3 July 2001
Source: Hardcopy from Richard K. Aldrich, author of The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, John Murray Publishers, London. Publication: July 5, 2001. ISBN 0 7195 5423 3. Mr. Aldrich recounts his discovery of this Top Secret document in The Hidden Hand.
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Foreign Policy
[Seal of Prime Minister]
Prime Minister
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
Attached DRP
12/4
PRIVATE OFFICE
I want to see the Secret report prepared by the
late Director of Naval Intelligence and sent to me by the
First Lord when I went to America. Let me have it back
again.
R
WSC
12 April, 1952.
30.x
B.F 15.2.52 Foreign Policy
Top secret
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL TELEGRAM
SERIAL No. 14.7.52
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
Your minute of 21st December.
It is the usual Communist approach to British
intellectuals. A sharp eye should be kept upon the
writer.
W.S.C.
9.1.52.
Paper by D.N.I.
(Vice Admiral Longley-Cook)
(USSR and War)
DRP
TOP SECRET PERSONAL GUARD
[Seal ADMIRALTY SW]
K.H.
PRIME MINISTER
A paper written in July by the late Director
of Naval Intelligence, Vice Admiral Longley-Cook,
has just been brought to my notice. It was shown
to Mr. Attlee by my predecessor, Pakenham, in the
autumn. Mr. Attlee was very interested in it but
did not pursue the matter in view of the imminent
General Election.
I feel that I should let you see a copy of
this document before your visit to America; it is
a long one, but I also attach a summary. I must
add that this paper has never been formally
considered by the Admiralty and contains only the
personal views of its author.
May I ask you to return the paper when you
have perused it? All other copies were ordered to
be destroyed some months ago.
G. P. L. Thomas
21st December, 1951.
It is the usual
communist approach
to British intellectuals.
A sharp eye should be kept upon the writer.
WSC
9.1.52
TOP SECRET PERSONAL GUARD
[Seal and classification on every page hereafter omitted.]
SUMMARY OF D.N.I.'s PAPER
The paper draws attention to three factors
which the author considers should influence British
policy. These factors are:-
(i) The Kremlin does not intend to commit the
U.S.S.R. to total war.
(ii) There is a very real danger that the U.S.A.
may involve herself and her allies in a
"preventive war" against Russia.
(iii) The struggle between the Western democracies
and the Soviet bloc is going to be a very
long term affair and cannot be solved by
total war.
From these factors the author draws the
following conclusions:-
(i) The present world tension is due both to Soviet
misunderstanding and fear of western
intentions and to United States misinterpretation
of Russian history and of the underlying
causes of contemporary Soviet policy.
(ii) The Marxian theory of an advance towards a
Communist Utopia by means of a series of
violent revolutions fits neatly into the
Kremlin's plan for world domination and is
used by Communists everywhere to subvert and
weaken the governments of countries outside
the Soviet bloc.
(iii) Russian history has been marked by successive
territorial advances and retreats. A period
/ of
- 2 -
of advance since 1945 may well now have
been checked and can be succeeded by retreat
if we stand firm.
(iv) The Russians aim to introduce Communism in the
free countries by economic and psychological
means, not by a general military offensive.
(v) The United States have emerged from the last
war richer and stronger than ever, though
perhaps little wiser, and obsessed by a
feeling of anger and frustration towards
recent Russian policy.
(vi) Many people in America have made up their minds
that war with Russia is inevitable and there
is a strong tendency in military circles to
"fix" the zero date for war.
(vii) It is doubtful whether,in a year's time, the
United States will be able to control the
Frankenstein monster which they are creating.
(viii) There is a definite danger of the U.S.A.
becoming involved in a preventive war against
Russia, however firmly their N.A.T.O. allies
object. Therefore the author believes that
we should make it known to the American
public now that, unless Russia attacks first,
they cannot expect to use our territory for
a war against Russia or to have our support.
(ix) Rearmament alone cannot save the West from the
Soviet threat.
/ (x)
- 3 -
(x) We are an old and experienced nation, and we
must make the U.S.A. realise that they will
be morally responsible if the haste and
extravagance of their rearmament plunges us
all into a preventive war.
He therefore considers that we should concentrate
on preserving the balance of Western structural security:
Politically - by proving that our ideals and
methods are better than those
of the Kremlin.
Economically - by safeguarding our own standard
of living and thereby destroying
the germs of Communism.
