DEATH-THROES OF TERRORISM IN KASHMIR?
by B.Raman
How many of us remember the day in August, 1992, when the Punjab Police killed Sukhdev
Singh Babbar, leader of the dreaded Babbar Khalsa (BK), a Sikh terrorist organisation, in
an ambush? That was followed by an orgy of killings of innocent civilians, many of them
relatives of special police officers,by members of the BK and other allied organisations.
Revulsion in the Sikh community over this carnage marked the beginning of the decline of
terrorism in Punjab.
Whenever a terrorist group suffers a serious set-back at the hands of the State or a group
splits from a terrorists' conglomeration and seeks a separate dialogue with the State,
others in the group or conglomeration step up violence to keep up the morale of their
members, to project their movement as unaffected by the set-back and to derail the
dialogue.
The history of terrorism has innumerable instances of such murderous reflexes after a
serious set-back. The shocking massacre of nearly 100 innocent civilians in Kashmir after
the Hizbul Mujahideen 's (HM's) recent offer of a cease-fire and dialogue with the
Government of India should not, therefore, come as a surprise. The Government and the
public of India should be prepared for an increase in violence in the coming weeks.
If they have to turn this madness into the death-throes of terrorism in Kashmir, they have
to maintain their cool in the face of this horror, press ahead with the dialogue with the
HM and persuade other indigenous Kashmiri organisations to join the bandwagon of peace and
prosperity.
There are three Jamaat-e-Islamis (JEIs)---the JEI, Pakistan, led by Qazi Hussain Ahmad,
the JEI, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, led by Abdul Rashid Turabi, and the JEI, Jammu &
Kashmir. The JEI, Bangla Desh, is not relevant here.
Though independent of one another, these organisations have some ideological commonalities
such as their concern over the growing influence of Wahabism in Pakistan and J & K and
over the widening Shia-Sunni divide due to the activities of extremist Sunni groups
against the Shias.
There are serious differences too, the most important of which is the reluctance of the
JEI, J & K, and the JEI, POK, to support the objective of the JEI, Pakistan, to fight,
through jehad, for the creation of two more independent homelands for the Muslims of North
and South India and its action in supporting the demand of the Sikh extremists for the
so-called Khalistan.The objective of the JEI, J & K, and of POK is confined to J &
K.
The Al Badr, the militant wing of the pre-1971 East Pakistan branch of the JEI, let itself
be used by the Pakistan army for the elimination of over 10,000 intellectuals of East
Pakistan, many of them Hindus, who were backing the Bangladesh movement. The late Andre
Malraux, the then Minister for Culture in France's Georges Pompidou Government, compared
these massacres to Hitler's elimination of the Jewish people in Germany.
Before the fall of Dacca in December, 1971, the JEI, with the help of the Pakistani Army,
shifted the Al Badr members, responsible for this holocaust, most of them Pakhtuns, to
Peshawar, after which the Al Badr, under strong criticism from Western human rights
organisations, disappeared from the scene. It was revived by the JEI under the
instructions of Gen.Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and used in Afghanistan.
Before 1989, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan assisted any Kashmiri group
seeking its help. However, concerned over the popularity of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), which called for the independence of J & K, the ISI, through the JEI,
Pakistan, subsequently persuaded the JEI, J&K, to set up its own militant wing to
counter the activities of the JKLF and fight for the merger of J & K with Pakistan.
Thus was born the HM, which set up its rear base in Muzzafarabad, the capital of POK, and
a number of training camps in the POK with the help of the ISI and the JEI, Pakistan, in
which recruits, some brought from the Valley and some recruited in the POK refugee camps,
were trained and armed.
From 1991 onwards, the ISI stopped assisting the JKLF and trained and armed only the HM
and other groups, which called for merger with Pakistan. While the HM was able to counter
the influence of the JKLF, partly by taking advantage of New Delhi's unwise action in
imprisoning the latter's leaders, it was not able to make headway against the Indian
security forces.
