Having played an active role, along with political leaders, in
the guerilla war for independence against the Dutch, the Indonesian armed forces have
always believed in their right to play a role in the political life of the country. In
1957, Gen.Nasution, the then army chief, articulated this belief through his concept of
the need for a middle road for Indonesia between the total apoliticisation of the armed
forces in Western democracies and their total involvement in politics in some of the Latin
American countries. This became the basis for the doctrine of "dwifungsi", the
dual function of the armed forces, which entered the statute book under Suharto in 1982.
The armed forces have justified this role by projecting themselves as the only State
institution with a national perspective capable of promoting national harmony. They have
justified their role in the economic management of the country on the ground that the
armed forces are the only segment of the State machinery with the required managerial
capability. They have also been projecting the armed forces as closer to the people than
the political class and the civil bureaucracy. The consequent militarisation of the State
reached it zenith under Suharto in the early 1980s.Since then, in the face of public
criticism, there has been a gradual dilution of the role of the army, but this process
slowed down under Dr.Habibie, the interim President in 1998-99. Since Mr. Abdurrahman
Wahid was elected as the President in October last, he has gradually been asserting his
powers of supervision and control over the armed forces and diluting their role at the
national level, while leaving their role intact at the regional level. He has reduced the
number of military officers in the President's office, enforced his right to take all
important decisions concerning the armed forces, reduced the primacy of the army in the
armed forces by giving greater importance to the Navy and the Air Force than they had
enjoyed in the past and removed from the military intelligence its responsibility for the
security vetting of the public servants. He has eased out Gen.Wiranto from the Cabinet as
well as the armed forces by taking advantage of the adverse report of the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission against him and the army. Till now, the army has not resisted the
changes brought in by Mr.Wahid because of its own unpopularity with the people, the
external support for Mr.Wahid, clear Western warnings against any resistance and fears of
stoppage of IMF assistance if it tried to resist the changes. Mr.Wahid's ability to
continue successfully on this path would depend on his continued good health, the attitude
of radical, but off-mainstream Islamic elements who are upset over the actions against
Muslim officers which they view as a conspiracy by the Christian West (particularly in
East Timor) and his ability to keep his family members, who are increasingly being accused
of Suharto-style cronyism, under control so that his popularity does not wither away and
to promote a recovery of the economy and a national reconciliation with the religious and
ethnic minorities. If he fails, the military may be tempted to take advantage of the
resulting situation to re-assert its dual role. (The text of the paper follows)
COMPOSITION BEFORE PRESIDENT WAHID TOOK OVER
The annual report on global military expenditures during
1998 submitted to the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses of the US Congress on
February 19,1999, by the US State Department indicated the composition of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI--Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) as follows:
Army--------216, 000
Air Force--- 27,000
Navy ------- 26,000
Marines----- 12,000
Police-------- 170,000
--------------
Total 451,000
The report estimated the official military budget (based
on a share of the State revenue and excluding revenue from military-run commercial
enterprises) during the financial year 1998-99 at US $ one billion, which in terms of the
pre-1997 economic crisis buying power, would come to US $ 700 million. This amount of US $
one billion amounted to 1.3 per cent of the GDP and 7.9 per cent of the total State
expenditure (as against 27 per cent in the case of Pakistan).
It commented as follows on the official military spending:
"Prior to the financial crisis, officially published Indonesian defence spending,
including police expenditure, had been falling in relation to GDP, from a peak level of 3
per cent in 1981 to levels of about 1.5 per cent in the 1990s. Defence spending had
experienced similar decline in relation to overall government outlay. Real growth in the
military budget from 1988 to 1997 paralleled the steady expansion of the Indonesian
economy during that period."
Authentic estimates of the unofficial defence expenditure,
not reflected in the State budget, which is incurred out of revenue from military-run
commercial enterprises, are not available. There are various tentative guesstimates,
claiming that, before 1997, the unofficial expenditure amounted to about four to seven
times the official expenditure.
On April 1,1999, the Police (POLRI), which was
incorporated into the armed forces by the then President Sukarno in 1964, was separated
and made into an autonomous department, no longer under the control of the chief of the
armed forces, but still under the supervision of the Defence Minister. After the
separation of the Police, the ABRI was re-named as the Indonesian National Armed Forces
(TNI--Tentara Nasional Indonesia).
