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Paper no. 144
INDIA-RUSSIA STRATEGIC COOPERATION: Time to
move away
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Executive Summary
* During the Cold War years. India while not a
member of any bloc due to her non-aligned activism, enjoyed a proximate relationship with
Russia.
* The proximate India-Russia relationship embraced
intense political, economic and military cooperation. This strategic cooperation reached
its peak in August 1971 with the signing of the "Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace ,
Friendship and Cooperation" incorporting security clauses.
* The contextual imperatives that forged the
India-Russia strategic cooperation were from the Indian side : US-Pakistan military
alliance and aid, Indo-US estrangement, the Sino-Pak strategic relationship
and the Sino-Pak-US stategic convergence. On the Russian side the imperatives were :
Sino Russian military confrontation, theSino-US quasi - strategic relationship of the 1975
s -1980s and the Russian need to reach out to Third World countries through India.
* The basic and common denominator on both
sides was the containment of China and Pakistan .
* These contextual imperatives underwent a
sea-change with President Gorbachev coming into power. He initiated what can be
described as Russia's 'China First ' priority. Russia's strategic shift in its
foreign policy formulations removed the planks on which rested the India-Russia strategic
cooperation.
* Russia "China First" policy was
vigorously pursued by President Yeltsin, and received active pursuance by President Putin.
* Russia latest foreign policy document (Foreign
Policy of the Russian Federation July 20,2000) is reflective of Russia's 'China
First' Policy.
* At the turn of the millienium, India which so
heavily rested for its national security interests on strategic cooperation with
Russia is faced with the crucial question: 'Is it time to move away'.
* The question gets further reinforced when it is
seen that Russia's switch to China has incorporated a Russia-China strategic coalition and
build-up of China's military power and force projection capabilities by advanced Russian
weapon systems. The same has security implication for India.
Following conclusions can be made:
* India should move away from this strategic
relationship, while continuing its traditional friendship with Russia.
* India should explore and excercise
alternative strategic options which furthers her national interests.
* India should decrease her military dependence on
Russia.
* India should not enter into creation of any
multipolar initation of the kind of Russia-China India Triangle. These are
strategically inadvisable.
Background
India and Russia enjoyed a close strategic
relationship for the major portion of the Cold War. The peak point of this relationship
was the conclusion of the Indo- Soviet ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation’ signed in 1971. With the emergence of two independent states of India
and Pakistan on the Indian sub-continent in August 1947, the United States made the first
bid to co.opt India as a regional partner, but without success. Nehru’s socialistic
inclinations and his Anglicized distaste for Americans drew him closer then to USSR and
China, Nehru’s self-righteousness in foreign affairs was equally matched by US
secretary of State, Dulles who as early as 1947 remarked that "Soviet Communism
exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu Government." 1
The India – Russia strategic relation was a
comprehensive one embracing political, military, cultural and economic cooperation and
exchanges. The proximity between the two countries led at times to India being labelled as
a Soviet satellite. Some basic points in the relationship are
* India-Russia strategic cooperation has been
good as long as Russia gave primacy to its Indian relationship.
* India-Russia strategic relationship was good as
long as China stood excluded from Russian foreign policy priorities.
* India-Russia strategic relationship was good as
long as China figured in Russian threat perceptions. This was when China was engaged in a
quasi-strategic alliance with USA.
In international relations, there are contextual
imperatives that prompt forging of strategic relationships or undoing them. This applies
to the India-Russia strategic relationship also.
India-Russia Strategic Cooperation in the
Past: The Contextual Imperatives
The historical background of events that led to
the emergence of the India-Russia strategic cooperation are well known. An analytical
review of the historical background would indicate that in the main, the following
contextual imperatives helped or spurred the forging of the India-Russia strategic
relationship:
* United States military aid to Pakistan
* Sino-Russian confrontation
* Indo-US estrangement
* Sino-US quasi-strategic Alliance
* Sino-Pak strategic Nexus
* US – Pak military alliances
* Russia’s need to reach out to the Third
World through India, as a leading nation.
In terms of detailed examination of Soviet
foreign relations, their policies and processes in relation to South Asia, the following
observations stand made by an American Professor are relevant .2
* "The Soviet-Indian relationship rests on
two pillars of mutual interest: the containment of China and the reduction of Western
influence in the region."
