)
reference to REP-specific
emergency information (e.g.,
brochures and information in
telephone books) for use by
the general public during an
emergency; and (4) a closing
statement asking the
affected and potentially
affected population to say
tuned for additional
information. In addition,
the ORO must demonstrate the
capability to contact, in a
timely manner, an authorized
offsite decision maker
relative to the nature and
severity of the event, in
accordance with plans and
procedures.
5.a.3: Activities associated Appendix 3: B.2.c; E.6................ 10.2, 10.3
with FEMA approved exception
areas (where applicable) are
completed within 45 minutes
of the initial decision by
authorized offsite emergency
officials to notify the
public of an emergency
situation. Backup alert and
notification of the public
is completed within 45
minutes following the
detection by the ORO of a
failure of the primary alert
and notification system.
5.b--Emergency Information and
Instructions for the Public and
the Media
5.b.1: OROs provide accurate E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.c.................. 11.1, 11.2, 11.3; 12.1, 12.2; 13.1,
emergency information and 13.2
instructions to the public
and the news media in a
timely manner.
6--Support Operation/Facilities.. ...................................... 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
6.a--Monitoring and
Decontamination of Evacuees and
Emergency Workers, and
Registration of Evacuees
6.a.1: The reception center/ J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a, b................ 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5; 22.1,
emergency worker facility 22.2
has appropriate space,
adequate resources, and
trained personnel to provide
monitoring, decontamination,
and registration of evacuees
and/or emergency workers.
6.b--Monitoring and
Decontamination of Emergency
Worker Equipment
6.b.1: The facility/ORO has K.5.a, b.............................. 22.1; 22.3
adequate procedures and
resources for the
accomplishment of monitoring
and decontamination of
emergency worker equipment
including vehicles.
6.c--Temporary Care of Evacuees
6.c.1: Managers of congregate J.10.h; J.12.......................... 19.1, 19.2
care facilities demonstrate
that the centers have
resources to provide
services and accommodations
consistent with American Red
Cross planning guidelines.
Managers demonstrate the
procedures to assure that
evacuees have been monitored
for contamination and have
been decontaminated as
appropriate prior to
entering congregate care
facilities.
6.d--Transportation and Treatment
of Contaminated Injured
Individuals
6.d.1: The facility/ORO has F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1; L.4......... 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5; 21.1,
the appropriate space, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4
adequate resources, and
trained personnel to provide
transport, monitoring
decontamination, and medical
services to contaminated
injured individuals.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replacement of REP-15 With the Evaluation Module Form
Adoption of the proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas will render
REP-15 which contains checklists keyed to the 33 REP-14 Objectives
obsolete. FEMA plans to utilize new forms called ``Evaluation
Modules'' in place of the REP-15 checklists. The Evaluation Modules
will be keyed to the Exercise Evaluation Areas. A sample Evaluation
Module appears below.
BILLING CODE 6718-06-P
[[Page 31350]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN11JN01.057
[[Page 31351]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN11JN01.058
BILLING CODE 6718-06-C
Implementation of Strategic Review Steering Committee Recommendation
1.2
The REP-14 objectives are currently evaluated at the frequency
described on Pages C-2.3 and C-2.4. Adoption of the proposed
Exercise Evaluation Areas will render these pages obsolete. In Table
2 proposes the minimum frequency with each of the Exercise
Evaluation Areas would be exercised. FEMA is open to ORO proposals
to voluntarily exercise certain criteria more frequently than the
minimums listed below.
Table 2.--Federal Evaluation Process Matrix
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed evaluation area and sub-elements Consolidates REP-14 objective Minimum frequency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Emergency Operations Management........... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17, 30.......... .........................
a. Mobilization.......................... ...................................... Every Exercise.
b. Facilities............................ ...................................... Once if new.\1\
c. Direction and Control................. ...................................... Every Exercise.
d. Communications Equipment.............. ...................................... Every Exercise.
e. Equipment and Supplies to Support ...................................... Every Exercise.
Operations.
2. Protective Action Decisionmaking.......... 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28........... .........................
a. Emergency Worker Exposure Control..... ...................................... Every Exercise.
b. Radiological Assessment & Protective ...................................... Every Exercise.
Action Recommendations & Decisions for
the Plume Phase of theEmergency.
c. Protective Action Decisions for the ...................................... Every Exercise.
Protection of Special Populations.
d. Radiological Assessment & ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
Decisionmaking for the Ingestion
Exposure Pathway \2\.
e. Radiological Assessment & ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
Decisionmaking Concerning Relocation, Re-
entry, and Return \2\.