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
The army is divided into the central and territorial
forces. Of the 216,000 personnel in the army, about 35,000 constitute the central forces
and the remaining the territorial forces. The central forces are divided into the Army
Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), with two light infantry divisions and supporting arms, and
the Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), divided into four operational groups.
The remaining troops have been distributed into 10
territorial commands (KODAM), which are proposed to be increased to 17, covering the
entire archipelago with its 27 provinces and 327 districts. While the KOSTRAD and the
KOPASSUS are largely Javanese dominated, the KODAMs have a large percentage of the sons of
the soil recruited within the jurisdiction of each KODAM.
The Navy consists of the Western Fleet based in Jakarta
and the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya. The jurisdiction of the Western Fleet covers the
approaches to the South China Sea and the Malacca and Sunda Straits. The Eastern Fleet is
responsible for guarding the approaches to the Pacific Ocean, the Lombok/Macassar Straits
and other eastern Straits.
The Air Force has about 20 squadrons, six of them fighter
squadrons, meant for the protection of Java.
A pre-1997 25-year plan for the revamping of the armed
forces, with the total strength of the army to be increased to 330,000,had to be shelved
due to the economic crisis. So too were plans for the acquisition of new equipment,
including five German submarines to supplement the existing two aging ones. The only new
programme, which has been retained, is for the acquisition of an additional squadron of
Hawk multi-purpose planes, bringing the total to 40 for providing air cover to the
approaches to the South China Sea and the Natuna gas fields from a new base at Pontianak
in West Kalimantan, which will act in co-ordination with the existing squadron based at
Pekan Baru in Sumatra.
Apart from the shelved plans to augment the submarine
strength, other deferred acquisition programmes related to the purchase of Russian
fighters and helicopters, production of French artillery under licence in Indonesia and
locally-ordered (from the IPTN, the indigenous aircraft manufacturers) transport and
maritime patrol planes and helicopters.
Before 1965, under Sukarno, the erstwhile USSR was the
most important source of military supplies. After 1965, most of the acquisitions came from
France, the US, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. At the same time, to promote
self-reliance and reduce the dependence on overseas supplies, the Suharto regime under
Dr.B.J.Habibie, the Technology Minister, who later succeeded Mr.Suharto as the interim
President in 1998, embarked on a policy of developing a capability for the production of
military equipment, including aircraft and helicopters for the Air Force. This programme
has not made much progress. Hence, the TNI is still largely dependent on external sources
for maintaining even its current level of operational capability, but, post-1997, does not
have the funds required for this purpose.
Even before 1997, Mr. Suharto had, in an apparent fit of
anger, cancelled plans to purchase from the US, at reduced rates, the F-16s manufactured
for Pakistan before the imposition of sanctions against it under the Pressler Amendment in
1990 following opposition to the deal in the US Congress due to the alleged human rights
violations by the then ABRI in East Timor and elsewhere. He also discontinued Jakarta's
participation in the International Military Education Training Programme (IMET) of the
Pentagon.
Since then, the only significant external military
collaboration (outside the ASEAN), which Jakarta still has, is with the UK in respect of
the purchase of the HAWK aircraft and with Australia, with which it signed an Agreement on
Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995, at the height of regional concerns over the
Chinese intrusions into the Mischief Reef and other islands/reefs in the South China Sea
claimed by the Philippines.
Under the AMS, Australia had been spending annually about
US $ 7 million on Australian training for Indonesian military personnel in Indonesia
itself as well as in Australia, low-level joint exercises, exchanges of visits and
reportedly also some material and logistic support, the details of which are not
available.
TASKS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Under Sukarno, the Indonesian armed forces exhibited
extra-territorial ambitions and tendencies. Reference could be made in this regard to the
period of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, the description of the Indian Ocean as the Indonesian
Ocean and Jakarta's reported interest in some of the islands of the Andaman & Nicobar
group. There was even speculation of Jakarta's interest in acquiring a military nuclear
capability.