* "Additionally, the USSR "uses"
India’s status as a leader of the non-aligned movement to bolster Soviet policy in
the Third World".
* "India uses Soviet economic and military
aid to pursue its own regional goals, the most important of which are containment of
Pakistan and Bangladesh."
* "In other words, the Soviet Union and
India have the basis for an ideal relationship: India’s needs are a match for Soviet
capabilities, and Soviet needs are a match for India’s strengths."
* "The Soviet-Indian relationship works best
when both perceive a link between China and Pakistan."
A little realised facet which also facilitated a
proximate India-Soviet relationship was that: "Over the years the monolithic
structure of the defunct Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) established harmonious
relationships with an equally monolithic Congress Party in India." 3
India-Russia Strategic Relationship : Time to
Move Away?
In relation to the contextual imperatives that
forged the India-Russia strategic relationship, a contemporaneous review of the regional
and international scene reveals the following changes that have taken place:
* The Cold War ended a decade back, resulting in
the emergence of the United States as a unipolar power.
* The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the
collapse of the economy and the economic upheaval have diluted Russia’s
countervailing power both regionally and globally.
* Sino-Russian confrontation stands replaced by a
growing strategic nexus between Russia and China. Their strategic aim is to dilute
America’s unipolar status.
* Post-Afghanisation withdrawal, Russia has
embarked on repairing relations with Pakistan.
* The Sino-Pak strategic nexus in South Asia has
gone to alarming lengths where China has not only provided nuclear weapons blueprints but
also provided ballistic missiles and missile production plants to Pakistan.
* In March 2000, the United States drew the
curtains on its special relationship with Pakistan. Concurrently it has embarked on
building and repairing its relations with India.
* Islamic fundamentalism and Islami Jehad have
raised their ugly heads in India, Central Asian Republics, China, Russia and targetted USA
too.
* China has embarked on building its military
power and force projection capabilities as pre-requisites for its aspirations for
super-power status.
That the contextual imperatives which shaped the
India-Russia strategic partnership have either been swept away or stand significantly
diluted. Further "In the Cold War years, superpower rivalry tended to aggravate or
even perpetuate conflict in South Asia in the form of contending alliances. The end of the
Cold War and break-up of the Soviet Union, have however transformed that rivalry into
Washington/ Moscow policy coordination and have in its wake brought about a grand shift
from alliance to realignment in South Asia." 4
More significantly, in relation to what was the
cornerstone of the India-Russia strategic relationship, the 1971 Peace and Friendship
Treaty, itself was questioned by the Russians themselves as early as 1992. It has been
observed that: "The breakup of the Soviet union has put an end to the Indo-Soviet
special relationship. Both the Russian Federation and India have decided to sign a new
political treaty to replace the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was
extended for another twenty years in 1991. But according to Indian press reports, the
Russian side has asked for deletion of security related articles from the original
treaty." 5
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
successive Russian Foreign Ministry spokesmen have consistently stressed that Russia will
honour all past agreements and treaties, "But this rhetoric could not hide the fact
that the Indo-Soviet treaty was no longer relevant to a situation in which India would be
in a confrontation with both China and Pakistan, which conceivably was India’s chief
rationale in the first place ……" 6 and
further that "Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, which provided for military
cooperation in the event of a military threat to either party had, therefore, now become a
benefit of dubious value for India." 7
Circumstantially, therefore, it is time that
India moves away from the strategic relationship of a proximate nature that it enjoyed
with Russia until Gorbachev came into power and disintegration of USSR took place.
Gorbachev had given notice of change of priorities in Russia’s foreign policies in
favour of China at his famous Vladivostok speech – the border settlement, Kampuchea
and Afghanistan. Somehow India missed noticing Russia’s switch in priorities i.e. a
China predominant policy as early as 1986.
Russia’s Strategic Switch: China Favoured
Over India
The mainstay of India-Russia strategic
partnership and the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971 was to make India
secure against threats from China and Pakistan. Russia in acceding to the 1971
Treaty had made a conscious strategic choice between India and China. Gorbachev set in
motion the paradigm switch towards China. It is unclear whether the Indian authorities
sensed it. His successor Yeltsin followed this switch more vigorously.
Following Yeltsin, President Putin seems to be continuing the policies set by his two
predecessors in giving China overriding priority in Russia’s foreign policy
relationship.
