11 July 2001. Thanks to Anonymous.

See also: "The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program,"

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp37.htm

By Anonymous

The work of the Apartheid biological/chemical warfare program (1982 - 1994) is currently under the spotlight in the Pretoria trial of Major (Dr) Wouter Basson, formerly of the South African Defence Force. Below is one of the pieces submitted in evidence against him on one of the charges of embezzlement. The document relates to his procurement of pre-cursor chemicals for one of the many bio/chem projects he managed.

Tagged as 'Dr Death' in the post-apartheid press, Basson ran the nuts-and-bolts workings of the programme which included a technical investigation into inducing lethal enzyme scrambling of human DNA sequences unique to the genetic makeup of 'non-whites', in brief, the most dedicated, state-sponsored research towards achieving mass murder based on racial criteria since Dr Josef Mengele of National Socialist Germany. He reported to the head of SADF Medical Services, Surgeon General GEN. Kniels Knobel, formerly Head of Anatomy at the University of Pretoria. Unlike Mengele's fanciful psuedo science, the South African project was deemed practicable on extant scientific knowledge.

A neural incapacitant was also developed that led to paralysis of the central nervous system without lasting effects beyond 36 hours and was intended for battlefield use. South Africa was signatory to the Geneva Conventions that outlawed such weaponry.

Another bizarre project was the mass production (5 tonnes) of the rave drug, Ecstasy, to be used as a crowd-control measure by dispersal onto the riotous black townships of the 1980s.

The state President mentioned below was Frederick de Klerk, the subsequent Nobel Prize laureate.

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[Translation: Afrikaans original]

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Only Copy GG /UG/302/6/J1282

CHRONOLOGICAL COURSE OF EVENTS IRO CROATIAN TRANSACTIONS

1. From 1981 project COAST (now JOTA) had the aim of doing research and development, in a clandestine and covert manner, into the establishment of production technology around the critical and nationally prestigious areas of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) in order to give South African security forces a CBW capacity in accordance with CBW philosophy and strategy.

2. In this manner a number of research and production processes were started and run. Contact was also made with different, official and unofficial suppliers of controlled technologies and products.

3. Initially products and weaponry were developed that included all three classes of chemical agency, namely irritants, incapacitants and lethal agents.

4. On 26 March 1990, the State President, after a wide ranging briefing on the project, issued the guideline that henceforth only irritant and incapacitant weaponry could be produced. Research into lethal agents was to be conducted insofar as it was necessary to develop a defensive capability.

5. After re-evaluation of the programme the VBR (Security Control Council) decided on 25 October 1990 that from then on work would be done on three types of incapacitant and one irritant-type of weaponry and that the irregular [guerilla] and conventional ammunition (of various forms) would be produced containing the three types of incapacitant through all production phases till the first production line (that's to say EOM [?], including VPM [?]).

6. The programme was rescheduled and to be concluded by the end of the financial year 93/94.

7. However, the <selection?> Control Committee on 31 October 1992 was informed of two important considerations:

a. The imminent signing [by South Africa] of the new [UN] Chemical Weapons Control Agreement could possibly hinder our local and international efforts.

b. The increasingly severe control regulations coming into force in Europe in respect of the movement and control of the raw materials necessary for the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction would have rendered most difficult the acquisition that had to be made in 1993.

8. A decision was taken that all acquisition efforts, necessary to finish the offensive project that was dependent on foreign involvement abroad, be expedited and, if possible, finished before the end of 1992. In February 1993 permission was granted to carry over an amount of R6.6 m from the 1993/94 financial year's budget to the 1992/3 financial year so that certain offensive and defensive actions could be concluded earlier to fit in with the speeded-up production schedule.

9. At this stage the project officer [MAJ Wouter Basson] had already negotiated with a group of persons in Croatia for the supply of certain raw material necessary for the weapons project.

10. It is a well-known fact that, during the period of the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the two most important in respect of research in, and production of chemical weapons.

11. Further it was also known that after the fall of the communist control system in the former USSR, numerous officials and state departments began to sell equipment under their control illegally to garner funds for their own departments and people out of fear for the future and the dearth of funding.

12. These actions particularly applied in cases involving equipment that was difficult to obtain and expensive.

13. After a visit by the project officer to Moscow in February 1990, he was introduced to a series of people employed and previously employed in the area of chemical warfare, including a group from Croatia.

14. With the speeding-up of the project and the accompanying budgetary cutoff point it was no longer possible for the project directors to produce the entire chemical component locally; and sources outside South Africa were sought.

15. Already in September 1992 negotiations were being conducted with a group of Croatians in Zagreb to obtain a certain substance M; that would be processed further in South Africa. The leader of the group of Croatians that were being dealt with, was the Minister of Energy Affairs, Mr. M. Kajfeg. In addition the delegation comprised a representative each of the Croatian army, the Croatian border guards and the Security Police (HOS).

16. It was agreed that 500 kg of substance M would be made available to the project officer subject to the following conditions:

a. Sampling of the substance be done by the project officer; thereafter the containers would be sealed.

b. Analysis of the sample would be done in a laboratory in Switzerland by the project officer.

c. Subject to the analysis proving satisfactory, the final price would be determined (according to quality). The estimated amount would be between US$ 4,600.00 per kg and US$ 5,400.00 per kg.

17. The conditions of payment were a problem. The four parties involved apparently did not trust each other and were not satisfied with a single payment without guarantees. Due to the nature of the substance no normal and formal payment guarantees, e.g. letters of credit etc., be used.

