MUSHARRAF'S
VIEWS BEFORE THE COUP: A COLLATION
Gen. Pervez Musharraf was commissioned in the Pakistan Artillery in 1964. As a
Lt.Col., he had commanded two self-propelled artillery regiments and, as a Brigadier, an
armoured division, an artillery and an infantry brigade. He had also commanded various
commando battalions of the Special Services Group (SSG) in two tenures lasting a total of
seven years, an infantry division and a strike corps.
The staff appointments held by him were as Brigade Major in an
infantry brigade, Deputy Director, Military Operations, Deputy Military Secretary and
Director-General, Military Operations.
He had done a training course in the Command and Staff College,
Quetta, and two courses in the UK. He had served on the faculties of the Command and Staff
College, Quetta, and the War Wing of the National Defence College.
He was the Corps Commander (Strike 1st Corps) at
Mangla at the time of his appointment as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) by the then
Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, on October 7,1998. He superseded Lt.Gen. Ali Kuli Khan
of his batch, who was then the Chief of the General Staff, and Lt.Gen. Khalid Nawaz, the
then Quarter-Master General.
Whenever his predecessor Gen.Jehangir Karamat travelled abroad,
Gen.Musharraf, as the seniormost Corps Commander, used to act as the COAS.
His first visit to a field formation after taking over was to
Siachen on October 21,1998. Addressing the Pakistani troops there, he said: "We are
aware of the motives of the adversary and have the capability to effectively defend the
territorial integrity of the country…It is costing the enemy heavily to keep troops
in Siachen. The induction of armour and air defence units in infantry role by the Indian
army in Kashmir indicates its ever-decreasing capability to face the freedom struggle
there."
Talking to Pressmen at the Turkish National Day reception on
October 29,1998, the General said that the Pakistani Constitution did not envisage a
political role for the army. Addressing Pakistani troops of the Kharian and Mangla
garrisons the same day, he said that the army would remain apolitical and added: "The
Pakistan army is conscious of its mission and is fully prepared to defeat the nefarious
designs of the enemy….Don't be carried away by the rhetoric of the Indians whose
armed forces are totally exhausted and whose morale is at its lowest ebb."
Talking to Pressmen at Karachi on November 14, 1998, Gen.
Musharraf referred to reports of Indian plans to construct a road in Siachen and said it
would not be easy to construct a road on a glacier. He added: "The Indians are
welcome to make an attempt. The Pakistan Army knows its obligations and is prepared to
handle any situation there."
Talking to Pressmen at the UAE National Day reception at
Islamabad on December 2,1998, he said: "Pakistan has been closely monitoring Indian
military exercises as these smack of an aggressive posture. In response, we are carrying
out our own exercises to show to India our preparedness."
He said that reports that India was constructing a pipeline to
carry kerosene to Siachen were not correct and added that the Indians were, however,
constructing a road in the Siachen area. He assured the journalists that Pakistan had an
upper hand over India at the Siachen glacier and was placed in a better position.
He further said: " The Pakistan army is not involved in
politics. We are not being dragged into politics. Of course, we are involved conceptually,
but our manpower is not involved."
Addressing troops exercising in southern Punjab and upper Sindh
on December 4,1998, Gen.Musharraf said: "By giving a matching nuclear response to
India, Pakistan's strategic deterrence had strengthened manifold. The balance of power of
which our adversary boasted now stood corrected."
On the recommendation of Gen. Musharraf, the Pakistan Government
decided on December 22,1998, to construct bomb-proof bunkers all along the Line of Control
(LOC), ostensibly for the protection of the civilian inhabitants of the areas adjoining
the LOC. It was announced that the bunkers would be constructed on the mountain slopes and
that, while RS.7.6 million had already been sanctioned for the construction of such
bunkers in the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), the army had been asked to work out
how much money would be needed for the rest of the LOC.
Since the last week of December, 1998, the Pakistani press
started carrying reports that Gen. Musharraf was pressing the Government for a
reorganisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) in order to give it a key
role in nuclear command and control and to provide that the Chairman would always be from
the army, a departure from the past practice of rotating it amongst the three services.
It was also stated that Gen. Musharraf pointed out that Gen.
Karamat, who held additional charge as JCSC Chairman, could not complete his term and
that, therefore, the post should be held by the army till the re-organisation was
introduced, instead of appointing Admiral Fasih Bokhari, then the seniormost amongst the
three chiefs, as the Chairman.
