With the ongoing operations in Kargil, the focus of analysts in
India has not yet turned to the Cox report of USA. But sooner or later, the
report is likely to be analysed in the context of India's quest for a credible minimum
deterrent against China. Already some opinions are being expressed that in view of
the changed situation where China has improved its nuclear capabilities and military
technologies in a stunning manner by stealth, India's earlier position with regard to its
promised adherence to the CTBT and willingness to enter into negotiations on FMCT should
be re examined. There is also a suggestion that India should go for MIRVs and
other advanced delivery systems. It is necessary therefore to make an objective review to
see what the Cox report would actually mean to Indian security and what steps should
be taken to offset the advantage China has secured.
Cox Report:
The bipartisan congressional Cox committee of USA issued its long
872 page report on May 25, 1999, detailing the efforts made by China to acquire, through
both legal and illegal means a wide range of U.S. commercial and military technology
secrets. The report points out that the "stolen information includes details of
seven thermo nuclear war heads, including every currently deployed thermo nuclear warhead
in the US ballistic arsenal."
Some important points mentioned in the voluminous report
are-
1. China obtained classified design information on
the most advance thermonuclear weapons of USA. These "thefts" enabled
China to design, develop and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons.
These include information on war heads W-88, W-87, W-78, W-76, W-70, W-62 and W-56.
Of these only W-70 and W-56 are not currently deployed. The information thus
obtained also relates to the "neutron bomb" which is yet to be deployed by any
country. Thus the report concludes, that China has leaped, in a handful of years,
from the 1950s-era strategic nuclear capabilities to the more modern thermo nuclear
weapons designs.
Of these, the most important one is the W-88- a
miniaturized, tapered war head coupled to the D-5 submarine launched ballistic missiles
carried by Trident submarine. The new smaller, lighter warheads with an increased
yield -to-weight ratio couldl be used in future for its mobile nuclear forces and also
make it possible for China to deploy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles -MRVs or
independently targetable MIRVs.
China by obtaining nuclear test codes, computer models and
data from the sensitive national laboratories could further accelerate its nuclear
development. Multiple reentry vehicles could also help in countering missile
defences. (This is significant as China while developing its own missile defences in
addition to the S -300 PMU/V series purchased from Russia has accused Japan of acquiring
anti missile defences- THAAD systems, causing instability in the region!)
2. China has stolen ballistic related technology which
besides being of help in ICBMs could be directly applicable to M-9 (CSS-6), M-11 (CSS-X-7
) and the CSS-8. (China has provided entire production facility for the manufacture
of M-11s besides transferring over 30 missiles with launchers to Pakistan).
3. China illegally obtained electro magnetic
weapons technology which if developed could be used for space-based weapons to attack
satellites and missiles.
4. US satellite manufacturers transferred missile
design information and know how to China which could help China in improving reliability
of future ballistic missiles. This has provided China with improved capability for modern
command and control and sophisticated intelligence collection. (This again is of
significance to India as in the Talbott- Jaswant Singh talks, the US side viewed
with concern that development of civilian missile programme could have a bearing on the
missile programme of DRDO in India. US itself was unable to prevent transfer of
military related technology to another country whereas in India the transfer, if at all to
take place is within Indian establishments!)
In 1996, US companies Loral and Hughes provided know how to
China to improve the design and reliability of the guidance system used in the PRC's Long
March rocket without proper licence and thus violated export control laws.
5. High Performance computers (HPCs) meant for other uses
have been diverted by China for nuclear weapon applications. With the relaxation of
export of HPCs, China has acquired from nothing in 1996 to over 600 US origin HPCs.
These HPCs will be useful in two ways. First it would help in three dimensional modeling
in assessing the effects of a new war head without testing and second in incorporating the
design information received illegally into the delivery systems.
The most interesting part of the report is the assessment
that
* PRC vigorously pursued over the last two decades the
acquisition of foreign military technologies.
* China seeks foreign military technology as part of its effort to place itself at
the forefront of nations and be able to fulfill its international agenda which
includes incorporating Taiwan and becoming the primary power in Asia.
* China has also asserted territorial claims against other Southeast Asian nations
and Japan and has used its military forces as leverage in asserting these claims.
* China's pervasive efforts to obtain US technologies by any means poses a
significant threat to US export control and counter intelligence efforts.
* China has proliferated nuclear, missile, and space-related technologies to a
number of countries.
Some Observations on Cox Report:
* Every nation has a right to develop its arsenal by fair or foul means
in the interest of its national security. But China's past behavior does not assure
confidence to its neighbours.
* The US has unwittingly provided modern technology and the means to design
sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems to China which pose a potential threat
to the United States itself. It may be recalled that in mid March 1996, lower level
Chinese officials told visiting American officials that U.S.A. would not dare to defend
Taiwan because China would rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles. This information given
out by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State of East Asia and Pacific was taken up
with the Chinese authorities as U.S. officials did take such threats seriously. It
should be of concern to Taiwan where over 100 missiles are said to be positioned within
striking range. Recent press reports of China targeting its missiles towards India
after Agni II test should be of concern to India too.
We may point out in this connection our paper in this web site of a review "Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese history." Some conclusions made by
the author need to be reiterated.