"By the middle of 1989, Indo-Soviet
relations drifted into a situation, presaging the need for their complete re-casting which
had to come about with Gorbachev’s removal ….." 8
so writes an eminent Indian Foreign Secretary. In fact it can be maintained that
India’s Russia policy needed rehashing soon after Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech
in 1986 when he initiated the Russian switch towards China. It was Gorbachev who
"called for a new China Policy" and it was he "who called for an end to a
China encirclement policy" and it was Gorbachev who conceded China’s "basic
demands for normalisation of relations: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Soviet
pressure to get Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the reduction of Soviet military
presence along its borders with China." 10
The decade of the 1990s witnessed a rapidly
galloping Russia-China relationship especially in strategic spheres. Concurrent with
this was the growing cold-shouldering of India especially between 1989 and 1996 when some
corrections were applied, Primakov became the Prime Minister.
Yeltsin while adopting a policy of building up a
strategic relationship of coalition with China, "emphasised a need for
de-ideologisation of its (Russia’s) foreign policy" which "resulted in
Russia adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy towards India " led to" in the
new Russia placing the Indo-Russia relations in a precarious position." 11
President Putin’s Government documents
‘Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 12 issued
on July 10, 2000 continues to reflect the Russian switch to China. This document states
the following objectives on China and India:
China
"The concurrence of the fundamental
approaches of Russia and People’s Republic of China to the key issues of world
problems is one of the mainstays of regional and global stability. Russia seeks to develop
mutually advantageous cooperation with China in all areas." 13
India
"Russia intends to strengthen its
traditional friendship with India, including in the international affairs and to aid
overcome problems persisting in South Asia and strengthen stability in the region." 14
An analytical observer would be able to grasp the
subtle Russian nuances in terms of Russian priorities vis-à-vis China and India. This
would indicate that what remains of the Russia-India strategic cooperation now is only
‘traditional friendship’. Russia’s switch towards China, and which is
likely to grow further into an intensified ‘strategic coalition’ (they may both
shy away from terming it a ‘strategic alliance’) necessitates examination of two
other topics, namely:
- India’s military dependence on Russia
- Russia’s advocacy of establishment of a
Russia-China-India triangle (Political and Security overtones).
India’s Military Dependence on Russia:
The Need for Diversification
India’s military dependence on Russia can be
said to be virtually total since 1965 in terms of military hardware for all three arms of
its armed forces. The inventories existing of Russian equipment and the large scale orders
currently contracted or under discussion, stand well documented in a number of
publications. 15
Some major facts that need to be highlighted are:
* "After 30 years of reliance on Soviet
produced hardware, India finds itself in a position where its armed forces are critically
dependent on Russian equipment and spares to the tune of: 16
Army - 75%
Air Force - 80%
Navy - 85%
* The 10 year Indo-Russian Agreement upto 2010 on
military – technological cooperation which includes advanced weapon systems is worth
$ 15 billion. 17
* Estimate show that over 800
Russian defence production facilities are kept in operation by Indian Defence Contracts. 18
* Russia’s military industrial
complex will be hard pressed to survive without India as a reliable client. 19
* Russia’s weapon sales provide
the badly needed hard currency the nation requires. 20
It also needs to be pointed out that:
* India’s defence purchases from Russia are
no longer on rupee payments. Hard currency payments are made.
* Russian spare parts are now sold at rates of
over 300 – 500% as compared to earlier years.
* In the early 1990’s when Indo-Russian
relations were on hold, spare-parts for India’s weapon systems were virtually stopped
affecting India’s military readiness.
The implications of this overwhelming Indian
military dependence on Russia meant:
* India’s over-reliance on Russian weapon
systems and their easy availability has directly contributed to slow progress in
India’s indigenous self-reliance and progress of DRDO capabilities and achievements.
* India’s pre-dominant reliance on Russian
weapon systems and military equipment is a serious strategic drawback, especially in the
changed nature of inter-se relationship between the two countries.
* India’s predominant reliance on Russian
military equipment opens India to Russia’s coercive pressures during critical
situations.
* With Russian defence production in disarray,
production times for contracted equipment is slow, thereby affecting India’s military
readiness.
