At the turn of the millenium when the post – Cold War realities in the international
arena are at last taking some predictable shape the major nations of the world are in the
process of reviewing and redefining their foreign policy priorities and preferences.
Countries like Japan and India, aspiring for major international roles, would have to
think of strategic and security matters on a global scale and context. Both
countries would have to break out of their regional security contexts if they wish to
achieve the status they aspire for. Cold War mind-sets would need discarding and
extra-regional strategic cooperation in the comprehensive security context explored.
Japan and India, are both poised at a historical
stage in their political development, aided by contemporary strategic and security
developments, both global and regional to reach out to each other in terms of strategic
cooperation. Japan – India strategic cooperation would not only contribute to Asia
– Pacific stability but also to global stability as a whole.
Political
Aspirations
Japanese political aspirations stand summed up in
a recent issue of The Economist which states "Japan’s ambitions do
not stop at Asia. It makes no secret of its longing for a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council. It has supported UN peace-keeping and reconstruction
efforts not just in Cambodia and East Timor, but also in the Middle East, Bosnia and
Kosovo. It has its own ideas for reforming the big international financial
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank ......" This lead article further points out
that "Until now Japan has deliberately understated its weight ..... . that has
changed. Today’s Japan wants and deserves more credit for all that it does to uphold
Asia’s stability and prosperity. And the role Japan needs to play is itself also
changing." 1
Avid Japan watchers namely the Chinese have
arrived at the following assessments in terms of Japan’s political aspirations namely
(1) Collapse of bi-polar world enables Japan to fulfill the aspirations of becoming a
political power (2) Japan has been fervently seeking to exert influence in global and
regional affairs since 1990. (3) Japan is in a transitional phase of converting its
economic power to political power. (4) To be a true political power Japan will have to
raise its political and military profile in the international arena.
2
India’s political aspirations are very
nearly similar to those of Japan. India too has made no secret of its ambitions to attain
a seat amongst the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. India has
extensively participated in United Nations peace-keeping right from the 1950’s all
over the world. India in addition shouldered UN combat responsibilities in Congo and
Somalia. India too desires a re-structuring of global financial institutions like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Like Japan, India’s voice has been
counted for its moderation and conflict – resolution efforts at global fora.
In terms of political aspirations, there does not
seem to be any competing conflict of political interests between Japan and India, neither
globally nor regionally. Politically both Japan and India stand out in Asia as democratic
nations, politically vibrant and with free societies. Both nations have espoused the cause
of peace and economic cooperation. Japan has been a generous donor of foreign aid to
under-developed countries.
Japanese and
Indian Foreign Policies During the Cold War
The noted American specialist on Japanese foreign
policies Edwin O Reischauer once observed that "Whatever the mechanism for
formulating foreign policy, the chief determinants are inevitably the actual international
realities and the national perception of these." 3
Necessarily so, it is the national perception of international realities which in the last
fifty years or so, especially during the Cold War years, kept Japan and India distant from
each other. Once again, the contemporary international realities of the post. Cold War era
are gradually drawing Japan and India closer together.
Japan’s foreign policies during the Cold War
era were conditioned by its alliance relationship with the United States and the West at
the global level. Regionally it was conditioned by the US-Japan Mutual Security treaty of
1954 and further revisions thereafter. Hence Japanese foreign policies during this era
were heavily conditioned and international realities viewed through American and Western
eyes. India’s policies of non-alignment and yet her proximity to erstwhile Soviet
union in strategic matters was suspect. It needs to be recalled that the USSR military
presence in the Far East, Japan’s territorial dispute with it over the Northern
Islands and the perceived threat to Japanese sea lanes from the Soviet Navy operating out
of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam heavily influenced Japanese foreign policy formulations.
Correspondingly, India during the Cold War era
pursued the policies of nonalignment and proclaimed that it would steer clear of both the
blocs. However, it was not so clearly followed. forced by its wars with Pakistan, the
military debacle with China in 1962 and the estranged relationship with USA, India had to
rely heavily on Soviet military equipment for its armed forces and the Soviet veto in the
United Nations on the Kashmir issue. This in the eyes of other nations, Japan inclusive,
distorted India’s claims to be a truly non-aligned nation. Till 1962, Japan viewed
India as a rising Asian power, and an alternative model to China, which could some day
take over the leadership of Asia. The 1962 military humiliation by China of India was a
disappointment to Japan and India fell low in Japanese foreign policy priorities.
Diplomatic contacts thereafter became minimal.
Japanese and
Indian Foreign Policies at the Turn of the Millennium
Japanese and Indian foreign policies at the turn
of the millennium indicate changes reflecting the new international realities as the post
- Cold War starts settling down after a decade of unpredictable regional and ethnic
conflicts the world over. Irrespective of the time-frame, Japanese foreign policy planners
have to face the following truisms in terms of perspectives, which were articulated nearly
two decades back: 4
* Japan lies in the centre of a highly strategic region
which involve global powers like USA and Russia and other major power like China and the
two Koreas.
