South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 236

02. 05. 2001

  

home.jpg (6376 bytes)

 

 

USA, PAKISTAN & TERRORISM

by B.Raman

An Overview

The report on the patterns of global terrorism during the year 2000, released by Gen.Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, at Washington on April 30, was initially drafted by the officials of the outgoing Clinton Administration, but revised and finalised by the officials of the new Bush Administration and hence is the first important indicator of the Bush Administration's counter-terrorism policy.

It may be recalled that the first report of the Clinton Administration, released in April, 1993, had seen a toning down of the recommendation made by the preceding Bush (Sr) Administration officials, in their draft of December,1992, for declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism. Instead, the Clinton Administration put Pakistan in a so-called watch list of suspected State-sponsors of international terrorism and deleted it in July, 1993.

The report for 2000 of the new Bush Administration refers to the role of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Taliban, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in much greater detail than any past reports of the previous US Administrations. Though it has not declared Pakistan a state-sponsor of international terrorism, it discusses the role of Pakistan not only in the chapter on terrorism in South Asia, as was done in the past reports, but also in the chapter on state-sponsored terrorism.

Previous US Administrations had considered only premeditated attacks on civilians as acts of terrorism, but not attacks on security forces. The latest report explains the circumstances under which the US would consider even attacks on security forces as terrorism.

The latest US report specifies that the HUM is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel and had signed his fatwa of February, 1998, calling for attacks against US and Israeli nationals/interests. Such a specific finding was not there in past reports.

The report has two Annexures--one on terrorist organisations, which have already been declared as international (foreign) terrorist organisations by the US and the other on terrorist organisations, which were active in 2000, but against which evidence was not adequate to warrant such a declaration. The HUM figures in the first list and the JEM and the LET in the second.

The Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Department submits two reports to the Congress every year-- one in October on organisations, which need to be declared international terrorist organisations and the other in April on States, which need to be declared State-sponsors of international terrorism.

Though there is nothing to prevent the State Department from declaring an organisation as an international terrorist organisation even in April, generally this is not done. It is, therefore, likely that this issue was not considered now and would be reviewed only in October next.

While the UK has had no problem in banning the LET and the JEM under the new Terrorism Act of 2000, the US did not do so during the last annual review in October,2000. This is due to the following reasons:

* US law-makers declare only those terrorist organisations, which are active in the territory or against the nationals/interests of more than one country, as international terrorist organisations. Other organisations are treated as domestic terrorist organisations, which do not attract the penal provisions of the US law.

* Even domestic terrorist organisations can be declared as international terrorist organisations if they operate from US territory. Both LET and JEM operate also from British, but not American territory.

Even though the HUM does not operate from US territory, it was declared an international terrorist organisation because it had targeted American nationals in Pakistan and India; and is a member of bin Laden's International Front.

To make out a strong case for a similar declaration against the LET and the JEM in October next, the Govt. of India would have to furnish to the US evidence on the following:

* The LET and the JEM are not Kashmiri terrorist organisations, but Pakistani terrorist organisations operating in Indian territory. For their operations, they use recruits from the UK who are trained in Yemen and other places.

* They have both links with the Taliban and bin Laden's International Front. Even the latest report of the State Department refers to the LET as a largely foreign (Pakistani) organisation with international networking.

Just furnishing to the State Department details of their terrorist attacks in Indian territory would not suffice.

It needs to be underlined that as in previous years, the latest report too focuses mainly on terrorism that could threaten US nationals/interests.

Comments on the Report

To understand its significance, the report has to be studied in comparison with the position on terrorism taken by Mr.George Bush (Jr) himself in his election platform and by think tanks associated with the Republican Party before the election and the report on patterns of global terrorism during 1999 issued by the Clinton Administration.

The earliest position with specific reference to Pakistan and terrorism figured in a paper on Afghanistan prepared by the conservative Heritage Foundation of Washington D.C. in July, 2000, which said: "Washington's neglect of Afghanistan's festering problems has allowed the Taliban to dominate Afghanistan and export terrorism, revolution, and opium. Through disengagement, America squandered its influence in the region and left itself with few options besides hurling cruise missiles at Osama bin Laden's easily replaceable training camps and bracing for further terrorist attacks.

"This "chuck and duck" approach is doomed to failure. Even if the United States were fortunate enough to eliminate bin Laden by military means, other Islamic radicals will continue to threaten American security and American allies from Afghan bases as long as the Taliban prevails there.