Militarily - by rearming wisely and with the
realisation that war potential is
more important than immediate
readiness.
N.I.D.7956
"WHERE ARE WE GOING?"
The object of this paper is to draw attention to
three factors which in my opinion should influence our
policy In this country. It is hardly possible to prove
the existence of them factors but my belief in them is
based on the experience of my three years' study, as
Director of Naval Intelligence and as a member of the
Joint Intelligence Committee, of the "Likelihood of War".
2. The Three Factors
1. The Kremlin does not intend to commit the
U.S.S.R. to a general military offensive
("Total War").
2. There Is a very real danger of the U.S.A.
involving herself and her allies in a
"Preventive, war" against Russia.
3. The struggle between the the Western Democracies
and the Soviet Block is going to be a very
long term affair and cannot be solved by
Total War.
3. I submit this paper in the firm belief that the
safety and prosperity of this country depend on our
remaining firmly allied with the U.S.A. Indeed, the
leadership of the English-speaking peoples is essential
to the peaceful progress of the whole world; but if, in
a year or two, it becomes obvious to the British people
that the kinetic energy of American war preparations is
/dragging
-2-
dragging the West into a needless war, they will,never
forgive the Americans, nor would they fight wholeheartedly
on their side.
But I also wish to make it clear that I believe
that Marxist Communism is basically evil and that we have
got to prove - not by war but through a long struggle -
that our system of democracy, built up over at least
400 years of practical experience, to better in every way
ideologically and economically than Marxist Communism.
4. The conclusions of my paper are these:-
a) The present world tension is due both to Soviet
misunderstanding and fear of western intentions, and to
United States misinterpretation of Russian history and of
the underlying causes of contemporary Soviet policy.
b) Human society is in process of an evolution
which cannot be stopped. The Marxian theory of
dialectical materialism states that society advances
towards a communist Utopia by means of a series of violent
revolutions which mark the transition from one stage to
another. This theory fits neatly into the Kremlin's plan
for world domination and is used by communists everywhere
to subvert and weaken the governments of all countries
outside the political control of the Kremlin.
c) Russian history has been marked by successive
territorial advances and retreats. A period of advance
since 1945 may now well have been checked, and can be
succeeded by a retreat, if the West stands firm.
d) The Soviet Union aim to introduce Communism in
the free countries of the world by economic and psychological
/means,
- 3 -
means, not by a general military offensive. Although
the misery and destruction of warfare would produce very
fertile ground for communism in Western countries, the
devastation in the U.S.S.R. would be so great that the
best the Kremlin could hope for would be a stalemate.
They therefore do not intend to commit themselves to
"total war".
e) The United States has emerged from World War II
richer and stronger than ever before, though perhaps
little wiser. She is less than ever inclined to listen
to advice, and to obsessed with a feeling of anger and
frustration as a result of the development of Soviet
policy since 1945.
f) Many responsible persons in the United States
and many millions of the public have made up their minds
that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable., The nation
is rearming on a scale never before known in peace-time,
and there is a strong tendency in military circles to
"fix" the zero date for war.
g) I know of no case in history of a nation which
has armed at this rate without finally going to war. It
is doubtful whether, in a year's time, the United States
will be able to control the Frankenstein monster which
she is creating.
h) There is a definite danger of the U.S.A. becoming
involved in a "preventive" war against Russia, when they
feel strong enough for it, however firmly her N.A.T.O.
allies object. ("We may have to go it alone" is an
expression more and more frequently seen in American
/speeches,
-4-
broadcasts and articles.) If this should occur, our
people would not wholeheartedly support America; there-
fore I believe we should make it known to the American
public that unless Russia attacks first, they cannot
expect to use our territory for a war against Russia, or
to have our support. Or, more diplomatically, we should
try to convince them by supporting Mr. Truman's recent
statement that a "preventive war" was neither desirable
nor likely to succeed.
i) Rearmament alone cannot save the West from the
Soviet threat. Instead, in the case of European countries,
it may well break them economically, which would be exactly
according to the Soviet plan. A sane balance of
expenditure between military strength and internal
economic strength is, therefore, vital to us.
j) As an old and experienced nation, the United
Kingdom has a tremendous responsibility today in advising
the West to maintain the balance between reasonable military
strength on the one hand and economic strength and stability
on the other.
While remembering the great need for Britain and the
U.S. to stand united, we must make the Americans realise
that they will be morally responsible if the haste and
extravagant extent of their rearmament plunges us all into
a "preventive" war.
