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CHINA'S CLANDESTINE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY IN U.S.

Since 1997, there has been a number of enquiries in the US by Congressional committees, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and individual Government departments into allegations of clandestine acquisition of sensitive technology by China in the US through means such as secret diversion of dual-use technology and equipment for military purposes and espionage. These reports have highlighted the modus operandi (MO) of the Chinese and the damages to US national security therefrom.

The most recent of these enquiry reports submitted to President Bill Clinton, with an edited version released to the public , by a bipartisan House Select Committee headed by Republican Representative Christopher Cox has evoked mixed reactions in the US. While some analysts have welcomed the report for drawing attention to the already-suffered and the likely future damages to national security due to the hitherto under-stated Chinese activities, others have criticised the report for overstating its case against Chinese espionage and for trying to create a public scare through a projection of many worst-case scenarios, based more on conjectures than on credible evidence.

To understand the problem in its proper perspective, one has to analyse China's intelligence structure insofar as it relates to clandestine technology acquisition, the MO followed and the background to the recently enhanced US concerns in this regard.

CHINA'S CLANDESTINE TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION STRUCTURE

Till April, 1998, at the top of the structure was the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, known as the COSTIND. The COSTIND was responsible for supervision over all industries producing military equipment, fully or partly, and research and development (R&D) with regard to military equipment.

As the agency responsible for weapons R & D, it not only supervised the work of the defence-related research establishments, but also set tasks for the acquisition of technology abroad by the intelligence community and monitored their implementation. The civilian agencies responsible for weapons production and R & D as well as the PLA were equally represented on the COSTIND.

The April, 1998, session of the National People's Congress (NPC), which designated Mr.Zhu Rongji as the Prime Minister, approved a re-organisation of this apex body. Under this plan, the COSTIND was converted into a purely civilian body with no PLA representation under the changed name the State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, now referred to as the SCOSTIND.Mr. Liu Jibin, a former Vice-Minister for Finance, who had worked for some years in the defence industries, was promoted as the Minister in charge of the SCOSTIND.

At the same time, a new department called the General Armaments Department (GAD) was created within the PLA. The GAD was made responsible for supervising the work of all industries exclusively producing military equipment and R & D in respect of military equipment. The SCOSTIND was given the task of supervising all industries producing equipment for military as well as civilian use and R & D connected therewith.

Thus, since April, 1998, the SCOSTIND and the GAD jointly task the intelligence community for the clandestine acquisition of technology---the GAD in respect of purely military technology and the SCOSTIND in respect of dual-use technology.

The Chinese intelligence community consists of the Ministry for Public Security (MPS), the Ministry for State Security (MSS) and the Second and Third Bureaus of the General Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA.

Till 1983, the MPS was responsible for internal security and counter-espionage and an organisation called the Central Investigation Department (CID) for external intelligence and security. In June,1983, the NPC re-designated the CID as the MSS and merged with it the counter-espionage division of the MPS. Mr.Deng Xiao-ping also ordered that the MSS should, in future, send its officers abroad more under non-diplomatic covers such as journalists, academics, scientists, businessmen and business executives than under diplomatic covers as the CID was doing. Mr.Deng wanted the MSS to take advantage of the new opportunities created by the opening-up of China for diversifying its methods of collecting intelligence.

The MSS was divided into 12 Bureaus, of which three were made exclusively responsible for science & technology. The Fourth Bureau was made responsible for R & D with regard to the gadgetry required by the MSS officers for their operations; the Tenth Bureau was given the task of clandestine acquisition of scientific and technological information; and the Eleventh Bureau was allotted the task of computer security inside the MSS and other Government departments and clandestine collection of information relating to information technology.

The Second Bureau of the GSD is responsible for military intelligence through human sources and the Third Bureau for technical intelligence, through monitoring of wireless and telephone communications, aerial surveillance and other means.

The April, 1998, NPC session designated Mr.Jia Chunwang, who was the Minister for State Security from 1985, as the Minister for Public Security in replacement of Mr.Tao Siju and appointed Mr.Xu Yongyue as the new Minister for State Security.

The reasons for the replacement of Mr.Tao Siju are not known. As the Minister responsible for external intelligence for 13 years, Mr. Jia had, on the one hand, established a network of liaison relationships with the external intelligence agencies of many countries, including the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, on the other, strengthened the MSS's capability for the clandestine acquisition of scientific and technological information abroad.