"Rather than focusing narrowly on bin Laden, the United States should focus on uprooting the Taliban regime that sustains him and others like him. Washington should develop a regional strategy to halt Pakistan's support of the Taliban, build up Afghan opposition to the Taliban, and encourage defections from its ranks. The ultimate U.S. goal should be a stable, tolerant, inclusive Afghan government that poses no threats to its neighbors or to its own ethnic and religious minorities. To accomplish this, Washington should cooperate with the broad anti-Taliban coalition that surrounds Afghanistan and help to forge a broad anti-Taliban coalition inside Afghanistan."

The paper made the following recommendations: " Specifically, the United States should: Maximize international pressure on the Taliban, including additional United Nations sanctions, to halt its support of terrorism; pressure Pakistan to end its support of the Taliban.; provide military, diplomatic, and economic support to the anti-Taliban opposition; forge a regional coalition to support the anti-Taliban opposition and support an Afghan peace settlement.; build an internal Afghan consensus for peace; designate the Taliban as a terrorist organization to set the stage for declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism if it continues to support the Taliban; provide humanitarian aid to non-Taliban areas of Afghanistan; appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan to raise the priority of Afghan policy within the U.S. government and coordinate U.S. policy with other governments; allow the Afghan opposition to reopen the Afghan embassy in Washington, which has been closed since 1997; revive bipartisan congressional activism on Afghanistan similar to the broad coalition that supported aid for the Afghans during the Cold War. "

Election Manifesto

Subsequently, in a fairly comprehensive statement on terrorism, Mr.Bush's election manifesto, finalised in August 2000, said: "America faces a new and rapidly evolving threat from terrorism and international crime. Meeting this threat requires not just new measures, but also consistent policies and determination from America's leaders.

"Many established terrorist groups faded away in the 1990s after the Cold War ended. But the decade also witnessed a series of enormously destructive attacks against America. Increasingly, terrorists seem to be motivated by amorphous religious causes or simple hatred of America rather than by specific political aims. Terrorism crosses borders easily and frequently, including U.S. borders, and cannot easily be categorized as either domestic or international.

"Republicans support a response to terrorism that is resolute but not impulsive. The most likely highly destructive terrorist attack remains a large bomb hidden in a car or truck. Yet, as with the rest of our defense posture, we must prepare for the most dangerous threats as well as the most likely ones. Therefore the United States must be extremely vigilant about the possibility that future terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction, which are increasingly available and present an unprecedented threat to America. In many instances the military will have to rethink its traditional doctrine and begin to focus on counter-terrorism, human intelligence gathering, and unconventional warfare.

"Republicans endorse the four principles of U.S. counter-terrorism policy that were laid down originally by Vice President George Bush's Commission on Combating Terrorism in 1985. First, we will make no concessions to terrorists. Giving in simply encourages future terrorist actions and debases America's power and moral authority. Second, we will isolate, pressure, and punish the state sponsors of terrorism. Third, we will bring individual terrorists to justice. Past and potential terrorists will know that America will never stop hunting them. Fourth, we will provide assistance to other governments combating terrorism. Fighting international terrorism requires international collaboration. Once again, allies matter.

"Republicans in Congress have led the way in building the domestic preparedness programs to train and equip local, state, and federal response personnel to deal with terrorist dangers in America. The administration has not offered clear leadership over these programs. They remain scattered across many agencies, uncoordinated and poorly managed. We will streamline and improve the federal coordination of the domestic emergency preparedness programs.

"We will ensure that federal law enforcement agencies have every lawful resource and authority they require to combat international organized crime. A Republican administration will work to improve international cooperation against all forms of cross-border criminality, especially the burgeoning threat of cyber-crime that threatens the vitality of American industries as diverse as aerospace and entertainment.

"Nowhere has the administration been more timid in protecting America's national interests than in cyberspace. Americans have recently glimpsed the full vulnerability of their information systems to penetration and massive disruption by amateurs. A sophisticated terrorist or adversary government could potentially cripple a critical U.S. infrastructure, such as the electrical grid or a military logistics system, in time of crisis. A new Republican government will work closely with our international partners and the private sector to conceive and implement a viable strategy for reducing America's vulnerability to the spectrum of cyber threats, from the adolescent hacker launching a contagious computer virus to the most advanced threat of strategic information warfare."

Washington Institute's Recommendations

Mrs.Christina Rocca, who has been nominated by President Bush, subject to Senate confirmation, as the new US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in place of Mr.Karl Inderfurth, was a member of a bipartisan group of Washington academics and former government officials constituted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which, in a report on West Asia submitted on January 16,2001,advised the incoming Bush Administration on terrorism as follows:

* "In recent years, state sponsorship of terrorism has become less prominent, just as the region has witnessed an increased threat from non-state actors. The new President should lend high-level encouragement to counter-terrorism cooperation among U.S. allies and friends in order to deal with threats, new and old.