1. A study of 12 foreign policy issues in which People's Republic of China was involved,
it resorted to violence in 9 cases.
2. China was far more likely to use violence in a
dispute over military security questions such as territory.
3. The Chinese tended to establish a very low
threshold to determine what constitutes a clear threat to the security of the state.
* While U.S.A. has been advising India, a country which has
a clean track record to tighten its export controls of sensitive nuclear and missile
related technology, it has itself allowed its far superior and sophisticated technology to
be exported to a country which has been described by many analysts as the "biggest
proliferator." Similarly the U.S. has been telling India to create a "fire
wall" between the civilian and military space programmes, while it has allowed both
Hughes and Loral companies to freely transfer technology without licence and by exploiting
the loopholes in the existing laws relating to such transfers.
* Of more concern to India, is the acquisition of sophisticated technology by China
to improve its CSS-6 and CSS-X- 7 missiles- M- 9 and M-11 respectively. That China
has transferred M-11 missiles and equipment for regular production of the M11s
to Pakistan is well known and well documented. It is also suspected that the Shaheen
of Pakistan is nothing but the M-9s. The guidance system for Ghauri I and II ( North
Korean Nodong I) is also said to be from China.
China, India and Pakistan- A triangular relationship:
The people of India have lived since independence in a dangerous
neighbourhood and have had to fight hot and cold wars against Pakistan and China.
After Pokhran II tests, a serious review is being made of India's current nuclear
capabilities and the scientific, logistic and administrative structures that go with this
capability. The strategic threat from both China and Pakistan will have to be
factored in to formulate a strategic nuclear policy. It is in this context that the
revelations made in the Cox report make disturbing reading.
China's lead in both conventional and nuclear weapons over India
are well known. This asymmetry in conventional forces and in nuclear weapon
technology between China and India will remain in China's favour for a long time even if
the recent acquisition by stealth of advance designs and technology both in nuclear
devices and delivery system is not taken into account. As in the case of China and India,
a similar situation of asymmetry exists between India and Pakistan. In this case,
asymmetry exists in favour of India. Despite the desperate efforts of Pakistan to
reach conventional parity or nuclear parity, the asymmetry between the two countries will
continue. Pakistan's economy is already over-stretched by the increasing demands of
its military and dwindling revenues. ( latest budget rise for the army is said to be
by 11 percent). After the Kargil experience, India will have to maintain at least a
division in the Kargil heights and costs for maintaining troops at such great heights are
going to be high. It is another matter that Pakistan will have to maintain matching
troops on their side of LOC and incur additional expenditure. But it is neither necessary
nor economically feasible for India to seek parity with China.
Some analysts believe that the present asymmetry amongst the
three countries has resulted in a fragile equilibrium. Whether it has resulted in a
fragile equilibrium or not, acquisition of sophisticated technology by one of its
constituents is bound to affect this equation now or later. What would make it worse
is , if China decides to continue to collaborate in a big way to provide Pakistan the know
how, equipment and materials for nuclear weaponization and nuclear technology.
What therefore should worry Indian policy makers is not so much the acquisition of
technology from U.S.A. but continuing nexus between China and Pakistan in nuclear weapons
and missile development.
It is not denied that in view of two of its neighbours being
nuclear, India must have a nuclear capability. It is understood that the National
Security Advisory Group is busy preparing a nuclear doctrine. It is going to be
difficult with a large body of analysts to come to a consensus as to what constitutes a
credible deterrent force. Terms like recessed deterrence, minimum deterrence and
second strike capability are being freely used by analysts in the analytic and policy
community without proper definition or specification. Externally, a deterrent
capability must to some extent be visible to potential adversaries if it is to have any
credibility. Internally there has to be a formal integrated command and control
structures, delivery and fail safe systems with responsibility for the stock piling of
bomb components and overall stewardship and management. India is on its way to
configure a credible deterrent force eventually with Agni III, three tested nuclear
designs of latest vintage and other components of delivery systems..
Conclusion:
1. The Cox report is disturbing in more than one sense. It
shows that USA with its awesome capability to introduce the "latest state of art
weapons" has shown its incapacity to plug the leaks. One is reminded of the way
the Russians obtained samples of enriched Uranium and even detailed drawings of bomb
designs in the 40's. If China has obtained such technology, it is certain that other
countries may also have obtained these secrets.
2. For India, there is no cause for alarm. Its basic
approach towards the CTBT and FMCT has been well thought out and there is no need for any
change.
3. Strategic planning should cover a long stretch of
time. The present agreement with China on the border for "peace and
tranquility" should not lull us into a sense of complacency. Some day or other
India will have to enter into a strategic dialogue with China . An agreement on
"no first use" will be a good beginning. The present visit of Indian
Foreign minister to China for a "security dialogue" is no substitute for a
strategic dialogue necessary for peace in this region.
4. A credible deterrent force that is being thought of by
India will have to be expedited, without entering into an arms race neither with China nor
with Pakistan.
5. For India, foreign policy or even a strategic security
policy can only be an extension of internal stability and prosperity. This has to be
kept in mind by the policy planners while assessing threat perceptions.
Dr.S.Chandrasekharan.
16.6.99