But, under Mr.Suharto, the Indonesian armed forces became
almost totally inward-looking, with the priorities assigned to the following tasks:
* Protection of internal stability and security, with the
two main sources of threat, as identified by the military, being the communists and the
religious and ethnic separatist groups. Communism as a continuing threat to internal
security is no longer highlighted, but the armed forces are still nervous over the
possibility of a resurgence of communism by taking advantage of the widespread popular
dissatisfaction caused by the economic crisis and of what the military perceives as the
weakening of state authority due to too rapid political liberalisation.
* Surveillance over Indonesia's vast Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and archipelagic waters.
*Protection of its immense natural resources, on and
off-shore, from illegal exploitation by Indonesian nationals and foreigners.
Indonesia does not identify any foreign country as a
threat or a potential threat. It does not have any territorial dispute with any country
except Malaysia in respect of sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, off
East Kalimantan. After a failure to solve the issue bilaterally, the two countries have
agreed to jointly refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for
adjudication.
Indonesia's relations with China have further improved
since the normalisation of the diplomatic relations in 1989 and Jakarta doesn't speak of
China as a potential threat. But, in its defence thinking and planning, China is far from
its mind due to the following reasons:
* Presence of a large ethnic Chinese minority and their
crucial role in the Indonesian economy.
* Fears of a conflict over the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea overflowing into Indonesian waters. This should explain the discreet
behind-the-scene role played by Jakarta under Mr.Suharto to promote a peaceful solution to
the conflicting claims of sovereignty even though Indonesia itself is not a claimant.
* Existence of past Chinese maps showing parts of the
Natuna gas field area as falling within Chinese territorial waters. Beijing has not
formally laid any claim to any part of this area, but, at the same time, has evaded
repeated Jakarta requests for a clarification, if not a repudiation, of these maps.
Though President Abdurrahman Wahid has taken steps for a
further improvement of Jakarta's relations with China and has spoken of the important role
which India, Indonesia and China could play in this region, the subterranean worries about
China still remain.
DOCTRINE, CONCEPTS AND MINDSET
To understand the "dwifungsi" (dual function)
role of the armed forces, one has to keep in view certain doctrines, concepts and
arguments, which have figured from time to time in debates inside and outside the
military. These could be summarised as follows:
* National Perspective: The military is the only State
institution capable of viewing problems from a national perspective. Politicians and
others tend to view them from personal or partisan angles. Gen.Sudirman, the first
Commander of the Indonesian army, said in 1947: "The governments may change every
day; the army remains the same."
* National resilience: To keep an archipelagic State like
Indonesia with its different religious and ethnic groups united and stable, political,
social and economic harmony is essential. The military is better placed than other
institutions to promote such harmony.
* The Doctrine of Total People's Defence: Keeping in view
the archipelagic nature of the State and the present strength and composition of the armed
forces, the military would not be able to counter an external aggression only through
conventional means. The response has to be a mix of conventional and guerilla fighting. To
be able to mobilise the people in different regions to participate in such guerilla
fighting, a close association of the military with the people during peacetime is
required. This would be possible only if the military is actively involved in
administration and community management in the provinces. The concept of the military
remaining within barracks during peacetime does not apply to Indonesia--particularly not
to the provinces and districts.
* Better managerial capability: Being, in the military's
perception, the most well-trained, well-managed and well-motivated institution of the
State, the military has personnel with better managerial capability than the civilian
bureaucracy to manage industrial and other business enterprises, particularly in key
sectors of the economy such as oil and gas, mining etc
* Better local knowledge: Military officers are posted for
long periods in the provinces and districts, tour widely and interact closely with the
people even in remote areas. In contrast, the Jakarta-based civilian bureaucrats rarely
travel in the interior and even the members of Parliament representing interior districts
remain confined to Jakarta and go to their constituencies only during the election
campaign. As a result, the military has a better knowledge of the ground conditions all
over the country and of the problems of the people than any other section of the
administration.
The critics of the military and the advocates of the
abolition of the military's dual role use the following arguments:
* The armed forces were partly to blame for the widespread
mismanagement, lack of accountability, cronyism and corruption which contributed to the
economic collapse of 1997.
