South Asia Analysis Group 


Paper no. 242

18. 05. 2001

  

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NMD-TMD: RIGHT QUESTION, WRONG ANSWER

by B.Raman

Executive Assessment

Not only to the rest of the world, but even to many in the US, the over-enthusiasm of the US Administration for the National Missile Defence (NMD) and the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) project is a mystery.  What is it due to?

The political debt owed by the Conservative Congressmen and by the present Bush administration to the military-industrial complex, which was a major contributor to their election funds? This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that whereas the NMD/TMD project as contemplated by the Clinton Administration would have pumped into the military-industrial complex orders worth US $ 30 to 60 billion, the project as modified by the present Bush Administration would reportedly bring the complex orders worth US $ 200 billion in the next 10 years.

Threats to the security of the USA, its allies and its troops abroad, particularly in Asia, from the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities of the so-called rogue States (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) and non- State actors such as the Pakistan and Afghanistan-based Islamic terrorist groups? Likely threats from the rogue States (not including Pakistan) are cited by the Bush Administration as the main motivating factor for its decision, but this reason is not taken seriously by the rest of the world.  Even the Israeli intelligence does not believe that Libya and Iraq have or are likely to have in the near or distant future a WMD and long-range missile capability.  North Korea has a long-range missile capability and Iran may have one in the near future, but would they be so foolish as to use it against the US or Israel and invite massive retaliation? Not many think so.

Even Israel, which closely monitors WMD and missile developments in its neighbourhood, does not believe that an expensive and questionably effective missile defence is the answer to such threats.  In its view, the only effective answer is to destroy their capability on the ground even before they could complete it as it did to Iraq's Osirak reactor instead of waiting till they acquire the capability and countering it through a missile defence.

Israel is more worried over the possibility of the Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) coming to power one day and having their finger on the nuclear/missile button in Pakistan and developing this capability in the CARs.  So is Russia worried not only over the CARs, but also Chechnya and Dagestan.  Both Israel and Russia believe that the answer to this is not a mega missile defence project announced from the roof-top and developed and deployed in full public knowledge.  For them, the effective answer is an accurate intelligence collection capability and a clandestine capability to neutralise the threat on the ground before it materialises.

Even if the USA's fears of threats from rogue States and non-State actors is valid, is this the way to go about it as the Administration is doing? As pointed out by many US scientists, the rogue States would have by now shifted their attention to developing alternate means of reaching the WMD to their targets instead of using a missile and, even if they still intended using their missiles, they would have developed counter-measures (decoys etc) to make the NMD/TMD ineffective.  Such alternate means and counter-measures are available.  The technology involved is not as sophisticated and not as expensive as the technology to be used in the NMD/TMD and, hence, affordable for them..

Or is the desire to contain China the real reason for the NMD/TMD, as many assert? A careful reading of the plethora of pronouncements emanating from Mr.Bush and his advisers during the last 18 months or so would indicate the outlines of a political and economic engagement and strategic containment policy.  The political and economic engagement to be direct and the strategic containment to be through surrogates.  Japan and India figure in their thoughts as likely surrogates.

Japan, like Israel, is already secretly collaborating with the US in the research and development of the new defence technologies.  The Bush team would like Japan to play a more active role in the containment of China, but is, at the same time, concerned over the spectre of a militarily legitimised and re-energised Japan one day assuming an adversarial role vis-à-vis the US and adding to the threats and destabilising factors in the Asia-Pacific region.  Moreover, a militarily strong and active Japan might re-ignite the old fears of it in the minds of South-East Asian nations and drive them into the embrace of China.  It is here that the attraction of India, in their eyes, comes.  In their calculation, India poses no such risks.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the progenitor of the NMD/TMD initiative, was conceived by the Reagan and Bush (Sr) Administrations partly with a view to forcing the USSR into a prohibitively expensive arms race and, thereby, damaging its economy.  Is the NMD/TMD initiative meant to similarly force China into a similar costly arms race in order to weaken its economic strength, prevent its graduation into a formidable economic competitor to the US and set in motion the till now contained centrifugal political forces of China in the hope of thereby pre-empting its emergence as a strategic equal to the US in the Asia-Pacific region? China thinks so, but the US Administration strongly denies any anti-Chinese motivation.  It says it looks upon China as a benign and not a malign competitor.