-5-
"Where are we Going?"
ARGUMENTS
5. In deducing the foregoing conclusions, I attempt
to:-
a) Review afresh Soviet internal and foreign policy;
b) Analyse United States intentions in face of this
policy; and
c) Assess what British policy should be in the light
of a) and b).
6. Since the end of the war in 1945, world affairs
have hinged on four basic factors:-
a) The moral deterioration of Europe and the
breaking up of the British Empire largely
as a result of two world wars;
b) The emergence of the Soviet Union as a
major world power;
c) The great strengthening of the United States
in the political, military and economic
fields;
d) The development and mis-use of Marxism as
a political creed throughout the world.
7. The great desire for a long period of peace after
the defeat of Germany and Japan brought into being the
United Nations Organisation. In order that a policy
could quickly be provided to enable this organisation to
function, the leading nations set to work to study the
/trends
- 6 -
trends in world affairs based on the four factors listed
above.
8. This study soon showed that the world was divided
into two principal spheres of conflict:-
a) The power group, representing the conflict
between the Soviet orbit and the free
countries of the world; and
b) The ideological sphere, representing
a political conflict between countries with
Socialist and Capitalist systems of govern-
ment respectively.
9. The Russian Government's successful use of the
rivalries and differences within the ideological sphere
and the different views held of Soviet intentions by the
leaders of free nations in the-power group, has resulted
in very considerable confusion of thought amongst leaders
and led alike in all countries. For Instance, the two
leading powers of the free world in the power group,
Britain and America, are themselves to some extent rivals
within the ideological sphere.
10. Nevertheless, in 1945, the United Kingdom and the
United States put aside their underlying ideological
differences and took the lead in formulating the policy
of the free world. In the lapse of time since than, it
appears probable that their original appreciation of the
situation was based on a hasty and largely incorrect
appreciation of the intentions of their rivals in the
power group.
/ 11
- 7 -
11. The same can also be said of the Soviet Union.
At the and of hostilities in 1945, the Soviet leaders
made it clear that their war machine was to be retained
at great strength, despite the fact that they were
signatories of the United Nations Organisation and so
pledged to a policy of collective security and disarmament.
12. Skillful exploitation by Stalin of the existing
confusion of thought within the ideological sphere, and
mistrust and misunderstanding between sides in the power
group, has resulted in the present international
situation, which may well be leading to World War III.
It is with a view to clarifying the causes of this tension,
and putting forward measures to relieve it, that the
following remarks are submitted.
SOVIET INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICIES
Soviet Evolution
13. For at least 2000 years, many great and good men
have tried to improve the lot of the common man. It is
by no means a new idea that all men should have an equal
chance in this life,, but the inescapable law of "the
survival of the fittest" and the unchanging characteristics
of human nature have made the theories hard to implement.
14. The growth of liberal ideas at the end of the
18th Century, brought to a head by the great social
changes of the Industrial Revolution of the early 19th,
was followed by the attempts of Marx and Engels to show
how changes in the social order In Europe could benefit
the lower classes of society. Liberal-socialist ideas,
/ in
- 8 -
in various forms, were gradually accepted and introduced,
with occasional back-slidings due to reaction, in all
Western countries.
15. The established order in Russia, however, proved
relatively impervious to liberal or Marxist theories until
the overthrow of Tsarist rule early in this century. In
true Russian style, this new Marxist doctrine was
established by Lenin as violently as the old order had
been dropped. Lenin's practical application of true
Marxist theory was that Moscow should be regarded as the
headquarters of world Socialist revolution.
16. Stalin, on succeeding Lenin, saw that pure Leninism
alone was insufficient to advance the practical interests
of the new Soviet state. The security of Soviet territory
was not going to be insured thereby; neither was the
power position of the Russian empire going to be enhanced
by the acceptance of such a doctrine. Apart from this,
the rise of Fascism, and later of Nazism, made it apparent
that the spread of Marx's revolutionary socialism to all
countries of the world under the direction of Moscow was
unlikely to offset the rise of militant nationalism, which
was producing an increasing military threat from such
countries as Germany and Japan.