* "Learn from antiterrorism success stories. These include the successes of Turkey against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Egypt against the Gama'a Islamiyya, and, to some extent, Algeria against the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armee).

* "Insulate antiterrorism efforts from peace process dynamics. Work to convince all parties in the peace process that antiterrorism efforts should be delinked from the ups-and-downs of diplomacy. In this regard, Jordan presents a positive model, whereas the record of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been uneven. When lax on counter-terrorism, the PA needs to pay a price in terms of its relationship with the United States.

* "Strengthen response to continuing challenges. Enhance efforts to promote international cooperation against violent Islamist extremist networks. Take an active role in organizing intelligence cooperation - if necessary, playing an intermediary role among countries that do not want to be seen openly sharing information. Work with European and Middle Eastern countries to apply collective pressure on the few remaining states that provide refuge or turn a blind eye to such terrorists, i.e. Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

* "Make more effective use of existing U.S. policy instruments. Follow through on official pledges to pursue terrorists for their crimes even when diplomatically inconvenient, for instance, the Khobar Towers bombing suspects in Iran. At the same time, be prepared to use military force against countries that provide safe haven to terrorists....

* "The process of determining the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism has ossified. Consider defining road maps to removal from the list, and order a policy review to seek ways to make the list more effective against governments that do little to prosecute terrorists."

Last Report of the Clinton Administration

During his visit to South Asia in March 2000, Mr.Bill Clinton was very careful in his use of expressions. In India, he condemned the acts of violence against civilians in Kashmir, but was silent on violence against the security forces.

In Pakistan, he referred to the explosions caused by bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front for Jehad Against the US and Israel in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in 1998 and to the activities of the HUM, which had kidnapped in 1995 six foreign tourists, two of them US nationals, in Kashmir under the name Al Faran, allegedly killed two other Americans in Karachi and caused the explosions near the US Embassy in Islamabad in November last, as terrorism, but to the attacks on Indian civilians in Kashmir as acts of violence.

A similar care in the use of expressions had been exercised by the State Department in its report for 1999 submitted to the Congress and by Mr. Michael Sheehan, State Department's then Special Co-ordinator on Counter-terrorism, while releasing the report to the press on April 30,2000.

However, there was an advance in the US position slightly in India's favour and to the detriment of Pakistan in that the US described all attacks on civilians, not only by the HUM, but also by other Kashmiri groups operating from Pakistan, as terrorism. The report said:

"Credible reports continued to indicate official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage terrorism, such as the HUM… Kashmiri extremist groups continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre. The groups were responsible for numerous terrorist acts in 1999 against civilian targets in India-held Kashmir and elsewhere in India." (Italics author's)

However, the report was silent on violence against the security forces and, when asked about this, Mr. Sheehan said last year: " In a war, if military forces are attacking each other, it is not terrorism. But if an armed terrorist organisation attacks civilian targets, that is terrorism."

While referring to the shifting of the locus of terrorism from the Middle East to South Asia during 1999, last year's report used the expression "the locus of terrorism directed against the US." (Italics author's)

Last year's report described in detail in the following words to the Congress the demarche made by the US to Pakistan regarding Afghanistan-based terrorists, including bin Laden and his mercenaries, threatening the US:" The US repeatedly has asked Islamabad to end support to elements that conduct terrorist training in Afghanistan, to interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistic support to camps in Afghanistan. In addition, the US has urged Islamabad to close certain madrasas or religious schools, that actually serve as conduits for terrorism."

But significantly, it was silent on any demarche made by it with Islamabad regarding action against Pakistan-based terrorists operating against India. It merely said: "Pakistani officials from both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Government and, after his removal by the military, Gen.Pervez Musharraf's regime publicly stated that Pakistan provided diplomatic, political and moral support for "freedom fighters" in Kashmir--including the terrorist group HUM--but denied providing the militants training or material."

Report for 2000

The salient points in the report for 2000 released by the Bush Administration are as follows:

* "In 2000, South Asia remained a focal point for terrorism directed against the United States, further confirming the trend of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to South Asia. The Taliban continued to provide safehaven for international terrorists, particularly Usama Bin Ladin and his network, in the portions of Afghanistan it controlled.

* "The Government of Pakistan increased its support to the Taliban and continued its support to militant groups active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), some of which engaged in terrorism.

* "Islamic extremists from around the world--including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia--continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their worldwide terrorist activities in 2000. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory, permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistics support to members of various terrorist organizations and mujahidin, including those waging jihads (holy wars) in Central Asia, Chechnya, and Kashmir.