Dozens of statements on the NMD/TMD initiative issued by China since the beginning of last year contain one message for the US and the rest of the world loud and clear, namely:

* To China, its national security is sacrosanct.

* It would not allow it to be weakened whatever be the cost.

* If this results in a destabilising arms race, the responsibility would be that of the US.

What are the options open to China to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent and to preserve its national security? Upgradation of its nuclear and missile capabilities and development of a counter-NMD capability.  A group of US scientists has cited a CIA assessment of 1999 as cautioning the Clinton Administration that China had already in position a counter-NMD capability.  Other reports speak of China having already embarked on an upgradation of its missile capability.  If so, of what use the yet unproved missile defence capability, the first components of which would be in position (Insha-Allah) only by 2004, with the other components falling into position only by 2010?

Would the NMD/TMD enhance the USA's security? Unlikely.  On the contrary, it could provoke the rogue elements--State or non-State-- into redoubling their attempts to find ways of hurting the US.  They are not interested in overwhelming and destroying the US for which they would require an abundance of WMD and missile capability.  They are just interested in getting one weapon through to a target in the US or in US bases abroad in order to hurt the US seriously.  By any means-- through the space, by air, road, sea or train.

The pre-1998 nuclear dramatis personae were rational thinkers.  The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) made sense, logic to them.  The very thought of it acted as a deterrent to irresponsible or irrational policies and actions.

Since 1998, irrational elements-- State and non-State- have joined the ranks of the nuclear dramatis personae. MAD is no deterrent to their irrational actions.  They cannot be deterred.  They can only be neutralised and, if necessary in the interest of world peace, destroyed before they acquire the means of giving vent to their irrationality.  How to do so?

This is the most important question today for the rational world and particularly for the US, Russia, India, China and Israel.  The Bush Administration is right in posing this question, but the answer to this is not the NMD/TMD, but joint intelligence collection, sharing of intelligence and joint clandestine operational capability to neutralise/destroy the threats from irrational elements before they assume a serious form.

India should take the lead in directing the debate and decisions in the right direction.

A related chronology is attached.  

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com )

 

A Chronology

In its National Intelligence Estimate for 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US had, inter alia, ruled out any missile threat to the US and Canada from any nation outside the declared nuclear powers before 2011.

The CIA's assessment was confined to an evaluation of the threat to the States of the US and Canada from nuclear and nuclear-capable States.  It did not reportedly address likely threats to US allies and to US troops abroad and threats from non-State actors such as Osama bin Laden's and other terrorist groups seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The US Congress appointed a nine-member bipartisan Commission headed by Mr.Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defence Secretary under President Gerald Ford who has now again become Defence Secretary under Mr.George Bush (Jr), to re-examine the CIA's threat perception.

In its report of July 1998, the Commission concluded that the U.S. intelligence had underestimated missile threats to the US, particularly from the so-called rogue States (now called States of concern) such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.  The Commission unanimously assessed that countries such as Iran, North Korea and, eventually, Iraq, could field ballistic missiles with ''little or no warning.''

The CIA at first stood by its 1995 conclusions.  In a July 15, 1998, letter to Congress, CIA Director George Tenet said the intelligence community's predictions were "supported by the available evidence and were well tested'' in an internal review.  Since then, the CIA has said it agrees that a missile threat could emerge sooner than it had originally predicted.

The sanitised summary of the Rumsfeld Commission report of 1998 released to the press referred to only the threats from the so-called rogue States, but it is believed that the classified sections of the report had also discussed the possibility of threats to the US troops in Diego Garcia and the Gulf from Pakistani missiles should there be a Talibanisation of Pakistan and also to US troops in the region from non-State actors .

While Mr.Rumsfeld's chairmanship of the Congressional Commission on missile threats was well known outside the US, the fact that he also headed another Congressionally nominated commission to study the use of space for national security purposes, including employing space assets to support military operations and protecting U.S. satellites from possible attack was not equally well known.