The press also reported that Mr. Nawaz Sharif was in a dilemma as
to whether he should give additional charge to Gen. Musharraf as was done in the case of
Gen. Karamat or appoint Gen. Musharraf as the full-time Chairman and nominate another
officer as the COAS.
After taking over the responsibility for the running of the Water
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Gen. Musharraf said on January 26,1999, that the
threat faced by the country was internal and not external and that this internal threat
affected the economy. That was why the army agreed to take over the responsibility for
running the WAPDA.
He accompanied Mr.Nawaz Sharif on a visit to Siachen on January
29,1999. Talking to accompanying Pressmen, the General said: " There is zero chance
of a war between India and Pakistan. We are not talking of winning a war. We are talking
of the degree of difficulties we can create for the other side. Winning the battle means
winning Kashmir."
Talking to Pressmen in the lobby of the National Assembly on
March 11,1999, after President Mohammad Rafique Tarar's address to the joint session of
Parliament, Gen. Musharraf said: "Unless India is serious, talks on Kashmir are
useless. The Indians are only interested in verbosity. There will be no separate agreement
on Siachen with India.The Siachen dispute cannot be separated from the Kashmir
issue."
On March 12,1999, Gen. Musharraf called on Mr.Nawaz Sharif for
discussions on the security situation, following which Mr.Sharif visited the headquarters
of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for discussions with the ISI Director-General and
his officers.
The "Dawn" of Karachi reported the next day that
Mr.Sharif briefed the army chief on his talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr.
A.B.Vajpayee, at Lahore. According to the "Dawn", Mr.Sharif told the army chief
that he foresaw a breakthrough in the bilateral relations as India had, for the first
time, agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue. However, Mr.Sharif reportedly assured the army
chief that he would not compromise on principles and that, without the resolution of the
Kashmir issue, there could be no improvement in bilateral relations. He also reportedly
ruled out the normalisation of trade relations till the Kashmir issue was resolved.
During his discussions with the ISI officers, Mr.Sharif
reportedly assured them that his Government would continue to provide political and moral
support to the Kashmiris despite the Lahore Declaration.
Talking to Pressmen after an investiture ceremony at the
President's House on March 23,1999, Gen. Musharraf said: " There is nothing wrong in
talks and in the launch of a bus service to India. The Kashmir problem should not be
linked to other issues. It must not be construed from the talks that Pakistan has changed
its position on Kashmir. There is no harm in starting trade with India. In my view, our
position on Kashmir will continue to be the same even if we establish trade relations with
India."
The "Frontier Post" of Peshawar reported on March
29,1999, that Mr.Nawaz Sharif was holding discussions with his father, Mr.Mohammad Sharif,
and senior members of his Cabinet on the advisability of replacing Gen. Musharraf as the
COAS, as the latter was opposing any compromise with India on the Kashmir issue.
The paper said: " The latest statement (the writer's
comment--the paper did not give the date and place of the statement) of Gen.Musharraf
opposing any compromise on the issue of Kashmir is seen by military observers as a
possible reason for the proposed change. Gen. Musharraf said that Pakistan would never
compromise on Kashmir. Earlier, he had stated that the bus diplomacy has not produced any
change in the Indian perception regarding Kashmir."
The Pakistan Government announced on March 31,1999, the
postponement of the 10-day official visit of Gen. Musharraf to China, which was to have
started on April 5,1999, to the second half of May. The visit of Mr. Li Peng, Chairman of
China's National People's Congress, to Pakistan from April 8 was given as the reason. It
was stated that since the Chinese Military Attache in Pakistan would be required to stay
in Pakistan during Mr. Li Peng's visit, it would not have been possible for him to
accompany Gen. Musharraf.
Mr. Nawaz Sharif visited the Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi for
eight hours on April 2,1999. It was stated that he held detailed discussions with the army
chief and his officers on the proposed re-organisation of the JCSC and the setting-up of a
nuclear command and control authority.
The Government announced on April 9,1999, that Gen. Musharraf
would hold additional charge as the Chairman of the JCSC for one year. It was stated that
he would also act as the Strategic Commander of Pakistan's nuclear force. The Pakistani
Press reported that during this period, Gen. Musharraf would prepare detailed proposals
for the JCSC re-organisation, get them approved by the Government and have them
implemented.