* Quality of Russian weapon systems in recent
past has been poor and defective. This has created disquiet in India’s military
circles. Some reports indicate that as high as 80% of Russian systems are found defective
in performance. Reports indicate that Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes had to
raise this point officially during his recent visit to Moscow.21
Additionally, a sinister implication that has
arisen in this field is the rapidly growing supply of Russian military systems to China
during the last five years. The implications for India’s security are enormous, and
it is surprising that the Indian media should be found wanting in highlighting this
threat, especially those who have strategic analysts on their rolls. Only one analysis
seems to have come into print by Jyotsna Bakshi, a Research Fellow at IDSA 22. Some pertinent observations from her article appropriate
for our analysis, are noted below:
* China has received $ 7 billion worth of
advanced weapon systems from Russia during the period 1996-1997.
* China will be buying $ 20 billion worth of
Russian hi-tech air force and naval systems between 2000 – 2004.
* Russia’s supplies of military hardware in
sizeable quantities include:
- SU 27 fighter aircraft – 26.
- IL 76 strategic airlift transport aircraft
- TU-22 Backfire bombers
- SU-27 SK fighter aircraft - 300
- MI-17 helicopters - 30
- SU-30 MI multi purpose combat aircraft 200
- Ka-31 helicopters
- Nuclear powered submarines Typhoon Class
- Submarines, KILO Class - 8
- Destroyers - 5
- Soveremmeny Class Destroyers - 4
- S-300 Anti missile systems
- SA-10 SAM systems - 14
- T-72 Tank 50
- T-80 Tanks 200
* The above is only a partial list. The actual
orders are reported to be much more.
* Russia supplied technology for DF 31/41 ICBMs
to China enhancing her ICBM capabilties.
* Russia has proposed that China become a partner
in the GLONASS navigational satellite system which would enable nuclear weapons and
missile targeting, and control of nuclear submarines.
* More than 4000 Russian scientists and
technicians are working in Chinese defence production facilities.
* Transfer of Russian military technology for all
advanced weapons systems sold to China.
Russia’s supply of advanced military weapon
systems and equipment to China has led to the following:
* China’s war machine which was primitive
until Russian arms supplies commenced in 1992 stands substantially upgraded.
* Russia’s military contributions to China
in the last five years has enabled China to develop significant offensive capabilities in
terms of its airforce and navy
* Russian technical assistance has added to
significant expansion of Chinese ICBM capabilities.
* Russia has enabled China to develop blue-water
naval capabilities.
* Russian technology transferred under licence to
China is being passed on to Pakistan (RD-33 engines for FS1 fighter).
* India financed Russian R & D for SU-30 MK
multi role combat aircraft as per Indian specifications. Russia has agreed to sell
this version to China also despite agreement with India, that it will not be sold to
China.
The Security implications for India of
Russia’s military supplies to China are stupendous namely:
* Russia has enabled China to overcome and
surpass the qualitative edge that India enjoyed in the conventional weapons field. 23
* Russian supplies of advanced
weapons to China have led to significant accretion of Chinese offensive capabilities.
Indian security, therefore comes under strain as India’s contingency planning would
now have to create assets to meet enhanced Chinese threats.
* The above also enables China build-up of blue
water naval capability. This would result in China’s intrusive naval presence in
South Asian waters. A naval dimension now gets added to the existing Chinese land threat
to India.
Russia’s military build-up of China cannot
be defined as contributing to its traditional friendship with India. One does not
build up adversaries against one’s friends. All these developments suggest that:
* India needs to diversify immediately its
military dependence on Russia.
* India must on a crash basis go in for
indigenous production of spare parts for Russian military hardware on Indian inventories.
* India must buy Russian origin equipment from
East European & Central Asian countries for cannibalization to create spares reserves.
It is ironic that while Russia had decisively
moved away strategically and politically from India by 1990. India took no steps until
1998 to move away from its Russian military dependence and diversify to other sources.
Russia – China – India Triangle :
Strategically Inadvisable for India
The formation of a Russia-China-India triangular
relationship or axis has been advocated by both President Yeltsin (1993) and Prime
Minister Primakov in 1996. Many Russian and Indian academics followed suit in advocating
it. A realistic appraisal of the following factors would indicate that it is politically
and more so strategically inadvisable for India to join such a triangle / axis:
* Russia and China perceive USA as a threat and
hence this advocacy. India does not perceive USA as a threat.
