USA, PAKISTAN & TERRORISM
by B.Raman
An Overview
The report on the patterns of global terrorism during
the year 2000, released by Gen.Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, at
Washington on April 30, was initially drafted by the officials of the
outgoing Clinton Administration, but revised and finalised by the
officials of the new Bush Administration and hence is the first important
indicator of the Bush Administration's counter-terrorism policy.
It may be recalled that the first report of the Clinton
Administration, released in April, 1993, had seen a toning down of the
recommendation made by the preceding Bush (Sr) Administration officials,
in their draft of December,1992, for declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of
international terrorism. Instead, the Clinton Administration put Pakistan
in a so-called watch list of suspected State-sponsors of international
terrorism and deleted it in July, 1993.
The report for 2000 of the new Bush Administration
refers to the role of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Taliban, the
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in much greater detail than any past reports of the
previous US Administrations. Though it has not declared Pakistan a
state-sponsor of international terrorism, it discusses the role of
Pakistan not only in the chapter on terrorism in South Asia, as was done
in the past reports, but also in the chapter on state-sponsored terrorism.
Previous US Administrations had considered only
premeditated attacks on civilians as acts of terrorism, but not attacks on
security forces. The latest report explains the circumstances under which
the US would consider even attacks on security forces as terrorism.
The latest US report specifies that the HUM is a member
of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US
and Israel and had signed his fatwa of February, 1998, calling for attacks
against US and Israeli nationals/interests. Such a specific finding was
not there in past reports.
The report has two Annexures--one on terrorist
organisations, which have already been declared as international (foreign)
terrorist organisations by the US and the other on terrorist organisations,
which were active in 2000, but against which evidence was not adequate to
warrant such a declaration. The HUM figures in the first list and the JEM
and the LET in the second.
The Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Department
submits two reports to the Congress every year-- one in October on
organisations, which need to be declared international terrorist
organisations and the other in April on States, which need to be declared
State-sponsors of international terrorism.
Though there is nothing to prevent the State Department
from declaring an organisation as an international terrorist organisation
even in April, generally this is not done. It is, therefore, likely that
this issue was not considered now and would be reviewed only in October
next.
While the UK has had no problem in banning the LET and
the JEM under the new Terrorism Act of 2000, the US did not do so during
the last annual review in October,2000. This is due to the following
reasons:
* US law-makers declare only those terrorist
organisations, which are active in the territory or against the
nationals/interests of more than one country, as international terrorist
organisations. Other organisations are treated as domestic terrorist
organisations, which do not attract the penal provisions of the US law.
* Even domestic terrorist organisations can be
declared as international terrorist organisations if they operate from
US territory. Both LET and JEM operate also from British, but not
American territory.
Even though the HUM does not operate from US territory,
it was declared an international terrorist organisation because it had
targeted American nationals in Pakistan and India; and is a member of bin
Laden's International Front.
To make out a strong case for a similar declaration
against the LET and the JEM in October next, the Govt. of India would have
to furnish to the US evidence on the following:
* The LET and the JEM are not Kashmiri terrorist
organisations, but Pakistani terrorist organisations operating in Indian
territory. For their operations, they use recruits from the UK who are
trained in Yemen and other places.
* They have both links with the Taliban and bin
Laden's International Front. Even the latest report of the State
Department refers to the LET as a largely foreign (Pakistani)
organisation with international networking.
Just furnishing to the State Department details of their
terrorist attacks in Indian territory would not suffice.
It needs to be underlined that as in previous years, the
latest report too focuses mainly on terrorism that could threaten US
nationals/interests.
Comments on the Report
To understand its significance, the report has to be
studied in comparison with the position on terrorism taken by Mr.George
Bush (Jr) himself in his election platform and by think tanks associated
with the Republican Party before the election and the report on patterns
of global terrorism during 1999 issued by the Clinton Administration.
The earliest position with specific reference to
Pakistan and terrorism figured in a paper on Afghanistan prepared by the
conservative Heritage Foundation of Washington D.C. in July, 2000, which
said: "Washington's neglect of Afghanistan's festering problems has
allowed the Taliban to dominate Afghanistan and export terrorism,
revolution, and opium. Through disengagement, America squandered its
influence in the region and left itself with few options besides hurling
cruise missiles at Osama bin Laden's easily replaceable training camps and
bracing for further terrorist attacks.