* Japan’s unprecedented reliance on external resources and markets set the
broad perimeters within which Japanese foreign policy must operate.
* "Japan would not be in a position to make
regionalism the primary focus of its foreign policies, economic or political. The nature
of developments has made Japan one of the first societies of the contemporary world with
truly global interests."
* "A minimal foreign policy can no longer produce the
benefits that accrued during the firs two decades following World War II".
Japan therefore today has to reach out for newer
relationships with content more strategic than economic in view of the changing strategic
realities. It is desirable for Japan to discard Cold War mind – sets and
especially establish long term strategic relationships with the newer global power centres
that are emerging.
India too should discard its Cold War mind-sets
and needs to posit its foreign policy on the following perspectives.
* The international order in the post – Cold War era
is resolving itself into grouping which are regional, economic, strategic and religious.
* In such an evolving global environment nonalignment
policies are out dated and anachronistic.
* India’s aspirations for great power status cannot be
achieved through non-alignment, strategic ambiguities and strategic coyness.
* India would need to make clear its strategic preferences
and seek for a wide-ranging strategic cooperation further afield to serve its national
interests.
Thus, India too, has to reach out strategic-ally
to emerging power centres like Japan, nations with which there is no historical discord or
disputes. This is what the changing international strategic realities dictate. In the
process of reviewing and renewal of their foreign policies related to contemporary
developments political space exists for both Japan and India to forge a strategic
relationship.
Regional
Security Environments of Japan and India and Threat Perceptions
Contemporarily Japan’s security environment
is marked by the following developments, which are of great concern.
* Concurrent with her economic advancement China has
embarked on a significant upgradation and modernisation of her conventional forces and
nuclear arsenals.
* North Korea has emerged as a covert nuclear weapons state
and has overt long range missile arsenal backing her sizeable conventional forces.
* Japan exists in a highly militarised region surrounded by
China, North Korea, Russia and South Korea. 5
* If China
takes over Taiwan, Japanese sea-lanes which are vital for her existence will be under
potential Chinese threat.
* A growing Chinese strategic nexus with Russia further
complicates Japanese security environment.
United States as the uni-polar power has its
hands full dealing with regional conflicts all over the world. Consequently, in Asia
Pacific, Japan will have to shoulder additional defence responsibilities and loads. Today
more than Russia it is China that has emerged as a major threat perception in the Asia
Pacific. As one analyst puts it. "Beijing is clearly modernising its military forces
and seems determined to have a more potent strategic deterrent, a first class air force
and a blue water navy." 6 The extent of this
modernisation can be gauged by further quoting this analyst "Most credible estimates
of PRC military spending fall in the range of $ 30 billion to $ 50 billion a year." 7 This raises justifiable security concerns in Japan.
India’s security environment in south Asia
and contiguous regions is highly conflictual and troubled due to the following
developments.
* Nuclear weaponised and highly militarised Pakistan with a
record of four wars with India, Currently under military dictatorship, the propensity for
conflict is sharpened.
* Cross border terrorism and proxy wars being activated in
Kashmir using Islamic fundamentalist mercenaries, thereby testing India’s military
patience.
* China's strategic nexus with Pakistan. This incorporated
supply of nuclear weapons blue prints and long range missile systems.
* China’s use of North Korea to supply long range
missiles to Pakistan in addition to those supplied by it, thereby adding to Pakistan
missile holding.
* China’s deployment of nuclear missiles on the Indian
border i.e. in Tibet.
* Afghanistan fractured by a civil war due to Pak aided
Talibanisation. This is causing instability in South Asia and Central Asia.
* Ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka.
* Hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Both these countries are exporting Islamic terrorism in contiguous areas and
particularly in India.
A comparative analysis of the Japanese and Indian
security environments would indicate that China looms large as the major security concern
and a worrisome threat perception. In the case of India the Chinese threat perception is
more acute because of the conflictual past, the border with Tibet where Chinese armed
forces are deployed in strength. China is in a position to generate the full potential of
its greatest strength i.e. military land power against India from the territory of Tibet.
Japan is comparatively lucky in that it has no
contiguous land borders with China, but it is within easy range of China’s missile
arsenal. The biggest potential threat to Japan from China is that China can very easily
sever Japanese sea-lanes i.e. its very survival. These sea-lanes run perilously close to
Chinese mainland and the problem could be more acute if Taiwan becomes part of China. The
North Korean missile threat to Japan is co-attendant with that of China.
