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SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS:
A CHRONOLOGY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On
the eve of the 11th meeting of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG) to discuss
bilateral relations, with special reference to the pending border dispute, it would be
useful to analyse the set-back to the bilateral relations since May, 1998, and the Chinese
perception of its relations with India in the bilateral and global context after the
Pokhran II nuclear tests.
An
attempt has been made to cover all important Chinese statements since May 1998 in this
chronology.
From the chronology, one could notice three phases in the Chinese reactions.
In
the first phase (May to July, 1998), there was a strong barrage of criticism of the
statements of George Fernandes, the Indian Defence Minister, and Prime Minister Atal
Behari Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton portraying the threat from China as a
motivating factor for the Pokhran II nuclear tests. The characterisation of the Chinese
threat was condemned by China as hurting the Chinese people and projected as a mere
pretext to cover India's hegemonistic ambitions. The tests were viewed as also indicative
of India's desire to acquire a new political status through the possession of nuclear
weapons. During this phase, the Chinese criticism of India related to the bilateral
(damage to Sino-Indian relations) as well as global (damage to the global
non-proliferation regime) aspects. There was rigidity in the Chinese attitude to both
these aspects.
In
the second phase (July-middle to December, 1998), there were signs of a mellowing down of
the Chinese rigidity on the bilateral aspect. There was once again stress on the
importance of Sino-Indian relations and repeated calls to India to make amends in a
suitable manner so that the bilateral relations could be put back on track. After the
initial hard-line comments on Kashmir suggesting a multilateral conference on the issue,
Beijing reverted back to its 1996 and pre-1996 stance of neutrality as between India and
Pakistan on this issue.
In
the third phase (since January, 1999), while welcoming the Indian initiatives for mending
the damage to bilateral relations, Beijing continued to be rigid in its insistence that
the international community should not accept India's concept of a minimum nuclear
deterrence and that India and Pakistan should sign the NPT and the CTBT unconditionally
and immediately. There was also a note of concern in Chinese pronouncements that other
permanent members of the UN Security Council might ultimately accept India's need for a
minimum nuclear deterrence.
During all these phases, Chinese inconsistencies in possessing a nuclear and missile
capability for itself and opposing a similar capability for India were sought to be
explained as follows:
- The Chinese capability was acquired in self-defence in
the context of the cold war. China did not view the capability as conferring a political
status on it. Moreover, China was already a permanent member of the Security Council.
- On the other hand, the Indian capability was acquired
after the cold war was over when the contemporary trend was towards peace, harmony and
non-proliferation. The Indian nuclear aspirations marked a revival of its hegemonistic
designs and had the ulterior motive of seeking a new political status in the international
community.
It is
evident from the chronology that China's two-pronged policy is to continue to oppose
India's nuclear aspirations and deny it any new political status at par with that of China
through its emergence as a de facto nuclear weapon power, while at the same time not
allowing this to affect the bilateral relations.
THE CHRONOLOGY
The setback process started with a statement by George Fernandes, the Indian Defence
Minister, in the beginning of May 1998, in which he reportedly described China as a major
military threat to India. However, he subsequently claimed that his observation made to a
private TV channel was distorted.
On
May 5,1998, Zhu Bangzao, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office, described
Mr.Fernandes' remarks as "absolutely ridiculous and unworthy of refutation" and
added that China had noted with the "utmost regret and resentment" his
statements on China since coming to office. He said:" The remarks by the Indian
Defence Minister George Fernandes have seriously sabotaged the friendly atmosphere for
improving bilateral relations between China and India…China does not pose any threat
to neighbouring countries. His accusation concerning China's relations with relevant
countries is utterly fictitious and has no basis in facts. ..His statement that China has
built a sophisticated electronic surveillance base in Myanmar's Coco Islands and has
installed missiles in Tibet targeting India is absolutely fictitious and entirely
baseless…. It is extremely irresponsible."
On
May 8,1998, an unidentified spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office told pressmen that
China had twice protested to India through the Indian Embassy in Beijing over the
"ridiculous and fragile" statements of Fernandes.
On
May 12,1998, Lin Shanglin, the Chinese CDA in New Delhi, issued a written statement at New
Delhi stating as follows:" The so-called issue that China has been building a naval
base in Myanmar is utterly fictitious, whose aim is to find grounds to the so-called China
threat. ..Allegations of Chinese involvement in the development of Pakistan's Ghauri
missile are a fabrication. It is irresponsible to assume that China is engaged in nuclear
proliferation. The co-operation between China and Pakistan in the peaceful utilisation of
nuclear energy is under the safeguards and supervision of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and conforms to the international general practices."
After the suspected leakage to the "New York Times" by the US State Department
of the letter written by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to President Clinton
citing India's perception of a possible threat from China as one of the reasons for
Pokhran II, Chinese Government spokesmen, govt-controlled media and strategic analysts
started a barrage of vigorous criticism of India.
The
Xinhua news agency said on May 18,1998: "Political analysts are of the view that with
the nuclear explosion, India seeks to develop nuclear weapons, barge into the world's club
of nuclear powers and then seek regional hegemony."