The background of Mr.Xu, the new head of the external intelligence set-up, is not yet known. Till 1985, China followed the tradition of appointing career intelligence officers as the heads of the MPS and the MSS. In 1985,Mr.Deng broke with this tradition and brought in Mr.Jia, a bureaucrat with no exposure to intelligence work, to head the MSS. It is, therefore, difficult to say whether Mr.Xu is a career intelligence officer or has been inducted from outside the intelligence community.

The Second Bureau of the GSD is headed by Maj.Gen. Ji Shengde. The name of the head of the Third Bureau of the GSD is not known.

One of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Chinese Communist Party co-ordinates the work of all the agencies of the intelligence community, civilian as well as military. Mr.Qiao Shi, former Chairman of the NPC, used to be the co-ordinator for nearly two decades. Due to differences with President Jiang Zemin, he was eased out of his party functions at the Party Congress of 1997 and replaced as the NPC Chairman by Mr. Li Peng, in April, 1998.

It is not yet known who now acts as the co-ordinator of the intelligence community. There are, however, unconfirmed indications that this job has now been entrusted to Mr.Hu Jintao, a Jiang Zemin loyalist, who was elected to the Politbureau Standing Committee by the 1997 Party congress and also subsequently designated as the Vice-President of China. He started his career as a hydraulic engineer and served for some years as the head of the Communist Youth League. He was the most visible and vocal member of the leadership when Beijing was recently rocked by anti-US riots over the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. It was he and not Mr.Jiang or Mr.Zhu, who made a televised broadcast to the nation on the occasion.

THE MODUS OPERANDI

Like the KGB, the Committee of State Security of the erstwhile USSR, and the newly-created (in 1993) Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the Chinese external intelligence agency relies considerably on non-diplomatic covers for intelligence collection abroad.

Since the erstwhile USSR did not have an overseas Russian Diaspora, the KGB's non-diplomatic covers were confined to the professions of journalism, academics and the staff of state-owned enterprises having overseas linkages, such as the Aeroflot, the Intourist etc. However, the fact that the overwhelming number of the communist parties of the world, particularly in Western countries, were pro-Moscow and that there was considerable ideological sympathy for Moscow even amongst non-Communist leftist circles, particularly amongst the Western elite, provided the KGB with a reservoir of talents for exploitation for the collection of scientific and technological intelligence.

The majority of the spies, who helped the KGB in the clandestine acquisition of technology abroad, were native-born citizens of the country from which intelligence was collected. They worked for the KGB either due to ideological affinity or for money or under pressure.

China did not have a similar reservoir of ideologically pro-Beijing talents in the US and other Western countries. But, it had at its disposal a vast Diaspora of overseas Chinese who were prepared to help the MSS in the clandestine acquisition of technology either out of a feeling of patriotism or for money or under pressure exercised through their relatives still living in China. The role of the overseas Chinese community in helping the MSS is as significant as that of the overseas Jewish community in helping the MOSSAD, the Israeli external intelligence organisation.

The ethnic Asians constitute 4 per cent of the US population, but scientists belonging to the ethnic Asian communities occupy 10 per cent of the posts in various research establishments in sensitive fields. Amongst these, ethnic Chinese scientists constitute the largest single group. These are the permanent employees of these research establishments and this number does not include the large number of scientists from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong who go to the US periodically on visiting Fellowships.

The significant role played by the ethnic Chinese citizens or permanent residents of the US in helping the MSS in the clandestine acquisition of technology would be evident from the following: Only in one of the reported important cases of Chinese technological espionage in the US since 1949 was the suspect a White American citizen, with ideological affinity to Beijing. In all other cases, the suspects were US citizens or permanent residents of Chinese origin. In a majority of the cases, the suspects had migrated to the US from Taiwan and not from the mainland. The MSS's past preference for recruits from amongst the Chinese of Taiwanese origin could be attributed to the fact that the migrants from Taiwan did not evoke the same distrust in the US as migrants from the mainland and that, consequently, the FBI surveillance on them was not as strict as it was on mainland Chinese.