* USA does not pose any threat to India. On the
contrary USA has this year pulled the curtain off its special relationship with Pakistan.
* Any power bloc composed of Russia and China
would be perceived by Asia – Pacific countries as a potential threat. India cannot
therefore, be part of an axis that generates fears in countries which have always been
friendly with India.
* China is part of the strategic nexus with
Pakistan aimed at India. How can India be a part of a condition in which two of its
potential threats are inter-twined?
* China does not treat India as an equal. How can
India be therefore be a partner of such a bloc.
* For a Russia-China-India triangle to emerge,
China would have to concede India’s pre-eminent status in South Asia. This would also
mean giving up China’s strategic nexus with Pakistan. China will not do so.
Hence a Russia-China-India triangle is an
unworkable proposition, besides being strategically inadvisable for India.
Russia’s Current Perceptions of its
Relationship with India
This analysis would be incomplete if current
Russian perceptions of its relationship with India are not taken into account before
reaching conclusions. Leaving aside political statements of Russian leaders, a sampling of
views by Russian political analysts are quoted below to highlight the emerging trends:
Vladimir Baranovosky 24
* "In an era of
massive realignment, Russia appreciates India’s continuing insistence with
non-aligned status and its caution and restraint in development of ties with the United
States of America, especially in the area of arms transfers."
* "India’s ascendance to the status of
a declared nuclear weapon power has produced mixed feelings in Russia… However, the
very fact of India going ‘nuclear may be seen by Russia as devaluing its own nuclear
arsenal which is almost the sole remaining symbol of its great power status and an
important bargaining chip in the international arena."
* "It seems clear, however, that both powers
assign each other considerable roles in their respective foreign policy calculations. In
particular, the rapprochement is generated by India’s search for higher international
status and Russia’s desire to prevent further erosion of its global role."
Vladimir Moskalenko & Tatiana Shaunna 25
* "The appearance of two new
possessors of nuclear arms in South Asia is a serious challenge to Russia’s National
Security."
* At the same time an
improvement of Russia’s relations with Pakistan as the second party in the South Asia
confrontation seems possible and must run in parallel to further expansion and
strengthening of relations with India."
Felix N Yurolov 26
* "With the emergence of a new President of
the Russian Federation, it has to strengthen its eastern policy by making it more
concrete, more substantial, and more dynamic. Russian-Indian bi-lateral relations and
international cooperation between the two countries must be a very important part of this
policy."
* The signing of the ‘Declaration of
Strategic Partnership’ between Russia and India should not be further delayed."
* "It is also in Russia’s interests to
call for support of India’s entry to UN Security Council as a permanent member.
* "In any case we have to admit that the
fundamental changes in the world balance of forces have had a direct bearing on
Russia-India relations. While formulating their strategy of national interests and
security, Russia and India should fully take into account the radical changes that have
taken place in the international system. They cannot ignore the new realities."
These are very interesting Russian thoughts, but
somehow they seem to compartmentalise Russia. India focus to South Asia only. The Russian
analysts are also silent on the strategic coalition that has emerged between Russia and
China and how it impacts on the India-Russia relations. Felix Yurolov (the last named
Russian analyst) seems to be conceding that by implied analysis, namely, each country to
take into account its own national interests and security.
Concluding Analysis
In state craft and foreign policy formulations,
as Lord Salisbury once stated that there are no permanent friends or foes, only permanent
interests. The same dictum applies to India-Russia relations also. The changed parameters
of Russia’s foreign policy according an overriding priority to its China relationship
and building up a Russia-China coalition aimed at the United States unipolarity,
imperatively demands that India too carries out a re-appraisal of what was once a
strategic relationship between India and Russia.
When Russia made a conscious decision to enter
into a strategic coalition with China, it could surely not have been oblivious to
India’s threat perceptions about China. It could have been foreseen that
Gorbachev’s concessions to China would release her from her Pacific preoccupations
and permit additional Chinese military formations for deployment on its Southern
Peripheries complicating India’s security problems27.
Russian upgradation of Chinese offensive capabilities cannot be exclusively confined for
use against USA; they could be used elsewhere. However, Russia in its defence could argue,
that these determinations were made in Russia’s national interests. Similar India
prerogatives need to be conceded by Russia, without rancour.