17. A major change in Soviet policy appears to date
roughly from the Communist Party "Congress of Victors" of
1954, when the Russian rulers decided that the Communist
Utopia was still outside their grasp, and that the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" (i.e. of the Party
/ bosses
- 9 -
bosses in the Kremlin) must be maintained until the
external threat from Nazi Germany and the capitalist West
bad been eliminated. From that date the Russian economy
was placed on a war footing and the rights and liberties
of the individual were even more ruthlessly than before
subordinated to the needs of the State. All the worst
features of the old Tsarist tyranny were restored, and
the secret police were firmly established as the lynch-pin
of the system.
18. Today,throughout the free world, socialist theories
and ideals continue to spread and modify the social and
economic features in all countries. In the United
States the influence of socialism is still relatively
small. The social evolution which has been in progress
for centuries goes on independently of the rise of the
Soviet Union as a major world power. Nevertheless the
fact that the Soviet has adopted the Marxist, as opposed
to the Liberal, brand of socialism, is of decisive
importance.
Soviet abuse of Marxism
19. The overthrow of Tsarism in the early part of this
century certainly evoked a great wave of sympathy through-
out the whole free world; deep interest was taken in the
first Russian experiments to bring about a new social era.
The subtle reversion to Russian Imperialist policy has
been largely hidden to the outside world by the lowering
of the Iron Curtain.
/ 20.
- 10 -
20. Today, the Soviet people are being governed by
methods which are the complete antithesis of Socialism
as we understand it in Britain. Nevertheless, the
socialist framework is maintained and Marxist revolutionary
principles are being preached 'ad nauseam' from the
Kremlin. A world-wide propaganda campaign is being
waged in order to obtain from outside the Iron Curtain
recruits who are prepared to support Soviet policy in the
misguided belief that Stalin is the champion of the
working classes throughout the world. There is thus
established within the Ideological sphere, a state of
confusion that promotes disunity between those nations
(and within those nations) who are attempting to unite
against the Soviet Union within the power group. In
bringing this about, Stalin has been both clever and
successful.
Soviet Policy and Aims
21. Throughout history, the Russian Empire, with its
vast perimeter, and its lack of natural frontiers, has
been subject to invasion from all directions. Fear of
foreign attack has thus become ingrained in the minds
of the Russian people, and the "Intervention" of 1918-20
underlined it. The corollary to this fear has been the
instinctive reaching out of Russian power towards a
geographical line where a natural defensive frontier can
be found.
22. Whether or not we could have done anything about
this in 1945, the fact is that the Soviet leaders decided
/ to
- 11 -
to retain their war machine at great strength even after
the defeat of Germany and Japan. I believe that they did
this largely to ensure the security of the Soviet Union
from external aggression. The Russians remembered the
intervention of the Western Allies In 1918, the Polish
war of 1920 and, most of all, the German Invasion of 1941.
New weapons, in particular the enormous strides made in
amphibious warfare, and the development of the atomic
bomb, from the knowledge of which Russia had been
officially excluded, all led to increasing Russian
suspicions. There is no doubt that Stalin believed in
1942 that we and the Americans were basing our plans for
ultimate victory on a war to exhaustion between Germany
and Russia. Finally, the exclusion of Russia from the
Atlantic Charter signed by ourselves and the United States
in 1941 bred deep suspicion of the West in Soviet minds.
This has been kept alive and accentuated by the witch hunt
against the American negotiators of the Yalta and other
agreements.
Soviet Policy and Intentions
23. Certain that the West would one day attack the
Soviet Union has undoubtedly coloured Kremlin policy since
1945. This suspicion has of course in no way been
lessened by Western reaction to this policy. The reaction
to the immense scale of Russian defensive measures has
taken the not unnatural form of a general assumption in
the West that the Soviet Union herself was preparing to
attack the free world.
/ 24.
- 12 -
24. Although, perhaps, the analogy is not altogether
a fair one, the strategy, tactics and aims of the Soviet
Union, in the long term, are to be found in print, just as
Hitler's plan for world conquest was set out in "Mein Kampf".
This has been done in the written and spoken words of Lenin
and Stalin, and in the day-to-day propaganda from Moscow.
To quote Stalin in "Problems of Leninism_ - "The co-
existence of the Soviet republic side by side with
imperialist states is unthinkable; one or the other must
triumph in the end; and, before that end, a series of
frightful collisions between either side must occur".
And again - "The transition (from socialism to Communism)
must not be regarded as a fleeting period of super
revolution, but as an entire historical era, replete with
civil war and external conflicts, with advances and
retreats, victories and defeats". (As in the case of
Hitler, however, it is possible also to quote statements
in a contrary sense made from time to time on "tactical"
grounds.)