3. Protective Action Implementation.......... 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29......... .........................
a. Implementation of Emergency Worker ...................................... Every Exercise.
Exposure Control.
b. Implementation of KI Decision......... ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
c. Implementation of Protective Actions ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.\3\
for Special Populations.
d. Implementation of Traffic and Access ...................................... Every Exercise.
Control \4\.
e. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
Decisions.
f. Implementation of Relocation, Re- ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
entry, and Return Decisions.
4. Field Measurement and Analysis............ 6, 8, 24, 25.......................... .........................
a. Plume Phase Field Measurements & ...................................... Every Exercise.
Analysis.
b. Post Plume Phase Field Measurements ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
and Sampling.
c. Laboratory Operations................. ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.
5. Emergency Notification and Public 10, 11, 12, 13........................ .........................
Information.
a.1 Activation of the Prompt Alert and ...................................... Every Exercise.
Notification System.
[[Page 31352]]
a.2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and ...................................... Separate Drill once in 6
Notification System (Fast Breaking). yrs.
a.3 Notification of exception areas and/ ...................................... Every Exercise--as
or Back-up Alert and Notification System needed.
within 45 Minutes.
b. Emergency Information & Instructions ...................................... Every Exercise.
for the Public and the Media.
6. Support Operations/Facilities............. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.................... .........................
a. Monitoring & Decontamination of ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.\3\
Evacuees and Emergency Workers &
Registration of Evacuees.
b. Monitoring & Decontamination of ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.\3\
Emergency Worker Equipment \3\.
c. Temporary Care of Evacuees \5\........ ...................................... Once in 6 yrs.\5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Will be evaluated if new or changed substantially.
\2\ The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, re-entry and return) can be demonstrated
separately.
\3\ All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle.
\4\ Physical deployment of resources is not necessary.
\5\ Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be
evaluated once when designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC
must be evaluated once in the six-year exercise cycle.
Coordination With the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
FEMA conducts and evaluates exercises in part under authority of
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The text of the current Memorandum of Understanding is
published in Appendix A to 44 CFR Part 353 (2000 edition). Section E
of the Memorandum of Understanding provides that each agency will
provide an opportunity for the other agency to review and comment on
emergency planning and preparedness guidance (including
interpretations of agreed joint guidance) prior to adoption as
formal agency guidance. FEMA has transmitted a copy of this document
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and requested their comments no
later than the date upon which the public comment period closes.
Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.a--Mobilization
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and
staff emergency facilities.
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify,
and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely
manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)
Extent of Play. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the
capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from
the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and
mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. At each
facility, a roster and/or procedures indicating 24-hour staffing
capability for key positions (those emergency personnel necessary to
carry out critical functions), as indicated in the plan and/or
procedures, should be provided to the evaluator. Although
demonstration of a shift change is not required, each ORO shall
demonstrate its ability to transition from an outgoing shift to an
incoming shift without discontinuity in operations either by having
personnel in key positions briefing the evaluators or their actual
replacements on the current status of the simulated emergency. In
addition, responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of
facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive
to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be
completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-
positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance
with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located
beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty
location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-
sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent
of play agreement.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 1.b--Facilities
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the
emergency response.
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the
emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H)
Extent of Play. Facilities will only be specifically evaluated
for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in
structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the
availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of
emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are:
adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation,
backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support
operations).
Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency,
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 1.c--Direction and Control
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control
their overall response to an emergency.
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO
provide direction and control to that part of the overall response
effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)
Extent of Play. Leadership personnel should demonstrate the
ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for
example: keeping the staff informed, coordinating with other
appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and
requests.
All activities associated with direction and control must be
performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in
the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 1.d--Communications Equipment
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should establish at least two
reliable communication systems to ensure communications with key
emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate
contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ),
Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its
facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are
available, at least one operates properly, and communication links
are established and maintained with appropriate locations.
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency
operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)
Extent of Play. Communications equipment and procedures for
facilities and field units should be used as needed for the
transmission and receipt of exercise
[[Page 31353]]
messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability
to access at least one communication system that is independent of
the commercial telephone system and uses a separate power source.
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the
communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled
without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency
operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link
for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exist. The specific
communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that
specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios
could require the failure of a communications system and the use of
an alternate system.
All activities associated with the management of communications
capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency,
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 1.e--Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and
supplies adequate to support the emergency response.
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium
iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency
operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a, b, e, j, k; j.11; K.3.a)
Extent of Play. Equipment within the facility (facilities)
should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that
facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of
emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.