* The blatant violations of human rights in East Timor,
Aceh, Ambon and other regional areas and the aggravation of the feelings of alienation of
the people in different parts of Indonesia and of social disharmony even in Java were due
to the lack of effective political and civilian control over the military.
ORIGIN & EVOLUTION OF "DWIFUNGSI"
Unlike India and Pakistan, which inherited from the
British a hard core of well-trained, well-motivated and experienced civil and military
bureaucracy, which was further built up after independence, Indonesia inherited from the
Dutch colonial masters no legacy of a well-oiled political, civil and military
infrastructure and traditions of apolitical governance. The founding fathers of its
independence had to build up almost from scratch a military and administrative system
through trial and error. This aspect has to be kept in mind while discussing the origin
and evolution of "dwifungsi".
The other aspect to be noted is the role played by the
founding core of the officer class of the military in the freedom struggle against the
Dutch after the defeat of the Japanese. They got used to a role in political and
administrative policy-making in association with the political leaders of the independence
struggle and insisted on retaining this role even after final independence.
The Japanese Army surrendered on August 16,1945. Two days
later, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and the
setting-up of a Republic. The Dutch refused to recognise it and attempted to re-assert
their control over the territory. Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the formation of the new
Republic's army on October 5,1945, consisting of Indonesians who had served in the
pre-world war Dutch colonial army and the Japanese occupation forces and political
activists close to Sukarno and Hatta as well as to the communists. The Japanese-trained
Gen.Sudirman took over as its Commander.
The new army embarked on a guerilla warfare against the
Dutch. In 1948, clashes broke out between troops loyal to Sukarno and Hatta and those
sympathetic to the communists. The former defeated the latter. In December, 1948, the
Dutch arrested Sukarno and Hatta. Thereafter, the new Indonesian army took over the
responsibility for the administration of the areas liberated from Dutch control and for
the political guidance of the struggle against the Dutch, who finally agreed to recognise
Indonesian independence the next year.
The history books taught in the military training
institutions overplay the role of the military officers in putting an end to the Dutch
rule and underplay that of the political leaders.
Attempts by the parliament of the new Republic to make the
military subservient to political and civilian control led to a demonstration by a group
of army officers led by Dutch-trained A.H.Nasution outside the presidential palace on
October 17,1952, in protest against civilian meddling in the internal affairs of the
military. Sukarno rejected their demand for a dissolution of the parliament and the
Nasution putsch failed.
However, the two spells of martial law -- the first
between 1957 and 1963 to deal with separatist movements and the second in 1964 to deal
with the conflict with Malaysia-- saw Sukarno conceding gradually the military's demand
for an active role in political and economic decision-making. In 1957. Gen.Nasution, then
the Chief of Staff of the army, formulated the view that professionalisation of the
military did not mean its total apoliticisation. He called for a middle way for Indonesia
between the total apoliticisation of the military as in Western democracies and its total
involvement in politics as in certain Latin American dictatorships. This formulation
became the basis of the concept of "dwifungsi".
The same year, after the failure of the members of
Parliament to form a coalition government, Sukarno, with the support of Gen.Nasution,
proclaimed a return to the 1945 Constitution, which had provided for representation for
functional groups in the parliament. The military was declared as a functional group and
given parliamentary representation. Thus was born the dwifungsi concept, which under
Mr.Suharto, was put on the statute book in 1982.
The policy of large-scale nationalisation of plantations,
oil, mining and trading companies introduced in 1957 saw an increase in the military's
role in economic management too, with many military officers being appointed to head the
new public sector companies.
Between 1965 and 1998, Indonesia passed through two kinds
of dictatorships. For about 20 years, it was the dictatorship of the military as an
institution, with Mr.Suharto acting as its guiding spirit. From the middle 1980s onwards,
there was a gradual transformation of this into the personal dictatorship of Mr.Suharto,
as an individual with a civilian facade, ruling with the help of a mix of military
loyalists, civilian technocrats and businessmen close to the armed forces.