While Russia in pursuance of its national
interests and security has cast its lot with China, India’s national interests and
security needs demand that:
* India moves away from its erstwhile strategic
relationship with Russia and exercise alternative options.
* India drastically reduces its military
dependency on Russian weapon systems and spares. Immediate diversification is the answer.
* India unambiguously declares that it is not
interested in creation of any multi-polar structures and especially not the kind being
advocated of a Russia-China-India triangle. There are many other ‘poles’ which
will emerge in the natural evolution of the global structure.
* Many years ago, USA gave an assurance that
American arms given to Pakistan in aid will not be used against India. Pakistan did use
the same. There is no guarantee that Russian arms given to China will not be used against
India in any future India- China conflict. India must take into account enhanced Chinese
offensive capabilities arising from Russian arms supplies.
India and Russia can surely continue to have good
friendly relations based on their proximity of the past. India and Russia can surely look
for convergence of interests in the international field. However, seeking convergence with
Russia cannot be at the expense of India’s quest for newer strategic cooperative link
with countries like USA, France, Israel, Vietnam, Japan and South Africa. More
realistically, and in tune with the emerging international system, it is Russia which
would need to be more accommodative in seeking strategic convergence with India. India
needs to be aware of the many alternative strategic options open to her, other than
Russia, which the emerging international security environment provides her. India
should be ready and have the will to play the ‘India card’.
7.9.2000
NOTES:
1. William J Barnds, ‘India Pakistan and the
Great Powers’. New York, Praegar Publishers, 1972. P121
2. Peter Zwick, ‘Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy’. New
Jersey, Prentice – Hall, 1990. PP 316 – 318.
3. PL Dash, ‘Soviet Disintegration and Challengers in Indo-CIS
Relations’ in Stephen P Cohen, Ed ‘South Asia After the Cold War: International
Perspectives: ACDIS Papers. 1992 P5.
4. Lin Maohui ‘From conflict to conciliation and cooperation’ in
Stephen P Cohen, Ed, ACDIS Papers 1992 quoted above P 45.
5. Ibid P 46
6. Shelton U. Kodikara, ‘South Asian Security Dilemmas in the Post-Cold
War World’ in Stephen P Cohen, Ed, ACDIS Papers 1992 quoted above. P 149.
7. Ibid, P 150.
8. J. N. Dixit, ‘Across Borders: Fifty Years of India’s Foreign
Policy’, New Delhi, Picus Books, 1998 P 180.
9. John R Faust & Judith F Kornberg, ‘China in World Politics,
Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995 P 109.
10. Ibid: PP 4 – 5.
11. Jerome M Conley, ‘India-Russia Military and Nuclear Cooperation:
Implications for US Security.’ US Air Force, National Strategic Institute Studies
Paper, February 2000.
12. ‘Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, Special Issue dated
July 20, 2000 issued by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow.
13. Ibid P 18.
14. Ibid P 19.
15. For detailed inventories ‘Military Balance 2000’ may be seen.
Annual details of arms transfers can be scrutinised in the SIPRI Annual Year Book. For
details of recent contracts and other aspects of Russian arms sales and defence production
see ‘DEFENSE NEWS, July 17, 2000.
16. Jerome M Conley, Feb 2000 See reference at Note 11.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Richard F Grimmet, Senior Defense Analyst, US congressional Research
Service Washington quoted in ‘India Abroad’, September 1, 2000. P 8.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russia-China Military – Technical Cooperation :
Implications for India’, Strategic Analysis, Monthly Journal of the Institute of
Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, July 2000 Vol XXIV No.4 PP 633 – 667.
23. Ibid. P 661.
24. Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for National and
International Security in Gennady Chufrin, Ed, ‘Russia and Asia: The Emerging
Security Agenda’, SIPRI, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999 PP 25 – 26.
25. Vladimir Moskalenko and Tatiana Shaunna, ‘Russia’s Security and
the Geopolitical Situation in South Asia in Gennady Chufrin, Ed (1999) above P 240.
26. Felix N Yuralov ‘Russia : Problems of Security in Post Cold War
World’ in ‘World Affairs’ (New Delhi) Volume 4\, No. 2, April – June
2000 PP 51-55.
27. Brigadier Subhash Kapila, ‘The China Threat is Real’, Journal
of the United Services Institutions of India (New Delhi) Vol XXVIII, No. 533, July –
September 1998.
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