The ISI, then headed by Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, took a number of steps to intensify the proxy
war in Kashmir such as shifting the Al Badr to Kashmir and pressurising the HM to agree to
the merger of the two, helping the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT), both Wahabi groups of Afghan vintage, to infiltrate into the Valley and forcing the
JEI, J & K, to assist the HUM and LeT.
This policy led to an increase in the number of non-Kashmiris in the HM, which practically
became an appendage of the HUM.
In 1993, following the action of the Clinton Administration in placing Pakistan in the
so-called watch list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism, the ISI
shifted the HUM and HM leaderships and their training camps to Afghan territory and
started routing its assistance to them thereafter through JEI, Pakistan.
Till 1995, the HUM and the HM worked together. The HUM, which generally does not claim
credit for its successful actions in the Valley, let the HM claim credit, in order to
project these actions as due to indigenous Kashmiri groups.
Towards the end of 1995, differences started appearing between the HM on the one side and
the HUM and the LeT on the other over the HUM's kidnapping of some Western tourists in
Kashmir, under the name Al Faran, and the stand of the HUM and the LeT that the
"liberation" of J & K would only be the first step towards the
"liberation" of the Muslims in North and South India in order to create two
independent homelands for the Muslims of India (Jehad-e-Hind).
The JEI, J & K, and the HM had always been saying that their objective was confined to
the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris. The HM felt that the kidnapping would
antagonise the West whose support the Kashmiris needed. The HM was also worried over the
spread of Wahabism to Kashmir by these organisations and its negative impact on Kashmiri
culture.
The capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September, 1996, led to a parting of the ways
between the HM and the Al Badr. The HM, which had been in receipt of regular financial
assistance from Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizbe Islami through the JEI, declined to support
the Taliban, which expelled the HM leadership from Afghan territory and handed over their
training camps to the HUM. The Al Badr split from the HM and started supporting the
Taliban and operating independently.
The exit of the Al Badr, which consisted largely of Pakistanis, once again transformed the
HM into an almost totally Kashmiri organisation. In order not to antagonise the US, the HM
did not support Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda (The Base) whereas the HUM, the LeT and the Al
Badr became members of his International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and
Israel.
During the Kargil war of last year, the Pakistan Army, while continuing to project Syed
Salahuddin of the HM as the head and spokesman of the Muzzafarabad-based United Jehad
Council, kept the HM cadres away from the frontline. Instead, it used the HUM, the Al
Badr, the LeT and the Al Qaeda for assisting its troops.
The hijacking of the IAC aircraft to Kandahar by the HUM in December last year caused a
further divide between the HM and the HUM, as the former felt that it would further
antagonise the US.
Since then, it was clear that the HM, while continuing to support the jehad in Kashmir
openly, was covertly exploring the possibility of breaking off from the grip of the
Pakistani mercenary organisations and making overtures to the Govt. of India.
The ISI must have been aware of the signs of violence-fatigue of the HM and the growing
difficulties in its relations with other organisations. The fact that Gen. Pervez
Musharraf, the Chief Executive, did not try to prevent its overtures to New Delhi could
indicate either that he himself wants to encourage a peace process or that this is a
devious stratagem to impress Washington of his sincerity by not standing in the way of the
HM, while, at the same time, covertly encouraging the other groups, who have a much
stronger ground presence, to step up their violence.
If the HM remains firm in its determination to go ahead with the finalisation of the
cease-fire followed by talks with New Delhi, this could bring not only the other purely
Kashmiri organisations into the peace bandwagon, but also create difficulties for the
Pakistan-based mercenary organisations, by denying them local support and shelter.
The situation will continue to be very fragile for some weeks, if not months, and would
require delicate handling. The Govt, the public and the media should avoid any note of
triumpholism, which could act as a red rag to the bull to the other terrorist groups.
Discreet talks, low profile and even lower rhetoric would be the need of the hour.
(4.8.2000)
(The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute for
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: corde@vsnl.com )