The first phase saw priority being given to internal
security and political stability and more than half a million people were killed and an
equal number imprisoned on suspicion of being communist sympathisers. Of the half a
million rounded up, only about a thousand were formally tried before a court of law in a
sham judicial process. The rest of them did not have the benefit of even this sham process
and were kept under illegal detention till the late 1970s, when the military regime
started releasing them. Even after their release, they were kept under surveillance and
debarred from employment in any office or enterprise connected with the Government. Their
identity cards showed them as former security suspects, thereby creating difficulties in
their getting jobs even in private enterprises. They were reduced to third class citizens.
At the height of the militarisation of the administrative
structure in 1980, about a half of the Ministers in the Cabinet, 75 per cent of the
Secretaries-General in the various departments, 60 per cent of the Directors-General, 84
per cent of the Secretaries and 75 per cent of the provincial Governors were officers with
a military background, most of them serving.
Even while thus almost totally militarising the
administration, Mr.Suharto tried to give the façade of a civilian democracy to his
regime. While retaining the title of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he
resigned as the chief of the ABRI, nominating handpicked officers to exercise
administrative and operational control over the military.
To serve his dual purpose of strengthening the civilian
façade of his regime and, at the same time, retaining a watching brief for the military
in the political, economic and social management of the country, he promoted the primacy
of the officially-floated GOLKAR party, which worked under the guidance of the territorial
commanders, strictly regulated the functioning of the other political parties allowed to
participate in the elections to the People's House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat or the DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
or the MPR), which is the highest constitutional authority and elects the President and
Vice-President, and reserved a certain number of seats for the armed forces and the police
in the DPR and MPR under powers entrusted to him by the MPR to nominate up to 20 per cent
of the total strength of the DPR.
After a gap of 15 years, the first elections to the DPR
were held in 1971 and Mr.Suharto was unanimously elected as the President of the country
and his nominee as the Vice-President. Under the pretext of simplifying the party system,
Mr.Suharto allowed only three parties to function--the GOLKAR, which was formed by merging
the various functional groups, the People's Development Party (PPP), formed by the merger
of four Muslim political parties and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), formed by the
merger of five nationalist (followers of Sukarno) and Christian parties.
As initially constituted, the Golkar had three
components---the military, the civil servants and the civilians. The military officers,
serving as well as retired, formed the most powerful component at the national and
regional levels, with Mr.Suharto himself designated as the Chief Supervisor, with powers
to suspend or dismiss the central executive board.
The critics of "dwifungsi" used to sarcastically
refer to the GOLKAR as the political wing of the ABRI. In the face of their criticism, the
1978 Congress of the GOLKAR decided that while both serving and retired military and civil
officers could become members, only retired officers could hold party positions. The
critics, thereupon, started ridiculing it as the retired Generals' party. Despite this,
the party, with the support of the administration, managed to secure over 60 per cent of
the vote in every general election.
Finding no political space for themselves under the
carefully-controlled party system, critics of the military and "dwifungsi"
started floating non-governmental organisations (NGOs), ostensibly to take up social
issues such as workers' welfare, women's welfare, environmental issues, etc, but really to
articulate their dissatisfaction with the lack of democracy and accountability under the
Suharto regime. The country saw a mushrooming of about 7,000 NGOs, 2,800 of them located
in Jakarta alone.
In the face of this, Mr.Suharto started changing the
emphasis from internal security and political stability to people's welfare. To project
his dictatorship as welfare-oriented and no longer purely security-oriented, and to
further strengthen the civilian façade of the Government, Mr.Suharto discontinued the
practice of appointing a large number of military officers as Cabinet Ministers,
drastically reduced the percentage of officers with a military background in the various
government departments and correspondingly increased the percentage of civilian
bureaucrats occupying key positions at the decision-making level. While thus diluting the
visible role of the military at the national level, he did not do so at the regional
level.
Towards the end of the 1980s, there were signs of
differences inside the armed forces over the wisdom of continuing with
"dwifungsi"and over what many secular-minded officers looked upon as
Mr.Suharto's new tendency to court the new Islamic elements making their appearance in
different parts of the country and contesting the primacy of the PPP as the only
legally-permitted Muslim party.