25. Even before winning the war Stalin was determined
not to lose the peace, and there can be no denying that he
has been successful in the past six years. There may now
well follow a long period of holding tactics or even
retreat; the Russians are in no hurry. (I think it is
worth remembering that the "Eastern Question" was a worry
to us for half of the 19th Century.). The Soviet leaders
hope to achieve ultimate world domination by exploiting
the "contradictions" inherent In the Western way of life,
/ which
- 13 -
which they firmly believe can and will bring about the
moral and economic collapse of the free world.
26. As a constant threat, the Soviet war machine plays
an important part, but, in considering the size of the
Soviet Army, it should be remembered that Russia has
always required a very large standing army for the
garrisoning of her immensely long frontiers. It is not
primarily intended for offensive purposes, and it should
not be allowed to drive the Western powers into attempting
an exact balance of military power. By building huge
armaments, economic instability is produced, followed by
inflation and reduced standards of living. The Marxist
seeds of unrest and discontent, which are sown daily in
propaganda from Moscow, are thus helped to grow.
27. Since the summer of 1948(1) U.K. intelligence reports
have always advised that the Soviet leaders, are unlikely
to commit themselves to total war, even in the long term.
We have invariably stated our opinion that their long term
aim is to achieve world domination by all means short of
war. But we have at the same time advised(2) that they
might be frightened into using their immense army if they
felt their last chance of survival had come in the face of
the rapid build up of U.S. forces and/or German rearmament
on a very big scale.
But should Russia provoke total war, it would
mobilise and units the free world in a manner that could
/ be
(1) J.I.C.(48) 9 (0) Final - 23rd July 1948.
(2) Latest appreciation In J.I.C.(50) 111 Final -
15.2.51.
- 14 -
achieved by no other means. The vastly superior
economic and military potential of the free world would
thereby be integrated and ranged against that of the
Soviet Union, and the result would be the inevitable (but
costly) defeat of Russia and her Satellites.
28. The Russians have never been warlike people in the
sense in which we use the word, say, of the Germans, but
they have always fought well in defence of their country.
Soviet overall policy has relied on establishing security
by undermining the authority of opposing states. Only
after the softening-up process is complete do they absorb
them as "potential aggressors against the Soviet Union".
29. After much careful study, over the past three years,
I have no reason to suppose that Soviet policy is
substantially changed today.
U.S. INTENTIONS IN THE FACE OF THIS POLICY
Review of American Position
30. The United States emerged from the last war richer
and stronger in every way; older warring nations were
rendered correspondingly weaker as a result Of two World
Wars. Today, Americans everywhere are enjoying the full
flush of power resulting from military conquest; they are,
by comparison, more wealthy and more prosperous than ever
before; American power and prestige have never been higher.
31. At the end of hostilities in 1945, the United States
looked forward to a long period of peace which could be
/ devoted
- 15 -
devoted to domestic affairs, greatly improved standards
of living, and to a general consolidation of her very
favourable position.
32. The first apparent evidence that such ideas would
not materialise was shown by the Soviet disregard of the
Yalta agreement, first in the case of Romania, and then
followed by Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and,
later, Czechoslovakia. The soviet Union was in fact
building a defensive belt of satellite countries around
her Western frontier. (That she has found these
satellites very indigestible is another fact.)
33. The chasm dividing the Soviet Union from the West
became clear beyond all doubt in 1947. In March of that
year, President Truman announced his decision to aid
Greece and Turkey; in June, General Marshall proposed
his plan for the economic assistance of Europe. Molotov
refused Soviet cooperation, and Czechoslovakia was called
sharply to order for trying to accept American aid. In
September, the Soviet Union established the foundation of
the Cominform in Warsaw; in December, talks on the
unification of Germany broke down.
34. These and other events sharpened and clarified
the conflict that had been growing since 1945. The
Cominform was designed to work for the closer control and
isolation of Eastern Europe against the increase of
American political influence implicit in the Marshall Plan,
and for the dislodgement of France and Italy from the
Western orbit. The Truman doctrine further increased
/ Soviet
- 17 -
Soviet suspicions of American intentions. Tension was
made ever greater by the military alliance of the Atlantic
Pact; subsequently, a nearly successful attempt at a
further Communist advance in the Far East (Korea) brought
about the decision of the United States to rearm on a
scale never before known in peace time.