Ye
Zhengjia, a former Chinese diplomat posted at New Delhi and subsequently posted to the
Chinese Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies, told Japan's Kyodo news
service on May 18,1998: " By presenting a China threat scenario, India is trying to
extract mileage out of ideological differences between China and the West while New Delhi
is actually masking its own contradictions with the West to lessen the blow of
sanctions."
He
denied that China's nuclear tests were carried out to raise the country's political status
in the new world order. He added: " In any case, a country's international standing
does not depend upon its capability to do a nuclear test. That time has passed."
The
official "China Daily" wrote on May 20,1998: " India's improper move of
attributing its nuclear tests at Pokhran to potential threat from China has made the
international community realise that the new Indian Government is not only irresponsible,
but also immoral. This is the first time in history that a nuclear country has denied its
own responsibility for its nuclear tests and shifted the blame to others..To justify its
series of nuclear tests, India uses the political tactic of making India-China ties
tense....China had been taking a reserved attitude towards provocative statements from
India in order to push forward Sino-Indian ties. However, India took China's forbearance
as weakness."
Xinhua reported on June 2,1998, that at a meeting between the Chinese Vice-Premier Qian
Qichen and the US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger both sides "believed
that the international community must take effective and feasible measures to halt the
nuclear arms race in the South Asian region and prevent nuclear proliferation in order to
restore and safeguard peace and stability in the region." Sandy Berger had gone to
Beijing to prepare the ground for Clinton's visit.
In
an interview to the AFP news agency on June 3,1998, President Jiang Zemin denied that
China had helped Pakistan make nuclear bombs and said: "The nuclear co-operation
between the two countries is strictly peaceful in the area of technology of nuclear
reactors and all the installations concerned are under the control of the IAEA."
He
recalled his historic visit to India in 1996 "after a number of signals of friendship
from New Delhi" and said he had received a warm welcome, " but the Prime
Minister then was not the same person as the one today."
Jiang further said that Pokhran II which clearly showed that "India is targeting
China and Pakistan" surprised him He added: "China hopes that Pakistan will not
respond and will make a wise decision. But the Pakistani Government is faced with strong
public pressure on the subject."
In
an article on June 5,1998, the "Liberation Army Daily", the journal of the PLA,
accused George Fernandes of recklessly using China's name as an excuse for India's nuclear
ambitions and warned: " If this arrogant boast and military expansionism are not
effectively checked, the consequences will be serious."
A
signed editorial in the "China Daily" of June 6,1998, urged India to show wisdom
by renouncing its nuclear weapons programme and said that a 14 per cent rise in India's
defence budget was an unwise decision which would further escalate the arms race in South
Asia.
It
added: "Such a rise in defence spending reveals the South Asian country's ambition to
be a military power and is adding fuel to the already heated arms race…It is unwise
for the Indian Government to develop nuclear weapons and raise defence spending with no
regard for its relations with the international community." It described Fernandes'
statement in the Indian Parliament about the occupation of Indian territory by China as a
"concocted excuse."
In
an interview to the "Newsweek" on June 21,1998, Jiang Zemin said: "In
November 1996, I paid a successful visit to India. I was accorded a very friendly
reception by the Government and people of India. That visit has left me with very good
memories. I was very surprised that they conducted the nuclear tests. I was even more
surprised that they cited China as a reason for their nuclear testing. I really don't know
what kind of threat China poses."
Jiang also said that if Clinton raised the question of alleged Chinese supply of missiles
to Pakistan, "the answer very simply is that we don't plan to sell
missiles."
A
joint statement issued by Jiang Zemin and President Clinton on June 27,1998, after the
latter's visit to Beijing in the last week of June, 1998, said: "Recent nuclear tests
by India and Pakistan and the resulting increase in tension between them are a source of
deep and lasting concern to both of us.
"Our shared interests in a peaceful and stable South Asia in a strong global
non-proliferation regime have been put at risk by these tests, which we have joined in
condemning.
"We have agreed to continue to work closely together, within the P-5, the Security
Council and with others, to prevent an accelerating nuclear and missile arms race in South
Asia, strengthen international non-proliferation efforts and promote reconciliation and
the peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.
"The P-5 joint communiqué of June 4, which was endorsed by UN Security Council
Resolution 1172, set out clear and comprehensive objectives and a plan for action to
address the threat of a South Asian nuclear and missile arms race.
"We pledge our full support for the steps outlined in the joint communiqué and again
call on India and Pakistan to stop all further nuclear tests and adhere immediately and
unconditionally to the CTBT, to refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear
weapons and from testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons
and to enter into firm commitment not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles
capable of delivering them.
"The United States and China remain firmly committed to strong and effective
international co-operation on nuclear non-proliferation, with the NPT as its cornerstone.
"We will continue to bolster nuclear non-proliferation efforts and reiterate that our
goal is adherence of all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the NPT as it stands,
without any modification.
