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The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A
Ritual Performed
by Rajesh Kumar Mishra
The most significant outcome of the 2000 Review Conference is that the Nuclear
Weapons states got away without committing themselves to a definite programme for
disarmament. India though not a participant , not to be outdone, positioned itself as a
nuclear weapon power with few doctrinal propositions. Director, SAAG.
The Sixth Review Conference of the parties to the
NPT (Non- Proliferation Treaty), having 187 members, concluded on 19th May,
2000 at New York with much louder voice against the dangers of production, deployment, and
spread of the nuclear weapons and technologies. Throughout the conference, while on the
one hand, nuclear political elites maintained their articulate negotiating strategies, on
the other hand, the non nuclear weapon states (NNWS) kept on trying to push through their
demands in words and phrases. Even the NPT managers forgot to include few "core
issues" in final draft which had emerged at the outset of the conference in different
proposals, just to avoid the blame for wrecking the conference. And several issues of
great importance to the NNWS, like sustainable development, environment protection and
other security aspects, were swept under the carpet by the early arrangements amongst the
P-5 states.
This Review Conference opened with the key
address of the President Abdallah Baali of Algeria and set up two Subsidiary Committees
along with Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament chaired by Ambassador Clive Pearson of
New Zealand; Main Committee II on safeguards and nuclear weapon free zone, chaired by Adam
Koberacki of Poland; Main Committee III on nuclear energy and related issues under the
chair of Marakku Reimaa of Finland; and a Drafting Committee, chaired by Andr Erds of
Hungary. Other than the statements from the P-5 states the main representative proposals
came from New Agenda Coalition(Ms Rosario Green of Mexico as spokesperson, Brazil, Egypt,
Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) ; the group of 110 NAM state parties
represented with working paper by Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia; European Union; a joint
paper from five NATO countries(Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway); a
working group of five Central Asian states; G-10( Australia, Austria, Canada, Hungary,
Ireland Netherlands and Sweden) etc.
Important announcements at the beginning of
the Conference:
(i) The United States:
Praising the indefinite extention of the NPT in 1995, Madelein Albright said-" a
priceless gift for our children---and ourselves---has transformed acquiring a nuclear
weapon capability from an act of pride to a cause for international alarm". With the
US’s desire to amend the ABM Treaty she argued-" the world has changed since the
Treaty was signed, that it had already been amended once and there is no good reason it
cannot be amended again to reflect new threats from third countries outside the strategic
deterrence regime". She ended with cautions ahead as –" if countries demand
unrealistic and premature measures, they will harm the NPT and set back everyone’s
cause."
(ii) Russia: Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov focussed on -"new serious threats to international
security and stability---- local conflicts, international terrorism, militant
separatism". He condemned "attempts to build national at the expense of the
interests of the other states----misappropriation of the right to use force" and
warned against such actions which lead to "a direct invitation to a new arms
race". He also underlined that "compliance with ABM Treaty in its present from
without any modifications is a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear
disarmament in accordance with Article VI of NPT". Therefore to avoid the crises he
proposed a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System (GCS)
under the UN auspices.
(iii) China: With its call
for no-first-use (NFU), the Chinese ambassador Sha Zukang, extended its desire for NWS
to" must faithfully implement their obligations for nuclear disarmament". Sha
put forth two preconditions for Beijing’s participation in arms control
negotiations(till date it has remained out of such negotiations)- "not compromising
global strategic balance and stability and not to undermine China’s national security
interests". Criticising the superpower attitudes, Sha said-" it is neither
condusive to their own security nor in the interests of global strategic balance and
stability to ask the small or medium sized nuclear countries to take transparency
measures". And referring to the US missile defence programmes, Sha reminded of Jiang
Zemin’s statement-"---will inevitably exert an extensive negative impact on
international security and stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new
areas---."
(iv) Britain: Foreign
Office Minister Peter Hain in his paper "Towards a nuclear-free world" enlisted
its successful efforts towards arms control and disarmament and reiterated the UK policy
as-" when we are satisfied with the progress towards our goal of the global
elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included
in negotiations".
(v) France: Enumerating
"Strict Sufficiency", ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle counted the French
efforts towards its commitment to non-proliferation regime. However, Fortelle indicated
moderately against U.S by saying-"anxious to avoid any challenges to the Treaty
liable to bring about a breakdown of strategic equilibrium and to restart the arms
race".
(vi) New Agenda Coalition (NAC):
In its working paper NAC showed concern over the pace of nuclear disarmament by
quoting-"events in the field of disarmament and international security have not been
encouraging". It sought from NWS to make an "unequivocal undertaking to
accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming
review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations---." It
wanted more transparency, irreversibility, accountability, de-alerting and removal of
warheads and further measures to remove fissile material from weapon programmes".
