As the
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive of Pakistan, was
much more easily available to the media and opinion-makers than his predecessors and much
more open in expressing his views and sharing his perceptions with governmental
decision-makers and non-governmental opinion-makers. In his interactions with the
political leadership, he had the reputation of calling a spade a spade---sometimes, more
than a spade.
His interactions with the officer corps and the rank and file of
the army were qualitatively different from those of his predecessors. His inspection
visits to lower formations were not just ceremonial occasions, with more pomp than
substance. He interacted actively with them, sharing his perceptions and concerns and
encouraging an open expression of theirs, without being unduly restrained by rank and
juniority.
As a result, even though he took over as the COAS only a year
ago, one had a much larger flow of information on his thinking on various issues than one
had on that of his predecessors, while they were in office.
The image one had of him was that of a typical
commando---deceptive and ready to jump from the heights without thinking or asking himself
why should he and what thereafter.
He made a comprehensive presentation of his perceptions of
Pakistan's security environment before the English-speaking Union of Karachi on April 12.
One has not been able to lay hand on its text, but the details as published in the
Pakistani press should have triggered off a debate in India and the US, but didn't.
Surprisingly, even in Pakistan, barring the "Nation"
and the "Dawn", the dailies, and the "Herald", the monthly of the
"Dawn" group, other sections of the media did not seem to have adequately
analysed the General's perceptions of threats to Pakistan's security and vision of the
role of the army in Pakistani society and administration in order to see what it could
portend for Pakistan's future.
The General compared Pakistan to a boat carrying trained
soldiers, which developed leaks and the civilian dispensation did not know what to do.
What should the soldiers do? he asked. Wait till the enemy ship came and sank them or
initiate action to plug the holes?
In a detailed assessment of the man and his views, the
"Herald" (May) cautioned the public and the political leadership that General
Musharraf was not like any other COAS who had preceded him after Zia-ul-Haq and stressed
the importance of the political leadership disabusing his mind of his disconcerting ideas
of what the army could and should do outside its legitimate sphere of duty and competence
before it became too late. The caution apparently went unheeded.
The ideas propounded by Gen. Musharraf as the COAS, which were
referred to as the new security doctrine or the Musharraf doctrine, had the following
components:
First, the nuclear deterrence in the hands of India and
Pakistan reduced the chances of a conventional war between the two to almost zero.
Two, even though India had a conventional superiority over
Pakistan, so long as its army was kept bleeding in Kashmir, it would not be able to
undertake a war of aggression against Pakistan.
Three, even if the Kashmir issue was resolved, that would
not mean peace because Pakistan, by opposing India's hegemonistic ambitions in Asia, would
continue to be a thorn on India's side. So long as it did so, Pakistan would have the
support of not only China, but also Japan, both of which did not want India to emerge as a
major power.
Four, India would, therefore, step up its attempts to
remove this thorn. Since it cannot do so by conventional means, it would resort to covert
means and low-intensity conflicts.
Five, political instability and economic mismanagement
would weaken Pakistan's ability to counter India. The army, therefore, had a vital
interest in ensuring political stability and a healthy economy through effective
governance.
Six, without naming Mr.Mushahid Hussain, former Minister for
Information and Broadcasting in Mr.Nawaz Sharif's Cabinet, the General seemed to agree
with the former's assessment that future Indo-Pakistan conflicts would be covert with the
three "Ks"--Kashmir, Karachi and Kabul--being the main theatres of their covert
operations against each other.
Seven, the post-1992 developments in Afghanistan were a major success
story for Pakistan with the Pakthun- dominated Taliban controlling 90 per cent of the
territory, thereby breaking the past hold of the Tadjiks on the power and decision-making
structure of Kabul. Even though Pakistan might not like the internal policies of the
Taliban, it would not be in its interest to stop supporting the latter since this could
lead to a disintegration of Afghanistan. India should not be allowed to re-gain its past
influence in Kabul.
In his post-coup statements, he has been trying to dissipate his
past image as an Islamic hawk and project himself as a man of reason, not only to the US,
but also to India by toning down his rhetoric. Since one may have to do business with him
whether one likes him or not, one has to carefully evaluate his statements with an open
mind despite his past acts of deception.
We erred in uncritically trusting Mr.Sharif and walked into the
Kargil trap. We should not err now by obsessively distrusting the General due to the
Kargil syndrome and thereby missing a possible opportunity for a new opening in
Indo-Pakistan relations.
Gen. Musharraf, as the Chief Executive of Pakistan, with
responsibilities for political, economic and security management, may not be a carbon copy
of Gen. Musharraf, the COAS. Power moderates and, often, power moderates surprisingly
beyond expectations.
We should look for and encourage credible signs of moderation
without rushing headlong into an embrace.
The need for caution in responding to any overtures from him is
reinforced by the delay in the constitution of the promised National Security Council and
the two tiers of civilian advisers and policy-formulators. There is apparently
considerable reluctance on the part of even the past critics of Mr.Sharif to collaborate
with the General because of the lack of legal legitimacy of his regime and its actions.
They do not want to be accused of having been accomplices of an
illegal regime, if democracy is restored one day.
1999 is not 1977 (when Zia-Ul-Haq seized power) and a Mohajir,
with his forefathers' Hindu blood in him, is not a blue-blooded Punjabi with no
"impure Hindu blood".
That is the painful reality which is confronting the Mohajir
General as he starts his third week in office frantically looking for reputed Punjabi
civilians willing to do his bidding.
A saviour yesterday. A Mohajir parvenu today.
Perceptions can change very fast in Pakistan. We should not forget this.
B.RAMAN
(25-10-99)