Gen.Musharraf spoke on the "Security Environment of
Pakistan" at the English-Speaking Union of Pakistan at Karachi on April 12,1999.The
talk was not open to the press and only a paraphrased version was subsequently released to
the press. The "Nation" (April 14) reported as follows on this version:
"He began by setting himself the task of bridging the gap
between public perception of certain vital issues and the facts as he saw them. Among
these issues, he mentioned the missile race and how it did not give an edge to India,
external threat to Pakistan's security, internal security, the resolution of the Kashmir
dispute, civilian assignments to the army and the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
"Taking the last issue first, he said that there seemed to
be a school of thought in Pakistan which held that Pakistan should not support the Taliban
because of their ultra-conservative or even retrogressive orientation. But the fact was
that Pakistan had little choice in the matter. The fall of Taliban could lead to the
disintegration of Afghanistan. It would be better, he said, to support them and to bring
them round to a more liberal interpretation of Islam.
"Speaking about civilian assignments given to the army,
which had led to the perception that it would take the armed forces away from their
primary responsibilities, he said that the army took up such tasks to save Pakistan's
economy. It would not have done so if there had been a civilian outfit capable of
performing those tasks.
"But the main thrust of his talk, for obvious reasons, was
on security-related issues. And in that there are likely to be quite a few who may not
agree with his reading of the facts as opposed to perceptions.
"Of these, the relatively less contentious may be his claim
that despite India's acquisition of a huge stockpile of arms there was no danger of the
breaking-out of a conventional war. First, because India had only a two to one advantage
over Pakistan (while a ratio of three to one was needed for an attack) and secondly,
because, Pakistan, even with its present strength, could do grievous damage to India.
"But where some disagreements with his presentation may
emerge is in his thesis that even after the resolution of Kashmir, our problems with India
may not end, because India wanted to keep Pakistan weak and to that end would continue to
wage a low-intensity war against us. Why? Because, according to him, Pakistan is a thorn
in India's side, constantly thwarting India's ambition to become a world power."
Answering questions from the audience, the General stated as
follows: "We have developed Ghauri, which is an effective missile and better than
Agni. India has ambition to reach the world, but we have the capability to reach India.
"The firing of Agni by India can be termed indirect
aggression. We shall soon give the response. But the decision is to be taken by the
Government which has the authority to order us. However, we are ready.
"In this unipolar world, the USA is a superpower and its
perception about us is very important. It is important to understand how the USA has four
concerns --nuclear proliferation, narcotics, Islamic fundamentalism and China's future
strength in the region. Due to our strategic position, we have a central place and,
because of that, all US concerns are related to us.
" Pakistan is not following an offensive policy, but can
match India anywhere. Pakistan has calculated its defence requirements and is maintaining
a one to two ratio. We have the capability to end the war (with India) on a favourable
note.
" The Pakistan army has the ability to capture more
territory of the opponent and causing more destruction than the enemy. Pakistan's nuclear
and missile technology is better than India's in many ways.
" The central command system to use nuclear and missile
technology will be ready within a month. Four broad components of the system would be: a
national command authority; a developmental control authority; a strategic force command;
and a common secretariat for all the three."
Addressing a ceremonial parade at the Pakistan Military Academy
at Kakul on April 17,1999, the General said: " The army is committed to ideals of
democracy and firmly believes in its political neutrality."
Brig. (retd) A.R.Siddiqi, who attended Gen. Musharraf's talk at
Karachi, wrote as follows in the "Nation" of April 29,1999:
"Some of the major points (of the General's presentation)
were as follows: (i). More chances of a low-intensity conflict (LIC) vis-à-vis a regular
conventional war; (ii). Afghanistan as a success story; (iii). India-Pakistan tensions to
continue even after the resolution of the core issue of Kashmir; and (iv). Different
national security perceptions between Karachiites and the people of Sindh vis-à-vis the
people of the north.
" It was heartening to see the army chief firm on his
viewpoint that chances of a war with India had reduced. He, however, spoke of the looming
threat of a low-level-conflict from India. They (Indians) would want to splinter Pakistan
not through direct approach, but through low intensity conflicts within Pakistan.
