The
Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr.Nawaz Sharif's reported decision to cut short his stay in
China by four days and return home indicates that he probably finds himself cornered at
home and abroad because of the proxy invasion by the Pakistan army in the Kargil sector.
The pressure from the US to withdraw the invaders from the Indian
territory cannot be ignored by his Government lightly. The economic situation continues to
be critical as seen from the details of the 1999-2000 budget presented to the National
Assembly recently.
It was to prevent a possible collapse of the Pakistani economy
that President Clinton used his waiver powers last year and authorised US support for an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package for Pakistan. The next instalment of US $
100 million under this package is due for release in the middle of July.
After the recent visit of Gen. Anthony Zinni, the Commanding
Officer of the US Central Command, to Islamabad reportedly to convey personally not only
to Mr.Sharif, but also to Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), a
tough message from the White House demanding Pakistani withdrawal from the Indian
territory, State Department officials in Washington, in their background briefings for US
journalists, have been hinting at a possible US advice to the IMF to withhold the payment
of the next tranche till Pakistani troops and bin Laden's terrorists vacate Indian
territory.
Moreover, by increasing the proposed defence expenditure by 11
per cent under pressure from Gen. Musharraf, Mr. Sharif has violated one of the conditions
of the IMF package which called for a freeze and then reduction in defence expenditure.
Pakistan finds that its past tactics of pressurising the US and
other Western countries to support its case for the internationalisation of the Kashmir
issue by painting grim scenarios of a nuclear flashpoint have started producing
diminishing returns.
In the past, Pakistan had been vehemently denying any material
assistance to the Kashmiri extremists and any links with bin Laden's terrorists brigade.
Since the fighting broke out in the Kargil sector, it has also been denying any violation
of the Line of Control (LOC) by Pakistani army regulars.
By his utter carelessness in talking over phone with Lt.Gen.
Mohd. Aziz, his Chief of the General Staff (CGS), from Beijing last month about the role
of the Pakistani army in organising the invasion and its control over the terrorists,Gen.
Musharraf has totally damaged the deniability of this operation. US officials have
reportedly confronted Mr.Sharif with recordings of the telephone conversations containing
Gen.Musharraf's incriminating admissions.
Pakistani denials no longer carry conviction with the US and
other Western countries and US officials have reportedly been feeling that the present
Pakistani Army leadership has been as perfidious with the US as it was with India--by
denying contacts with bin Laden's terrorists' brigade, but secretly using them.
In an apparent exercise to pressurise Mr.Sharif to distance
himself from the actions of Gen. Musharraf, US intelligence agencies have been briefing US
journalists on the evidence they have about the COAS' nexus with extremist organisations
such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Al Badr.
Thus, Mr.Selig Harrison, the well-known US analyst and columnist,
wrote in the "International Herald Tribune" of June 16: "Recent information
makes clear that the newly-installed Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has
longstanding links with several Islamic fundamentalist groups."
Mr.Sharif's dilemma arises from the fact that any withdrawal from
the Kargil area, under American pressure, without a face-saving formula, which could be
used to proclaim Pakistani gains, could be politically damaging. In October 1998,
Mr.Sharif had handpicked Gen. Musharraf as COAS, Lt.Gen. Ziauddin as the Director-General
of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt.Gen. (Retd) Javed Nasir as his Intelligence
Adviser and Brig. (Retd) Imtiaz as his Internal Security Adviser.
Of these, only Lt.Gen.Ziauddin and Brig. Imtiaz have continued to
be loyal to him. Gen. Musharraf has proved to be a rogue elephant and Lt.Gen. Nasir, who
had to be sacked in 1993 under US pressure, is now supporting Gen. Musharraf and opposing
acceptance of the US demand for withdrawal.
Since March, there have been indications that Mr.Sharif was
facing difficulty in reining in the COAS who has been openly criticising the lack of
effective internal governance. Under pressure from Gen. Musharraf, Mr.Sharif had to
appoint him on April 9 as concurrently the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee, though only for one year.
Under the rotation rules, it was the turn of the Chief of the
Naval Staff, Admiral Fasih Bokhari, to hold this post, but Gen. Musharraf was insisting
that since the Army was the most important component of the Armed Forces, the Chairman
should always be from the Army. While Mr.Sharif has not accepted this, he appointed Gen.
Musharraf to this post for one year as against the normal tenure of three years and asked
him to prepare a detailed note on the subject for the Cabinet.
Outwardly, Mr.Sharif has been expressing total endorsement of the
actions of the COAS and his determination not to accept the US demands, which are
described by him as one-sided and unreasonable. At the same time, he seems to be
desperately searching for a face-saving formula as was evident from his secret despatch of
Mr.Niaz Naik, former Foreign Secretary, to New Delhi on June 27 for unanounced and
subsequently denied (by the Pakistan Foreign Office) talks with our Prime Minister,
Mr.A.B.Vajpayee.
Gen. Musharraf, who seems to be determined not to accept the US
demand without a quid pro quo in the form of some sort of reactivation of the
international interest in the settlement of the Kashmir issue, has been trying to
frustrate Mr. Sharif's efforts for a face-saving solution by leaking to the press the news
of the move for a Clinton-Sharif meeting and by allegedly alerting the Press about
Mr.Naik's secret visit to New Delhi.
Even though Mr.Sharif went to China as scheduled, he must have
been worried about what Gen. Musharraf might be doing behind his back.
India has to closely monitor the activities of Gen. Musharraf and
the Pakistani Army. He has always had the reputation of acting rashly without the orders
of his superiors and then confronting them with a fait accompli. He is quite capable of
organising some new action such as a major assault on the Indian garrison on the Siachen
Glacier or elsewhere in the hope of thereby preventing the Pakistani Government from
agreeing to any way out which does not satisfy the army.
The indications are that Mr.Sharif would be the happiest to be
rid of Gen. Musharraf, a Mohajir, but he has to carefully consider the likely fall-out of
any such action. He could manage any adverse reaction from the public and the Islamic
parties provided the Punjabi and Pakhtoon officers of the Army stand by Mr. Sharif. But,
will they?
During Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's regime, he favoured a large number of
religious-minded Deobandi officers recommended by the Jammat-e-Islami for sensitive posts.
Gen. Musharraf was one of them. These are all irrational elements capable of unpredictable
reflexes. If they manage to pressurise Mr.Sharif to go along with their actions unmindful
of the diplomatic consequences, we could be in for an escalation on the ground.
B.RAMAN
(29-6-99)
