Despite the continued activities of some
Marxist and Maoist groups in India, Nepal, the Philippines, Japan and some
countries of Latin America, terrorism inspired by ideology is on the decline
after the collapse of the communist state in the erstwhile USSR and other
countries of East Europe.
The major ideological terrorist groups of West
Europe such as the Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army faction of the former
West Germany, the Red Brigade of Italy, the Action Directe of France and
the Revolutionary Communist Cells of Belgium have practically ceased to
operate.
In West Asia, the remnants of the multilateral
terrorist network led by Carlos alias Michel have disappeared without a
trace after the arrest in Sudan of Carlos and his detention in France and
after the surrender to the German authorities of Carlos' No.2, the German
Yohannes Weinrach alias Peter. Nothing is known of the Palestinian Ali
(full name not known), who used to act as the No.3 of this network.
Religion and ethnicity based terrorist groups,
however, continue to be active. Their terrorism is not motivated by ideology.
It is more an expression of anger over perceived injustices to minority
religious and ethnic communities by the majority communities and a symbol
of assertion of the feelings of separateness of the aggrieved communities.
The expression of anger and the assertion of feelings
of separateness have been motivated by various factorsthe perceived neglect
of the political and economic aspirations of the minorities, feelings of
injustice by the majority communities and fears of danger to their culture
from external influences.
Amongst other causes, particularly in the case
of trans-national Islamic terrorist groups, one could cite feelings of
continued injustice towards the Palestinians, the outrage over the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the large-scale induction of
Western troopswhich are mainly projected as Christian troopsinto the
Gulfparticularly into Saudi Arabia where the holiest of the holy places
of Islam are located--- during and after the Gulf war of 1991.
The trans-national Islamic terrorists of today
see no difference between the induction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
in the 1980s and of American troops into the Gulf in the 1990s. They view
both as external interference to preserve the political and economic interests
of external powers by preventing the weakening of the hold of the Soviet
(in the case of Afghanistan) and Western-influenced/controlled local political
and social elite.
It is the feeling of Islam being in danger from
the Soviet troops which galvanised the Mujahideen of Afghanistan and their
external Islamic supporters such as the Arab mercenaries of Osama alias
Osman Bin Laden. It is a similar feeling of Islam being in danger from
the US troops in this region which is presently galvanising the Islamic
extremist groups in various countries of the region and their external
Islamic supporters such as Bin Laden.
The apparent US hopes that its vigorous intervention
in support of the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo would dilute the anger of
the Muslims in the rest of the worldparticularly in West Asiaare being
belied. Islamic extremists of West Asia view the US intervention as an
attempt to divert attention from what they perceive as its machinations
in West Asia.
Of all the religion-based groups, those based
in Islam have thus been the most active and have shown a capability for
sustained, spectacular actions not only inside the territory of the country
in which they were born, but also outside. The networking and solidarity
amongst the various Islamic extremist/terrorist groups continue to be strong
and the various Afghan Mujahideen groups and their Arab fellow-fighters
are still their major sources of inspiration and support.
A new phenomenon of the 1980s and the 1990s was
the appearance and aggravation of sectarian terrorism (the Sunni majority
vs the Shia minority) in Islam in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Denominational
terrorism within the same religious group (the Catholics vs the Protestants)
was previously confined to Christianity in Northern Ireland. It has now
afflicted Islam toomainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In both these countries,
it is the majority group (the Sunnis ) which took to terrorism against
the minority group (the Shias), provoking the latter to retaliate in kind.
The terrorism of the majority sect was provoked
not by any political, economic, social or religious grievances, but by
a determination to force the minority sect to accept the majority sect's
interpretation of the religion's teachings and practices. This sectarian
terrorism of the majority against the minority sect of the same religion
has been even more ruthless than the terrorism of Islamic groups against
Christians, Hindus and the Jewish people. While the number of successful
international terrorist incidents has declined during this decade, the
average number of casualties per successful incident has increased.
While the decline in the number of incidents is
due to the better training and capability of the counter-terrorism agencies
and increased international co-operation against terrorism, the increase
in the number of victims per incident could be attributed to the better
training, expertise and weapons which had become available to terrorist
groups from various States such as the US during the Afghan war, Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan which had not hesitated to
use them to achieve their own national geo-political objectives.
Despite international condemnation of State-sponsorship
of terrorism, official agencies of Iran, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan
continue to assist various Muslim extremist groupseach for its own reason.
While they have assisted other States in acting against ideological terrorist
groups as seen from the Sudan's assistance to France in the arrest and
deportation of Carlos, they have been chary of similarly acting against
Islamic terrorists.
