nukes-29000.htm + 29,000 Names and Addresses of Nuclear Licensees June 11, 2007 army-oio.htm + Army Offensive Information Operations RFP June 9, 2007 nsa-liberty.htm + NSA Opens 100s of New Docs on USS Liberty Attack June 9, 2007 cia-blackholes.pdf + CIA Secret Detention Facilities June 9, 2007 nsa-ip-info2.htm + More NSA IP Packet Tracking and Analysis June 8, 2007 doj060707.htm + Federal Detainees Grow 1000 Per Cent: Ka-Chink June 8, 2007 bop060607-2.htm + Annual Cost of Federal Prisoner: Ka-Chink June 8, 2007 nsa-ip-info.htm + NSA IP Packet Tracking and Analysis June 6, 2007 jfk-tanks.htm + Eyeballing the JFK Airport Fuel Tanks June 3, 2007 usemb-iq.htm + Eyeballing the US Embassy Baghdad June 2, 2007 nsa-ping.htm + NSA Resources For Rapid Targeting and Analysis June 2, 2007 sss060107.htm + Draft Board Spies College Students June 2, 2007
O f f s i t e
Mujahid 2 Analysis of Technical Mujahid 2 June 10, 2007 USA Gag America's Secret Obsession June 10, 2007 Moakus Coast Guard Deepwater Doo Doo June 9, 2007 Black Ops Blackwater Thugs Sue Families of Iraq War Dead June 9, 2007 Sweettalk Educing Information June 9, 2007 Home Spy CIA Officers Home Addresses June 9, 2007 SI Ed Strategic Intelligence Education June 8, 2007 Rogues 4 The Corporate Takeover of US Spying 4 June 8, 2007 NSA Patent 2 Synchronization Without Broadcasting Signal June 8, 2007 NSA Patent 1 Automated Permutation Method and Apparatus June 8, 2007 BE Bio Belgian Biometric Passport June 6, 2007 Rogues 3 The Corporate Takeover of US Spying 3 June 6, 2007 Rogues 2 The Corporate Takeover of US Spying 2 June 6, 2007 JFK Plot Complaint Alleging Plot to Attack JFK Airport June 2, 2007 Rogues 1 The Corporate Takeover of US Spying 1 June 2, 2007 Feeb FBI Web Mail Service June 2, 2007
Cryptout Recent Listings OTHER STUFF Contact, Public Key |
A writes: An alternate link for the Salon story, "The Corporate Takeover of US Spying;" the Salon link is subscription only, the one below is free.
A writes: Why do you suppose that two of the three NRC listings in my home state (NH, Region1) are a preschool and a church? You sure this is legit? Cryptome: Good question which applies to most of the listings which don't appear to fit the NRC rationale below for licensing. It is likely the list contains names of parties which commented on nuclear regulation, probably in opposition to a toxic site. If so, it would be a substantial privacy violation by NRC to release the list without explanation or warning to the parties listed. Maybe some of the innocents will write to complain about the NRC toxic threat for targeting them.http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/privacy.html#3 ___________________ http://cryptome.org/nrc-lic/nukes-29000.htm 29,000 Names and Addresses of Nuclear Licensees "In the United States there are large quantities of nonfissionable but highly radioactive materials contained within machines, primarily in hospitals and at industrial sites, and the machines, because they are expensive, are sometimes stolen for resale. In fact in the United States alone there are hundreds of thefts of radioactive material every year. As to why no dirty bomb has yet been assembled and used, analysts provide earnest explanations, but largely to avoid throwing up their hands in wonder. It turns out that the world is rich with fresh, safe, user-friendly Highly Enriched Uranium -- a global accumulation (outside of our collective thirty thousand nuclear warheads) that is dispersed among hundreds of sites and further separated into nicely transportable, necessarily subcritical packages. The practical question is how to pick some up." -- The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche, 2007, pp. 18, 27.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/08/AR2007060802496.html America' Secret Obsession For the past six years, I've been exploring the resurgent culture of secrecy. What I've found is a confluence of causes behind it, among them the chill wrought by 9/11, industry deregulation, the long dominance of a single political party, fear of litigation and liability and the threat of the Internet. But perhaps most alarming to me was the public's increasing tolerance of secrecy. Without timely information, citizens are reduced to mere residents, and representative government atrophies into a representational image of democracy as illusory as a hologram. But the notion that information is more credible because it's secret is increasingly unfounded. In fact, secret information is often more suspect because it hasn't been subjected to open debate. Those with their own agendas can game the system, over-classifying or stove-piping self-serving intelligence to shield it from scrutiny. Those who cherry-picked intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq war could ignore anything that contradicted it. Even now, some members of Congress tell me that they avoid reading classified reports for fear that if they do, the edicts of secrecy will bar them from discussing vital public issues. Even before 9/11, the nation was expending enormous energy sifting through historical records that had been public for 25 years or more, searching for anything that might aid terrorists. At the National Archives, an Energy Department employee, relying on a list of key or "dirty" words, spent month after month going through hundreds of thousands of dusty records for anything that might be used against the nation and therefore require reclassification. He and a cadre of security specialists were focused on the nuclear threat. On Sept. 10, 2001, he found himself perusing a box of decades-old files in which he found records chronicling the story of a B-25 bomber that flew into the Empire State Building in a thick fog on July 28, 1945, killing 14 people and traumatizing the city of New York. But neither "airplane" nor "skyscraper" appeared on his word list, and he had the records returned to the open shelves. The next day he realized that he had been staring into the face of the real peril. It was a humbling lesson in the limits of secrecy -- and a stark reminder that what we have to fear is not information but a lack of imagination.
