2 November 2000. Thanks to author and publisher.
Source: The China Threat, Bill Gertz; Regnery, Washington, D.C.; 2000. ISBN 0-89526-281-9.

Selections from several classified and unclassified documents. See another secret document from the book on spying on US nuclear weapons and technology: http://cryptome.org/tct-docs2.htm

Anotations by the author.

[Appendix, pp 246-47.]

A report from the CIA's National Intelligence Daily analyzing Chinese President Jiang Zemin's efforts to consolidate power. (2 pages)

Top Secret
UMBRA

CHINA: Jiang's Position Remains Unconsolidated (S NF)

Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin appears to have weathered criticism of his Taiwan policies but remains unable to parlay his appointment as Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor into the paramount position. The US Embassy reports that rivals are trying to limit his power as next fall's 15th Party Congress nears.

                                                            press reports say National People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi has been openly critical of Jiang's Taiwan policy and key appointments and

(S NF OC)

In addition, Jiang has been unable to assert his authority in areas he should be able to control after seven years as party General Secretary, six as Central Military Commission chairman, and three as President.

                                                            deposed Beijing party secretary and former Politburo member Chen Xitong, whose corruption investigation Jiang spearheaded, will not be brought to trial.

                                                            military leaders, some of whom Jiang promoted, last summer attacked Jiang's policy toward Taiwan as too lenient.

-- Jiang is still resorting to Deng's theories to provide legitimacy to the Communist Party, suggesting an inability to claim Deng's mantle on his own.

(S NF OC)

Jiang's inability to consolidate his power means he will remain focused on domestic issues and is unlikely to initiate any steps to improve relations with the US or Taiwan that could spark internal criticism. Rather, he will pursue less controversial activities -- such as his recent African tour -- to build his own and China's international stature. (S NF) -CIA, DIA-

Top Secret
13                                                                                   3 June 1996

Top Secret
UMBRA

Top Secret

[Appendix, pp. 250-52.]

A proposal by White House National Security Council proliferation specialist Gary Samore that would have allowed China to gain access to missile technology in exchange for agreeing not to sell missile technology to rogue states. The plan was never implemented after it became public. (3 pages)

    
    SECRET                                SECRET
                         NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
                           WASHINGTON. D.C, 20504
                               March 12, 1998

    
    MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE HAMEL/JOHN NORRIS, OVP
                   JOHN HOLUM, STATE/T
                   ROBERT EINHORN, STATE/PM
                   SUSAN SHIRK, STATE/EAP
                   MELINDA KIMBLE, STATE/OES
                   TED WARNER, DEFENSE
                   MARC BERKOWITZ, DEFENSE
                   KEITH CALHOUN-SENGHOR, COMMERCE
                   CATHERINE NOVELLI, USTR
                   JEFFREY HOFGARD, OSTP
                   NORM WULF, ACDA
                   ROBERT DIEKER, JCS
                   JOHN SHOEMARKER, NASA
    
    SUBJECT: China Missile Proposal
    
    The attached paper proposes elements of a missile deal with
    China, to be presented during U/S Holum's trip to China March
    25-26. In essence, we would offer to expand commercial and
    scientific space cooperation with China (in limited areas) if
    China meets our conditions for joining the MTCR and controlling
    its missile-related exports to Iran, Pakistan, etc. (Note that
    Article 10 of the draft NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific
    Cooperation in the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and
    Climate Change has been largely deleted.)
    
    Please provide your comments and clearance to me by COB Tuesday,
    March 17. Thanks.
    

                             [Signature]

                             Gary Samore
                             Special Assistant: to the President and
                               Senior Director for Nonproliferation
                               and Export Controls

    
    cc:  Sandy Kristoff/Jeff Bader
    

    SECRET                                SECRET







    SECRET    
    
    
    ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA MISSILE DEAL
    
    Following are the elements of a missile deal that would be
    proposed to China during Bob Einhorn's expert-level talks in
    China March 23-24 and U/S Holum's "Global Security" discussions
    in China March 25-26. In presenting the package, we would
    propose to complete the elements in time to be announced during
    the President's trip to China later this year.
    