(vii) NAM: In its paper,
with regard to Article I and II of the NPT, it mentioned-" refrain from nuclear
sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements-----comply with the
letter and spirit of the CTBT----call for a Treaty banning the production and stockpiling
of fissile materials for nuclear weapons-----deliberate on practical steps for systematic
and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons". The NAM stressed on the
importance of universality and nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ). It further emphasized on
that " no NPT-party should be denied technology, equipment or assistance on the basis
of allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA".
(viii) N-5 Statement: In
its historic manner for first of its kind P-5 term replaced by N-5 for the purpose of
making joint statement on behalf of so called nuclear weapon possessor states. Hubert de
la Fortelle of France presented N-5 statement on behalf of the NWS as-" unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals[as
"ultimate goals" of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on
general and complete disarmament ( however, at the end of the conference the commitment
for N-5 states endorsed as ‘ultimate goal’ replaced by ‘obligation’ as
pressed by the NNWS)]. It also confirmed that " non of our nuclear weapons are
targeted at any state". Further it explained that-"N-5 look forward to the
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM
Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis fir further reductions of
strategic offensive weapons".
Few Major Points of differences during
the Conference:
i) Egypt took the lead to address the problem posed by
Israel’s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Later on , the US, Egypt and some Middle
Eastern delegations got bogged down over the issue of " Middle East Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone".
ii) Representatives of U.S, Russia and Britain denying to
accept the New Agenda Coalition’s demand for the time frame of 2000-2005.
iii) The term " Strategic Stability" used by
Russia and China followed in N-5 Statement needed more clarifications for NNWS.
Later this term was exhaustively discussed between NWS and New Agenda Coalition.
iv) China didn’t like the references
such as "irreversibility, transparency, or de-alerting" what NNWS considered
them as components to fulfill the Treaty obligations.
v) China wanted commitment to no-first-use which Russia and
NATO nuclear weapon states somehow rejected.
vi) Japan’s call for "earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, but not
latter than 2005 Review Conference".
vii) China’s repeated emphasis that outer space issues
are more urgent for its national security than any FMC.
viii) Australia, Canada and France opposed to the proposal of five Central Asian
states on "serious environmental consequences due to Uranium mining and associated
nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production and testing of nuclear weapons".
ix) Issues related to export controls had seen sharp
differences on the proposal by G-10 and Iran. It further fuelled the debate between
western states and NAM.
x) "As soon as possible (supported by NNWS)" Vs
"As soon as practicable(preferred by NWS)—the languages relating to the
verification of fissile material excess to the ‘defence needs’ of NWS under IAEA
or other verifications.
xi) United States and Iraq strongly opposed each other on
the language regarding the compliance of Iraq with its safeguards obligations under the
Treaty.
Comments:
The most important task that the
participants to the NPT Review Conference had to undergo was to find commonality of
language and words between the differing views and proposals. The reasons are best known
to themselves. NNWS, as has always been in past, couldn’t change the attitudes (a
queer blending of national security and interests) of P-5 states. It is also heard that
some countries accused the process of negotiations being non-transparent and selective.
None of the "responsible" participants
wanted to take the blame for wrecking the conference which was apparent at several
instances when demands were more pressing for the nuclear weapon states. This boon in
disguise or for that matter the perplexities faced by the NWS themselves became
instrumental on few philosophically elaborated agreements related to nuclear safety,
sharing and liability.
Perhaps, the ghost of mutual assured destruction
had its presence throughout the conference. The issues pertaining to ABM Treaty and the
U.S’ national missile defence programmes suddenly disappeared from somewhere on the
negotiation table.
China quietly agreed to the
"transparency" factor. This could also be indicative to some tacit compromises
and arrangements amongst the P-5 states camouflaging their own qualitative improvement
plans. The common aim to maintain strategic stability could swiftly pass through the
negotiations-leaving enormous scope for maintaining P-5’s nuclear strongholds in
future.
To mention the Indian concern, India's opposition
to the NPT and CTBT in past based on the argument of both being discriminatory,
inequitable, non transparent and non compliant to any time-frame, kept India out of this
conference. Its absence at New York reminds the famous adage-"everyone wants to go to
heaven, but nobody wants to die". The Indian viewpoint on the conference has clearly
been mentioned in "Suo Motu Statement" made in the parliament on May9, 2000 by
the Minister of External Affair. This statement acknowledges India as a nuclear weapon
state and reiterates the Indian position on global disarmament unequivocally, provided the
negotiations are just.
Last but the most important, except the
"unequivocal undertaking" and few proposed prospective cooperation between the
NWS and NNWS, the Conference couldn’t satisfactorily produce any time bound solution
or some proactive policy formulas. From past experiences, it is always much said than
done.
2.6.2000
(Rajesh Kumar Mishra, is a Researcher in JNU,
Delhi)
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