"This "chuck and duck" approach is doomed
to failure. Even if the United States were fortunate enough to eliminate
bin Laden by military means, other Islamic radicals will continue to
threaten American security and American allies from Afghan bases as long
as the Taliban prevails there.
"Rather than focusing narrowly on bin Laden, the
United States should focus on uprooting the Taliban regime that sustains
him and others like him. Washington should develop a regional strategy to
halt Pakistan's support of the Taliban, build up Afghan opposition to the
Taliban, and encourage defections from its ranks. The ultimate U.S. goal
should be a stable, tolerant, inclusive Afghan government that poses no
threats to its neighbors or to its own ethnic and religious minorities. To
accomplish this, Washington should cooperate with the broad anti-Taliban
coalition that surrounds Afghanistan and help to forge a broad anti-Taliban
coalition inside Afghanistan."
The paper made the following recommendations: "
Specifically, the United States should: Maximize international pressure on
the Taliban, including additional United Nations sanctions, to halt its
support of terrorism; pressure Pakistan to end its support of the Taliban.;
provide military, diplomatic, and economic support to the anti-Taliban
opposition; forge a regional coalition to support the anti-Taliban
opposition and support an Afghan peace settlement.; build an internal
Afghan consensus for peace; designate the Taliban as a terrorist
organization to set the stage for declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of
terrorism if it continues to support the Taliban; provide humanitarian aid
to non-Taliban areas of Afghanistan; appoint a special envoy for
Afghanistan to raise the priority of Afghan policy within the U.S.
government and coordinate U.S. policy with other governments; allow the
Afghan opposition to reopen the Afghan embassy in Washington, which has
been closed since 1997; revive bipartisan congressional activism on
Afghanistan similar to the broad coalition that supported aid for the
Afghans during the Cold War. "
Election Manifesto
Subsequently, in a fairly comprehensive statement on
terrorism, Mr.Bush's election manifesto, finalised in August 2000, said:
"America faces a new and rapidly evolving threat from terrorism and
international crime. Meeting this threat requires not just new measures,
but also consistent policies and determination from America's leaders.
"Many established terrorist groups faded away in
the 1990s after the Cold War ended. But the decade also witnessed a series
of enormously destructive attacks against America. Increasingly,
terrorists seem to be motivated by amorphous religious causes or simple
hatred of America rather than by specific political aims. Terrorism
crosses borders easily and frequently, including U.S. borders, and cannot
easily be categorized as either domestic or international.
"Republicans support a response to terrorism that
is resolute but not impulsive. The most likely highly destructive
terrorist attack remains a large bomb hidden in a car or truck. Yet, as
with the rest of our defense posture, we must prepare for the most
dangerous threats as well as the most likely ones. Therefore the United
States must be extremely vigilant about the possibility that future
terrorists might use weapons of mass destruction, which are increasingly
available and present an unprecedented threat to America. In many
instances the military will have to rethink its traditional doctrine and
begin to focus on counter-terrorism, human intelligence gathering, and
unconventional warfare.
"Republicans endorse the four principles of U.S.
counter-terrorism policy that were laid down originally by Vice President
George Bush's Commission on Combating Terrorism in 1985. First, we will
make no concessions to terrorists. Giving in simply encourages future
terrorist actions and debases America's power and moral authority. Second,
we will isolate, pressure, and punish the state sponsors of terrorism.
Third, we will bring individual terrorists to justice. Past and potential
terrorists will know that America will never stop hunting them. Fourth, we
will provide assistance to other governments combating terrorism. Fighting
international terrorism requires international collaboration. Once again,
allies matter.
"Republicans in Congress have led the way in
building the domestic preparedness programs to train and equip local,
state, and federal response personnel to deal with terrorist dangers in
America. The administration has not offered clear leadership over these
programs. They remain scattered across many agencies, uncoordinated and
poorly managed. We will streamline and improve the federal coordination of
the domestic emergency preparedness programs.
"We will ensure that federal law enforcement
agencies have every lawful resource and authority they require to combat
international organized crime. A Republican administration will work to
improve international cooperation against all forms of cross-border
criminality, especially the burgeoning threat of cyber-crime that
threatens the vitality of American industries as diverse as aerospace and
entertainment.