United States Frustration
35. A general wave of annoyance was registered
throughout the United States when it was realised that
the Kremlin was not going to cooperate with the White
House after the defeat of Germany and Japan. This first
twinge probably arose from Soviet exploitation of
President Roosevelt's grave strategic error in allowing
Berlin to be divided, and in the cynical Soviet disregard
of the terms of the Yalta agreement. Subsequent Soviet
policy, although based as much as anything else on fear
and misunderstanding of United States intentions, further
aggravated an already angry American public. The Kremlin
has, undoubtedly, foiled American post-war plans to open
up new markets, and has prevented them from reaping the
full benefits of their newly gained strength throughout
the world. The revulsion of American feeling is
illustrated by the witch hunt now in progress against
Roosevelt's former political advisers.
36. The result of this anger and sense of frustration
is to drive American public opinion to the conclusion that
the Soviet Union has aggressive military designs on the
United States as the main bastion of the free world. It
/ is
- 17 -
is not unreasonable to say that American thinking radiates
from this assumption and, as a result, United States
intelligence studies tend to fit in with the prejudged
conclusion that a shooting war with the Soviet Union at
some time is inevitable. This was all too clearly
illustrated when representatives of J.I.C. London met the
United States J.I.C. in Washington last October. Although
the Americans were eventually persuaded to endorse a
combined appreciation of the Soviet threat, based on reason
and factual intelligence, they were quick to alter it to
fit their own preconceived ideas as soon as the London team
had returned to this country. American military plans,
which in our opinion were not based on sound intelligence
or fair argument, have accordingly gone ahead to prepare
for an inevitable clash of arms with the Soviet Union.
By equally unsound methods, this clash seems now to be
"fixed" for mid or late 1952. (In view of the extreme
importance of this factor I append an annexe to this paper
called "Fixing the Date".)
American Intentions
37. The United States is a young nation which, by our
standards, has hardly yet reached maturity; the American
public has never tasted the horrors of war at home; the
New World has not yet felt the boot of an enemy on its
soil, nor has the U.S. Army ever fought a major power on
land until the main forces of that power have been broken
by others. On the contrary, World War I confirmed them
as a first class power, World War II made them the greatest
power. Those wars solved their unemployment problems and
/ brought
- 18 -
brought them prosperity. In these circumstances, it is
not surprising that there is a considerable and growing
of opinion in the U.S. which does not regard the
prospect of a third world war with complete disfavour.
38. Other American are prepared to accept without
question the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union;
this is largely on account of fear. This fear, or dread
of the unknown, is very apparent amongst the dwellers of
the larger American cities, who visualise in their own
concentrated home towns the ruins of Hamburg and Berlin.
These, and other Americans, say - "We have the bomb; let
us use it now while the balance is in our favour. Since
war with Russia is inevitable, let's get it over now.
39. The United States people are intensely interested
in material progress; at all costs they want to maintain
the momentum and avoid a slump. Few Americans will admit
that there is any danger of a slump. They are convinced
that their economic system is sufficiently flexible to be
able to meet any change of world conditions. However,
fear of another slump, such as that of 1929, to American
is as the dread of another civil war to to Spaniards - it
colours their entire outlook. It may not be too unfair
to suggest that one of the first thoughts behind Marshall
Aid was the avoidance of a future slump, The decision
now to rearm militarily and accept the inevitability of
war may, in part, be as a result of slump-phobia. Wall
Street certainly does not control government policy, but
/ there
- 19 -
there do exist financial pressure groups that wield great
power. In addition, the American people are both
mercurial and volatile; they are easily stampeded and
can be whipped up to a state of war hysteria, as is
apparent today, particularly on the West Coast.
40. No American will admit that he wants a third World
War; he will insist that rearmament is being undertaken
solely to prevent total war. Nevertheless, the Americans
are convinced that they are threatened, and have decided
to rearm militarily in order to meet this threat. The
danger, in my considered opinion, lies firstly in the fact
that United States policy is based on false reasoning, and
on intelligence which is shaped to fit a preconceived idea;
and secondly, on lack of any clear policy as to what they
are going to do once they an fully rearmed. Whether my
arguments are right or not, the fact is that most
experienced observers are concerned at the "impetus towards
war" which is increasingly evident throughout the U.S.A.
I feel that the Americans are creating a Frankenstein
monster which, in a year or so's time, they will be unable
to control unless they take steps now to slow the tempo of
their rearmament and mobilisation, and concentrate more on
organising and preparing their war potential. Quite apart
from this is the urgency with which the Americans are
evidently prepared to rearm the Germans and the Japanese.