Even though there was no Chinese business community in the mainland before 1979, the then CID was able to recruit talents from the overseas Chinese business communities of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and the South-East Asian countries, particularly Indonesia and Thailand. After the opening-up of China in 1979, a Chinese business community has come up and a large number of private companies have come into existence.

While many of these companies are genuinely private in the sense of being owned by private entrepreneurs, there are others which are private in name and registration, but, in reality, have been floated by different Government departments, including the PLA, to act as joint venture partners of foreign investors. This is particularly so in sensitive fields like telecommunications, aerospace industries, broadcasting and telecasting and Internet Service Providers, where, in the Chinese perception, unmonitored foreign presence could damage national security.

All the so-called private firms, which are joint venture partners of foreign companies for providing cellular phone and paging services, are controlled by the PLA. Similarly, the mainland company (Today's Asia), which is a partner of Mr.Rupert Murdoch's Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, is allegedly controlled by the PLA.

In 1993, SCM/Brooks, a US company specialising in communications technology, formed a joint venture with an ostensibly private Chinese company called the Galaxy New Technology under the name Hua Mei and obtained the clearance of the Clinton Administration for the transfer of its technology to the jointly-owned firm in China. It transpired in 1996 that the Galaxy had actually been floated by the PLA and that Mr.Deng Changru, who was appointed by the Galaxy as its President in December,1995, was a telecommunications officer of the PLA with the rank of a Colonel. He had allegedly served for some years in the Third Bureau of the GSD responsible for technical intelligence.

There have been many other such instances of ostensibly private companies floated by the PLA, the Second Bureau of the GSD and the MSS. Among companies which are strongly suspected to have been floated by the Chinese intelligence community are the Anran Company, reportedly owned 100 per cent by the MSS, and the China Resources (Holdings), Beijing, and the China Resources Enterprises, Hong Kong, reportedly jointly controlled by the MSS and the Second Bureau of the GSD.

The most active state-owned company of China is the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). It has two branches in Hong Kong called CITIC, Hong Kong, 100 per cent owned by it, and CITIC,Pacific, owned 45 per cent by CITIC, Hong Kong, with the other shares held by Hong Kong businessmen.

The CITIC, Beijing, and the Polytechnologies, a company of the PLA, are both headed by Mr. Wang Jun, son of the late Mr.Wang Zhen, former Vice-President of China. Mr.Wang Jun is a former naval officer. As head of the Polytechnologies, he works under Mr.He Ping, a son-in-law of the late Mr.Deng Xiaoping, who is the head of a conglomerate called the China Poly Group. Mr.He Ping, who was also in the PLA, had worked for some years as a Service Attaché in the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

Ms.Liu Chao-ying, daughter of Gen. Liu Huaqing, who was senior Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has come under media scrutiny in the US in connection with the enquiries into the activities of Chinese companies. She was a Major in the PLA before she went to the US.

There has been a proliferation of Chinese companies in the US since 1990. The Cox Committee estimates the number of such companies at 3,000.Investigations into the working of these companies done by various non-governmental and governmental agencies since 1992 have brought out that:

----Many of these companies do not have any genuine business activity. Often, they are just letterhead companies registered and opened for the collection of technological information.

----Many of these companies have common staff, common office accommodation and even common telephones.

----The heads of many of them are ex-PLA officers or other bureaucrats.

President Jiang Zemin's order of last year regarding the removal of the PLA from business activity is unlikely to affect companies floated by the PLA and the intelligence community for intelligence collection. The "China Daily Business Weekly" of March 21 has reported that "some sectors of a special nature" would be exempted from the purview of Mr.Jiang's order.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE ENHANCED US CONCERNS

Mr.William Perry, who was Defence Secretary in the first Clinton administration, became an ardent advocate of what he called co-operation with China in the field of defence conversion. By this, he meant persuading China to convert its defence industries to exclusively civilian use and helping it to reduce the PLA's presence in those sectors of the economy and administration where responsibilities should lie in civilian and not military hands.

For this purpose, he persuaded Beijing to agree to the formation of an US-China Joint Defence Conversion Commission with representatives of the Pentagon and the COSTIND. Justifying his proposal, he said in 1995 that "by engaging the PLA directly, we can help promote more openness in the Chinese national security apparatus, including military institutions."