The only exceptions to this were the assistance
extended by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to the FBI
of the US in the arrest and deportation of Ramzi Yousuf, wanted in the
New York World Trade Centre bombing case, Mir Aimal Kansi, wanted for the
assassination of two CIA officers, and some suspects in the recent bombings
of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniya.
Another phenomenon of the 1990s has been the private
sponsorship of terrorist groups by rich individuals (Example :Bin Laden)
and private organisations in order to achieve their own agenda and the
use by the State of such private organisations to help terrorist activities
in other States without getting directly involved. A typical example is
the Pakistani use of the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad (the Centre For Preaching)
and its armed wing the Lashkar-e-Toiba (the Army of the Pure) in Kashmir
and other parts of India.
In addition to classical terrorist groups, irrational
individuals or groups of individuals have shown a tendency to take to terrorism
to give vent to their anger against the society or the Government. Typical
examples would be the Aum Shinrikyo sect of Japan, which killed a number
of innocent civilians through the use of the Sarin gas in March,1995, and
the two US citizens, disgruntled against the Federal Government, who bombed
the building housing the Federal offices in Oklahoma in April,1995.
The terrorist groups of today have been able to
constantly have the quality of their weapons and means of communication
upgraded with the help of contributions from the prosperous members of
their communities all over the world and their earnings from the narcotics
trade. While counter-terrorism agencies have scored many spectacular successes
in their ground action against terrorists, they have not had similar success
in stopping the flow of funds to terrorists and in effectively controlling
the use of narcotics to keep terrorism sustained.
The Internet is proving to be a double-edged weapon.
It has revolutionised means of communications and spread of knowledge.
At the same time, the rapid spread of Internet even before the intelligence
and other security agencies and their political masters have had time to
understand the security implications of it and to equip themselves to deal
with those implications has made the tasks of counter-terrorism agencies
more difficult than in the past.
Modern means of communications such as mobile
telephones, the FAX instrument , the satellite telephone and the Internet,
the mushrooming of public telephone booths and cyber cafes, the availability
of mobile telephones for temporary hiring and the commercialisation of
cryptography (the science of coding and decoding) have given the terrorists
hitherto unimaginable scope for operational flexibility.
A similar flexibility continues to be denied to
intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies by outmoded laws regulating
communications interception and the reluctance of society and the State,
often under pressure from human rights groups, to update these laws to
empower the agencies to deal more effectively with high-tech terrorism.
The State and society unfairly expect high-tech terrorism to be tackled
by low-tech counter-terrorism methods.
The widespread dissemination by irrational elements
through the Internet of details regarding the making of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) has placed at the disposal of terrorist and terrorism-prone
irrational elements knowledge of such techniques.
And the collapse of the USSR, the floating around
without jobs of a large number of ex-Soviet scientists and the erosion
of security measures in the WMD establishments of the former States of
the USSR have given rise to fears of terrorist and irrational elements
graduating one day to the use of WMD to intimidate States, Governments
and societies. The use of the Sarin gas by the Aum Shinrikiyo of Japan
and Bin Laden's justification, in his interview to the "Time" magazine
( January 13), of his search for WMD show that such a scenario can no longer
be dismissed as far-fetched.
How to equip the counter-terrorism agencies with
the capability to deal with such an eventuality without its resulting in
an excessive increase in counter-terrorism budgets and without creating
an atmosphere of paranoia in civilian society is a question to which adequate
attention has not been paid outside the US and Japan.
The networking of the financial, economic, military,
scientific and technological infrastructures of the world through computers
has placed at the hands of computer-literate terrorists the means of causing
considerable economic damage without having to penetrate the physical security
infrastructure of establishments.
This is called cyber-terrorism. The cyber-terrorists
have a new class of high-tech mercenaries at their disposal. The mercenaries
of the pre-cyber age came from other countries crossing international borders
to wield arms on behalf of the terrorists for a monetary consideration.
The hackers, the mercenaries of the cyber age, would be able to assist
terrorists hiring their services for the disruption of the data, communication
and public utility services networks of States without ever having to leave
the territory of their country.
International counter-terrorism co-operation has
increased during this decade, but this has been mainly in the form of sharing
of intelligence and aids in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist
incidents. International co-operation through the pooling of operational
expertise and resources for joint operations to penetrate terrorist networks
is, however, lacking either due to political reasons or due to fears of
one's own operational secrecy being compromised or both.
Such co-operation is not easy to achieve. Intelligence
and counter-terrorism agencies of the same State are often reluctant to
co-operate with each other and to co-ordinate their operations. Any such
co-operation at the international level is not for tomorrow. Till such
co-operation is achieved, counter-terrorism efforts would continue to be
stymied.
B.Raman
6-1-99
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat Govt. of India, and presently Director, Institute
For Topical Studies, Chennai)