Nasution, the original author of the "dwifungsi"
concept in 1957, was one of the first to express the view that the time had come to review
it. In the early 1990s, a group of 50 retired military officers and former politicians,
which came to be known as the Petisi 50 Group, became increasingly vocal in its criticism
of the political style of functioning of Mr.Suharto.
In 1987-88, differences erupted between Mr.Suharto and
Gen. Benny Murdani, a Catholic, who was the chief of the ABRI, after the latter criticised
the activities of Mr.Suharto's family and allegedly tried to make the armed forces more
independent of the President.Gen.Murdani was transferred as Defence Minister, from which
post he was removed in 1993.
This was followed by a purge of Murdani loyalists from the
armed forces and the Intelligence and Strategic Centre (BIAS), set up by him, which was
re-organised and renamed as the Military Intelligence Unit (BIA). The number of Christians
in the Cabinet and the DPR was reduced. Amongst prominent Christians removed from
influential positions were Mr.Radius Prawiro, who was Co-ordinating Minister for Economy,
Finance and Industry, Mr.Adrianus Mooy, who used to be the Central Bank Governor, and
Mr.Johannes Sumarlin, who was the Finance Minister.
While thus diluting the role of the Christian officers in
the civilian and military bureaucracy, Mr.Suharto, at the same time, gave a lift to a
number of officers who were considered to be "santris" (strict Muslims) as
distinguished from the secular-minded "abangans". Amongst the
"santris" thus favoured by Mr.Suharto during this period were Try Sutrisno, who
later on became the Vice-President in 1993, despite Mr.Suharto's preference for Dr.Habibie
because of the insistence of status quoists in the military, Feisal Tanjung, who became
the chief of the armed forces, and Hartono, who became the army Chief of Staff.
Before the 1992 elections, Mr.Suharto performed
"haj" for the first time and started calling himself Muhammed Suharto. Earlier,
in 1990, he had also encouraged the formation of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals
(ICMI) by Dr.Habibie.
While thus courting the newly-emerging Muslim political
elements in order to keep them on his side without letting their emergence affect the
'Pancasila" ideology, which stresses belief in one God, a just and civilised
humanitarianism, a united Indonesia, democracy guided by wisdom, consultation and
representation and social justice for all Indonesian nationals, he also tried to make some
concessions to the critics of "dwifungsi" by having Mr.Harmoko, a civilian,
elected in 1993 as the GOLKAR Chairman defeating retired General Soesilo Soedarman, who
was backed by the status quoists in the military. Mr.Suharto also reduced the number of
seats reserved for the military in the two Houses from 100 (20 per cent of the total
strength of the DPR) to 75 in 1997. After Mr.Suharto's resignation, this was further
reduced to 38 (slightly less than 8 per cent) in June 1999.
UNDER Dr.HABIBIE
Dr. Habibie, who took over as the President after the
resignation of Mr.Suharto on May 21,1998, in the face of unrelenting student demand for
his resignation, massive street riots on the issue and deepening economic crisis, stopped
exercising the powers of the President relating to appointments, promotions and transfers
in the armed forces and let Gen. Wiranto, the Defence Minister and chief of the TNI,
handle this power, thereby once again strengthening the position of the TNI chief.
However, Dr.Habibie's interim term saw some genuine
reforms such as a dilution of the restrictions on the right of other political parties to
contest the elections and fixing the tenure of the President and the Vice-President to two
five-year terms.
In the face of unrelenting demands from the critics for
the abolition of "dwifungsi", the military seems inclined to accept the
abolition of reservation of seats for the armed forces in the Parliament from the year
2004. However, in statements made before his suspension by President Wahid, Gen. Wiranto
laid down the following conditions:
* No interference of the political leadership in the
internal affairs of the armed forces. (Meaning all powers regarding appointments,
promotions and transfers of senior officers would be exercised by the chief of the armed
forces).
* No interference by the armed forces in the political
process.
* No attempt to isolate the armed forces from the people.
(This is interpreted to mean that while the military is reconciled to further dilution and
ultimate abolition of its dual function at the national level, it is not yet prepared to
accept it at the regional level).