"States that do not adhere to the treaty cannot expect to be accorded the same
benefits and international standing as are accorded to NPT parties. Notwithstanding their
recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states
in accordance with the NPT."
Speaking at the Beijing University on June 29,1998, Clinton said: "We (the US and
China) are now pursuing a common strategy to move India and Pakistan away from further
testing and engage in a dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues."
Commenting the same day on the reference in the Clinton-Jiang statement to the nuclear
issue in South Asia, the "China Daily" said that the US-China understanding on
this subject "signified a healthy, stable China-US relationship." It added:
" Such a relationship is not only in the interest of China and the US, but of the
world peace and stability at large. "
Tang Guoqiang, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office, rejected on June 30,1998,
India's criticism of the Clinton-Jiang statement. He said that as major powers, the US and
China had to act in the common interest of the international community to prevent a
nuclear arms race in the region and promote reconciliation between New Delhi and
Islamabad.
Accusing India of starting a nuclear arms race in South Asia, he said: "The joint
statement expresses the strong determination of China and the US in further preventing
nuclear proliferation and also promoting reconciliation and peaceful settlement of the
differences between India and Pakistan.
"There is nothing reproachful about the joint statement on South Asia. While India
opposed the joint statement, Pakistan has welcomed it. However, we have taken note of
India's comments."
Writing in "The Hindu" of July 2,1998, F.J.Khergamvala, its Tokyo correspondent,
quoted Robert Manning and James Przystup, former senior US State Department officials, who
had visited China, as having stated in an article in the "Wall Street Journal"
(date not mentioned) that during their visit a prominent Chinese analyst told them that
"transferring material or technology to Iran is negotiable, but Pakistan is our
Israel", implying thereby that Pakistan's security was as important to China as
Israel's was to the US.
However, in an interview to the State-run China Central Television before leaving China,
Clinton said that the US and China had agreed to work together to prevent the spread of
nuclear and missile technologies to countries like Pakistan that might misuse it.
He
added: "China has agreed to work with the US to stop the transfer of technologies to
countries that might misuse it, to not assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities like
Pakistan's and to consider joining the worldwide system that prevents the exportation of
dangerous technologies."
At
a meeting of the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan held at
Almaty in Kazakhstan on July 3, 1998, Jiang Zemin failed to have a critical reference to
the nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia included in the final communiqué.
However, during a joint press conference by the leaders after the summit he condemned
India for starting a nuclear race in South Asia.
While briefing pressmen on July 9,1998, Tang Guoqiang, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman, avoided commenting on India's offer of a pledge of no-first-use of nuclear
weapons. He merely said: "The most urgent task for India is to immediately abandon
its nuclear programme and sign the NPT and the CTBT unconditionally as soon as
possible."
However, in an interview to K.K.Katyal and C.Raja Mohan, the New Delhi correspondents
of "The Hindu" the same day, Zhou Gang, the Chinese Ambassador to India,
gave the first indication of the beginning of a mellowing down of the Chinese criticism of
India. He made the following points:
- "It is up to the doer to undo the knot".
Beijing would like India to provide responsible explanations for totally
"unreasonable and groundless" accusations against China and, thus, create a
favourable atmosphere for a new beginning in bilateral relations. The initiative for this
must be taken not by China, but by India. It was China's set policy to develop a
"constructive and co-operative partnership" with India towards the new
millennium.
- It was impossible to call for a dialogue and establish
best relations while keeping up attacks on China, which had been the victim of baseless
accusations. China would like these charges to stop and "actual actions"
initiated. China would not like the present situation to go on. "As two big powers,
the high-level political contacts between India and China should be normal."
- He hoped that India and Pakistan would peacefully resolve
their differences "including the Kashmir issue" through talks. "The
position of the Chinese side is consistent". After the nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan, the growing tension on Kashmir and the issue of peace and security in South Asia
had caused widespread concern in the international community. "We will do whatever is
beneficial for the improvement of India-Pakistan relations and peace and stability in
South Asia, but never do otherwise."
- China's ties with Pakistan were State-to-State relations
between two sovereign countries. China had not transferred to any country equipment or
technology that could be used for making nuclear weapons. Some of India's concerns over
Sino-Pakistan military co-operation were caused by misunderstandings and others arose out
of unnecessary misgivings. China would like to exchange views on this subject with India
through diplomatic channels, as used to be done in the past. He disapproved of the resort
to media and exaggerations based on "rumours from the West."
- There was peace and tranquillity on the India-China
border. "We hope the two sides would make joint efforts to maintain this
situation." China had taken "a series of flexible measures" on Sikkim and
he hoped that the Indian side " would also adopt a positive and flexible attitude so
as to create a proper atmosphere and conditions for the disposal of this issue."
In a
lead article on July 14,1998, the "China Daily" called for " a multilateral
meeting attended by India, Pakistan, the US, China and Russia to help resolve the Kashmir
dispute, over which India and Pakistan have fought two wars since 1947."