It would be seen that the regional security
environments of Japan and India stand complicated and threats generated to their security
directly by Chinese militarisation and build-up as a contiguous power. Chinese military
build up by itself could have been viewed as legitimate and benign, but China’s
nuclear weaponisation and missile build ups in North Korea and Pakistan betray other
intentions. By themselves neither North Korea nor Pakistan had the technological
capability nor financial resources to afford nuclear weapons and long range missiles.
These missiles in the case of North Korea cover the Japanese heartland and Okinawa and in
the case of Pakistan cover the Indian heartland, as graphically illustrated in a recent
‘Asiaweek’ journal. 7 It is legitimate to question as to why China provided these deadly
arsenals to failing states likes North Korea and Pakistan, who are heading for ‘rogue
nation’ status. The answer is obvious: China’s intentions were to develop
strategic pressure points by proxy in South Asia against India and in North East Asia
against Japan.
Japan and India thus face threats to their
security from a common quarter, namely China. China has also seconded Pakistan and North
Korea to add to these threats. Space therefore exists for Japan and India to carry out
strategic dialogues for comprehensive security and also explore strategic cooperation.
Imperatives for
Strategic Cooperation Between Japan and India
Japan and India in the past have demonstrated
similar attitudes to matters strategic and military. Both the countries shied away from
the acquisition of power and were apologetic about whatever military power they had.
Japanese restraint arose from its World War II defeat, the restrictions imposed by the
Japanese Constitution prepared under American guidance and a smugness that Japanese
security would be ensured by the American shield of its Pacific ally.
India’s apologetic approach to military
power and strategic cooperation arose from the pacifist leanings of its political leaders
during the formative stages of building the Indian nation state from 1947 onwards. Its
other off-spring i.e. the foreign policy of non-alignment ill-served India’s national
interests. This is evident from the fact that a country of the size of India was subjected
to four wars by Pakistan and one by China. In addition, both these countries generated and
aided insurgencies on India’s borders.
At the turn of the millenium, imperatives exist
for strategic cooperation between Japan and India and these are:
* Japan and India are rising power centres of Asia,
democratic countries with free societies and many shared values. With no competing
conflictual interests, it is desirable that both nations strategically cooperate for
stability and peace both in the regional and global context.
* Japan and India both value the freedom of the high seas
for their economic prosperity. India by its strategic location astride Japanese sea-lanes
in the Indian Ocean affords security to Japanese survival. In the years to come Indian
naval capabilities could provide this security right upto the South China Sea.
* Japan and India have over-lapping strategic interests in
the political stability and peace of the Middle East and South East Asia. India because of
the ripple effects arising from geographical contiguity and Japan because of energy
security and sea-lanes security. Japan – India strategic cooperation can ensure this
to mutual benefit.
* During the Cold War bi-polar security configuration, the
two poles provided counter- vailing power to each other. The present uni-polar structure
throws a disproportionate load for global security on USA and makes its counter-vailing
power or interventionary power that much more diluted or selective.
* In the context of the above the rising military power of
China, both conventional and nuclear is worrisome. China’s rising power and
intentions to challenge United States predominance in the Asia Pacific should prompt Japan
and India to explore strategic cooperation to provide counter-vailing power to
China’s might.
The imperatives for Japan-India strategic
cooperation become that much more important when the United States in relation to China
shies away from calling a spade a spade. Recent reports in the Washington Post suggest
that a Joint Chiefs of Staff assessment which had listed China as a potential threat in
its draft report has for its final presentation been changed to state ‘a rising power
in East Asia’ or words to that effect. Ironically, the United States is following a
historic parallel to what Britain was doing in respect of Germany before the First World
War and Second World War.
Japan –
India: Recognition of the Imperatives – A Beginning
Japan’s hard attitudes towards India
following the 1998 Pokharan nuclear weapons tests has fortunately given way to a more
impassioned stance on the subject. Similarly, India too, earlier disappointed and
frustrated by Japan’s attitudes realised that in Japan the deliberation process is
graduated and takes time. It is encouraging now to note that both countries have put aside
the past and recognising the imperatives for strategic cooperation have made a beginning
as the following developments would indicate:
* Visit of Foreign Minister Yukiho Ikeda in July 1997.
During visit Ikeda sensed possibility of a useful security engagement between Japan and
India. 8
* Three Japanese high officials visited India thereafter,
until a brief cooling of relations took place in 1998. 9
* Early 1999, Taro Nakayama former Foreign Minister visited
India and handed over letter from Japanese Prime Minister to Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee. 10
* Visit of Tadashi Yamamoto this year to take part in Trade
II India-Japan Policy Dialogue. He is President of the Japan Centre for International
Exchange and has prepared a report for the Japanese PM on Japan’s goals for the 21st
century.