18. Arrangements were then made that a deposit would be made into Banque Indosuez in Geneva as a devisable and recoverable guarantee (for all four parties). Each involved party along with the project officer could collect on the relevant guarantee at the successful conclusion of delivery and payment. Each party would be paid through an agent acceptable to everyone and stationed in Zagreb. This agent would handle the total amount.

19. The test samples were of high quality and the project officer took possession of them in Austria (because of the closure of Zagreb airport). He accompanied the convey from Zagreb to the Croatian depot in Austria.

20. The direct transfer of funds to the agent (Captain Jurg Jacomet, who is also involved with the Swiss Intelligence Service) happened on 6 November 1992 into an account with the Zagrebacka Banka situated in Zagreb, Croatia, from an account held by D John Truter in Zurich. The amount of US$ 2,300,000.00 was involved.

21. This agent was responsible for the further transfer of funds to the involved parties who should receive disbursement.

22. Two parties received their due payment and their respective guarantees were withdrawn by the Geneva bank and the monies were returned to South Africa, amounts of US$ 400,000.00 and US$ 390,000.00 during December 1992.

23. At this stage contact was lost with the relevant Croatian authorities, also CAPT Jacomet. Attempt to contact them by the project officer failed and it was said to him on his visit to Zagreb in January 1993 that the parties were preoccupied at the war front. Since the situation in the region was relatively chaotic, the inability to contact them did not raise much concern.

24. By February it had become plain that the government officials involved, and CAPT Jacomet, had been arrested as a result of a number of dubious transactions through which the government official (Minister Kajfeg) was implicated. The purchase/sale of substance M was not the cause of the problem; he apparently had embezzled other monies.

25. At this stage it was requested <by GG/KLK [Surgeon General/Niels Knobel]> that the project officer again visit the country involved in an attempt to sort the situation out.

26. From conversations with Jacomet, who had in the meanwhile been released, officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Banker in Zagreb, it was determined that the money in the account was removed temporarily by the Croatian government, pending certain inquiries among those involved. However, the project officer was assured that the whole problem would be resolved by the end of March 1993.

27. Throughout the project officer was kept informed telephonically by CAPT Jacomet that a solution was being found.

28. When there was no solution or improvement in the situation at the end of March 1993 the KBK [ ? ] was again informed and the project officer again returned to Europe to resolve the situation as speedily as possible. The first visit, during which different Croatian Government officials and representatives were consulted continued from 7 April 1993 until 7 May 1993.

29. A follow-up visit was made over the period 11 May 1993 till 14 May 1993. During this visit it was possible to obtain, through the services of the Danish Intelligence Service, important documents with a value of US$ 40m. The "bearer bonds" were provided through the Vatican to the Croatian government (through the intermediary) for the purchase of weapons (via non-traceable funding) and was conducted by the Dane involved and the project officer.

30. The agent involved was informed that the project officer had secured control over the [financial] instruments and would swap them for the cancellation of the outstanding guarantee of US$ 1,600,000.00 which at that stage could not be touched.

31. Further negotiations followed and as a result the project officer was invited to discuss the matter with KOS in Zagreb. These discussions took place in Zagreb from 26 to the 28 June 1993.

32. During these discussions a letter of authorization was handed over to the project officer under which he lawfully took possession of the important documents to the value of US$ 5m. These documents could not then be exchanged or sold in order to generate funds to meet the outstanding monies and to cancel the devisable and recoverable deposit and return the monies back to South Africa.

33. On the 28th June these instruments were presented by the project officer on behalf of CAPT Jacomet, to the Anlage-und-Kreditbank in Zurich for payment.

34. Nevertheless, the whole episode had apparently been reported to the Zurich Police by the Croats involved and the project officer was detained for questioning until midday 30th June when he was released.

35. The matter is being further investigated by the Zurich Police and the project officer declared himself prepared to return to Zurich in the event of further inquiries being necessary.

36. In the course of the above investigation duress was applied against the project officer and the outstanding payment was made to the parties involved out of the recoverable deposit. The project officer was released on the grounds of a document he had in his possession specifying that he had acted at the order of CAPT Jacomet and with his full consent. CAPT Jacomet was further questioned and then released after the intervention of the Swiss Intelligence Service.

37. After the project officer's return on Friday 2 July he only reported back on the matter on Monday 5 July as a result of exhaustion and convalescence abed.

38. The following pertinent points are of relevance:

a. During a briefing before the Minister of Defense on 2 January 1993, the order was given that all incapacitants (including pre-cursor chemicals) and such like be destroyed.

b. These substances were destroyed as ordered and a Certificate of Destruction (dated 30 March 1993) was issued.

c. The technology to resume production afresh was retained as per the order.

39. On 30 April 1993 the new Minister of Defense was shortly briefed on the project. At the briefing he issued the order that the research into the water- and foam-form of NGT [ ? ] be re-evaluated. Copies of the briefing documents to Mr. E. Louw and the certified notes were handed over to him.

40. On 14 May 1993 a scaled-back KBK informed the Chief of the South African Defense Force that the project officer was still abroad attempting to secure the recoverable deposits back to South Africa. At this stage assurances were once again received that the matter would be resolved shortly.

41. On 22 June 1993 the proposed severance packages for the personnel of D John Truter Financial Consultants were presented to the Chief of the South African Defense Force, GG <surgeon General> and Chief Staff Finances. At this stage GG also recommended that the development of the water cannon be continued along with the water-form of the NGT, but that the work on the foam-form should be scrapped. This was approved by the Minister of Defense.

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