The
article, quoting Ma Jiali of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations,
said: "Indian Government officials should stop spreading the China menace theory
which will create suspicion and hostility between the two peoples. The Indian Government's
unreasonable attacks on China deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and
undermined the mutual trust the two countries have been trying to build over
generations."
Quoting Ouyang Liping, another expert of the same Institute, the article said that China
had consistently adhered to the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and denied
that China was aiding Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme.
Commenting on the annual report of the Defence Ministry of the Government of India for
1997-98, the article said: "In the report, the Indian Government did not examine its
mistake in provoking a dangerous nuclear arms race. It vilified China as the main reason
for the deterioration of South Asia's security environment instead."
The
article described the BJP-led Government as head strong and alleged that the real purpose
of Pokhran II was to gain regional hegemony.
It
further quoted Ouyang Liping as saying: "India's recent nuclear explosions reflect a
dangerous ultra-nationalism and its ambition to build a regional hegemony and become a
major political power."
The
article added: "Continuously denying its faults and spreading lies will not win
sympathy or trust from others, but will make the international community more vigilant
against its ambitions. India should first abandon its nuclear development plan
unconditionally so as to convince Pakistan to follow in its foot steps."
The
article again quoted Ouyang Liping as saying that the international community must press
India and Pakistan to completely abandon their nuclear programmes and convert South Asia
into a non-nuclear area. In this connection, he cited the examples of South Africa and
Ukraine and said: "They (South Africa and Ukraine) abandoned their nuclear capability
in the 1990s under international pressure and for the good of their own peoples."
Despite this article, there was another indication of a possible mellowing down of the
Chinese official criticism in an address by Zhou Gang, the Chinese Ambassador, in the
India International Centre at New Delhi on July 25,1998. He made the following points:
- India's nuclear tests had led to "temporary
difficulties" in Sino-Indian ties, but had not diluted Beijing's commitment to
building a long-term friendly relationship with New Delhi." It is a firm policy of
the Chinese Government to develop with India a long-term neighbourly and constructive
partnership of co-operation for the 21st century.
- India and China could play an influential role in
promoting Asian stability. "As the two most populous developing countries in the
world, China and India can exert important influence in the affairs of South Asia and Asia
as a whole."
- China did not seek hegemony in the region though it was
naturally interested in the developments between India and Pakistan. China had normal
relations with Pakistan, which were based on the five principles of peaceful
co-existence. Pakistani nuclear weapons programme could not be linked to China's.
Pakistan had, however, received conventional weapons from China, but the quantum of these
exchanges was much smaller to the defence trade between India and a "powerful
country" (an apparent reference to Russia).
- "Friendly relations between China and any country
are not directed at any third country." China did not pose any security threat to
India. "Fictitious charges against China have gravely hurt the feelings of the
Chinese people and harmed Sino-Indian relations."
- China wished India "stability, progress and
development" and sought "neighbourliness, friendship and progress" from New
Delhi. The Chinese pronouncements were a refutation of some wanton attack and accusations
by certain personages in India. They were meant to "safeguard the friendly relations
between our two countries and bring them back on track."
Co-operation between India and China must diversify and should not be held hostage to the
pending resolution of the border dispute. The boundary question could be resolved on the
principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation . The Peace and Tranquillity
accord of 1993 and the subsequent agreement of 1996 on confidence-building measures
continued to be the cornerstone of the Sino-Indian security relationship.
In
an interview to the "Al Ahram" of Cairo on July 26,1998, Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji said: "I assure there is no Chinese threat to India. I confirm our keenness on
good neighbourly relations and peaceful co-existence. Beijing had no time to threaten or
scare other countries, as it is busy with its own economic development. Any view on
China's fearful size came only from India. No other State took this view. India has
utilised this theory as a pretext to conduct its nuclear tests. However, the real target
behind the nuclear tests is practice of hegemony as well as settling the internal crisis
facing the ruling party. Due to limited economic capabilities, China sets aside a limited
percentage of its resources for defence purposes. It is less than that allocated by India
and Japan. In fact, China needs some defence capabilities."
Jaswant Singh, who attended the ASEAN meeting at Manila as the Indian Prime Minister's
special representative, met Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister, on July 27,1998. A
Chinese spokesman later said that "both sides conducted frank discussions on the
Indian nuclear explosions and Sino-Indian relations." He added that during the
discussions, the Chinese Foreign Minister stressed that India, running counter to the
world trend, conducted nuclear tests and that India, "in an attempt to find an excuse
for the tests, groundlessly alleged that China poses a threat to India."
A
joint statement issued by Tang Jiaxuan and his Filipino counterpart, Domingo Siazon after
bilateral talks on August 2,1998, expressed the support of the two countries for the
Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6,1998. The two countries expressed "their
grave concern over and strongly deplored the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. These had
exacerbated tensions in the region and raised the spectre of a nuclear arms race."
In
a statement in the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, on August 4,1998,
Prime Minister Vajpayee said India was keen on improving its relations with China and
asserted that his Government had never dubbed China as an enemy or a threat. He also said
that India wanted to accelerate the efforts for a solution to the border problem.