* "Throughout 2000 the Taliban continued to host Usama Bin Ladin despite UN sanctions and international pressure to hand him over to stand trial in the United States or a third country. In a serious and ongoing dialogue with the Taliban, the United States repeatedly made clear to the Taliban that it would be held responsible for any terrorist attacks undertaken by Bin Ladin while he is in its territory.

* "In October, a terrorist bomb attack against the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen, killed 17 US sailors and injured scores of others. Although no definitive link has been made to Bin Ladin's organization, Yemeni authorities have determined that some suspects in custody and at large are veterans of Afghan training camps.

* "In August, Bangladeshi authorities uncovered a bomb plot to assassinate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at a public rally. Bangladeshi police maintained that Islamic terrorists trained in Afghanistan planted the bomb.

* "Massacres of civilians in Kashmir during March and August were attributed to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and other militant groups.

* "The Indian Government continued cooperative efforts with the United States against terrorism. During the year, the US-India Joint Counter-terrorism Working Group--founded in November 1999--met twice and agreed to increased cooperation on mutual counter-terrorism interests. New Delhi continued to cooperate with US officials to ascertain the fate of four Western hostages--including one US citizen--kidnapped in Indian-held Kashmir in 1995, although the hostages' whereabouts remained unknown.

* "Pakistan's military government, headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, continued previous Pakistani Government support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri militant groups continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre. Several of these groups were responsible for attacks against civilians in Indian-held Kashmir, and the largest of the groups, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, claimed responsibility for a suicide car-bomb attack against an Indian garrison in Srinagar in April.

* "In addition, the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, continues to be active in Pakistan without discouragement by the Government of Pakistan. Members of the group were associated with the hijacking in December 1999 of an Air India flight that resulted in the release from an Indian jail of former HUM leader Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar since has founded his own Kashmiri militant group,Jaish-e-Mohammed, and publicly has threatened the United States.

* "The United States remains concerned about reports of continued Pakistani support for the Taliban's military operations in Afghanistan. Credible reporting indicates that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisers. Pakistan has not prevented large numbers of Pakistani nationals from moving into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. Islamabad also failed to take effective steps to curb the activities of certain madrassas, or religious schools, that serve as recruiting grounds for terrorism. Pakistan publicly and privately said it intends to comply fully with UNSCR 1333, which imposes an arms embargo on the Taliban.

* "The attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in October prompted fears of US retaliatory strikes against Bin Ladin's organization and targets in Afghanistan if the investigation pointed in that direction. Pakistani religious party leaders and militant groups threatened US citizens and facilities if such an action were to occur, much as they did after the US attacks on training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998 and following the US diplomatic intervention in the Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India in 1999. The Government of Pakistan generally has cooperated with US requests to enhance security for US facilities and personnel.

* "The designation of state sponsors of terrorism by the United States--and the imposition of sanctions--is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism as a means of political expression. US policy seeks to pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes. The United States is committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them accountable for past attacks, regardless of when the acts occurred.

* "The US Government has a long memory and will not simply expunge a terrorist's record because time has passed. The states that choose to harbor terrorists are like accomplices who provide shelter for criminals. They will be held accountable for their "guests'" actions. International terrorists should know, before they contemplate a crime, that they cannot hunker down in safehaven for a period of time and be absolved of their crimes.

* "The United States is firmly committed to removing countries from the list once they have taken necessary steps to end their link to terrorism. In fact, the Department of State is engaged in ongoing discussions with North Korea and Sudan with the object of getting those governments completely out of the terrorism business and off the terrorism list. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan continue to be the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism.

* "State sponsorship has decreased over the past several decades. As it decreases, it becomes increasingly important for all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance" for terrorist activity within their borders. Terrorists will seek safehaven in those areas where they are able to avoid the rule of law and to travel, prepare, raise funds, and operate. The United States continued actively researching and gathering intelligence on other states that will be considered for designation as state sponsors. If the United States deems a country to "repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism," the US Government is required by law to add it to the list. In South Asia, the United States has been increasingly concerned about reports of Pakistani support to terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir, as well as Pakistani support, especially military support, to the Taliban, which continues to harbor terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

* "We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere. "

Details of HUM,JEM & LET

The report gives the following details of the HUM, the JEM and the LET: 

THE HUM

Description

"Formerly known as the Harakat al-Ansar, the HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. Long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. Continued to operate terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan.

Activities

"Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. The new millennium brought significant developments for Pakistani militant groups, particularly the HUM. Most of these sprang from the hijacking of an Indian airliner on 24 December by militants believed to be associated with the HUM. The hijackers negotiated the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar imprisoned by the Indians in 1994. Azhar did not, however, return to the HUM, choosing instead to form the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a rival militant group expressing a more radical line than the HUM.