http://cryptome.org/army-oio.htm ARMY OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGIES The Army manages several OIO initiatives that provide supported elements with the ability to interdict enemy networks and other communication platforms. This BAA represents a concerted effort to leverage innovative technologies that will satisfy these requirements and prevent enemy forces from detecting and countering efforts directed against them. Technologies designed to interrupt these modern networks must use subtle, less obvious methodology that disguises the technique used; protecting the ability whenever possible to permit future use. This solicitation seeks vendors that have the ability to develop specific OIO capabilities described above and to achieve operational effects at a clearly defined level of excellence required by battlefield commanders against key enemy communications elements in todays modern battlefield. Once demonstrated, capabilities must be integrated into new or existing systems to achieve the desired result under both laboratory and field conditions. Fieldable prototypes will undergo stringent formal testing (developmental and operational) to verify readiness for field use. The overall goal of this solicitation is to design and develop operationally functional OIO technologies that have the ability to defeat enemy communication networks without causing serious or permanent damage while using methods and techniques that protect technologies and methodologies.
A writes: You recently posted a BOP document about the fed population of detainees. I can relate to this. I work for a private contractor of federal inmates. Our facility is a half-way house, a RCCM. Our population at any given time is 157, which is maxed out. Next door to us is a U.S. Marshall detention center which is run by a different federal contractor. Their current population is in the area of 900. They just recently broke ground for an addition which will house an additional 850. At our facility we do save the taxpayer money. These residents of our facility all undergo drug treatment and aftercare. They all do routine drug testing 4 times a month. All of them, except for the disabled are required to go into the community and gain employment within 2 weeks of arrival. All of them are required to pay susbsistence to cover the expense of supervising them. If they become problems of one sort or another, they become program failures and sent back to the BOP. These residents are under the close scrutiny of not just the staff of our facility but also the BOP. Nothing is left to chance. The BOP has issued strict guidelines that all contractors must follow. I assure you, nothing is left to chance. If there is any doubt as to any risk any of these individuals may place on the community they are restricted to the facility until the matter is resolved, a temporary disciplinary action is carried out, or they are returned to BOP custody. Program failure rate is less than 5% from our facility. The recidivism rate after they release home I am not sure of. But very few return to us for parole/probation violations. __________ http://cryptome.org/doj060707.htm During the past 20 years, the federal detainee population has experienced unprecedented growth as a result of expanded federal law enforcement initiatives and resources. During this time, the detainee population has increased by over 1,000 percent, from approximately 3,000 in 1981 to over 55,000 today with continued growth in the federal detainee population expected for the foreseeable future.
http://www.dia.mil/college/academics.htm The Graduate Center at the National Security Agency (NSA) offers a 2-year part-time MSSI program tailored for NSA professionals, including core courses, Signal Intelligence-related elective courses and a masters thesis. Core courses are taught by NDIC faculty and the Signal Intelligence electives are taught by adjunct faculty members who are senior NSA professionals and subject matter experts.
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Cryptome is now on a new ISP, Network Solutions, another US giant like
Verio, closely linked to the authorities. We'll see if it can take the heat
or cave. We intend to test all the giants if necessary to see what is up
with them and the censors: if one buckles we'll sign up with another. And
air the results. Meanwhile the archives are being distributed worldwide by
other means.
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