Commenting on this statement on August 7,1998, Tang Guoqiang, spokesman of the Chinese
Foreign Office, said: "We have taken note of the Prime Minister's statement in
Parliament. We hope that the Indian side will take concrete actions so that the bilateral
relations will return to normal."
Replying to a question on the Kashmir issue on August 11,1998, the same spokesman
distanced himself from the views mentioned in the "China Daily" article and
re-stated the traditional Chinese position. He said: " Kashmir is an outstanding
issue between India and Pakistan. The Chinese position on that is consistent. The Chinese
side hopes that India and Pakistan will solve their dispute through peaceful negotiations
and maintain calm and restraint before the solution of the problem."
Addressing a meeting of industrialists organised at New Delhi on August 12,1998, by the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Zhou Gang, the Chinese Ambassador,
made yet another reassuring statement. He said that despite the setback to the Sino-Indian
bilateral relations, there was scope for increased bilateral trade and economic relations
"because the reforms and the opening up of the economy in both the countries have
provided great opportunities for expanding trade and economic relations."
He
expressed his optimism that "on the eve of the next century trade and economic
relations and cooperation between China and India would be pushed on to a new high."
However, while talking to journalists after the meeting, he added that India's nuclear
tests had severely damaged bilateral relations and "this will spill over to the
economic relations also."
In
reply to questions during the daily press briefing on August 13,1998, Tang Guoqiang, the
Chinese Foreign Office spokesman, again evaded comments on China's reaction to India's
no-first-use of nuclear weapons offer and repeated the Chinese demand that India should
first give up its nuclear programme and sign unconditionally the NPT and the CTBT.
Addressing a meeting at the Bharat Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta on September 14,1998,
Zhou Gang, the Chinese Ambassador, said differences between the two countries should not
be seen as an obstacle to fostering trade. He added: "Expansion of economic
relations, trade and technological co-operation between our two countries is beneficial
for the overall development of bilateral relations and in conformity with the fundamental
interests of the people of our two countries." He also claimed that China's nuclear
tests were undertaken in the interest of self-defence.
China reacted sharply to a courtesy call by the Dalai Lama on Prime Minister Vajpayee in
the third week of October 1998. On October 22,1998, a Chinese Foreign Office spokesman
described it as a violation of India's commitment to keep itself away from the Dalai
Lama's anti-Chinese activities. Rejecting the Chinese criticism, a spokesman of the Indian
Foreign Office pointed out the next day that the Dalai Lama had been received in his
capacity as a religious leader by successive Indian Prime Ministers and that leaders of
other countries had similarly received him too.
The
11th meeting of the JWG, which should have been held in the second half of 1998, could not
be held due to the misunderstanding in the bilateral relations. While talking to a group
of visiting American journalists at New Delhi in the middle of November, 1998, a diplomat
of the Chinese Embassy said that China had adopted an "active approach" to the
subject and that the matter was under discussion through diplomatic channels.
In
his briefing for the US journalists, the unnamed Chinese diplomat reportedly made the
following points:
- China acquired a nuclear weapon capability in the context
of the cold war. After the end of the cold war the trend was towards non-proliferation.
- The Indian tests were against the contemporary historical
trend and seriously affected peace and stability in South Asia. The Indian tests had also
dealt a heavy blow to international nuclear disarmament and the global non-proliferation
regime.
- China did not agree that there was a nuclear apartheid.
"The nuclear status of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is a
product of history. In our opinion, favouring the NPT doesn't mean that the nuclear weapon
states will enjoy the permanent privilege of possessing nuclear weapons. China had all
along urged countries with the largest nuclear arsenals to speed up the process of nuclear
weapon reduction. As a nuclear state, China will never shirk its own responsibility for
the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in the end."
- "China has always been committed, on the basis of
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, to the development of good neighbourly and
friendly relations with its neighbouring countries, including India. China has made
unremitting efforts to improve and develop Sino-Indian relations. This stand of China has
not changed. Before and after India's nuclear tests, the Indian Defence Minister and other
senior officials preached the China threat theory and made wanton accusations against
China. All this cannot but affect the normal development of the bilateral relations. The
responsibility for upsetting Sino-Indian relations at present is totally on the Indian
side. As the ball is now in the Indian court, we hope that apart from expressing its
willingness to improve the relations in words, what is more important for the Indian side
is to take concrete actions to improve the relations."
A joint
declaration signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, at the end of the
latter's visit to Russia on November 25,1998, cited South Asia along with Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Korea as regions of "the most acute conflict situations, which, if
they escalate, may pose real threats to the international community." It added:
"On South Asia, Russia and China confirm their position expressed in the UN and at
other international fora and stress the paramount importance of the NPT and the CTBT for
the global efforts to promote the non-spread of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament.
Russia and China call upon all countries which have not yet joined these treaties so far
to do so without delay and without conditions."
Russian Foreign Office officials tried to play down the significance of the reference by
saying that they had succeeded in toning down a harsh statement which Jiang wanted and in
ruling out any reference to India by name. According to them, since Jiang insisted on some
reference to it in the joint declaration they had to agree to a mild formulation which
need not cause embarrassment to India.