"Nowhere has the administration been more timid in
protecting America's national interests than in cyberspace. Americans have
recently glimpsed the full vulnerability of their information systems to
penetration and massive disruption by amateurs. A sophisticated terrorist
or adversary government could potentially cripple a critical U.S.
infrastructure, such as the electrical grid or a military logistics
system, in time of crisis. A new Republican government will work closely
with our international partners and the private sector to conceive and
implement a viable strategy for reducing America's vulnerability to the
spectrum of cyber threats, from the adolescent hacker launching a
contagious computer virus to the most advanced threat of strategic
information warfare."
Washington Institute's Recommendations
Mrs.Christina Rocca, who has been nominated by President
Bush, subject to Senate confirmation, as the new US Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asia in place of Mr.Karl Inderfurth, was a member of a
bipartisan group of Washington academics and former government officials
constituted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which, in a
report on West Asia submitted on January 16,2001,advised the incoming Bush
Administration on terrorism as follows:
* "In recent years, state sponsorship of terrorism
has become less prominent, just as the region has witnessed an increased
threat from non-state actors. The new President should lend high-level
encouragement to counter-terrorism cooperation among U.S. allies and
friends in order to deal with threats, new and old.
* "Learn from antiterrorism success stories.
These include the successes of Turkey against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers
Party), Egypt against the Gama'a Islamiyya, and, to some extent, Algeria
against the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armee).
* "Insulate antiterrorism efforts from peace
process dynamics. Work to convince all parties in the peace process that
antiterrorism efforts should be delinked from the ups-and-downs of
diplomacy. In this regard, Jordan presents a positive model, whereas the
record of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been uneven. When lax on
counter-terrorism, the PA needs to pay a price in terms of its
relationship with the United States.
* "Strengthen response to continuing challenges.
Enhance efforts to promote international cooperation against violent
Islamist extremist networks. Take an active role in organizing
intelligence cooperation - if necessary, playing an intermediary role
among countries that do not want to be seen openly sharing information.
Work with European and Middle Eastern countries to apply collective
pressure on the few remaining states that provide refuge or turn a blind
eye to such terrorists, i.e. Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, and the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
* "Make more effective use of existing U.S.
policy instruments. Follow through on official pledges to pursue
terrorists for their crimes even when diplomatically inconvenient, for
instance, the Khobar Towers bombing suspects in Iran. At the same time,
be prepared to use military force against countries that provide safe
haven to terrorists....
* "The process of determining the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism has ossified. Consider
defining road maps to removal from the list, and order a policy review
to seek ways to make the list more effective against governments that do
little to prosecute terrorists."
Last Report of the Clinton Administration
During his visit to South Asia in March 2000, Mr.Bill
Clinton was very careful in his use of expressions. In India, he condemned
the acts of violence against civilians in Kashmir, but was silent on
violence against the security forces.
In Pakistan, he referred to the explosions caused by bin
Laden's Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front for Jehad Against the
US and Israel in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salaam in 1998 and to the activities
of the HUM, which had kidnapped in 1995 six foreign tourists, two of them
US nationals, in Kashmir under the name Al Faran, allegedly killed two
other Americans in Karachi and caused the explosions near the US Embassy
in Islamabad in November last, as terrorism, but to the attacks on Indian
civilians in Kashmir as acts of violence.
A similar care in the use of expressions had been
exercised by the State Department in its report for 1999 submitted to the
Congress and by Mr. Michael Sheehan, State Department's then Special Co-ordinator
on Counter-terrorism, while releasing the report to the press on April
30,2000.
However, there was an advance in the US position
slightly in India's favour and to the detriment of Pakistan in that the US
described all attacks on civilians, not only by the HUM, but also by other
Kashmiri groups operating from Pakistan, as terrorism. The report said:
"Credible reports continued to indicate official
Pakistani support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage terrorism, such
as the HUM… Kashmiri extremist groups continued to operate in Pakistan,
raising funds and recruiting new cadre. The groups were responsible for
numerous terrorist acts in 1999 against civilian targets in India-held
Kashmir and elsewhere in India." (Italics author's)
However, the report was silent on violence against the
security forces and, when asked about this, Mr. Sheehan said last year:
" In a war, if military forces are attacking each other, it is not
terrorism. But if an armed terrorist organisation attacks civilian
targets, that is terrorism."