" It would be hard to agree with the COAS' description of
Afghanistan as a success story, without access to the data serving as the basis of his
perception. He made a strong case for Pakistan's continued support to the Taliban for two
main reasons: first, for their overwhelming Pakhtun majority and, second, for their being
in control of almost 90 per cent of Afghan territory.
" The General did not seem to agree with the widely held
view that an amicable resolution (of the Kashmir issue) would be the end of the
Indo-Pakistani imbroglio. Pakistan, he said, remained a major irritant in the realisation
of India's objective of becoming a world power with a seat in the UN Security Council.
Both the irritant and India's grand design would stay even after a settlement of the
Kashmir issue."
Talking to correspondents at the United Arab Emirates Armed
Forces Day reception on May 5, Gen. Musharraf said: " The range of our Ghauri II
missile is 2,200 kms at present. We have not decided as to what range we are going to
achieve ultimately. Our security concern is oriented against our eastern neighbour and
nobody else.
" However, if some threat is posed to us from any other
quarter, then our security concerns would get involved.
" We are trying to finalise a strategic organisation to show
to the world that whatever strategic weapons, nuclear and missile capability we have is in
very safe hands.
"Pakistan would never violate the international regime
restrictions. Our nuclear and missile power inhibits the use of that power and we would
never violate this condition. Without violating the international regime restrictions,
Pakistan would provide its friends whatever assistance it could from within its indigenous
capability."
Addressing a passing-out parade at the Pakistan Air Force Academy
at Bilaspur on May 15, 1999, Gen. Musharraf said: " We must build up our conventional
forces to deter the adversary's aggressive designs. Since World War II, no nation has ever
exercised the nuclear option. Conventional weapons continue to be the actual tools of war
even in the nuclear era. "
The "Pakistan Observer" (May 16) reported that the army
had refused to bow before pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce
the military expenditure and was insisting on a 11 per cent increase.
In an article expressing concern over the increasingly assertive
role of Gen.Musharraf vis-à-vis the elected government, Mr.Azhar Abbas wrote as follows
in the May, 1999, issue of the "Herald", the monthly journal of the
"Dawn" group:
" Over the last few months, the Pakistani army has gone on a
propaganda offensive with a new analysis of the role it must play to rid the country of
its countless predicaments. Based on a new thinking emerging from a changing threat
perception, the analysis advocates a proactive role for the army in civilian affairs.
"Speaking at a seminar at Karachi last month, Gen. Musharraf
compared Pakistan to a boat full of trained soldiers who are awaiting for the enemy. In
the meantime, the boat starts to develop holes. "So, what should these trained
soldiers do?" the COAS asked."Should they keep on waiting for the enemy ship and
let their own boat sink? Or, should they try and plug the leakage?"
"The army is longer prepared to remain silent if it feels
that things are spiralling out of control, says a recently retired senior army officer.
" The new threat perception has three major components:
first, that reduced risk of war with India may lead to an increase in covert warfare,
which, in military terminology, is referred to as low intensity conflict; two, the
worsening economic situation in the country may eventually cause a collapse of the entire
state structure, resulting in a situation comparable to Afghanistan or Yugoslavia; and
three, that endemic corruption in state institutions may render good governance impossible
if allowed to proceed unchecked.
"The army feels that without a well-defined role vis-à-vis
the civilian government, it may fail to counter this kind of covert warfare effectively.
And clearly it has no faith in the ability of the civilian law-enforcing agencies to
handle the job. If the circumstances require, the army can even force the government into
taking certain decisions which it feels are unavoidable regardless of whether they may or
may not be palatable for a civilian dispensation.
" The army appears convinced of the wisdom of keeping India
bleeding in Kashmir. As long as India is busy in Kashmir, it cannot have a 3 to one ratio
which is needed for an aggressive force.
"Several retired army officers believe that the new army
chief is far more assertive than his predecessor and, in the event of the Nawaz government
taking issue with the new doctrine, is unlikely to bow out as easily as Karamat. This
points to troubled civil- military relations in the future.
"In the guise of changing threat perceptions and bailing out
the system, the army may only be searching for a new power sharing formula after the
dissolution of the infamous troika. It is time for the Nawaz Government to disillusion the
army. If the government fails to do that, in the words of Dr.Eqbal Ahmad, this change of
threat perception can cost us, in the long run our entire future."