In
a letter to Jaswant Singh on December 15,1998, congratulating him on his taking over as
the Minister for External Affairs, Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister, hoped that
Sino-Indian relations could be consolidated and further developed during Singh's tenure.
In his reply to the message, Jaswant Singh said:" India remains committed to the
process of dialogue to address and resolve outstanding issues." He referred to his
meeting with Tang at Manila and said that he looked forward to "continuing our
interaction to further mutual understanding, co-operation and friendship, so essential for
our two countries and peoples."
In
his first press conference after taking office, Jaswant Singh stated that India was
committed to improving its ties with China so that all outstanding issues were resolved in
accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
In
his daily press briefing on December 28,1998, Zhu Bangzao, the spokesman of the Chinese
Foreign Office, said: " We welcome Minister for External affairs Jaswant Singh's
remarks. China has always attached importance to the growth of its good neighbourly,
friendly and co-operative ties with India on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
co-existence. Normalisation of Sino-Indian relations complies with the fundamental
interests of the people of both the countries."
The
"Jane's Defence Weekly" reported in the last week of December, 1998, that the
Chinese authorities had assessed that India would take at least 10 years to establish an
operational nuclear strike capability and, hence, India did not pose an immediate threat
to China's security.
China strongly expressed its annoyance over the remarks of Ram Jethmalani, the Indian
Urban Affairs Minister, that there was a strong case for India to recognise Taiwan as an
independent country. He made these remarks in an interview to "The Week" of
Kerala in the last week of December 1998.
The
"People's Daily" wrote on December 31,1998: "We strongly urge certain
Indian politicians to stop interfering in China's internal affairs and work towards
improving rather than damaging the bilateral ties. Jethmalani's remarks have further hurt
the feelings of the Chinese people. "
In
a despatch on January 1,1999, Xinhua described Jethmalani's remarks as "evil-minded
and dangerous." In an article on January 6,1999, the "China Daily" asked
Indian leaders "not to test China's patience with irresponsible comments" and to
adopt a coherent policy towards China. It added: "China's goodwill and repeated
patience should not be returned with vile language." The criticism came down after
the Government of India, through the Indian Embassy in Beijing as well as through its
press spokesman in New Delhi, assured China that there was no change in India's policy on
Taiwan.
There were clear indications in January 1999, that while showing readiness to restore the
pre-Pokhran II normalcy to the bilateral relations, China remained determined in its
opposition to India's acquiring any nuclear deterrence capability. Addressing a meeting of
non-proliferation experts in Washington in the middle of January 1999, Sha Zukang, head of
the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in China's Foreign Office, reportedly
stated as follows:
- "It is a direct violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1172 to negotiate, or to even discuss, with India on India's so-called minimum
nuclear deterrence capability."
- "It is also unhelpful to publicly support India's
permanent membership in the UN Security Council soon after its nuclear tests."
- The South Asian tests had become a litmus test for the
effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime. The international community
should do its best to stop and reverse the nuclear weapons programmes of India and
Pakistan.
- There were two essential requirements for the success of
the international nuclear diplomacy in the sub-continent. First, " the international
community should have sufficient patience and perseverance and should not lose hope
because of the lack of progress in the short run." Second, "the major powers
must have a consensus view and take concerted actions in this matter."
- "If any country seeks to exploit the South Asian
situation to obtain unilateral, short-term political, economic or strategic benefits at
the expense of the other countries and the international solidarity, it can only further
undermine the already badly-damaged international non-proliferation regime, and, in the
end, the long-term interests of that country will also be jeopardised."
- "We have noted with concern that after the Indian
nuclear tests, some Nuclear Suppliers' Group members have taken a more pro-active stand on
issues of nuclear co-operation with India. We hope that these countries could be more
cautious in this area."
In an
interview to the "Handelsblatt" of Germany on February 2,1999, Tang Jiaxuan, the
Chinese Foreign Minister, rejected indirectly the idea of a Russia-India-China strategic
triangle to which Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov had referred during his visit to India
in December, 1998. Tang spoke of China's "very good strategic partnership with
Russia, which is full of vitality and regularly produces new elements" but clarified
that Beijing's partnership with Moscow "includes neither alliances nor confrontation
with third countries such as the US."
He
described relations with India as far from ideal and blamed India for the deterioration in
the relations. He urged India "to take practical steps towards the restoration of
normal and healthy relations."
In
an interview to the Press Trust of India on February 4,1999, Zhou Gang, the Chinese
Ambassador to India, said: "India, instead of maintaining the so-called minimum
nuclear deterrent, must accede to the CTBT and the NPT without delay and conditions."
Referring to speculation about the possible easing of sanctions against India by the US in
the wake of the latest round of Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott discussions, he
said:"Basically, China does not advocate sanctions."