Strength

"Has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost some of its membership in defections to the JEM.

Location/Area of Operation

"Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

External Aid

"Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The sources and amount of HUM's military funding are unknown."

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)

Description

"The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is an Islamist group based in Pakistan that has rapidly expanded in size and capability since Maulana Masood Azhar, a former ultrafundamentalist Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) leader, announced its formation in February. The group's aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. It is politically aligned with the radical, pro-Taliban, political party, Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam (JUI-F).

Activities

"The JEM's leader, Masood Azhar, was released from Indian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages in Afghanistan. The 1994 HUA kidnappings of US and British nationals in New Delhi and the July 1995 HUA/Al Faran kidnappings of Westerners in Kashmir were two of several previous HUA efforts to free Azhar. Azhar organized large rallies and recruitment drives across Pakistan throughout 2000. In July, a JEM rocket-grenade attack failed to injure the Chief Minister at his office in Srinagar, India, but wounded four other persons. In December, JEM militants launched grenade attacks at a bus stop in Kupwara, India, injuring 24 persons, and at a marketplace in Chadoura, India, injuring 16 persons. JEM militants also planted two bombs that killed 21 persons in Qamarwari and Srinagar.

Strength

"Has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Following Maulana Masood Azhar's release from detention in India, a reported three quarters of Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM) members defected to the new organization, which has managed to attract a large number of urban Kashmiri youth. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.

Location/Area of Operation

"Based in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, but members conduct terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The JEM maintains training camps in Afghanistan.

External Aid

"Most of the JEM's cadre and material resources have been drawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM). The JEM has close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama Bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM."

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)

Description

"The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)--a Sunni anti-US missionary organization formed in 1989. One of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India, it is not connected to a political party. The LT leader is MDI chief, Professor Hafiz Mohammed Saeed.

Activities

"Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993. The LT is suspected of eight separate attacks in August that killed nearly 100, mostly Hindu Indians. LT militants are suspected of kidnapping six persons in Akhala, India, in November 2000 and killing five of them. The group also operates a chain of religious schools in the Punjab.

Strength

"Has several hundred members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Almost all LT cadres are foreigners--mostly Pakistanis from seminaries across the country and Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. Uses assault rifles, light and heavy machineguns, mortars, explosives, and rocket propelled grenades.

Location/Area of Operation

"Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad. The LT trains its militants in mobile training camps across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.

External Aid

"Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. The amount of LT funding is unknown. The LT maintains ties to religious/military groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya through the MDI fraternal network."

WMD and Cyber Terrorism 

The report comments as follows on WMD and Cyber terrorism:

"Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction (WMD) Terrorism. At the dawn of a new millennium, the possibility of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN), or large explosive weapons--remained real. As of the end of 2000, however, the most notorious attack involving chemical weapons against a civilian target remained Aum Shinrikyo's sarin nerve agent attack against the Tokyo subway in March 1995.

"Most terrorists continued to rely on conventional tactics, such as bombing, shooting, and kidnapping, but some terrorists--such as Usama Bin Ladin and his associates--continued to seek CBRN capabilities.

"Popular literature and the public dialog focused on the vulnerability of civilian targets to CBRN attacks. Such attacks could cause lasting disruption and generate significant psychological impact on a population and its infrastructure.

"A few groups, notably those driven by distorted religious and cultural ideologies, showed signs they were willing to cause large numbers of casualties. Other potentially dangerous but less predictable groups had emerged, and those groups may not abide by traditional targeting constraints that would prohibit using indiscriminate violence or CBRN weapons.

"Some CBRN materials, technology, and especially information continued to be widely available, particularly from commercial sources and the Internet. "

Terrorist Use of Information Technology

"Terrorists have seized upon the worldwide practice of using information technology (IT) in daily life. They embrace IT for several reasons: it improves communication and aids organization, allows members to coordinate quickly with large numbers of followers, and provides a platform for propaganda. The Internet also allows terrorists to reach a wide audience of potential donors and recruits who may be located over a large geographic area.

"In addition, terrorists are taking note of the proliferation of hacking and the use of the computer as a weapon. Extremists routinely post messages to widely accessible Web sites that call for defacing Western Internet sites and disrupting online service, for example. The widespread availability of hacking software and its anonymous and increasingly automated design make it likely that terrorists will more frequently incorporate these tools into their online activity. The appeal of such tools may increase as news media continue to sensationalize hacking. " 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

 

 

Back to the top

Home  | New  | Papers  | Notes  | Archives  | Search  | Feedback  | Links

Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group 
All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name  are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.