The "Nation" (May 27) reported that during a meeting
with Gen.Zang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, at Beijing on
May 26,1999, Gen. Musharraf, who visited China in the last week of May, referred to
"India's hegemonistic designs in South Asia" and Pakistan's resolve to live with
honour and dignity. He reportedly blamed Indian inflexibility for the failure to solve the
Kashmir problem.
Talking to newsmen at Karachi on June 26 on the Kargil conflict,
the General said: " Pakistan is trying to find a compatible solution, which is
agreeable to us, to the US and should be to India too. The situation is very tactical in
nature and it has its military aspects too. The strategic issue is Kashmir. It is the
biggest political issue. This and the tactical military issue of Kargil should be tackled
simultaneously. The decision on any withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Line of
Control (LoC) would be made by the Government. However, we will not withdraw unilaterally.
Pakistan does not want to escalate the situation. I am sure India also does not want to
escalate the situation. We need to reach a solution that is mutually acceptable. Pakistan
did not want to do the worst and it would not initiate the worst, but it should not be
misunderstood that we are weak. War is not imminent. I am sure India also does not want a
war."
In an interview to the "News" (July 6) after the
Clinton-Sharif agreement on the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the LoC, Gen.
Musharraf said: " 1,500 to 2,000 mujahideen are fighting in Kargil and Drass and
would be asked to leave their positions. However, the mujahideen's reaction is another
issue. The modus operandi for the withdrawal will be devised when the Prime Minister
returned from the US. There is complete understanding between the army and the Government
on the Prime Minister's US visit which was approved by the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet. Pakistan is not anxious about Indian withdrawal from Siachen as it has retaliated
to the Indian aggression there for the last 16 years. The Indians themselves would leave
the glacier. Withdrawal from Kargil as a quid pro quo for Siachen is ruled out. "
Briefing all the officers of the rank of Major and above working
in the GHQ at Rawalpindi on the Washington agreement on July 8, the General said there was
complete harmony between the Government and the armed forces.
In an interview to the "Takbeer" (first week of July),
the Urdu weekly, the General said: " In Kargil, only the Kashmiri mujahideen are
fighting. We are not providing them military, but moral and political support, which will
continue no matter what."
In an interview to the BBC on July 16, Gen. Musharraf said that
Mr.Sharif had approved Pakistani army patrols across the LoC during the Kargil conflict.
The Prime Minister was kept fully informed of the army's tactics at the LoC from the start
of the military campaign. "Everyone was on board." Asked if Mr.Sharif had
approved the army's tactics, he replied: "Absolutely." He added: "There was
occasional and aggressive patrolling by Pakistani troops on the Indian side. This was done
to pre-empt any possible Indian attack on Pakistan. "
Briefing Pressmen on July 17, Mr.Tariq Altaf, spokesman of the
Pakistan Foreign Office, denied that the COAS had told the BBC that the Pakistani troops
had been operating in the areas under the control of the mujahideen on the Indian side of
the LOC. He described the BBC broadcast as a misinterpretation of what the COAS had
stated. He also claimed that what the COAS told the BBC was that the Prime Minister had
been kept informed of the army's defensive actions on the LOC.
*Only through a qualitative edge in training and dedication
" we can blunt the numerical advantage of our enemy who is bent upon sabotaging peace
and harmony in South Asia."
* Since the Second World War, no nation had exercised the nuclear
option. "Conventional weapons thus continue to be the actual tools of war-waging even
in the nuclear era."
*A modern battlefield is characterised by an increasing use of
high-technology weapons with great destructive power. "Yet, superior weapons alone
have never been the sole arbiter of success in war. The decisive factor continues to
reside in better training and a higher degree of dedication."
*Pakistan was destined to fight with an enemy much larger in
size, but "being much lesser in number and at times in equipment has never dampened
our spirit."
Talking to pressmen at the Malaysian National Day reception at Islamabad on August 31, he
stated as follows:
*Pakistan cannot be cowed down by Indian threats. "Our armed
forces are fully prepared to defend the motherland and our deterrence is in place."
*"Kashmir is the core issue and India will have to come to
the negotiating table to resolve this issue, particularly after the recent
developments."
Addressing a gathering of officers and soldiers at Khar on
September 4, the COAS claimed that the Pakistani armed forces had demonstrated their skill
and talent at Kargil by defeating the 10 times better organised and equipped Indian
forces. He further claimed that the Pakistan army had captured more than 500 sq.kms of
Indian territory in the Kargil area, but in the larger interests of the nation, the armed
forces were withdrawn. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for India to get back
Kargil, he said, and warned that India would continue to suffer heavy human and property
losses, if the Kashmir issue was not resolved through talks.