While referring to the shifting of the locus of
terrorism from the Middle East to South Asia during 1999, last year's
report used the expression "the locus of terrorism directed
against the US." (Italics author's)
Last year's report described in detail in the following
words to the Congress the demarche made by the US to Pakistan regarding
Afghanistan-based terrorists, including bin Laden and his mercenaries,
threatening the US:" The US repeatedly has asked Islamabad to end
support to elements that conduct terrorist training in Afghanistan, to
interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent
militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistic
support to camps in Afghanistan. In addition, the US has urged Islamabad
to close certain madrasas or religious schools, that actually serve as
conduits for terrorism."
But significantly, it was silent on any demarche made by
it with Islamabad regarding action against Pakistan-based terrorists
operating against India. It merely said: "Pakistani officials from
both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Government and, after his removal by
the military, Gen.Pervez Musharraf's regime publicly stated that Pakistan
provided diplomatic, political and moral support for "freedom
fighters" in Kashmir--including the terrorist group HUM--but denied
providing the militants training or material."
Report for 2000
The salient points in the report for 2000 released by
the Bush Administration are as follows:
* "In 2000, South Asia remained a focal point for
terrorism directed against the United States, further confirming the
trend of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to South Asia. The
Taliban continued to provide safehaven for international terrorists,
particularly Usama Bin Ladin and his network, in the portions of
Afghanistan it controlled.
* "The Government of Pakistan increased its
support to the Taliban and continued its support to militant groups
active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM),
some of which engaged in terrorism.
* "Islamic extremists from around the
world--including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and
Central, South, and Southeast Asia--continued to use Afghanistan as a
training ground and base of operations for their worldwide terrorist
activities in 2000. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory,
permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for
non-Afghans and provided logistics support to members of various
terrorist organizations and mujahidin, including those waging jihads
(holy wars) in Central Asia, Chechnya, and Kashmir.
* "Throughout 2000 the Taliban continued to host
Usama Bin Ladin despite UN sanctions and international pressure to hand
him over to stand trial in the United States or a third country. In a
serious and ongoing dialogue with the Taliban, the United States
repeatedly made clear to the Taliban that it would be held responsible
for any terrorist attacks undertaken by Bin Ladin while he is in its
territory.
* "In October, a terrorist bomb attack against
the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen, killed 17 US sailors and injured
scores of others. Although no definitive link has been made to Bin
Ladin's organization, Yemeni authorities have determined that some
suspects in custody and at large are veterans of Afghan training camps.
* "In August, Bangladeshi authorities uncovered a
bomb plot to assassinate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at a public rally.
Bangladeshi police maintained that Islamic terrorists trained in
Afghanistan planted the bomb.
* "Massacres of civilians in Kashmir during March
and August were attributed to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and other militant
groups.
* "The Indian Government continued cooperative
efforts with the United States against terrorism. During the year, the
US-India Joint Counter-terrorism Working Group--founded in November
1999--met twice and agreed to increased cooperation on mutual
counter-terrorism interests. New Delhi continued to cooperate with US
officials to ascertain the fate of four Western hostages--including one
US citizen--kidnapped in Indian-held Kashmir in 1995, although the
hostages' whereabouts remained unknown.
* "Pakistan's military government, headed by Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, continued previous Pakistani Government support of the
Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri militant groups continued to operate in
Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre. Several of these
groups were responsible for attacks against civilians in Indian-held
Kashmir, and the largest of the groups, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, claimed
responsibility for a suicide car-bomb attack against an Indian garrison
in Srinagar in April.
* "In addition, the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), a
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, continues to be active in
Pakistan without discouragement by the Government of Pakistan. Members
of the group were associated with the hijacking in December 1999 of an
Air India flight that resulted in the release from an Indian jail of
former HUM leader Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar since has founded his own
Kashmiri militant group,Jaish-e-Mohammed, and publicly has threatened
the United States.
* "The United States remains concerned about
reports of continued Pakistani support for the Taliban's military
operations in Afghanistan. Credible reporting indicates that Pakistan is
providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical
assistance, and military advisers. Pakistan has not prevented large
numbers of Pakistani nationals from moving into Afghanistan to fight for
the Taliban. Islamabad also failed to take effective steps to curb the
activities of certain madrassas, or religious schools, that serve as
recruiting grounds for terrorism. Pakistan publicly and privately said
it intends to comply fully with UNSCR 1333, which imposes an arms
embargo on the Taliban.