The first project undertaken by the Commission was "to help China integrate the management of its military and civilian air-traffic control systems and modernise the system to improve flight safety in China."

Following a controversy in 1996 over the revelation that the Galaxy New Technology Company, a joint venture partner of the Hua Mei company, was actually controlled by the PLA, there was media spotlight on the role of Mr.Perry in getting clearance for the transfer of modern US communications technology to the PLA under the cover of this joint venture.

This led to criticism of the very idea of a joint Defence Conversion Commission in association with a Chinese entity involved in the clandestine acquisition of technology in the US. The critics contended that the COSTIND was exploiting this Commission to soften US bureaucratic resistance to the transfer of modern technology to China.

This criticism was intensified following a discovery in 1996 that China had secretly transferred to the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Factory in Jiangxi, which manufactures A-5 strike aircraft, Silkworm missiles, jet trainers and crop-spraying planes, six second-hand machine tools that it had bought from McDonnel Douglas in September,1994, ostensibly for a new plant meant to produce civilian aircraft.

There were certain other developments in 1996 and 1997, which led to criticism that in its keenness for pampering business interests, the Clinton Administration was damaging national security interests.

The Clinton Administration, allegedly under pressure from the aerospace and telecommunications lobbies, removed commercial communications satellites from the munition list and transferred the licensing powers with regard to such satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department. (This power has since been transferred back to the State Department this year).

The decision followed complaints from these lobbies that the State Department and the Pentagon had an unnecessarily restrictive attitude while dealing with applications for licence from US companies for having their communications satellites launched by China's Long March rockets.

Under the economic sanctions imposed against China by the Bush Administration after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, which are still in force, export of commercial communications satellites to China for being launched by Chinese rockets is banned. However, the Congress has vested the President with powers to issue waivers if considered necessary in national interest.

President Bush issued nine such waivers in three years. This was one of the reasons why Mr.Clinton, during the presidential campaign of 1992, accused Mr.Bush of mollycoddling Beijing. Mr.Clinton's attitude changed after coming to office and he himself issued 11 waivers in five years.

Both the Administrations justified the liberal issue of waivers as meant to be incentives to Beijing to exercise voluntary restraint on the export of missiles and related technology to other countries and to ultimately adhere fully to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The aerospace and telecommunications lobbies justified their demand for the easing of restrictions on the launching of their satellites on Chinese rockets by pointing out that it cost only 50 per cent of what it would cost if they were to get them launched on West European or Russian rockets.

Some advocates of a more liberal regime also underlined the opportunities such launchings provided to the scientific experts of the US intelligence community to visit Chinese space establishments and launching sites under the cover of the executives of the US companies, interact with Chinese scientists and identify points of strength and weaknesses of Chinese rockets and the direction of their R & D thrust.

In 1997, allegations were made in the media that the Democratic Party and Mr. Clinton himself had been in receipt of hefty campaign contributions not only from US aerospace companies, but also from a PLA-owned aerospace conglomerate of China, which had been the beneficiaries of the removal of commercial satellites from the munitions list and of the liberal issue of waivers by Mr. Clinton.

Between 1994 and 1996, the Long March rockets of China went through a bad patch with a failure rate of 25 per cent. Amongst the US companies affected by these failures were the Hughes Space & Communications in 1995 and the Loral Space & Communications in 1996.

Hughes' experts, who investigated the 1995 failure, reportedly identified the causes as inaccurate mathematical formulae used by the Chinese for assessing the impact of atmospheric conditions on the launching, structural weaknesses in the rivets used to attach the satellites to the rockets and the shape of the nose-cone which caused instability during the launchings. Without the knowledge of the Clinton Administration, the company allegedly shared these findings with the Chinese authorities.

Similarly, the Loral Company allegedly shared with the Chinese, without the permission of the administration, an enquiry report submitted by a team, which had investigated the failure of the 1996 launch.

The repeated failures between 1994 and 1996 of the Long March rockets led to a steep increase in the insurance premia for commercial satellites launched on Chinese rockets. What the Hughes and the Loral were gaining as a result of the attractive discount rates for launchings offered by the Chinese was neutralised by the increase in insurance premium rates and the losses due to the delayed commissioning of the satellites.