All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams
only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked
at least once each calendar quarter and after each use. They should
be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations
(or at least annually for the CDV-700 series or if there are no
manufacturer's recommendations for a specific instrument). A label
indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or
verifiable by other means. Note: Field team equipment is evaluated
under 4.a.1; radiological laboratory equipment under 4.c.1;
reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment is
evaluated under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities'
equipment is evaluated under 6.d.1.
Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and
permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be
available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that
could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading
dosimeters should allow individual(s) to read the administrative
reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's
plans and procedures.
Dosimeters should be inspected for electrical leakage at least
annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their
documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be
inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if
necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the
exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of
Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain
inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as
indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in
capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan
and/or procedures, members of the general public (including
transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.
Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage
locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage
location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted
during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification
submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit.
Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date
indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, a
letter from the drug manufacturer should be available that documents
a formal extension of the KI expiration date. Another alternative is
for the ORO to obtain approval from FEMA based on a certified
independent laboratory testing to extend the shelf life.
At locations where traffic and access control personnel are
deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic
cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability
described.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decision-Making
Sub-Element 2.a--Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
an Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to
assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency
workers and have a decision chain in place as specified in the ORO's
plans and procedures to authorize emergency worker exposure limits
to be exceeded for specific missions.
Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the
recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency
workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits
include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that
take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-
specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.
Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering
relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an
exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for
emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation
exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action
guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10. e, f)
Extent of Play. OROs authorized to send emergency workers into
the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate the following
capabilities on the basis of information in the emergency plan: (1)
Determination of radiation exposure limits to be authorized for
emergency workers; (2) appropriate decision making, based on
projected doses and in accordance with emergency workers' exposure
limits, as to whether or not to send emergency workers to areas
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ; (3) establishment of
procedures to allow emergency workers to voluntarily choose to enter
the plume exposure pathway EPZ where radiation levels may expose
individuals to higher than pre-authorized exposures for lifesaving
missions, to protect valuable property, or to protect large
populations; and (4) use of a KI decision-making process that
involves close coordination between appropriate assessment and
decision-making staff.
Whenever emergency personnel are planning to undertake an
operation, it is essential that the best estimate of the situation
be known by the personnel directing the operation. All sources of
information, including projected exposure rate patterns, should be
considered and a best estimate made of the exposure likely to be
received during a specific mission. The mission must be planned by
taking into consideration the most likely situation as well as the
most potentially hazardous situation. Items to be considered include
alternative entry and exit routes, potential changes in
meteorological conditions, areas or roads to be avoided, equipment
and vehicle failure, and other relevant items.
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make
decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess
of pre-authorized levels and to manage the number of emergency
workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.
As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make
decisions on the distribution and administration of KI, as a
protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or
projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for KI
administration.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 2.b.--Radiological Assessment and Protective Action
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which indicates
that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to
independently project integrated dose from exposure rates or other
information and compare the estimated dose savings with the
protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among
a range of
[[Page 31354]]
protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency
situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the ORO's plans and
procedures or EPA 400-R-92-001 and other criteria, such as, plant
conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination
of protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions
(e.g., other affected OROs), availability of appropriate in-place
shelter, weather conditions, evacuation time estimates, and
situations that create higher than normal risk from evacuation.
Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations
are based on available information on plant conditions, field
monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as
knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-
0654, I.8, 10, 11 and Supplement 3)
Extent of Play. During the initial stage of the emergency
response, following notification of plant conditions that may
warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the
capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or
procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for
decision-makers based on available information and recommendations
from the licensee, and field monitoring data, if available.
When release and meteorological data are provided by the
licensee, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should
demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose
projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on
the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs
appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected
dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to
quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs
should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged
format.
Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses
by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee
with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of
different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these
differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and
appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any
additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and
revise the associated PARs.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving
consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is
used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general
public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO
policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.m)
Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have
the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should
demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner
appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the
licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the
utility and ORO staff.
The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based
on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or
information on plant conditions. The decision-makers should
demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as
appropriate based on these projections.
Where specified in the plan and/or procedures, responsible OROs
should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the
distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure. This
decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or
projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI
administration. The KI decision-making process should involve close
coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.
If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should
communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should
demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions
to the affected jurisdictions.
All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be
performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in
the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 2.c--Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the
Protection of Special Populations
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation,
sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for
special population groups (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes,
correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers,
mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent
individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are
(or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a
nuclear power plant.