In the June, 1999, elections to the DPR, 48 parties
contested as against only three in the past and parties advocating political reforms
defeated the GOLKAR, with Mrs.Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party
(Struggle) emerging as the largest single party with 153 seats in a House of 500.The final
results were as follows:
1.The Indonesian Democratic Party (Struggle) and its
allies --- 153
2.The GOLKAR party and its allies --- 120
3.The United Development Party (PPP) and its allies --- 58
(Military-supported Islamic elements)
4.The National Awakening Party of President Wahid &
allies --- 51
5.The National Mandate Party of Mr.Amien Rais and its
allies --- 41
6.The Crescent Star Party and its allies --- 13
7.The Indonesian Unity and Awakening Party & its
allies --- 12
8.The United People's Sovereignty Party & its allies
--- 11
9.The Love the Nation Democratic Party & its allies
--- 3
10. Reserved for the TNI and the police --- 38
Of these, serial Nos. 1 and 2 are secular-minded parties
(273 out of a total of 500), S.Nos 3,4 and 5 are moderate Islamic parties (150 out of 500)
and serial Nos, 6 and 8 are Islamic parties of unknown origin and background (24 seats).
Nothing much is known about the parties at S.Nos. 7 and 9 (15 seats).
UNDER PRESIDENT WAHID
Mr.Abdurrahman Wahid, who was elected as the President on
October 21,1999,had initially not much freedom in choosing his Cabinet, having to accept
the nominees of the parties which supported him and of Gen. Wiranto, who himself was
designated as the Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs.
He has devoted the first few months in office to diluting
the role of the armed forces in politics at the national level by taking the following
action:
* For the first time since Mr. Djuanda, another civilian,
served as Defence Minister under Sukarno, President Wahid has appointed Mr.Juwono
Sudarsono, a civilian, as the Defence Minister. A former Professor of Political Science in
the University of Indonesia, he had served as the Environment Minister in the last Cabinet
of Mr.Suharto and as the Education Minister in the Cabinet of Dr.Habibie. He also used to
be the Vice-Chair of the National Defence Institute, a think tank funded by the TNI.
Mr.Juwono told the press after taking over that he had told the senior military officers
"they could no longer collect expensive toys, such as those owned by some
outlandishly rich Generals."
* Mr.Wahid has sought to reduce the primacy of the army in
the TNI by appointing a naval officer (Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto) as the chief of the
armed forces (TNI) and air force officers as the chief of the military intelligence (Air
Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso) and as media spokesman (Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo) of the
TNI. These posts have traditionally been held by army officers. President Wahid removed
the previous spokesman, Maj-Gen Sudrajat of the army, following two controversial remarks
by him in his media briefings. In one, he said that Mr.Wahid would have no right to
interfere in the internal affairs of the TNI, while, in the other, he said:
"Political reconciliation is needed, but this nation will remain
anti-communist."
* He suspended Gen.Wiranto from the Cabinet because of the
allegations of human rights violations by the TNI in East Timor made by the Indonesian
Human Rights Commission.
* He has insisted on exercising his prerogative of making
senior appointments, promotions and transfers in the TNI. He is reported to have already
shifted about 70 senior officers.
* He has started an exercise to ease out the supporters of
Gen.Wiranto and other status quoists from key positions in the army. He has already
reportedly appointed Major-Gen. Agus Wirahadukusumah as Commander of the KOSTRAD and
Lt.Gen. Djamari Chaniago as the Chief of the General Staff. Both of them were reputed to
be critics of Gen.Wiranto and strong advocates of the abolition of "dwifungsi".
Strongly criticising the military's involvement in business enterprises, Maj-Gen. Agus has
said in an interview:"Who backs and supports the discotheques, brothels and narcotics
rings, if not the military or police? An embarrassing fact is that the military has lost
the trust of the people."
* He has reduced the number of military officers in the
presidential office from 35 to 15 and imposed restrictions on the type of correspondence
that they could see.
* He has indicated that when the Government's finances
improve priority would be given to meeting the requirements of the Navy. As against this,
he is reportedly contemplating a reduction in the strengths of the KOSTRAD and the
KOPASSUS.
* He has reportedly removed from the military intelligence
the responsibility for the security vetting of Government servants. However, it is not yet
known to which department he has now entrusted this task.