Mr.Kamran Khan, the well-known Pakistani investigative
correspondent, wrote in the "News" of September 5 as follows:
*In response to growing disquiet in the rank and file of the
Pakistan army over the Government's sudden decision to pull back from the Kargil sector,
the COAS had been visiting the garrisons to explain his side of the Kargil story to the
soldiers.
* The theme of his addresses to the soldiers was that the army's
role was restricted to the military side of the Kargil battle. Only the Government was
entitled to determine the future of the operation, keeping in view its political, economic
and diplomatic aspects.
* He told visibly restless audiences that the historic bravery
shown by the mujahideen and the army personnel in the Kargil-Drass sector had brought the
Indian establishment to its knees. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was forced to rush
his emissary to Islamabad to seek an urgent solution.
* In almost every open-house session with his men and officers,
Gen.Musharraf maintained that the Kargil operation had brought the Kashmir conflict to the
centre stage of international diplomacy and a personal commitment from President Clinton
to help resolve the issue was a positive outcome.
* In exhaustive background interviews, serving and retired army
officers projected a strikingly identical view that the Kargil operation had pushed
Pakistan closest to a military victory against the Indian army in Kashmir. Intelligent use
of Pakistan's superior military position in the conflict could have transformed it into a
situation where India would have had no choice but to come to the negotiating table for a
final solution of the Kashmir issue, they said.
* Explaining the restlessness in the rank and file over
Mr.Sharif's orders to pull out from the Kargil area, Mr.Kamran Khan quoted a serving
senior officer as saying as follows:" Before the orders for retreat came, everyone
from an ordinary soldier to a general officer was convinced that within the next six weeks
at least three divisions of the Indian army would surrender or abandon the territory upto
the Siachen glacier. It (the retreat order) was the biggest psychological blow to the
troops. People in the army thought that we were so close to settling the 1971 score with
India."
* To deal with this restlessness, the Corps Commanders discussed
on August 13 the impact on the rank and file of ordering the retreat at a time when the
Indian army was facing the worst humiliation and decided that services of all those who
participated in the operation must be recognised at the highest level, keeping aside the
mujahideen-only participated stance of the government.
* Before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet discussed the
Washington announcement on the withdrawal, the army leadership was not prepared for an
abrupt pull-out, but there was no evidence that the COAS opposed the decision at the
Cabinet Defence Committee meeting or that he distanced himself from the decision.
* During June, preparations were in full swing at the GHQ in
Rawalpindi as well as on the ground to take the operation to its logical
conclusion and to establish permanent posts on the various ridges occupied. The Corps
Commanders meeting of June 13 had ordered a major realignment of the forces in preparation
for a long haul with the Indian forces in Kashmir. After the meeting the army told the
Nawaz Sharif Government that because of the huge diversion of Indian forces to the Kargil
sector, the Indian army would be incapable of opening a new front. Hence, in the Pakistan
army's view, there was no chance of a full-scale war with India and once the rains and
snowfall started, it would be impossible for the Indian army to even continue its fight to
recapture the ridges.
* Mr.Kamran Khan wrote: "Specific examples are available to
substantiate the impression that while the military leadership is not ready to influence
political decision-making, it is zealously protecting its own turf. Since the outbreak of
the conflict, two of the most high-profile military functions----the passing-out parade of
the Pakistan Military Academy and the passing-out parade of the Pakistan Naval
Academy----were held without civilian chief guests."
* He added: " Interestingly enough, senior active and
retired army officers, while discussing Kashmir, speak more about its strategic importance
and its being the source of major rivers in Pakistan than about the Kashmiri struggle for
freedom. Some of these officers thought that the political leadership was the least
knowledgeable about the national security implications of the Kashmir issue. If India is
not bleeding from inside, it will turn Pakistan into another Nepal or Sri Lanka of the
region."