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as
appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9,
J.10.c, d, e, g)
Extent of Play. Usually, it is appropriate to implement
evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower
end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a
high-risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile
or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that
should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability,
Evacuation Time Estimates, availability of transportation assets,
risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary
school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized
population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be
considered by the OROs.
All decision-making activities associated with protective
actions, including consideration of available resources, for special
population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 2.d.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for
the Ingestion Exposure Pathway
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the
radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate
them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate
protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion
pathway.
During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of
radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural
products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would
likely occur during the plume phase of the accident, and depending
on the nature of the release could impact the ingestion pathway for
weeks or years.
Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion
pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are
made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10; J.11)
Extent of Play. It is expected that the Offsite Response
Organizations (ORO) will take precautionary actions to protect food
and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially
contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective
plans and procedures. Often such precautionary actions are initiated
by the OROs based on criteria related to the facility's emergency
classification levels (ECL). Such actions may include
recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use
protected water supplies.
The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a
sampling plan) to assess the radiological consequences of a release
on the food and water supplies. The ORO assessment should include
the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative
samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local
interest from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of
the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially
impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs should
consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-
mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water should then
be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's
plan and/or procedures. (The plan and/or procedures may contain PAGs
based on specific dose commitment criteria or based on criteria as
recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance.)
Timely and appropriate recommendations should be provided to the ORO
decision-makers group for implementation decisions. As time permits,
the ORO may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a
given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.
The ORO should demonstrate timely decisions to minimize
radiological impacts
[[Page 31355]]
from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other
information available. Any such decisions should be communicated and
to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring and local
OROs.
OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Federal
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources
(e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation
of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal
and other resources participating.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 2.e.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making
Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
Intent
The sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to make
decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public.
These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from
the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials
from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.
Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return
decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on
assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's
plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, A.1.b; I.10; M)
Extent of Play.
Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to
estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these
estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for relocation of those
individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but
where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control
access to evacuated and restricted areas. Decisions are made for
relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that
now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs.
Determination of areas to be restricted should be based on factors
such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated
exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and field samples of vegetation and
soil analyses.
Re-entry: Decisions should be made regarding the
location of control points and policies regarding access and
exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general
public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform
specific tasks or missions.
Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or
checking for, direct-reading and non direct-reading dosimeters for
emergency workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives
and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames;
availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; advice
on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit including: monitoring of
individuals, vehicles, and equipment; decision criteria regarding
decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker
dosimeters and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure
records.
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a
strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted
zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs should
demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security
purposes (e.g., police patrols), for maintenance of essential
services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and for other
critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use
decision making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone
by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property
(e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or
to retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access
and exposure control should be developed among all agencies with
roles to perform in the restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the
capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all
individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The extent that
OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by
scenario events.
Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data
and political boundaries or physical/geological features, which
allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of
the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary
of the restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG. Other
factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: conditions
that permit the cancellation of the emergency classification level
and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures; basing return
recommendations (i.e., permitting populations that were previously
evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted
basis) on measurements of radiation from ground deposition; and the
capability to identify services and facilities that require
restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and
resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and
facilities are: medical and social services, utilities, roads,
schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.
Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation
Sub-Element 3.a--Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure
Control
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and
processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record
dosimeters; provide for direct-reading dosimeters to be read at
appropriate frequencies by emergency workers; maintain a radiation
dose record for each emergency worker; and provide for establishing
a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to
incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides,
always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable)
principle as appropriate.
Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and
procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in
accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers
periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters
and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
(NUREG-0654, K.3)
Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability to
provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry,
dosimetry chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to
emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-
reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s)
to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-
established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation
of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for
those emergency workers involved in life saving activities)
contained in the OROs plans and procedures.
Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of
radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or
procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and
to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.
During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should
demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative
exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency
worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as
indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the
actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining
whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur
additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do
not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional
exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency
workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the
event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency
workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures
and/or co-workers) in providing responses.
Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have
a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team
members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire
mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all
members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader.
Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g.,
at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations
centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-
reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters
strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even
in these situations, each team member must still have their own
permanent record dosimeter. Individuals without specific
radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care,
essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public
who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume
passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological
[[Page 31356]]
exposure commensurate with completing their missions.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 3.b--Implementation of KI Decision
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
provide radioprotective drugs for emergency workers,
institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or
procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may
not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it
is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to
emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision
of KI to the general public is an ORO option and is reflected in
ORO's plans and procedures. Provisions should include the
availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the
distribution of radioprotective drugs.