41. If the United States were to start a preventive
war they would be playing right into Kremlin hands. The
Soviet people would once again see that Russian territory
/ had
- 20 -
had been attacked (by atom bombs), or was threatened by
an American aided attack on a satellite (e.g. Yugoslavia
into Hungary, Chiang Kai-shek into China), and, as in the
past, they would fight with the utmost determination to
defend their soil. For years they have been brought up
in the Marxist belief that "the Capitalist powers, in
their death struggle, would go to war". A preventive,
war initiated by a Capitalist state would give the Soviet
leaders that degree of public support which they could
never expect from their long suffering people if Russian
troops were made to fight outside Russian territory, in
the cause of Soviet imperialism. In fact, such a war
would supply the cohesive force, the lack of which appears
to be one of the main internal weaknesses of the U.S.S.R.
A third World War would, this time, be disastrous to all,
including America. The resulting chaos could only
benefit Communism, which would spread freely whether
Moscow still remained on the map or not.
BRITISH POLICY
42. The Soviet Union is already waging a form of total
war against the free world. It is not their intention
to extend this into a military offensive of the old
(Napoleonic or German) pattern. To do so, Stalin knows,
would be to court certain disaster; by continuing as he
is, and by conducting a relentless psychological and
ideological offensive against all opposing governments
and economies, he may well prove successful, so long as
the free nations continue to turn their face away from
/ the
- 21 -
the real facts and refuse to accept the Soviet challenge
to their way of life. This challenge cannot be met by
military rearmament alone.
43. World structure is based on three essential
securities - economic, political and military. The
stability of any State is dependent on the maintenance
of a balance of those three. By rearming to excess, or
at an excessive rate, this balance can be upset; first,
the economic security goes, then there must follow want
and poverty, with the consequent upsetting of political
security. By rearming to excess or too rapidly, a country
can destroy itself economically and politically, which
fits in exactly with the Soviet plan.
44. As an old and experienced, though now much
weakened, nation, we have a great responsibility towards
civilisation today in giving the guidance of clear and
honest thinking to the Western world. Certainly Western
armaments must be rebuilt sufficiently to discourage
further Soviet expansion, but this must not be carried so
far that the effort breaks us economically. Our policy
should be to make it clear to the Soviet leaders that we
intend to resist, by all military means at our disposal,
any further Soviet, or Soviet-sponsored, aggression.
Concurrently, we should concentrate on preserving the
balance of Western structural security:-
Politically - by proving that our ideals and
methods are better than those of
the Kremlin.
/ Economically
- 22 -
Economically - by safeguarding our own
overall standard of living and
thereby destroying the germs
of Communism.
Militarily - by rearming wisely and with
the realisation that our war
potential is more important,
than immediate readiness for
total war.
45. I am of the opinion that time is on our side,
providing that we can make clear our policy not only to
ourselves but also to the rulers of the Soviet Union.
But it is urgent to see that our knowledge and experience
are put to good purpose by serving as a guide to those
responsible for shaping United STates policy.
If the free world were attacked by Russia, I hope
and believe that we should fight to the last man - and we
should say so now. But the United States should be left
in no doubt that if anything in the nature of a "preventive"
war were engineered by them against the Soviet Union, they
would have to fight alone, for even if H.M. Government
followed suit, how many of our people would willingly do
so?
The struggle ahead of us is a very long one. I
believe we can win, with wisdom and restraint.
ANNEXE I to "Where are we Going?"
"FIXING THE DATE"
The first positive evidence we had of the
Americans prejudging the date was during the U.S./U.K.
intelligence conference last year. Since then, the
date "late 1952" has been evident in many U.S. papers;
and, based on our knowledge of the way they tried to
force the issue at the conference, it has been apparent
that subsequent papers have been written around that
date, rather than any date being concluded from the
available evidence.
2. I think it is worth recalling the attitude of the
Americans at this conference. In the first place
General Magee tabled the proposal that "The first work
of the conference shall be to determine the imminence, of
war". Our Chairman suggested that we were in no position
to determine the imminence of war until we had methodically
considered all the factors affecting the problem.