* The journalist also quoted sources in the Prime Minister's
office as indicating that Mr. Nawaz Sharif wanted to have two Generals holding charge as
the COAS and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) instead of
letting Gen. Musharraf to continue to hold charge of both the posts. He identified
Lt.Gen.Salim Hyder, then Corps Commander, Mangla, Lt.Gen. Ziauddin, then DG of the ISI,
and Lt. Gen. Tariq Pervez, then Corps Commander, Quetta, as close to Mr.Sharif and
enjoying his confidence and speculated that one of them might be made the CJCSC, if
Mr.Sharif accepted the COAS' contention that this post should always be held by an army
officer instead of being rotated among the three services.
The "Dawn" of September 15 quoted sources in the army
as rejecting the allegation of Mr.Niaz A. Naik, former Foreign Secretary, that had there
been no Kargil conflict, Pakistan and India would have reached a Kashmir settlement by
September or October. It also quoted the same sources as insisting that the army had done
nothing to sabotage the Government's efforts towards a Kashmir solution and saying that
the army expected the Government to openly contradict Mr.Naik's allegation. The paper also
quoted them as saying as follows: "We do not meddle in political affairs. We only
carry out the orders of the civilian government."
The "Pakistan Observer" (September 19) reported that a
meeting of the Corps Commanders held the previous day unanimously rejected diplomatic
moves to withdraw Pakistani troops one km away from the strategically important peaks
between Mashkoh and Chorbatia. However, it did not say from whom this suggestion had
emanated.
Commenting on news agency reports from Washington claiming that
an unnamed official of the US State Department had cautioned against any unconstitutional
attempt to remove the Sharif Government following the discussions of Mr. Shahbaz Sharif,
brother of Mr.Nawaz Sharif and the then Chief Minister of Punjab, with State Department
officials in Washington, Brig. Rashid Qureshi, the army spokesman, told pressmen on
September 21 as follows: " I am not going to react to these reports. Of course, this
statement (of the US official) has affected and surprised us. I am at my wits' end as to
why this statement was made at this time. What has the army done to warrant this? The COAS
will not ask for a clarification from anyone."
The "Pakistan Observer" reported on September 22 that
the COAS had called on Mr. Nawaz Sharif on September 21 and expressed his concern over
baseless rumour-mongering implicating the army following Mr.Naik's allegation. He also
reportedly urged that the Government should protest to the US over the unwarranted caution
of the State Department official, which the COAS described as amounting to "an attack
on Pakistan's sovereignty."
On September 23, a meeting of senior officers of the army was
convened by Gen.Musharraf to discuss the reported caution of the US official. Thereafter,
while talking to pressmen at the Saudi National Day reception, the COAS refuted
speculation in Islamabad that he was planning to resign due to differences with the
Government over the handling of the Kargil operation. He said: " There is no
misunderstanding between the Government and the army. I am going to complete my
tenure."
Referring to the opposition agitation for the removal of the
Nawaz Sharif Government, he said: " I am not a political or constitutional expert. I
am a soldier and I don't want to comment on government-opposition relations. "
In reply to questions, he refused to comment on the alleged US
caution, but described the allegations of Mr.Naik as misleading. He maintained that there
was no back-channel diplomacy with India before the Kargil conflict and that it was only
after the Kargil conflict that Mr.Mishra, the Indian journalist, visited Pakistan many
times in June as the emissary of the Indian Prime Minister.
The next day, Mr.Shahbaz Sharif called on the COAS and had a
three-hour-long discussion. It was speculated in Islamabad that he sought this meeting to
remove misunderstanding in the army about the purpose of his visit to Washington and
particularly to refute the rumours that he had sought the support of the US for Mr.Nawaz
Sharif in his dispute with the COAS.
Succumbing to pressure from the COAS, the Nawaz Sharif Government
announced on September 29 that Gen. Musharraf would continue to hold additional charge as
CJCSC till October 6, 2001.
Talking to pressmen at a Chinese Embassy reception on September
30, the COAS refuted rumours that the continuation of his additional tenure as the CJCSC
was the result of a quid pro quo between him and the Government. He also stated as
follows:
* His relations with Mr.Nawaz Sharif were quite comfortable.
* There was no need for an enquiry into the Kargil operation. It
was not a failure. It was a great success.
* Kargil was not the main issue. Kashmir was the main issue.
"Pakistan wants to discuss the core issue of Kashmir with India through bilateral
means and with the assistance of the international community."
* There was no pressure by the army or the government not to sign
the CTBT.
B.RAMAN
(21-11-99)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,
Chennai.
E-Mail:corde@vsnl.com)