This made the American companies as anxious as the Chinese to improve the performance of the Long March rockets and it was alleged that the Hughes and the Loral not only shared their findings on the failures with the Chinese, but also gave them advice as to how to remove the defects. It was contended that, as a result, the performance of the Long March rockets has significantly improved since then.

The Congressional opponents of space co-operation with China saw a nexus between the campaign contributions by the aerospace companies, the liberal issue of waivers and the failure of the Clinton Administration to take punitive action against the Hughes and the Loral for the breach of security rules and claimed that these two companies, by their action, had not only helped China in improving the performance of its Long March rockets, but would have also enabled it to improve the accuracy of its missiles directed at the US. It was this, which led to the launching of the Cox Committee enquiry.

NUCLEAR ESPIONAGE

A CIA official, who testified before the Cox Committee, reportedly volunteered the information that in 1995 a Chinese, who claimed to have access to secret intelligence regarding China's nuclear arsenal, initiated contacts with a CIA official (the place was not mentioned, but it is believed to be Taiwan) and offered to work for the CIA. In support of his claim of access, he reportedly gave to the CIA official some documents containing data about nuclear weapons under development by China.

One of these documents dated 1988 contained data about a miniaturised nuclear weapon capable of being launched from a submarine and the weapon as described in the document closely resembled a miniaturised US warhead called W-88. Even earlier, US scientists had noticed that a miniaturised warhead being tested by the Chinese had qualities similar to those of W-88. The document given by the Chinese walk-in strengthened their suspicions of Chinese espionage in US nuclear establishments.

Surprisingly, the Chinese walk-in source did not meet the CIA official again, thereby giving rise to a suspicion that he might have been a double agent sent by the MSS, but no explanation has been forthcoming as to why the MSS should want the CIA to know that it has had access to US nuclear secrets.

A FBI enquiry was ordered into the suspected theft of W-88 designs by the MSS. The suspicion zeroed in on an American scientist of Taiwanese origin (Wen Ho Lee), working in a division of the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, which deals with miniaturisation of nuclear weapons.

From the US media allegations, the following picture emerges: Mrs.Wen Ho Lee, also of Chinese origin, was working in the Administration section of the Laboratory. She used to be attached as Liaison Officer to delegations of foreign scientists visiting the Laboratory.

Through her, Chinese delegations visiting the laboratory established contacts with her husband and other scientists of Chinese origin.

In 1988, Mr.Wen Ho Lee received, through his laboratory, an invitation to present a paper on a non-sensitive subject at a seminar organised by a Hong Kong organisation. The Laboratory permitted him to do so.

He was allegedly contacted by the Chinese at Hong Kong and taken secretly to Beijing for debriefing. He did not take the permission of the Laboratory for going to Beijing. Nor did he keep it informed after his return to New Mexico.

Though Mr.Wen denied any wrong-doing, the FBI wanted to keep his telephone and computer under watch, but its request for permission to do so was rejected by the Attorney-General on grounds of lack of evidence to suspect him.

Only after the matter came up before the Cox Committee and appeared in the media was the FBI permitted to examine his computer. They reportedly found that Mr.Wen had, without permission, transferred a lot of classified data from other computers to his. He has been sacked by the Laboratory on charges of unauthorised and unreported contacts with foreigners and breaches of computer security rules. He has not yet been charged with espionage for want of adequate evidence.

It has been reported that the testimonies collected by the Cox Committee and other agencies had indicated the possibility of Chinese theft of technologies relating to five other warheads, submarine detection and neutron bombs. The submarine detection technology and inputs regarding the use of laser in neutron bombs were alleged to have been provided to the Chinese by Mr.Peter Lee, an ethnic Chinese scientist of Taiwanese origin, reportedly working in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of California. He allegedly gave the laser inputs to the Chinese during a visit to Beijing in 1985 and the submarine detection inputs during another visit to Beijing in 1997.

However, action has been taken against him only on charges of submitting incomplete reports about his visits to Beijing and giving the Chinese the laser technology. According to the "International Herald Tribune" (May 11,1999), no action is being taken in respect of the submarine detection technology due to lack of adequate evidence. It is being speculated that the real reason is that the US Navy does not want to admit in court that a new technology for submarine detection has been developed.

