NAWAZ: BETWEEN THE DEVIL
& THE DEEP SEA
A casual visitor to New Delhi is struck by the air of quiet
confidence that has replaced the initial surprise and confusion caused by Pakistan's proxy
invasion in the Kargil sector.
The ground situation is still delicate and Pakistan's likely
response to the successful beginning made by the Indian armed forces in rolling back the
invasion in an area, which provides the initial advantages to the invader, is still
unpredictable. Despite this, the ground operations have been proceeding as well as
possible under difficult circumstances.
Indian national security managers are generally weak in
anticipating and preventing a crisis, but resilient and strong in recovering from the
initial surprises and dealing effectively with it. In Kargil too, their resilience and
ability to deprive the adversary of the initial advantages gained by him by surprise and
stealth have been much in evidence.
The intelligence community has not let itself be affected by
public criticism of its perceived failures before the invasion and has since achieved some
outstanding results which have received due recognition.
There is also a recognition that their perceived failures we
re due, at least partly, to past misconceptions at various levels of the administration
that there was a greater threat to the predominantly Buddhist Ladakh area from China than
from Pakistan. The need for an effective trans-Line of Control (LoC) intelligence and
surveillance capability in the Kargil sector to compensate for the decision taken in 1983,
when Mrs.Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, not to have a military presence in these
areas during the long winter months, was overlooked by different Governments. This made
possible Pakistan's proxy invasion.
Even sections of strategic analysts, official as well as
non-official, now admit their past lack of wisdom in overlooking a fundamental difference
between China and Pakistan while assessing the relative threats to India's national
security from them. While the destabilisation and balkanisation of India has not been a
component of China's policy towards India since 1979, it is an essential ingredient of
Pakistan's.
And, it is likely to remain so despite forward movements in the
bilateral dialogue process. The need for a long-term security doctrine to deal with
Pakistan, which takes into account the compulsive anti-India reflexes of various sections
of Pakistani society and administration despite their external pretensions of interest in
friendly bilateral relations, is getting to be recognised as a result of the Kargil
experience.
Even in the event of Pakistan withdrawing its invaders from the
Kargil sector and returning to the table, mutual tolerance and not mutual trust and
goodwill would be the hallmark of future relations. The damage caused by the Pakistani
Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif, his army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to
mutual trust by their perfidious invasion is unlikely to be repaired for a long time to
come.
Even the worst critics of the Prime Minister, Mr.A.B.Vajpayee,
admit in private that he has handled a very difficult situation with equanimity and
finesse. He has left professional decisions regarding the time and tactics required for
throwing out the invaders in the hands of the armed forces. At the same time, he has thus
far politely, but firmly rejected advice, from official as well as non-official sources,
to give the armed forces
greater operational flexibility in the interest of a quick end to the invasion, by
authorising carefully-selected trans-LoC strikes to stop supplies to the invaders and to
divert Pakistan's attention from the Kargil area.
His objective has been two-fold--- not to interfere with the
ground operations of the armed forces and, at the same time, to avoid any action which
could lead to undesirable escalation and neutralise the diplomatic gains of India. There
is a justified apprehension that these gains could evaporate fast if any unwise action by
India leads to an escalation.
There is considerable satisfaction over the supportive attitude
of not only the US Administration, but also large sections of American opinion-makers and
strategic analysts. While all the credit for this is being claimed by the Vajpayee
Government, other factors too have been in play such as the following---the
disillusionment of the Clinton Administration over the internal policies of Mr.Sharif such
as the vindictive harassment of political opponents and particularly Mrs. Benazir Bhutto;
the witch-hunt of independent journalists; the arbitrary revision of the agreements
concluded by the Benazir Government with independent power producers; the continuing
support to the Tali
ban ; non-co-operation in arresting Osama bin Laden and independent evidence collected by
the US agencies regarding the use by the Pakistan army of the international Islamic
terrorists' brigade of bin Laden in the Kargil area against Indian troops.
Influential Indian as well as American analysts share common concerns over what they
perceive as the changing civilian-military equation in Pakistan as a result of Mr.Sharif's
unwise dependence on the Army for toning up the economic administration in the
infrastructure sector.
Having tasted his newly-granted powers, Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has started talking of effective internal governance as an
essential component of national security and of the army's interest in ensuring this. For
airing similar views, Mr.Sharif had removed Gen. Jehangir Karamat, Gen. Musharraf's
predecessor, but the popularity of Gen. Musharraf due to the claimed successes of the army
in the Kargil area has made it difficult for Mr. Sharif to rein in the COAS.
While Mr.Sharif would appear to have given the initial clearance
to Gen.Musharraf's proposal for bringing the international terrorists' brigade of bin
Laden from Afghanistan to Skardu in the Northern Areas and infiltrating it into the Kargil
area, he seems to have been surprised by subsequent revelations by US officials,
apparently on the basis of independent recordings of Gen. Musharraf's telephonic
conversations with Gen.Mohd Aziz, his Chief of the General Staff, that the COAS has also
infiltrated Pakistani army regulars along with this terrorist brigade.
It is said that Mr.Sharif appeared genuinely shocked when the US
Ambassador in Islamabad played the American tapes of the COAS' conversations to him.
Mr.Sharif is under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to order the army
to pull back the invaders to the Pakistan side. It is not yet known whether the US also
wants action to be taken against the COAS and other officers for being mixed-up with the
terrorists' brigade and, if so, whether he would be able to comply with this demand.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration similarly demanded the
removal of Lt.Gen. (Retd) Javed Nasir, the then Director-General of the ISI, and some of
his senior office
rs for being mixed up with bin Laden's mercenaries and for not co-operating with the US in
the re-purchase of the Stinger missiles from the mercenaries. After resisting the pressure
for six months, Mr.Sharif ultimately succumbed and sacked them.
Mr.Sharif's action was facilitated by the fact that Lt.Gen. Nasir
was his close personal friend and did not mind leaving to spare Mr.Sharif any
embarrassment. The withdrawal of the Kargil invaders and any action against the COAS under
US pressure c
ould prove unpopular in Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf, a Mohajir, is not very popular amongst
the Punjabi officers, but his popularity in the general population and, particularly
amongst Islamic religious elements, is presently high.
Moreover, after taking over the administration of the Water and
Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the army, under the COAS' orders, has made out a list
of all past defaulters of payments. Mr.Sharif's detractors in Pakistan allege that the
Ittefaq Industries and other business enterprises owned by the Sharif family members top
the list of defaulters and that Gen. Musharraf has been cleverly using this weapon to make
Mr.Sharif support his actions.
There are thus indications of a growingly uneasy relationship
between Mr.Sharif and Gen.Musharraf. Who comes out on top would also have an impact on the
ground situation in Kargil.
B.RAMAN
(22-6-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of
India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail:corde@vsnl.com)