On
Primakov's strategic triangle idea, the Ambassador said:" China handles international
affairs by proceeding from the fundamental interests of the people of China and the whole
world and does not enter into alliances with any big power or group of countries. China's
developing relations with any other country are not directed against another
country."
In
his daily press briefing on February 23, 1999, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry
welcomed the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif summit and the resulting Lahore Declaration. He added:
"We hope the two sides will keep the momentum of dialogue and solve their differences
through peaceful negotiations and consultations."
In
his inaugural address to the budget session of the Indian Parliament on February 22,1999,
President K.R.Narayanan said that India "seeks to strengthen and deepen its historic
and friendly relations with China" and "is looking forward to continuing the
dialogue with that country."
Addressing a seminar on Sino-Indian relations at New Delhi on February 25,1999, Zhou Gang,
the Chinese Ambassador, said as follows:
- "We have consistently believed that the problems
that cropped up in the Sino-Indian relations are temporary and can be surmounted. There
exist extensive common interests between China and India and our commonalties far outweigh
our differences."
- 'The outstanding issue between China and India is no more
than the boundary dispute left behind by history." These differences could be
resolved on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and in accordance
with the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.
- "We have noted that the Indian side has recently
expressed its willingness to attach importance to its relations with China, not to view
China as an enemy,and resume the dialogue, so as to find solutions to mutual
concerns."
- China was not involved in the Pakistani nuclear and
missile programmes."All co-operation between China and Pakistan in the field of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy is under the safeguards of the IAEA. Non-existent is the
issue of nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan. In fact, the Chinese side has
already taken note of some concerns of the Indian side and, proceeding from the overall
interests of friendly relations between China and India, it has taken a positive, flexible
and pragmatic approach and made proper re-adjustment of certain policies concerned."
- The entire historical baggage of Sino-Indian differences
could not be shed overnight, but only on the basis of reciprocity in a step by step
manner. "All this needs a favourable atmosphere in our bilateral relations.
Therefore, we hope that the Indian side will also adopt a flexible and pragmatic approach
and solve the Chinese side's concerns earnestly."
- The attribution of a Chinese threat to justify India's
nuclear tests by some personalities was mainly responsible for the recent deterioration in
the Sino-Indian relations. "All this has deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese
people and seriously harmed the Sino-Indian relations. This is the main cause upsetting
Sino-Indian relations."
The
Ambassador's presentation coincided with the visit of a team of officials of India's
Ministry of External Affairs to Beijing for three days from February 25,1999, to prepare
the ground for holding the delayed JWG meeting.
In
the daily press briefing on March 1,1999, Ms. Zhang Qiyue, a spokesperson of the Chinese
Foreign Office, commented as follows on the talks with the Indian team: "Both sides
discussed India's tests and their impact on Sino-Indian ties and expounded their
respective positions on the issue. The two sides also focussed on bilateral issues and
re-affirmed their faith in the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The two sides
agreed to work for the restoration and improvement of bilateral relations."
A spokesman of the Indian Embassy in Beijing said that India stoutly defended its position
on the Pokhran tests and added: "We pointed out to them India's rejection of the UN
Security Council resolution and our stand on the NPT and the CTBT."
Addressing a press conference during the session of the National People's Congress, Tang
Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister, said on March 7.1999: "I expect, may be soon,
the JWG on the boundary question between China and India will resume its activity."
He again appealed to India and Pakistan to roll back their nuclear programme.
Addressing a seminar on "India, China and Russia in the 21st century" organised
by the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi on March 9,1998, Zhou Gang, the
Chinese Ambassador, said:
- The recent consultations in Beijing between officials of
the two Foreign Offices marked a "new starting point" to improve bilateral
relations.
- "We have noted that the Indian side has recently
expressed its willingness to attach importance to and improve relations with China and not
view China as its enemy. All this is welcome."
- China was pursuing an independent foreign policy
vis-à-vis Russia, the US and India. "As powers of major influence and permanent
members of the UN Security Council, China and the US share common interests on major
issues related to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a
whole. The two sides have decided to work together for the establishment of a constructive
strategic partnership."
- The concept of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership did
not have any military connotations. "Building a Sino-Russian strategic partnership is
not aimed at forming an alliance and is not directed at any third party, but is aimed at
abandoning confrontations between the two countries so as to create conditions for the
broadest equal exchanges and co-operation."
- "It is the firm policy of the Chinese Government to
develop with India, a long-term neighbourly, constructive and co-operative partnership
into the 21st century. The two countries had the foundation and potential for evolving
mutually beneficial co-operation. India and China shared similar or common views on such
issues as peace and development, human rights, environmental protection and population
control."
- "Strict adherence to the five principles of
peaceful, co-existence, mutual trust and shedding a threat image of each other were the
key for laying a credible foundation for a healthy Sino-Indian relationship."
- China hoped that "South Asian countries will treat
one another on an equal footing, live in harmony, develop friendly co-operation and settle
their differences and disputes through peaceful means."
- When the bilateral relations were developing without a
hitch, some personalities in India accused China of posing a threat to India's security so
as to justify the nuclear tests. This was the main cause for upsetting the bilateral
relations. Beijing's policy was defensive in nature and any fear of a China threat was
entirely "unfounded and fabricated with ulterior motives."