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available
should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record
keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and
institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is
maintained. (NUREG-0654, E. 7, J. 10. e, f)
Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should
demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency
workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in
the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public.
OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of
KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the
capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and
institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including
documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to
ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO
health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual
ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the
capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on
the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is
made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information
should be provided to the public by the means of notification
specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of
procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the
use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the
evaluator.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 3.c--Implementation of Protective Actions for Special
Populations
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or
sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special
populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a
radiological release from a nuclear power plant.
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for
special populations other than schools within areas subject to
protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E.7; J.9, 10.c, d, e, g)
Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the
capability to alert and notify (e.g., provide protective action
recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special
populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities,
mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs
should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of
special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and
procedures.
Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be
actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. At least
\1/3\ of transportation providers (including special resources for
disabled individuals) must be actually contacted during each
exercise. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.
All implementing activities associated with protective actions
for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency,
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement
protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)
Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the
capability to alert and notify all public schools, licensed day care
centers, and participating private schools within the emergency
planning zone of emergency conditions that are expected to or may
necessitate protective actions for students.
In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or
officials of participating public and private schools and licensed
day care centers should demonstrate the capability to make and
implement prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for
protective actions considers (e.g., either accepts automatically or
gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO
personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received,
preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the
location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are
still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).
Implementation of protective actions should be completed subject
to the following provisions: At least one school in each affected
school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the
implementation of protective actions. The implementation of
canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be
simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be
followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all
activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to
reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may
actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview
process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate
school personnel including decision making officials (e.g.,
superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher),
and at least one bus driver should be available to demonstrate
knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children.
Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses,
if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.
Officials of the participating school(s) or school system(s)
should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely
information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general
public, and the media on the status of protective actions for
schools.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 3.d.--Implementation of Traffic and Access Control
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to
implement protective action plans, including relocation and
restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element
focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and
access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of
evacuation traffic.
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is
established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and
access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j, k)
Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability to
select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control
points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example,
evacuating,sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs
should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic
and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in
protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation
patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate
knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may
be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance
with the extent of play agreement.
In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control
access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic),
they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or
Federal agencies with authority to control access.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they
[[Page 31357]]
would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated
in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and
resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability, as
required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions
concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources
to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be
demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be
logged.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 3.e--Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by
current Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion
pathway zone (IPZ), the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of
the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on those actions
required for implementation of protective actions.
Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and
appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food
supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion
exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of
protective actions. NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)
Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the
capability to secure and utilize current information on the
locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries,
fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing
plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective
actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. OROs should use Federal
resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this
criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and
other resources participating in the exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-
printed instructional material are developed for implementing
protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products,
milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; J.9, 11)
Extent of Play. Development of measures and strategies for
implementation of IPZ protective actions should be demonstrated
during exercise play by formulation of protective action information
for the general public and food producers and processors. This
includes the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution
of appropriate pre-printed information and instructions to pre-
determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the
capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of
contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play should
include demonstration of communications and coordination between
organizations to implement protective actions. However, actual field
play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example,
communications and coordination with agencies responsible for
enforcing food controls within the IPZ should be demonstrated, but
actual communications with food producers and processors may be
simulated.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-element 3.f--Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
Decisions
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the
capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for
relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions
is essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-
term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe
accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.
Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of
emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are
coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-
0654, M.1, 3)
Extent of Play.
Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to
coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of
individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological
contamination will not expose the general public to doses that
exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs should also demonstrate the
capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of
evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels
above the PAGs.
Areas of consideration should include the capability to
communicate with OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of
the population of the procedures for relocation, and the
notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be
converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be
able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination.
OROs should also demonstrate the capability to communicate
instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions.
Re-entry: OROs should demonstrate the capability to
control re-entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-
enter the restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary
radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to
control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area.
Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as
appropriate.
Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) The assignment
of, or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading
dosimeters for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the
individuals' objectives and locations expected to be visited and
associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure
rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit,
including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment,
decision criteria regarding contamination, proper disposition of
emergency worker dosimeters, and maintenance of emergency worker
radiation exposure records.
Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to
implement policies concerning return of members of the public to
areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should
demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and
facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to
identify the procedures and resources for their restoration.
Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social
services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term housing
for relocated persons.
Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return
may be simulated; however all simulated or actual contacts should be
documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group
setting.
OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP,
and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration
the level of Federal and other resources participating in the
exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement And Analysis
Sub-Element 4.a--Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise
necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In
addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability
to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to
measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to
measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In
the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible
release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby
population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are
available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these
methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it
is important to collect field radiological data in order to help
characterize any radiological release. This does not imply that
plume exposure projections should be made from
[[Page 31358]]
the field data. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to
such field measurement efforts.
Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field
measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine)
and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654,
H.10; I.7, 8, 9, 11)
Extent of Play. Field teams should be equipped with all
instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission.
This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure
rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These
instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and
exposure consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the
ORO's plans and procedures, including radiological protection/
exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the
air sample collection media. An appropriate radioactive check source
should be used to verify proper operational response for each low
range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr) and for
high range instruments when available. If a source is not available
for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to
operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only
a high range instrument can make useful readings. All activities
must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in
the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient
information to help characterize the release and to control
radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)
Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)
should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume
location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control
procedures before deployment.
Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release
and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to
be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be
directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to
provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and
impacts.
If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume
has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with
concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these
measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. The
sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all
field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination
concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form,
to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. OROs should use
Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (e.g.,
compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion
will take into consideration the level of Federal and other
resources participating in the exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and
recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate
samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low
background location to determine whether any significant (as
specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has
been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.7, 8, 9, 11)
Extent of Play. Field teams should demonstrate the capability to
report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of
airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the
field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate
authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above
background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for
expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Offsite Response
Organizations (ORO) should share data in a timely manner with all
appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control,
instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form
for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO
plan and/or procedures. OROs should use Federal resources as
identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., compacts,
utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take
into consideration the level of Federal and other resources
participating in the exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 4.b--Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
OROs should have the capability to assess the actual or potential
magnitude and locations of radiological hazards in the ingestion
pathway zone (IPZ) and for relocation, re-entry and return measures.
This sub-element focuses on the collection of environmental samples
for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on
protection of the public from contaminated food and water and direct
radiation from deposited materials.
Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to
make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples
(e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support
adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-
0654, H.12; I.8; J.10.a, 11)
Extent of Play. The Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) field
teams should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and
samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an
adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-
entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are
available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement
is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control,
instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form
for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO
plan and/or procedures.
Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural
products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return
should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas
that received radioactive ground deposition. OROs should use Federal
resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g.,
compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation
of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal
and other resources participating in the exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 4.c--Laboratory Operations
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and
environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.
Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing
required radiological analyses to support protective action
decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; I.8, 9; J.11)
Extent of Play. The laboratory staff should demonstrate the
capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples,
including logging of information, preventing contamination of the
laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored
samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving
samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample
identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the
capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.
The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide
analyses of media, as requested, on a timely basis, of sufficient
quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as
anticipated by the ORO's plans and procedures. The laboratory
(laboratories) instrument calibrations should be traceable to
standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides
released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans
and procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze
atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of
a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances of the event.
Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.
The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical
techniques and contamination control procedures.
OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP,
and other resources
[[Page 31359]]
(e.g., compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available.
Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level
of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information
Sub-Element 5.a--Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification
System
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway
EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.), and FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the
Evaluation of Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear Power
Plants.''
Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and
notification of the public are completed in a timely manner
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The
initial instructional message to the public must include as a
minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7)
Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO)
should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert
signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated
areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile
plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and
notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or
procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished
in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time
requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message
should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
For exercise purposes, timely is defined as ``the responsible
ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and
without undue delay.'' If message dissemination is to be identified
as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s)
will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not
considered timely.
Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated
as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of
transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not
required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the
procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual
activation. The capability of the primary notification system to
broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be
verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the
primary notification system.
All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual
emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the
extent of play agreement.
Criterion 5.a.2: After the State and local governmental agency
(agencies) point of contact is notified by the licensee of the
situation requiring urgent action, activities associated with
primary alerting and notification of the public in the event of an
emergency situation requiring urgent action (a fast-breaking
situation) are completed in one of the two following ways:
(1) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of
contact has 15 minutes from verified notification by the licensee in
which to complete primary alerting and notification of the public.
In addition, the initial point of contact must demonstrate the
capability to contact, in a timely manner, an authorized offsite
decision-maker relative to the nature and severity of the event, in
accordance with plans and procedures.
(2) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of
contact promptly (in a timely manner) notifies State and local
official(s) of the situation requiring urgent action, who then have
15 minutes in which to complete primary alerting and notification of
the public.
