Nearly a month after the visit of the US President, Mr.Bill
Clinton, to Pakistan and his frank talks with Gen.Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive,
and his polite, but blunt address to the Pakistani people pointing out the dangers of an
aggravation of their isolation, there are no signs, as yet, of any serious re-thinking by
the military regime of its policies--internal or external.
Interestingly, the military regime as well as the people of
Pakistan have taken Mr.Clinton's public admonition in their stride, without giving rise to
either any increase in anti-American feelings or knee-jerk revamping of policies.
Nor does the admonition seem to have weakened the position of the
General among the senior officers of the armed forces. On the contrary, forgetting the
reported differences in the first few weeks after the coup, the officer class, as a whole,
has, at least for the moment, united behind their Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and Chief
Executive, in his seeming determination to avoid any action which might give the
impression of succumbing to US pressure.
The fact that Gen.Musharraf undertook two long foreign tours
immediately after the Clinton visit, without worrying about any challenge to his authority
developing in his absence, attests to his confidence about his renewed hold on power and
about the unlikelihood of any serious public reaction against him.
In fact, some well-informed Pakistani observers, including
retired senior officers, who had disliked the General and his policies and had been
quietly urging him to return power to the politicians after mutually-agreed safeguards for
the military, have started feeling, in retrospect, that what they regard as Mr.Clinton's
public humiliation of the military was unwise and could prove counter-productive.
They point out that since the end of the US involvement in
Afghanistan and the Gulf war against Iraq, there has been a strong undercurrent of
anti-American feelings in Pakistan, nurtured by the religious parties, and no leader,
political or military, could afford to publicly take up a position of doing the US
bidding. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister, learnt this to his cost in July
last.
In 1993, when Mr.Clinton privately pressured Mr.Sharif to remove
from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) some senior officers associated with terrorist
groups, the latter had no difficulty in quietly responding to the US demand without any
adverse public reaction. On the contrary, in July last, when he publicly succumbed to US
pressure for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Kargil area, a large segment of
the public opinion and the officer class of the military turned against him.
They, therefore, feel that those in Washington, who advised
Mr.Clinton to insist on his direct address to the Pakistani people as a condition for his
stop-over in Islamabad, have done a disservice to US-Pakistan relations and to US
interests in this region. According to them, Mr.Clinton might have achieved quicker and
better results by confining his admonition to his private meeting with the General,
instead of going public with it.
Pakistani leaders and people realise that their economic
difficulties would increase if they do not give the impression of responding, at least
partially, to the US demands for a time-table for the restoration of democracy, the
signing of the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), a moderation of the policies of the
Taliban and its co-operation in the arrest and prosecution of Osama bin Laden and action
against Pakistan-based terrorist groups operating in Kashmir in order to create a positive
atmosphere for the resumption of the Lahore process with India.
Economically, two difficult dates are ahead of the
General--June-end when he has to implement his promise to the IMF to start collection of
the general sales tax from the retailers, which could lead to public and bazari anger
against him, and December, when the debts rescheduling agreements with the creditor
countries are due for renewal.
If the US doesn't signal to the IMF by then to resume its
assistance, under suspension since May last, the General's ability to end the economic
mess would be further weakened. But, for the moment, the General and his officers do not
seem to be unduly worried by this prospect due to two reasons:
* The officer class in the Pakistani military
believes--whether wishfully, one is not certain-- that the so-called pro-India tilt in the
US policy is confined to the State Department, the National Security Council and the White
House and that the Pentagon, its Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and large sections of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) outside its non-proliferation and counter-terrorism
divisions have been concerned over the implications of this tilt for US interests in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.It is, therefore, hopeful that the latter's
concerns would ultimately prevail and moderate the White House's policies towards
Pakistan.
* Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular have a
tremendous capacity and willingness to put up with sufferings and, in the process, make
martyrs of themselves, if they are convinced that this is necessary in the interests of
their religion. One had seen how severe US sanctions failed to intimidate the Islamic
societies of Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Sudan and the Taliban-controlled Afghan territory.
Nor did the comprehensive sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment since
1990 and the additional ones under the Glenn Amendment since 1998 weaken the determination
of Pakistan to achieve psychological nuclear parity with India. Therefore, the military
feels confident that the public would accept further sufferings in the interests of the
nation and Islam, were the US attitude to be further stiffened.
Normally, the military would have had no difficulty in signing
the CTBT but for the campaign started by the Jamaat-e-Islami and other religious parties
projecting any decision to sign the CTBT as anti-Islam. They have been saying that
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal belongs to the entire Islamic Ummah and that Pakistan cannot,
therefore, surrender its right to further strengthen this arsenal without the prior
approval of the Ummah. This view seems to be shared by large sections of the lower and
middle ranks of the army with strong sympathies for the religious parties.
Gen. Musharraf divides the terrorists operating from or through
Pakistani territory into three groups:
* Those posing threats to Pakistan's stability such as the
extremist Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Shia Sipah Mohammad. He and his Interior
Minister, Lt.Gen. Moinuddin Haider, seem inclined to act against them, particularly after
the recent recrudescence of anti-Shia violence.
* Those posing a threat to American lives and interests
such as bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the other Arab mercenary groups. He is prepared to act
against them so long as they operate from Pakistani territory, but not against their bases
in Afghan territory.
* Those operating in Kashmir and other parts of India. He looks
upon them as freedom-fighters and not terrorists. Pakistani officials claim that
Mr.Clinton himself during his talks in Islamabad and in his TV address used the expression
"terrorism" only against bin Laden's men operating from Afghanistan and the word
"violence" while referring to the groups in Kashmir.
Gen. Musharraf claims he has no moderating influence over the
Taliban, but admits some influence over the groups in Kashmir and says he would be
prepared to exercise that influence only in return for a deescalation by the Indian
security forces of their operations in Kashmir.
Gen.Musharraf and his officers are disappointed by Mr.Clinton's
refusal to mediate in the Kashmir issue and by his reluctance to pressure India to respond
positively to his offer of dialogue. They seem inclined to tone down the obsessive
rhetoric on the Kashmir issue, but are not prepared to relent in their attempts to get
Kashmir as they feel that if they miss this opportunity when, in their perception,
anti-New Delhi alienation in Kashmir is at its maximum, they may not get another
opportunity like this for many years.
They , therefore, seem determined to continue their policy of
keeping the Indian security forces bleeding in Kashmir, despite whatever may be the US
attitude. In this, they are likely to have the support of large sections of the Pakistani
public.
Ultimately, what could convince the Pakistani military of the
futility of its confrontation with India is not just the US attitude or admonition, which
is important, but New Delhi's success in making this confrontationist policy prohibitively
costly to Pakistan, militarily and economically, and in bringing the alienated sections of
the Kashmiri population back into the democratic political process.