In an
interview to the PTI on March 21,1999, Sha Zukang, Director-General of the Department of
Arms Control and Disarmament in the Chinese Foreign Office, said:
- "We have never posed a threat to India and history
clearly shows that. ..We didn't have New Delhi in mind when we decided to go
nuclear."
- Since China became a nuclear power, it had never
threatened any country. "On the contrary, because of our own bitter experience of
being blackmailed, we have declared to the world that we would never be the first to use
nuclear weapons. To say China's nuclear weapons are threatening the security of India is
hurting."
- China was willing to resume dialogue with India in the
post-Pokhran phase, provided New Delhi took concrete actions to normalise strained
bilateral relations. "We are prepared to enhance dialogue with India so as to clear
misgivings, further mutual understanding and promote the goal of establishing a
constructive and co-operative partnership between China and India. We hope that the Indian
side will also take concrete actions in the same direction."
- "We continue to maintain that India and Pakistan
should fully implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1172. To maintain peace and
stability in South Asia and establish a nuclear-weapon-free world, both South Asian
neighbours should abandon their nuclear weapons programmes and unconditionally accede to
the NPT and the CTBT."
In an
address to the United Services Institution (USI) of New Delhi on March 24,1999, Zhou Gang,
the Chinese Ambassador, said as follows:
- "There exists profound traditional friendship
between the people of the two countries. China and India sympathised and supported each
other during their struggles of national independence and liberation against foreign
aggression. The two countries share similar or identical views on many major issues such
as economic development, human rights, environmental protection, combating drug
trafficking and crime and population control."
- "There is nothing abnormal about some differences
between the two countries. As long as both sides proceed from the overall interests of
bilateral friendly relations and handle these concerns on the basis of mutual trust, with
a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and in a truth-seeking and forward-looking
spirit, the differences will be narrowed gradually and problems resolved instead of coming
in the way of the normal development of the bilateral relations."
- "Good neighbourly relations between India and China
will not only conform to the fundamental interests of the two countries, but will
encourage peace, stability and development in Asia and the world at large."
- "The outstanding issue between China and India is no
more than the boundary dispute left behind by history. The Chinese Government has
maintained that while positively seeking a solution to the boundary issue, the two sides
should work hard to develop bilateral relations in various fields so as to create a
favourable atmosphere for the final solution of the boundary issue. China stood for a
peaceful, fair and equitable solution to the boundary issue on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful co-existence, in accordance with the principle of mutual
understanding and mutual accommodation through friendly talks, while taking into account
the historical background and the present reality and the national feelings of the people
of the two countries."
- "China welcomed the resumption of talks between the
two Foreign Office officials in February. This useful meeting provides a new starting
point for the improvement of Sino-Indian ties." He hoped that the two sides trust
each other and treat each other with sincerity and strictly adhere to the five principles
of peaceful co-existence.
Talking
to pressmen on April 2,1999, Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime
Minister, said that an official dialogue with Beijing had already commenced and that the
forthcoming JWC meeting might result in a visit to China by the Indian Minister for
External Affairs.
During a meeting with a visiting delegation of the Congress (I) led by K.Natwar Singh, at
Beijing on April 8,1999,Hu Jintao, the Chinese Vice-President, asked India to pursue a
long-term policy on Sino-Indian relations in view of the "complex and dynamic
international situations unfolding at the turn of the century." He said that under
the changing international situation today, India and China should "look closely at
and handle the relations between the two countries from the historical perspective and a
long-term viewpoint."
He
noted that the bilateral relations had progressed on the normal track over the past decade
"thanks to the joint efforts of the leaders of the two countries ", and
regretted the chill in the bilateral relations after Pokhran II. The process of progress
had consequently suffered "undesirable disturbances", he said.
Reports of Chinese reaction to the Agni II missile test available so far indicate that the
spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office expressed regret and concern at the test which, he
pointed out, was a violation of the Security Resolution 1172 and added:" We have
taken note of the remark by the Indian Prime Minister that this test is not directed
against any country."
The
annual report of the Indian Defence Ministry for 1998-99 released on April 16,1999, said
as follows on Sino-Indian relations:
- Sino-Indian relations have improved in recent years and
New Delhi regards China as "a great neighbour."
- India does not regard China "as an adversary and
would like to develop mutually friendly relations with it."
- India has expressed its interest time and again in
resolving its boundary dispute with China peacefully and through bilateral negotiations as
quickly as possible.
- The September 1993 agreement on peace and tranquillity
and the subsequent accord on confidence-building measures provided a reliable framework
for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
- Contacts between the two sides such as the meeting
between Jaswant Singh and Tang Jiaxuan at Manila and the earlier visit to India by the
Chinese Chief of General Staff serve the objective of furthering mutual understanding
between the two countries and reassuring each other about their peaceful intentions.
B.RAMAN
23-4-99
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and presently Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai.
E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
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