The initial instructional message to the public must include the
elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7)
Extent of Play. The ORO's capability to meet this criterion must
be evaluated at least once every six years during a fast breaker
drill. The ORO's established fast-breaking incident procedures will
be evaluated. When the ORO's point of contact is notified by the
licensee of an emergency situation requiring urgent action, the
applicable ORO should demonstrate the capability to sequentially
provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message
to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the
10-mile plume pathway EPZ in one of the following two ways:
(1) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of
contact demonstrates the capability to sequentially provide an alert
signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated
areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile
plume pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of verified notification from
the utility that a situation exists requiring urgent action. The
initial instructional message should include the elements required
by current FEMA REP guidance. The ``clock'' will start when the
transmission of an initial notification of a General Emergency and a
protective action recommendation from the utility is completed and
verified. Within 15 minutes, actual contact of the primary
notification system facility (facilities) and dissemination of the
initial message to the public should be demonstrated; this is when
the ``clock'' will stop.
Broadcast of the message may be simulated; however, once again,
all activities leading to that point should be demonstrated. In
addition, the ORO(s) should demonstrate the capability to contact,
in a timely manner, an authorized offsite decision-maker relative to
the nature and severity of the event, in accordance with plans and
procedures. This contact may occur either prior to, or immediately
subsequent to, activation of the primary alerting and notification
system. Although it must be accomplished in a timely manner, contact
of the decision-maker does not have to be completed within the 15-
minute timeframe discussed above. The drill will be terminated when
the alert signal activation (simulated) is initiated, the broadcast
(simulated) is initiated by the primary notification system facility
(facilities), and an authorized offsite decision-maker has been
contacted.
(2) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of
contact demonstrates the capability to promptly (in a timely manner)
notify State and local official(s) of the situation requiring urgent
action, who then must sequentially provide an alert signal followed
by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent
resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ
within 15 minutes of notification by the point of contact. The
initial instructional message should include the elements required
by current FEMA REP guidance. The ``clock'' will start when the
transmission of an initial notification of a situation requiring
urgent action is received by the State and local governmental
official(s). Within 15 minutes, actual contact of the primary
notification system facility (facilities) and dissemination of the
initial message to the public should be demonstrated; this is when
the ``clock'' will stop. Broadcast of the message may be simulated;
however, once again, all activities leading to that point should be
demonstrated. The drill will be terminated when the alert signal
activation (simulated) is initiated and the broadcast (simulated) is
initiated by the primary notification system facility (facilities).
The drill will be scheduled to be conducted ``Unannounced''
within a one-week window. The evaluators and controllers for each
jurisdiction will be briefed in detail concerning the extent of play
and timing of the drill. Evaluators and controllers will be
stationed at each location where actions will be initiated, where
alert signals are controlled, and at the applicable primary
notification system facility (facilities). The actual activation of
the alert signal may be simulated; however, all activities leading
up to activation should be demonstrated and should be completed
within the 15-minute time frame. It should be noted that
coordination among OROs is normally desirable; however, in the event
of a fast breaker situation this coordination is not necessary prior
to activation of the primary alert and notification sequence.
All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's
plans and procedures
[[Page 31360]]
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as
noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved
exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup
alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes
following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert
and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)
Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-
approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and
Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power
plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary
alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-
minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate
the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific
emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum,
include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where
to obtain additional information.
For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be
demonstrated and evaluated. The selected routes should vary from
exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be
demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and
notification activities along the route should be simulated (that
is, the message that would actually be used is read for the
evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent
of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be
conducted at some agreed upon location.
Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed
within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of
the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting
needs only be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the
ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent of play agreement, if
the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the
primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s)
actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to
be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities
along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would
actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually
broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of
the Public Address system will be conducted at some agreed upon
location.
All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual
emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the
extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 5.b--Emergency Information and Instructions for the
Public and the Media
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information and
instructions including any recommended protective actions. In
addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure the capability
exists for providing information to the media. This includes the
availability of a physical location for use by the media during an
emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system be available for
dealing with rumors.
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and
instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
(NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, b, c)
Extent of Play. Subsequent emergency information and
instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a
timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements).
For exercise purposes, timely is defined as ``the responsible ORO
personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and
without undue delay.'' If message dissemination is to be identified
as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s)
will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not
considered timely.
The Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should ensure that
emergency information and instructions are consistent with
protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The
emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable
instructions to assist the public in carrying out protective action
decisions provided to them (e.g., evacuation instructions,
evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when
evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place
instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools
and special populations, rumor control telephone number, etc.). The
ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the emergency
classification level (ECL) of the incident. As a minimum, this must
be included in media briefings and/or press releases. OROs should
demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and
understandable to the public, including tribes, within both the
plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the
capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe
protective action areas.
