The Kashmir Drama: The need for Indian wariness:
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The announcement by the Hizbul-e-Mujahideen of a unilateral cease
fire for a period of three months and its readiness for talks with the Indian Government
to bring about a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute has taken analysts by surprise.
The Hizbul claims that the Indian Government is ready for
unconditional talks on Kashmir while Indias National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra
maintains that the talks will be within the purview of the Indian Constitution.
The latest claim of Hizbul is that any talks with the Indian
Government will not be possible without the participation of Pakistan. There are even
speculative reports in the press that three-way talks may take place in a place like Abu
Dhabi. There is another report again speculative, that talks may take place on the side
lines between PM Vajpayee and Pakistans Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf when
both visit USA in autumn for UN sessions.
Preceding these reports was the demand on autonomy passed
by the J&K Assembly under the stewardship of Farooq Abdullah. This was summarily
rejected by the Cabinet. All opposition parties were unanimous that any proposal for
reversion to pre-1953 status was unacceptable, though greater devolution of powers to all
States could be discussed.
Sandwiched between the Farooq govts demand for autonomy and
Hizbuls sensational offer of cease fire were the events relating to talks with the
Hurriyat leaders.
India has to be wary of these dramatic developments even
conceding that the PMO happens to be one of the lead players on these and on the track II
exchanges. Some relevant questions need to be asked
* Contextually how come Farooqs autonomy demands, talks
with Hurriyat and the Hizbul announcement of cease fire all fall in place in quick
succession?
* Why is it that there is no response from Government when the
Hurriyat and Hizbul spokesmen claim that the Indian Government has accepted
"unconditional talks " meaning outside the purview of the Constitution?
* Is the Indian Government accepting the remaining part of the
demand of Hurriyat and Hizbul that Pakistan should also participate in the talks?
As for the first question the unfolding events do not appear to
be coincidental. In terms of ground realities J&K continues to be subjected to proxy
(covert?) war, sabotage and terrorism incessantly. The Indian Armed Forces have not yet
reached the stage of total control over the insurgency. It is therefore too premature to
conclude that the Army operations have forced the two outfits to sue for peace. Strange it
may seem, that while the J&K resolution has been rejected promptly by the Indian
government ( After all Farooq had asked for autonomy within the Indian Union) the
Government has not challenged the claim of Hizbul and Hurriyat that the talks are
unconditional.
Is the silence of the government due to pressure or is it that
the Indian Governments track II sources indicate that once this approach is allowed,
by placating and keeping up the pretensions of the separatists, they could eventually be
brought on the rails for talks within the constitutional framework? Is the external
scripting at work?
If so, India would then eventually have to agree to let Pakistan
participate in discussions with the Hurriyat and the Hizbul or other terrorist
organisation that may follow this lead.
There is no doubt that the cease fire declaration of Hizbul is
with the full consent of Pakistan and it is suspected that Majit Dar left POK with the
acquiescence of Pakistan authorities. By letting other militant outfits to intensify their
attacks, Pakistan has neither reduced its support of cross border terrorism nor shown any
inclination of a genuine desire to solve the Kashmir problem by peaceful means.
India has to be wary and take the following factors into
consideration before getting immersed deeply into any peace initiatives:
* Pakistan is following a two track policy, namely, manipulating
the Hizbul Mujahideen to declare a cease fire, while at the same time directing Lashkar-e-
Taiba and others to intensify killings in the Valley.
* Lashkar-e-Taiba (Bulletin6/7/2000) has declared "We will
promote Jehad on India after Kashmirs freedom. We will now make efforts for the
success of the suppressed (meaning Muslims) people of India.
* Pakistans military ruler Gen.Musharraf has declared that
Jehad is an instrument of foreign policy.
It is therefore naive to presume as is being done by Indias
political liberals and the West that peace will prevail in South Asia once the
Kashmir issue is resolved. The above Pakistani pronouncements betray a much wider Jehadi
grandiose design.
Currently India has no compulsions to depart from the three
principles it had so far adhered to. These are
* The Kashmir issue is a bilateral one and no scope exists for a
third party involvement, external or internal.
* No talks on Kashmir with Pakistan until the proxy war and state
sponsored terrorism from Pakistan ceases.
* Final solution if any will have to be within the purview of the
Indian Constitution.
The Indian Government has also to take into consideration the
Indian Parliament Special Resolution on Kashmir of 1994 (unanimously passed) that the
territorial integrity of Kashmir is nonnegotiable. If this stands unchanged then the
Indian government has very little lee way for a flexible approach towards Hurriyat, Hizbul
or any other country..
The Indian Government should also be aware that no amount of
political liberalism that it may display of the western variety can soften the
"Jehad" impulses of the terrorist organisations, separatist groupings or of
Pakistan. Their political and strategic cultures are feudal. Hence these do not match with
political liberalism.
Indias current responses to peace talks should be based on
Indias national interest and strategic imperatives concerning Kashmir and not on
what external powers expect of us. The Government should also borrow lessons from
Nehrus dealings in the China crisis of the 1950s. No Prime Minister can keep the
Indian Public or the Parliament in the dark on issues on which Indias security,
existence and social fabric are dependant.
The government needs to see through the whole Kashmir drama in
its proper perspective and not give in to impulses which would
* Internationalise the Kashmir issue
* Give Pakistan a back door entry for dialogue without ceasing
its proxy war and terrorism in J &K.
The Government of India must not fall into the traditional Indian
mindset of finding or jumping to soft solutions for complex problems,
specially when the problem has strategic overtones. India went to Tashkent and
unilaterally released 90,000 Pak prisoners of war in 1972 and Indias current Prime
Minister made the journey to Lahore 1999 hoping for peace with Pakistan. Pakistans
responses have been otherwise. Since the basic premises and national objectives of
Pakistan are based on reneging on Indo-Pak agreements (Simla 1972 & Lahore 1999),
aggression (1947- 48,1965,1971 & Kargil 1999) and adventurous proxy war in J&K for
the last ten years, it would be too hard to concede that Pakistan has pious designs
currently to permit resolution of the Kashmir problem by proxy or jointly.
3.8.2000