At the same time, President Wahid has avoided any action
to dilute the military's role in the regions. He seems to be concentrating first on easing
out the military from its dual role at the centre.
REASONS FOR LACK OF RESISTANCE FROM TNI
Despite periodic reports of unhappiness in the military
over his actions and rumours of a possible coup by disgruntled officers, the TNI seems to
have accepted his decisions without much resistance, though Gen.Wiranto was initially
refusing to quit. President Wahid's success so far in having his decisions enforced,
though often in an erratic manner, could be attributed to the following reasons:
* Domestic public opinion continues to be strongly against
the TNI and the matter has been made worse by the recommendations of the Indonesian Human
Rights Commission for detailed investigation of the responsibility of the army in general
and Gen.Wiranto in particular for the human rights violations in East Timor. There have
been similar serious allegations against the TNI with regard to its handling of the
dissident movements in other regions. This has put the TNI totally on the defensive and
Mr.Wahid has skillfully taken advantage of this.
* External support for Mr.Wahid's actions from the US and
the European Union (EU) countries. During a visit to Jakarta, Mr.Richard Holbrooke, the US
Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, said on January14, in an indirect
reference to reports of a conflict between Mr.Wahid and Gen. Wiranto: " What we are
watching is a great drama, a struggle between the forces of democracy and reform and the
forces of backward looking corruption and militarism." Subsequently, he reportedly
told American journalists that he had his statement cleared by the Indonesian political
leadership before issuing it. His blunt warning against a return to militarism in
Indonesia went home loud and clear to the TNI leadership.
* The Indonesian economy is not yet out of the woods
though its GDP has for the first time since the 1997 collapse recorded a miniscule
positive growth rate of 0.2 per cent. The problem of outstanding corporate debt (over US $
70 billion) is yet to be sorted out. The economy may take another nose-dive if the IMF
suspends its assistance because of any military coup. The TNI and its individual senior
officers have been badly affected by the economic crisis and they do not want to provoke
another crisis by their unwise actions.
The unusually tough stand taken by the US President,
Mr.Bill Clinton, against the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan on the
question of return to democracy is partly motivated by fears of any leniency towards the
Pakistani regime on this issue being misread by the TNI leadership, thereby encouraging
them to move against the elected government of Mr.Wahid.Similarly, Washington is likely to
be concerned that if the IMF assistance to Pakistan is resumed despite the coup, fears of
a discontinuance of the IMF assistance to Jakarta may no longer act as a disincentive to
the status quoists in the TNI.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Would Mr.Wahid be able to tame the TNI and keep it
confined to its professional tasks? The answer to this would depend on the following
factors:
* His health. Though he has recovered from his stroke of
last year, his vision has been badly impaired and his health seems to be delicate. In the
event of any unfortunate incapacitation, the military may not be prepared to accept from
Mrs. Megawati what it is prepared to accept from Mr.Wahid, thereby leading to a clash
between the political leadership and the military.
* For how long does Mr.Wahid's reputation for his personal
integrity last? Because of his visual impairment, he is dependent on his children and
brothers and other trusted aides for scrutinising his official correspondence and
recommending action. He depends more on oral than on written communications for
decision-making. His dependence on them for carrying out his responsibilities has already
triggered off rumours of nepotism and cronyism and interference with the due process of
the law against bank loan defaulters close to his family. Such rumours and perception
could corrode his reputation, thereby depriving him of the moral high ground, which he
presently enjoys.
* The attitude of the Islamic elements outside Mr.Wahid's
Nahdlatul-Ulama organisation which have already been accusing him of a witch-hunt against
Muslim military officers. Organisations such as the Defenders of Islam, which have
considerable vocal power without much public support, have been projecting the
investigations of the Human Rights Commission against Gen. Wiranto and others for the
TNI's excesses in East Timor as a conspiracy against Muslim officers by international
Christianity.
* Mr.Wahid's success in restoring the economy and
controlling the religious and ethnic tensions. If he fails leading to serious disorder,
the TNI would be only too tempted to take advantage of it to move against him.
(20-5-00)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,
Chennai. E-mail:corde@vsnl.com)