* "The attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in October
prompted fears of US retaliatory strikes against Bin Ladin's
organization and targets in Afghanistan if the investigation pointed in
that direction. Pakistani religious party leaders and militant groups
threatened US citizens and facilities if such an action were to occur,
much as they did after the US attacks on training camps in Afghanistan
in August 1998 and following the US diplomatic intervention in the
Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India in 1999. The Government of
Pakistan generally has cooperated with US requests to enhance security
for US facilities and personnel.
* "The designation of state sponsors of terrorism
by the United States--and the imposition of sanctions--is a mechanism
for isolating nations that use terrorism as a means of political
expression. US policy seeks to pressure and isolate state sponsors so
they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and
bring terrorists to justice for past crimes. The United States is
committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them accountable
for past attacks, regardless of when the acts occurred.
* "The US Government has a long memory and will
not simply expunge a terrorist's record because time has passed. The
states that choose to harbor terrorists are like accomplices who provide
shelter for criminals. They will be held accountable for their
"guests'" actions. International terrorists should know,
before they contemplate a crime, that they cannot hunker down in
safehaven for a period of time and be absolved of their crimes.
* "The United States is firmly committed to
removing countries from the list once they have taken necessary steps to
end their link to terrorism. In fact, the Department of State is engaged
in ongoing discussions with North Korea and Sudan with the object of
getting those governments completely out of the terrorism business and
off the terrorism list. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and
Sudan continue to be the seven governments that the US Secretary of
State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism.
* "State sponsorship has decreased over the past
several decades. As it decreases, it becomes increasingly important for
all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance" for terrorist
activity within their borders. Terrorists will seek safehaven in those
areas where they are able to avoid the rule of law and to travel,
prepare, raise funds, and operate. The United States continued actively
researching and gathering intelligence on other states that will be
considered for designation as state sponsors. If the United States deems
a country to "repeatedly provide support for acts of international
terrorism," the US Government is required by law to add it to the
list. In South Asia, the United States has been increasingly concerned
about reports of Pakistani support to terrorist groups and elements
active in Kashmir, as well as Pakistani support, especially military
support, to the Taliban, which continues to harbor terrorist groups,
including al-Qaida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya,
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
* "We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks
on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of
military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings
against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere. "
Details of HUM,JEM & LET
The report gives the following details of the HUM, the
JEM and the LET:
THE HUM
Description
"Formerly known as the Harakat al-Ansar, the HUM is
an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in
Kashmir. Long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in
mid-February stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the
popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri.
Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February
1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position
of HUM Secretary General. Continued to operate terrorist training camps in
eastern Afghanistan.
Activities
"Has conducted a number of operations against
Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri
militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in
July 1995; one was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly
were killed in December of the same year. The new millennium brought
significant developments for Pakistani militant groups, particularly the
HUM. Most of these sprang from the hijacking of an Indian airliner on 24
December by militants believed to be associated with the HUM. The
hijackers negotiated the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in
the former Harakat ul-Ansar imprisoned by the Indians in 1994. Azhar did
not, however, return to the HUM, choosing instead to form the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JEM), a rival militant group expressing a more radical line than the HUM.
Strength
"Has several thousand armed supporters located in
Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions.
Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans
and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns,
assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost some of its
membership in defections to the JEM.
Location/Area of Operation
"Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several
other towns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but members conduct insurgent and
terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
External Aid
"Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The sources and
amount of HUM's military funding are unknown."
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
Description
"The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is an Islamist group
based in Pakistan that has rapidly expanded in size and capability since
Maulana Masood Azhar, a former ultrafundamentalist Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
leader, announced its formation in February. The group's aim is to unite
Kashmir with Pakistan. It is politically aligned with the radical, pro-Taliban,
political party, Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam (JUI-F).