3. The U.K. team commented: "The U.S. team had come
prepared primarily to consider the date by which a
hypothetical war was likely. The idea of giving serious
consideration to alternative possibilities, other than
total war, was a new one to them. Some of their members
were never able to achieve this objectivity, and they
influenced the discussions throughout, by imposing views
based on pre-conceived opinions. The main differences
between ourselves and the Americans were that there existed
a deep-seated conviction on the part of the U.S. military
authorities that all-out was against the Soviet Union was
not only inevitable, but imminent."
/ 4.
- 2 -
4. The combined intelligence meeting revealed that
the same factors were capable of a totally different
interpretation by the U.S. intelligence authorities.
We, on our part, could not agree with the American
conclusion that "a period of danger exists now and will
extend from the present through 1954, with its peak at
about halfway, i.e. 1952". Using the same factors, we
were unable to conclude other than that "the Soviet army
and navy are probably sufficiently prepared for a major
war now, but we do not consider they will be prepared to
take serious risks of a major war until certain
deficiencies in their air force, A.A. defences and economy
are sufficiently ready. There is little evidence that
this will be before the beginning of 1955."
5. We have now slightly modified our views, namely that
a risk of accidental total war will exist for a long time,
and will be qualified by increases or decreases, according
to the economic, political and military strength and
determination of the free world. The Americans, however,
rigidly stick to the date "late 1952"; and the general
impression that one has in one's dealings with them is
that they are not going to be shaken out of this pre-
conceived opinion whatever the factors of an unprejudiced
appreciation may truthfully indicate.
6. Finally I have been impressed and concerned by my
conversations with many responsible and influential
Americans who are obviously convinced that war with Russia
is inevitable and who have no clear idea what their policy
is going to be once they reach a position of strength.
/ Some
- 3 -
Some talk of an "ultimatum from strength", but
many more believe in the necessity for "smashing the
Russians" at the earliest possible moment.
ANNEXE II to "Where are we Going?"
This paper, conceived in June, was typed on the
6th July, 1951.
In the United States Naval Institute Proceedings
of July - received here 17th July - there is an article
on "The Case Against Preventive War" which the author
opens with the following paragraph.
2. "There has grown up in recent times within the
United States an articulate school of thought which
advocates the initiation of a preventive war now. In
the perilous state of international tension in which we
exist, the idea of seizing the initiative to strike the
enemy before he surely strikes us is one which might be
deemed to appeal to all who seek to preserve the democratic
way of life. The prominence of those who advance the
theory of what has been called "a war of aggression for
peace" has served to enhance its validity among the
adherents of this concept."
3. In a letter dated 28th July from Washington, the
Naval Attache writes to me as follows:-
"Some time ago I wrote to you on the control which
the Military were gaining of the political policies in
this country. Travelling about there is no doubt in my
mind that it is growing and in most local papers in
various states one will always find articles or statements
by some General, Admiral, Colonel etc. advocating policy
and how to deal with the present world crisis. On an
altogether higher plane, it was rather astonishing to me
that the recent mission - in the open - to Spain which
/ involved
- 2 -
involved a change of national policy toward Spain was
undertaken not by a politician or a diplomat, but by
Admiral Sherman. Maybe the change in policy was
dictated by Military needs, but even so one would have
expected it to have been initiated by the civil
administration.
"During the last month I have had many
conversations, mainly with private Americans, as to
what they think will happen in 2 or 3 years' time when
they have built large forces. There is no doubt,
although no one will say openly that they want war, that
there will be considerable pressure to use what they
have spent their money on. It is not human nature to
spend billions on something and then put it on one side.
Some people even do say "Well, isn't Russia just waiting
to choose her moment? Why shouldn't we choose OUR moment
when we are in a position to do so?"
"The danger that I see at the moment is that if
the Military gain too much power in the policy of the
country, and this internal pressure does materialize,
whilst they are the people who also directly control the
forces, they may be pushed too easily into using them.
There is a great feeling in this country that the only way
of dealing with Communism is by force, and it may be
disastrous if there is no civil political leadership to
guide the Military.
"The point as I see it is that whilst rearmament
and the building-up of strength is a necessity now for our
protection and as a deterrent, there is a very fine
/ dividing
- 3 -
dividing line at the moment when to stop in order to
avoid either war or economic disaster, and I don't at
present see the leader in this country who is going to
appreciate that point. It was interesting to see the
immediate reaction in Wall Street to the possibility of
peace in Korea - a sharp decline, temporary only
admittedly. However, we are now only at the beginning
of rearmament, and it will need extremely careful handling
in 2 or 3 years time after we have built up our strength
to reduce the pressure in war production."
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