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Paper no. 132

The Kashmir Drama: The need for Indian wariness:

by  Dr. Subhash Kapila

The announcement by the Hizbul-e-Mujahideen of a unilateral cease fire for a period of three months and its readiness for talks with the Indian Government to bring about a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute has taken analysts by surprise.

The Hizbul claims that the Indian Government is ready for unconditional talks on Kashmir while India’s National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra maintains that the talks will be within the purview of the Indian Constitution.

The latest claim of Hizbul is that any talks with the Indian Government will not be possible without the participation of Pakistan. There are even speculative reports in the press that three-way talks may take place in a place like Abu Dhabi. There is another report again speculative, that talks may take place on the side lines between PM Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf when both visit USA in autumn for UN sessions.

Preceding these reports was the demand on autonomy  passed by the J&K Assembly under the stewardship of Farooq Abdullah. This was summarily rejected by the Cabinet. All opposition parties were unanimous that any proposal for reversion to pre-1953 status was unacceptable, though greater devolution of powers to all States could be discussed.

Sandwiched between the Farooq govt’s demand for autonomy and Hizbul’s sensational offer of cease fire were the events relating to talks with the Hurriyat leaders.

Thus, for the last couple of weeks India has been treated to a three-act drama on Kashmir with none of the acts giving any clue as to the climax of the play so far as the Indian side is concerned. Obviously the public is not being informed of the imperatives of the unfolding drama but a distinct impression has been created that the script is from outside.

India has to be wary of these dramatic developments even conceding that the PMO happens to be one of the lead players on these and on the track II exchanges. Some relevant questions need to be asked

* Contextually how come Farooq’s autonomy demands, talks with Hurriyat and the Hizbul announcement of cease fire all fall in place in quick succession?

* Why is it that there is no response from Government when the Hurriyat and Hizbul spokesmen claim that the Indian Government has accepted "unconditional talks " meaning outside the purview of the Constitution?

* Is the Indian Government accepting the remaining part of the demand of Hurriyat and Hizbul that Pakistan should also participate in the talks?

As for the first question the unfolding events do not appear to be coincidental. In terms of ground realities J&K continues to be subjected to proxy (covert?) war, sabotage and terrorism incessantly. The Indian Armed Forces have not yet reached the stage of total control over the insurgency. It is therefore too premature to conclude that the Army operations have forced the two outfits to sue for peace. Strange it may seem, that while the J&K resolution has been rejected promptly by the Indian government ( After all Farooq had asked for autonomy within the Indian Union) the Government has not challenged the claim of Hizbul and Hurriyat that the talks are unconditional.

Is the silence of the government due to pressure or is it that the Indian Government’s track II sources indicate that once this approach is allowed, by placating and keeping up the pretensions of the separatists, they could eventually be brought on the rails for talks within the constitutional framework? Is the external scripting at work?

If so, India would then eventually have to agree to let Pakistan participate in discussions with the Hurriyat and the Hizbul or other terrorist organisation that may follow this lead.

There is no doubt that the cease fire declaration of Hizbul is with the full consent of Pakistan and it is suspected that Majit Dar left POK with the acquiescence of Pakistan authorities. By letting other militant outfits to intensify their attacks, Pakistan has neither reduced its support of cross border terrorism nor shown any inclination of a genuine desire to solve the Kashmir problem by peaceful means.

India has to be wary and take the following factors into consideration before getting immersed deeply into any peace initiatives:

* Pakistan is following a two track policy, namely, manipulating the Hizbul Mujahideen to declare a cease fire, while at the same time directing Lashkar-e- Taiba and others to intensify killings in the Valley.

* Lashkar-e-Taiba (Bulletin6/7/2000) has declared "We will promote Jehad on India after Kashmir’s freedom. We will now make efforts for the success of the suppressed (meaning Muslims) people of India.

* Pakistan’s military ruler Gen.Musharraf has declared that Jehad is an instrument of foreign policy.

It is therefore naive to presume as is being done by India’s political liberals and  the West that  peace will prevail in South Asia once the Kashmir issue is resolved. The above Pakistani pronouncements betray a much wider Jehadi grandiose design.

Currently India has no compulsions to depart from the three principles it had so far adhered to.  These are

* The Kashmir issue is a bilateral one and no scope exists for a third party involvement, external or internal.

* No talks on Kashmir with Pakistan until the proxy war and state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan ceases.

* Final solution if any will have to be within the purview of the Indian Constitution.

The Indian Government has also to take into consideration the Indian Parliament Special Resolution on Kashmir of 1994 (unanimously passed) that the territorial integrity of Kashmir is nonnegotiable. If this stands unchanged then the Indian government has very little lee way for a flexible approach towards Hurriyat, Hizbul or any other country..

The Indian Government should also be aware that no amount of political liberalism that it may display of the western variety can soften the "Jehad" impulses of the terrorist organisations, separatist groupings or of Pakistan. Their political and strategic cultures are feudal. Hence these do not match with political liberalism.

India’s current responses to peace talks should be based on India’s national interest and strategic imperatives concerning Kashmir and not on what external powers expect of us. The Government should also borrow lessons from Nehru’s dealings in the China crisis of the 1950s. No Prime Minister can keep the Indian Public or the Parliament in the dark on issues on which India’s security, existence and social fabric are dependant.

The government needs to see through the whole Kashmir drama in its proper perspective and not give in to impulses which would

* Internationalise the Kashmir issue

* Give Pakistan a back door entry for dialogue without ceasing its proxy war and terrorism in J &K.

The Government of India must not fall into the traditional Indian mindset of finding or jumping to ‘soft solutions’ for complex problems, specially when the problem has strategic overtones. India went to Tashkent and unilaterally released 90,000 Pak prisoners of war in 1972 and India’s current Prime Minister made the journey to Lahore 1999 hoping for peace with Pakistan. Pakistan’s responses have been otherwise. Since the basic premises and national objectives of Pakistan are based on reneging on Indo-Pak agreements (Simla 1972 & Lahore 1999), aggression (1947- 48,1965,1971 & Kargil 1999) and adventurous proxy war in J&K for the last ten years, it would be too hard to concede that Pakistan has pious designs currently to permit resolution of the Kashmir problem by proxy or jointly.


3.8.2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
            
               
 

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