Activities
"The JEM's leader, Masood Azhar, was released from
Indian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian
Airlines hostages in Afghanistan. The 1994 HUA kidnappings of US and
British nationals in New Delhi and the July 1995 HUA/Al Faran kidnappings
of Westerners in Kashmir were two of several previous HUA efforts to free
Azhar. Azhar organized large rallies and recruitment drives across
Pakistan throughout 2000. In July, a JEM rocket-grenade attack failed to
injure the Chief Minister at his office in Srinagar, India, but wounded
four other persons. In December, JEM militants launched grenade attacks at
a bus stop in Kupwara, India, injuring 24 persons, and at a marketplace in
Chadoura, India, injuring 16 persons. JEM militants also planted two bombs
that killed 21 persons in Qamarwari and Srinagar.
Strength
"Has several hundred armed supporters located in
Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions.
Following Maulana Masood Azhar's release from detention in India, a
reported three quarters of Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM) members defected to
the new organization, which has managed to attract a large number of urban
Kashmiri youth. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also
include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy
machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and
rocket grenades.
Location/Area of Operation
"Based in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, but members
conduct terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. The JEM maintains
training camps in Afghanistan.
External Aid
"Most of the JEM's cadre and material resources
have been drawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI)
and the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM). The JEM has close ties to Afghan Arabs
and the Taliban. Usama Bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM."
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
Description
"The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based
religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI)--a Sunni anti-US
missionary organization formed in 1989. One of the three largest and
best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India, it is not connected
to a political party. The LT leader is MDI chief, Professor Hafiz Mohammed
Saeed.
Activities
"Has conducted a number of operations against
Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993. The LT is
suspected of eight separate attacks in August that killed nearly 100,
mostly Hindu Indians. LT militants are suspected of kidnapping six persons
in Akhala, India, in November 2000 and killing five of them. The group
also operates a chain of religious schools in the Punjab.
Strength
"Has several hundred members in Azad Kashmir,
Pakistan, and in India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Almost all LT
cadres are foreigners--mostly Pakistanis from seminaries across the
country and Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. Uses assault rifles, light
and heavy machineguns, mortars, explosives, and rocket propelled grenades.
Location/Area of Operation
"Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.
The LT trains its militants in mobile training camps across
Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.
External Aid
"Collects donations from the Pakistani community in
the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and
Kashmiri businessmen. The amount of LT funding is unknown. The LT
maintains ties to religious/military groups around the world, ranging from
the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya through the MDI fraternal
network."
WMD and Cyber Terrorism
The report comments as follows on WMD and Cyber
terrorism:
"Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction (WMD) Terrorism. At
the dawn of a new millennium, the possibility of a terrorist attack
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear (CBRN), or large explosive weapons--remained real.
As of the end of 2000, however, the most notorious attack involving
chemical weapons against a civilian target remained Aum Shinrikyo's sarin
nerve agent attack against the Tokyo subway in March 1995.
"Most terrorists continued to rely on conventional
tactics, such as bombing, shooting, and kidnapping, but some
terrorists--such as Usama Bin Ladin and his associates--continued to seek
CBRN capabilities.
"Popular literature and the public dialog focused
on the vulnerability of civilian targets to CBRN attacks. Such attacks
could cause lasting disruption and generate significant psychological
impact on a population and its infrastructure.
"A few groups, notably those driven by distorted
religious and cultural ideologies, showed signs they were willing to cause
large numbers of casualties. Other potentially dangerous but less
predictable groups had emerged, and those groups may not abide by
traditional targeting constraints that would prohibit using indiscriminate
violence or CBRN weapons.
"Some CBRN materials, technology, and especially
information continued to be widely available, particularly from commercial
sources and the Internet. "
Terrorist Use of Information Technology
"Terrorists have seized upon the worldwide practice
of using information technology (IT) in daily life. They embrace IT for
several reasons: it improves communication and aids organization, allows
members to coordinate quickly with large numbers of followers, and
provides a platform for propaganda. The Internet also allows terrorists to
reach a wide audience of potential donors and recruits who may be located
over a large geographic area.
"In addition, terrorists are taking note of the
proliferation of hacking and the use of the computer as a weapon.
Extremists routinely post messages to widely accessible Web sites that
call for defacing Western Internet sites and disrupting online service,
for example. The widespread availability of hacking software and its
anonymous and increasingly automated design make it likely that terrorists
will more frequently incorporate these tools into their online activity.
The appeal of such tools may increase as news media continue to
sensationalize hacking. "
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)