CONCLUSIONS

The recent allegations regarding the clandestine acquisition of sensitive technologies by China in the US broadly related to five fields--nuclear weaponisation, improvement of the performance of their space rockets and missiles, submarine detection techniques, improvement of the PLA's telecommunications capability and super computers.

Of these, only the reported Chinese success in the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weaponisation and submarine detection technologies was the result of classic espionage operations.

The acquisition by the Chinese of technological inputs for the improvement of the performance of their space rockets and, hence, supposedly of missiles and of the PLA's telecommunications capability was the result not so much of Chinese espionage as of the over-keenness of US business companies to expand their business interests in China even by secretly providing the Chinese with technological inputs without the knowledge of the US Administration. The clandestine nature of these transactions came more from the American than from the Chinese side.

There was nothing clandestine about the reported Chinese purchase of about 600 sophisticated computers in the US. The Clinton Administration had liberalised the rules regarding the export of computers and the Chinese took advantage of this.

Certain other observations would be in order.

First, the greater tolerance of clandestine Chinese acquisition activities by the Clinton Administration and of the repeated breaches of security rules by US business companies with expanding interests in China. This is in marked contrast to the severe action which the pre-1991 US Administrations used to take against similar clandestine acquisitions by the USSR and against US companies obliging the Soviets in violation of security rules.

This tolerance could be attributed partly to the enormous interests of the US business companies in the expanding Chinese market and partly to ill-advised policy considerations. The US companies did not have a similar interest in the Soviet market and do not have a similar interest in the Russian market. The ill-advised policy considerations arose from naïve assumptions, which have been repeatedly belied, that such leniency towards China could bring in political dividends in the form of a more responsible and responsive Chinese regime in matters such as restraints in the export of nuclear weapons and missile technologies to Iran and Pakistan and political liberalisation to accompany the economic liberalisation.

Second, the enormous influence which the pro-China business lobby in the US exercises on public servants not only in the White House and the State, Defence and Commerce Departments, but also in the US intelligence community. One had seen how the CIA repeatedly withstood pressure from the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department to dilute its reports against China in respect of supply of nuclear weapons and missile technologies and equipment to Pakistan. But, in respect of violation of security rules by the US companies in their dealings with China, it has been amenable to external pressure and has had no qualms over diluting its estimate of the gravity of the damage to the US national security interests.

The recent investigations have brought out that the CIA's station chief in Beijing had sent a report to his headquarters in Washington forwarding some allegations that the representative of the Hughes in Beijing had been paying bribes to Chinese officials in order to get better terms for the satellite launchings. This is an offence under US laws which prohibit payment of bribes by US companies to promote their business, but the CIA headquarters never sent the field report to the Attorney-General's office for investigation.

Third , the way Chinese and US business companies have been systematically softening former and serving public servants through lucrative consultancy offers in order to induce a more tolerant attitude towards wrong-doings by these companies. Amongst those who are alleged to be working as consultants to such companies are Dr.Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser under President Nixon, Mr.Al Haig, Secretary of State under President Reagan, and Mr.William Perry and Mr. Joseph Nye, Defence Secretary and Assistant Defence Secretary respectively in Mr. Clinton's first Administration. It has even been alleged in sections of the US media that Mr.Sandy Berger, the present National Security Adviser, had worked as a consultant to one such firm before he joined Mr. Clinton's first Administration as Deputy National Security Adviser.

Fourth, the marked contrast between the way the Clinton Administration has been mollycoddling China despite the repeated violations of US laws by Chinese entities and the way it has sought to penalise a large number of Indian entities not due to evidence of any wrong-doing by them but due to unjustified and imaginary fears that they might indulge in wrong-doing. Only five Chinese companies figure in the USA's "entities black list" as against dozens of Indian companies.

And, the fifth and the last, China is not the only country, which indulges in scientific and technological espionage. The USA does it too, as aggressively as China if not more, through the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology headed by Mr.Gary Smith, former Director of the Applied Physics Laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University. Whereas China indulges in espionage to strengthen its technological capability, the CIA's technological wizards do it in order to deny other countries access to modern technologies and thus keep them in a state of technological servitude to the US.

 

B.RAMAN                                                                          (13-6-99)

(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail:corde@vsnl.com)

 

 

 

 

 

 
            
               
 

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