The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including
previously identified protective action areas that are still valid
as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to
ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is
rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs
should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency
information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance
with the plan and/or procedures.
OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency
information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/
or procedures.
If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should
demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of
ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and
businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely,
accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for
subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include
demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent
media briefings and distribute press releases as the situation
warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond
appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information
presented in media briefings and press releases should be consistent
with protective action decisions and other emergency information
provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information
(e.g., EAS messages and press releases) and media information kits
should be available for dissemination to the media.
OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for
dealing with rumors. Rumor control staff should demonstrate the
capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or
refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from
the rumor control staff, including information that corrects false
or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included,
as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public,
media briefings, and/or press releases.
All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual
emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play
agreement.
Evaluation Area 6--Support Operation/Facilities
Sub-Element 6.a--Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and
Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to
implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees
and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the
facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.
Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility
has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to
provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees
and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)
Extent of Play. Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and
registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be
set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or
as indicated in the
[[Page 31361]]
extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for
evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the
monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the
population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Prior to using
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the
process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.
Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees
should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring
productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the emergency planning
zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This
monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that
can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using
an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals
per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and
procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow
demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration
capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated
evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in
order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met.
Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-
hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should
be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.
Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated
and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for
separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff
should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of
contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and
appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate
clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also
exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals,
provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is
contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal
belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or
facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be
contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling
of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.
Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for
determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain
the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately
decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the
ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be
determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level
radiation source.
The capability to register individuals upon completion of the
monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated.
The registration activities demonstrated should include the
establishment of a registration record for each individual,
consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring,
and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in
the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all
acceptable means for registration.
All activities associated with this criterion must be based on
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an
actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play
agreement.
Sub-Element 6.b--Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker
Equipment
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to
implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency
worker equipment, including vehicles.
Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and
resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination
of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654,
K.5.b)
Extent of Play. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the
capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for
contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations
(ORO) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to
equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals
found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate
the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of
equipment including vehicles based on guidance levels and procedures
stated in the plan and/or procedures.
The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be
set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route
markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control
measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for
a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor
the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor
areas such as air intake systems, air filters, radiator grills,
bumpers, wheel wells and tires of vehicles, and door handles, as a
minimum, should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that
were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should
also be checked.
Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and
equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and
conducted by interview.
All activities associated with this criterion must be based on
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an
actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the
extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 6.c--Temporary Care of Evacuees
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the capability to
establish relocation centers in host areas. Congregate care is
normally provided in support of OROs by the American Red Cross (ARC)
under existing letters of agreement.
Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities
demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and
accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning
guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE--Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031)
Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have
been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as
appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-
0654, J.10.h, J.12)
Extent of Play. Under this criterion, demonstration of
congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the
exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of
the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the
services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this
simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would
be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be
demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and
providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the
substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this
objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly
specified in extent-of-play agreements.
Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to
ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have
been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before
entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an
interview process.
If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that
would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets,
sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically
available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of
such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of
sources with locations and estimates of quantities.
All activities associated with this criterion must be based on
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an
actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the
extent of play agreement.
Sub-Element 6.d--Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated
Injured Individuals
Intent
This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to
transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities
with the capability to provide medical services.
Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space,
adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport,
monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated
injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)
Extent of Play. Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination
control
[[Page 31362]]
efforts will not delay urgent medical care for the victim.
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the
capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical
facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the
victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an
extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be
utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal
communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving
medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is
used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must
occur prior to releasing the ambulance from the drill. This
communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results,
if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate,
by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be
monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for
such information.
Monitoring of the victim may be performed prior to transport,
done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Prior to using a
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the
process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All
monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an
actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures should
be demonstrated prior to and during transport and at the receiving
medical facility.
The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to
activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment.
Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of
contaminated injured individuals.
The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make
decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, to
follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain
records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures
for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination
of the individual should be demonstrated or described to the
evaluator.
All activities associated with this criterion must be based on
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an
actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play
agreement.
Dated: June 5, 2001.
Archibald C. Reid III,
Acting Executive Associate Director, Preparedness, Training & Exercises
Directorate.
[FR Doc. 01-14637 Filed 6-8-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-06-P