The feed back on the paper "FMCT and India Part
I" was good.
The frequently asked questions were
* Whether the proposed FMCT is universal and not
discriminatory?
* Whether the weapon powers could be trusted on
their word about not producing fissile material anymore and if so why is it that they
haven't come out with an open declaration about their intentions?
*What steps have been taken to safe guard the
fissile materials from dismantled weapons and prevent their recycling?
* What happens to the core issue of the NPT of
nuclear disarmament?
* Should India declare a moratorium on production of
fissile material as is being insisted by US in their bilateral talks with India?
It is well known but needs to be emphasised once
again that the FMCT is part of a larger framework of a comprehensive non proliferation
regime not only for prevention of horizontal and vertical proliferation but also as part
of total disarmament to fulfill the objectives of Article VI of the NPT. Thus the proposed
FMCT is not a "stand alone" treaty but will have to be assessed in a larger
context together with the NPT and CTBT and the test would be whether these measures make
non proliferation irreversible. A monitoring system that ensures strict auditing of
sensitive missile material production facilities will also have to be in place in tandem.
The FMCT technically speaking, is non discriminatory
and universal, in that it prevents production of fissile material for weapon purposes of
all countries. In actual fact it could address only declared weapon powers the P5, the two
declared but unrecognized weapon powers India and Pakistan ( Perhaps India, Pakistan and
Israel could be called emerging nuclear powers) and T1, the lone threshold power, Israel.
But the discrimination is already embedded in the NPT where the weapon powers are treated
separately and this continues. If the whole non proliferation regime which includes NPT,
CTBT and FMCT, is taken as a "comprehensive whole," then the FMCT can be
considered as discriminatory.
Many suspect that the FMCT was mainly meant to curb
the three states, India, Pakistan and Israel that are outside the NPT from producing
fissile material further. This view is strengthened by the statements made by some of the
states in the second preparatory Committee of the 2000 Review Conference of the States
Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Geneva in April 1998.
A typical example is the speech by the Australian Representative at Prep. Com on April 30,
1998. While paying obeisance to article VI of NPT, a ritual followed by weapon powers and
some others, he says that "it is essential that the fissile material production
facilities in those states which are not parties to the NPT and which operate facilities
outside the safeguards are part of the treaty." It goes on to say that "unless
these (Non NPT) become part of the FMCT, its potential to contribute significantly to the
elimination of nuclear weapons will be greatly diminished . . . ," thus placing the
responsibility for disarmament on the non NPT states and lauding the efforts of weapons
powers for "determined pursuit . . . of the objectives set out in Article VI of the
Treaty."
From the Indian point of view, having tested not one
but five including a thermo nuclear device, instead of looking at the treaty clinically
whether it is universal and non discriminatory, it would be better to see whether signing
of FMCT serves India's interests and does not diminish its security threats.
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State in his
speech at Brookings Institution on 12th November, while referring to FMCT said as follows;
"We are urging India and Pakistan to take in the near future to halt all production
of fissile material which constitutes the essential building block of nuclear weapons. On
this point there have been some encouraging developments: the agreement earlier this year
of India and Pakistan to join talks at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, on a
fissile material cut-off treaty allowed those long stalled discussions to go forward. This
agreement could be an important milestone in promoting international acceptance of a key
principle of nuclear arms control. But even if as we hope those negotiations go well and
move forward quickly, completion and formal entry into force on a cut-off treaty is still
several years away. To prevent accumulation of fissile material during that time, we urge
India and Pakistan to join the other nations that have conducted test explosions in
announcing that they will refrain from producing conclusion of a treaty fissile material
for nuclear weapons pending conclusion of a treaty."
This statement makes two basic presumption 1. that
the weapon powers (P5) have stopped producing fissile material and 2. that it has been
done as part of an arms control measure.
Both the presumptions appear to be wrong. Firstly
the weapon powers as pointed out in Part I of this paper, have stopped producing fissile
material because they have fissile material in excess of their requirements, causing
problems in storage, accounting and security in some states like Russia. This is not the
case with India. Secondly, except in the case of USA, there is no authentic information
that the weapon powers have really stopped producing fissile material. The case of a
chance remark by a senior scientist affiliated with the nuclear weapons programme in 1994
being taken as a definitive position of China has already been referred to earlier in Part
I of this paper.
In the case of Russia, it is learnt that weapon
grade plutonium is still being produced. Three reactors, two at Seversk (Tomsl-7) and one
at Zeleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) which generates electricity in Siberia is separating
Plutonium to prevent corrosion of the nuclear fuel discharged from reactors and the
stockpile of unsafeguarding Plutonium is increasing by 1.5 tons per year. ("Excess
weapons Plutonium: How to reduce a clear and present danger? Arms Control today 26:9,
1996, p.8). Russia is said to hold more than 200 tons of excess fissile material and
another 30 tons of separated Plutonium for civilian purposes. The Russians themselves do
not have a proper inventory of their holdings. Many of the facilities are not fully secure
either. One such example cited by the analysts was that the famous Kurchatov Institute in
building 116, thousands of pellets of Plutonium and Highly enriched Uranium (HEU) were
found in the building opening to the street level and locked by a padlock. The place has
since been secured. This is being pointed out only to show that before any fissile
material production is stopped, steps will have to be taken to ensure that what is
available and found to be surplus in properly secured and institutionally safeguarded.
In taking a view on declaring a moratorium as
insisted by the US, India should take into account two aspects.
* The informal declarations of weapon powers of
their discontinuance of production of weapon grade fissile material should not be
accepted, unless there is a formal declaration not only of stoppage of production but also
a declaration of their surplus stocks as USA has already done and how they propose to
place them under international monitoring and safeguards system.
* An objective review should be undertaken to see
whether the stockpiles India holds will be sufficient to meet the demands of the limited
deterrence India is seeking.
Having done that and if found that India has
sufficient stock of fissile material, it could declare a moratorium on further production
of fissile material. Talbott himself has said that even if negotiations go well and move
forward quickly, completion and formal entry into force on a cut- off treaty is still
"several years" away. This would mean acceptance of a stockpile for India for
the interim period and implicit in its acceptance, is a weapon power status for India.
Till Pokhran II tests, India was in an unenviable
position of keeping the weapon option open and at the same time working for total
disarmament. This was an unstable situation. Having tested devices of varied configuration
and having declared itself a weapon power, India cannot remain outside the global non
proliferation framework indefinitely. A way has to be found to involve itself in this
regime without compromising its security and without succumbing to the pressures of the
weapon powers. It is a difficult task but could be done.
20-12-98
Dr. S.Chandrasekharan.