    What China Does:
    
    1. Establishes effective MTCR export controls, and "catch-all"
    controls on items destined for MTCR-class missile programs.
    
       * This meets one of the MTCR's two substantive requirements
         for Chinese membership. it would require China to adhere
         to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and to
         incorporate them into China's export control system.
         "Catch-all" is not an MTCR requirement, but is needed to
         deter circumvention of MTCR controls and to enforce
         limits on Iran (see below).
    
    2. Does not transfer MTCR-controlled equipment and technology
    to Category I (MTCR-class) missile programs in any non-MTCR
    country, including Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Pakistan,
    Syria, Turkey, etc.
    
       * This meets the second of the MTCR's two substantive
         requirements.
    
    3. Does not assist ground-to-ground missile programs in Iran.
    
       * This would cover all ground-to-ground ballistic and
         cruise missiles, even those below MTCR thresholds, and
         would include B610/8610/CSS-8, NP-110, and Shahab-series
         missiles.
    
    What the U.S. Does:
    
    1. Support Chinese MTCR membership, upon implementation of 1 and
    2 above.
    
       * This would provide China with political prestige, the
         ability to shape future MTCR decisions, substantial
         protecticn from future U.S. missile sanctions, and would
    

    SECRET                                SECRET


    


    SECRET

    
         expedite somewhat the consideration of MTCR-controlled U.S.
         exports to China.
    
    2. Conclude NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific Cooperation in
    the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and Climate Change
    Research. (See attached.)
    
       * We would table the draft umbrella agreement during the
         talks, noting its conclusion would be dependent on a
         missile deal.  (NOTE: Regardless of whether we reach a
         missile deal, we would proceed with the space projects
         that were agreed in the context of the Jiang visit.)
    
    3. Issue blanket Presidential waiver of Tiananmen Square
    sanctions to coverall future commercial satellite launches.
    
       * Such waivers currently are issued case-by-case. Under a
         blanket waiver, we would continue to review case-by-case
         the export licenses required to launch U.S. satellites on
         Chinese boosters.
    
    4. Increase number of permitted commercial space-launches.
    
       * We would amend the existing Commercial Space Launch
         Agreement to increase the launch quota. We would also
         make clear to the Chinese that, as a practical matter, a
         lack of progress on the missile issue would prevent us
         form [sic] increasing launch quotas and could even endanger the
         existing quota.














    
    SECRET

    

[Appendix, p. 263.]

A top secret CIA report on China's weapons sales, including a delivery of missile-related cargo to Syria. (1 page)

Top Secret

EAST ASIA (continued)
_______________________________________________________________

China: Possible Missile-Related Delivery to Syria

China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation -- China's premier missile sales firm -- delivered what probably is military-related cargo to Syria early this month, according to special intelligence. Though the exact nature of the equipment, described as special and dangerous, remains unclear, the involvement of CPMIEC and the Syrian end user suggests the shipments are missile related.

                                                            the cargo was destined for the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which is responsible for Syria's ballistic missile, weapons-of-mass-destruction, and advanced conventional-weapons programs.

-- SSRC runs Syria's Scud C ballistic missile production program and an upgrade program for antiship missiles. Moreover, in recent years it has sought and received assistance for each of the projects from CPMIEC.

China: Seeking Advanced US Defense Technology

                                                            a Chinese firm has illicitly obtained sophisticated US-made millimeter-wave traveling wave tubes, power transmission devices that can be used in a variety of military applications, including airborne missile seeking and fire-control radars, targeting systems, and navigation pods.

-- The Chinese will most likely try to duplicate the technology in the power transmission tubes. They have reportedly tried -- with little success -- to produce similar tubes in the past; their efforts have included joint ventures with the Russians.

The cost of the tubes -- obtained in the Philippines -- increased fourfold to $80,000 each because of the illegal nature of the transaction, but there is high military and commercial demand for this equipment.

Top Secret
11                                                                                     17 June 1996

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