* Visit of Indian Defence Minister to Japan twice in five
months, the second in June 2000. Earlier a visit by Indian Foreign Minister to
Japan". 11
* Since January 2000 Japanese Navy and Indian Navy ships
carried out naval exercise off Mumbai and later these two navies joined the Vietnamese
Navy for a tri-lateral exercise in South China Sea. 12
Besides the above official developments,
academics and strategic analysts have called for a strategic cooperation and comprehensive
security engagement between Japan and India. Prof. Seki writing in the Far Eastern
Economic Review puts it bluntly: "There are good reasons to set in place a security
framework that could contain any future Chinese adventurism. Within such an understanding
a triangulation with India in the West and Japan in the East could form the basis to keep
any Chinese belligerence in check and the region in peace." 13
In an article for the Indian Peace and Conflict
Studies Institute, New Delhi, in February 2000, this author pointed out. "The new
millenium witnesses changing security environments in both Japan’s and India’s
neighbourhood, especially with nuclear and IRBM proliferation fuelled by China. China
itself is propelling towards significant military build-up, both conventional and nuclear,
which would be dreaded in contiguous regions. Unlike the Cold War where adversial
intentions on both sides were predictable, China’s intentions are ambiguous and
generate uncertainties. In such an uncertain Asian security environment, it is imperative
that like minded Asian democracies (Japan and India) enter into comprehensive security
dialogues to discern evolving security challenges." 14
Conclusion
The post Cold War era did not bring about the much heralded ‘peace dividend’
and a peaceful ‘New World Order’. As the euphoria of the Cold War started fading
away nations in strategic regions of the world came to grips with the harsh realities that
the predictable bi-polar template stood replaced by unpredictable security environments
marked by regional and ethnic conflicts. In the Asia-Pacific, in the post - Cold War era,
China has emerged as a formidable military power and with aspirations to become a
super-power. Unlike the Cold War super-powers i.e. USA and USSR, China carries along with
its ambitions a historical baggage of perceived injustices, territorial disputes and
humiliations which are likely to make it more aggressive and unrestrained. Russia is in no
position to restrain China’s ambitions. For reasons of its own it is virtually
sponsoring a China – Russia strategic nexus. The United States today as the unipolar
power, is in an imperial over-stretch strategically.
Also, in a historical parallel with
Great Britains policies towards Germany before both World Wars the United States will
react only when it is too late to contain China.
In such a global security environment, it falls
to the lot of the next order of major powers, like Japan and India, in the Asia-Pacific,
to enter into strategic cooperation to further the cause of peace and stability. The
‘raison d'etre’ is not to form military alliances and ring China and put it
under siege. Strategic cooperation between countries like Japan and India would ensure
that China does not run wild in Asia-Pacific and that it would exercise caution and
restraint before it embarks on any mis-adventures or political coercion. Once again Prof
Seki needs to be quoted in conclusion and that is: "With this in mind, the proposed
strategic partnership between India and Japan should be one that contributes, as a long
term goal, of the construction of a balanced triangle of forces in Asia. In this endeavour
an India that is growing more dynamic economically and more closely associated with an
increasingly prosperous Asia Pacific can play a bigger role in enhancing regional
security. Japan’s task here is to ensure that the historic encounter between it and
India, two nations, too long indifferent to each other become an effective international
reality." 15
6.6.2000
NOTES
- See lead article "Can Japan find its Voice?" in
"The Economist" of May 6th 2000 P 15.
- Rex Li, ‘Partners or Rivals: Chinese perceptions of Japanese
Security Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region’ in "The Journal of Strategic
Studies", London, A Frank cass Journal December 1999, Volume 22, Number 4. P 5 and PP
17 – 20.
- Edwin O Reischauer, Foreward, in Robert A Scalapino, Ed. "The
Foreign Policy of Modern Japan" Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977 P XV.
- Robert A Scalapino, ‘Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign
Policy in "The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan", Ibid, PP 390 – 401.
- For details of the intense militanisation in Japan’s security
environment, graphical depictions are available in "Defense of Japan: Response to a
New Era" published by Japan’s Defense Agency, 1996 Edition, Page 30, Diagram 1
– 5.
- Ted Galen Carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship.
The United States, China and East Asian Security", in "The Journal of Strategic
Studies", London, A Frank Cass Journal, March 1998, Volume 21, Number 1, P 9.
- ASIAWEEK, Special Report Security, PP 44 – 45.
- Prof. Tomeda Seki, ‘A Japan – Indian Front’, in
‘Far Eastern Economic Review’ May 25, 2000, P 38.
- Ibid
- Ibid
- See Mahendra Ved ‘Fernandes Tokyo visit will help thaw Japan
ties’ in ‘The Times of India, June 5, 2000.
- Ibid
- See Note 8 above.
- Dr. Subhash Kapila, "Japan and India: Imperatives for a
Comprehensive Security Dialogue. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi,
www.southernasia.com/ipcs. Article No. 326 dated 28 February 2001.
- See Note 8 above.