Addressing the Center for Security Policy, Washington, on October 7, 1998, on the Commission's report, Mr.Rumsfeld stated as follows:

"It is increasingly clear that anti-proliferation efforts, coupled with the inevitable imposition of still more sanctions--which already cover a large majority of the people on earth--are not stopping other nations from acquiring increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies.  There are two schools of thought as to how to deal with this obvious failure: One is to try still harder and impose still more sanctions.  The second approach is to seriously work to prevent the availability of the most important technologies, try to delay the availability of the next tier of information, but to recognize that we live in a world where those who don't wish us well will inevitably gain sophisticated weapons, and that, therefore, the answer is to invest as necessary in the offensive and defense capabilities and the intelligence assets that will enable us to live with these increasingly dangerous threats. "

In media interviews before and after the Republican Party's convention in August last, Mr.Rumsfeld also stated as follows:

"The thing that struck me about the missile-defense issue as it is being considered in the United States, in Russia, in China, in Western Europe is this: If you think about it, Russia and the People's Republic of China, along with North Korea, are the principal proliferators of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

"The Russians, for example, have helped North Korea. They are currently providing assistance to China.  They are providing assistance to Iran.  They have, over a sustained period, provided assistance to India.  They have helped Iraq over time.  They are active in spreading these technologies around the world.

"So too, with China.  China has helped Iran, Pakistan, North Korea.  The ironic thing is that here you have two countries that are actively creating a more dangerous world through the proliferation of these technologies, complaining and protesting that the United States has decided that it thinks that it is in our best interest to provide a capability to defend against those various technologies.  Their argument is that it is destabilizing.

"What is destabilizing is proliferation.  They are the ones who are taking an act that is causing an instability to be injected into the world equation.  Only leaders that are deluding themselves can fail to see what's happening. And it is just beyond comprehension why someone doesn't just call them on it.  For them to be arguing that the United States should not take steps to defend itself against ballistic missiles from states that they have been providing assistance to, because it's destabilizing, is on its face inconsistent.

"One thing that is new in the world equation is that the Soviet Union does not exist.  And therefore the threat of a Soviet attack across Germany or the threat of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union has diminished substantially.

"What has come up — a relatively new phenomenon — is the fact that, given the number of years since nuclear weapons have existed, and given the end of the Cold War and the relaxed mood around the world, proliferation has become pervasive.  With the result being, if a country wants those capabilities, they can, in fact, over a period of time, get them.

"Not a lot of them, and not highly accurate, and not particularly safe.  But they can get weapons that can threaten and impose great damage on their neighbors and other countries.  Now that's a fact.  What ought to be done about it? Well, at the moment, the nations that have those are nations that have essentially been cooperating with Russia and China because Russia and China have been providing them assistance.  They are nations that in many instances are not friendly to the United States or Western Europe or to the United States's friends and allies in Northeast Asia.

"So, the question is, who are they more likely to threaten? Obviously, not China or Russia at the present time.  So, it's not surprising that Mr. Putin apparently conceded in his communiqué that there is in fact a growing threat from such countries in the world.  But the reality is that that threat is essentially not against Russia or China at the present time, but much more likely against the United States and our friends and allies around the world.

"The truth, however, is that when proliferation starts, it tends to not stop.  That is to say, if Russia helps Iran, Iran does not necessarily have to take an oath that they'll never take those same technologies and give them to anybody else.  And over time Iran could decide to give those technologies to someone who could in fact threaten Russia.  So Russia is playing a very dangerous game by continuing this pattern of proliferation.

"The issue of sharing of technologies is a complex one.  It could be done in a variety of ways.  At one extreme, someone could argue that you could have a world system that would immediately shoot down any missile that had not been previously announced and understood to be for peaceful purposes.  And it could be independently operated.  There have been people who've proposed that.  You could have a theater system that the United States could help to use to protect a friend or an ally or a location where we have deployed troops.  So that is a sharing of the capability, as we are discussing with Israel.

"You could have, for example, a system where the United States might have a shared warning system, a detection system, as opposed to a shoot-down system. So there are pieces that could be shared.  There are technologies that could be shared.

"It's an enormously complex subject, and there are things that we would not want to share.  And there are things that we would not want jointly operated.  But there are other things that we could conceivably share or that could be jointly operated. "

Even before the Republican Party Convention of August last, the perceptions relating to China and missile defence were touched upon by Ms.Condoleezza Rice, Mr.Bush's present National Security Adviser, in an article in the "Foreign Affairs" journal (January-February 2000) as well as in subsequent interviews.  She said: " Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat.  Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness.  The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa.  But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment.  Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread.

"Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does.  It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment of defenses.  The United States should make clear that it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new offense-defense mix, but that it is prepared to do so unilaterally.  Moscow should understand, too, that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record -- problematic to date -- on the proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to WMD.  It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending.

" As to the ABM treaty, the Governor has made clear that we are in a new environment -- post-Cold War-- and that he intends to approach the Russians about fundamental changes to the ABM treaty to permit the building of defenses.  Diplomacy is the art of the hard, and no one suggests that it will be easy.  But it is in America's and her allies' interests to find a new way of dealing with nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive. "

In July 2000,a Commission on America's National Interests, established by a group of Americans with the help of well-known US think-tanks such as Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Nixon Center, the RAND and the Hauser Foundation released a report identifying the US national interests that should receive the attention of the new US Administration .

The Commission was jointly chaired by Mr.Robert Ellsworth of the Hamilton Technology Ventures, L.P., Mr.Andrew Goodpaster of the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute and Ms.Rita Hauser of the Hauser Foundation and included, amongst its members, Mr. Richard Armitage, now the Deputy Secretary of State, Ms.Rice, and Mr.Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser under Mr.George Bush (Sr), whom Ms.Rice once described as amongst her mentors.

Amongst the vital US national interests identified by the Commission were :

* That the nuclear danger to the US be reduced to the achievable minimum.

* That there be no nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons attacks on the United States or against its military forces abroad.

* That there be no further proliferation or build-up of WMD capabilities in countries hostile to the United States (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya).

* That no country acquire new or build up existing intercontinental-range strategic nuclear capabilities.

* That all global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material be maintained in conditions of security, safety, and accountability.

* That the safety and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile be assured.

The report said: "There is an emerging consensus within the US national security community that the greatest source of direct threat to US national interests stems from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems to hostile states and non-state actors.  This view is correct.  Because of its geographic position, the United States is highly secure from conventional forms of attack.  Only weapons of mass destruction offer US adversaries a powerful way to strike America's cities and citizens.  Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses profound challenges to the US government as it seeks to advance or protect other interests in distant regions.  With its immense conventional military superiority, the only current real threats to US military forces abroad are adversaries equipped with, and prepared to use effectively, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. These facts force WMD proliferation to the center of any US assessment of the threats to US national interests.

"Clearly the highest aim of US national security policy should be to prevent nuclear or biological weapons attacks against American cities and civilians, or American military forces abroad.  While the shape of the biological weapons threat is only beginning to emerge, the nuclear threat had been familiar in the form of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal.  The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the accompanying collapse of its command-and-control state have presented today a new nuclear challenge.  As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the risks of one or a dozen nuclear devices being exploded in an American city have increased. Today the most serious threat to vital American interests is the threat that loose nuclear weapons and fissile material from the former Soviet Union will fall into the hands of pariah states or terrorist or criminal groups.

"Preventing the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons to countries and entities that wish America ill must take priority over controlling proliferation to friendly, democratic countries."

In an interview given to the Council on Foreign Relations on July 31,2000, Mr.Robert Blackwill, the US Ambassador-designate to India, who was also associated with the work of this Commission, elaborated on Mr.Bush's perceptions as follows:

"One of Governor Bush's most important initiatives in the past few months has been his call to move decisively beyond the Cold War to modify American policy toward nuclear weapons.  There are two dimensions of this. First, the Governor believes that an effective American ballistic missile defense should be deployed at the earliest possible time.  Such a defense should protect the American homeland, American forces overseas, and our allies and friends.  This concept is designed to deal with the rapidly emerging threat from rogue state ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.  It makes no sense -- indeed it is not moral -- for an American President to be so captivated by an arms control treaty negotiated 30 years ago that he does not fulfill his Constitutional obligation to protect the American people.

"On the offensive side, Governor Bush has stressed that calculating the level of American strategic nuclear weapons in relationship to the Russian nuclear arsenal is an antique idea -- Cold War old think.  No one believes that the United States and the Russian Federation are going to nuclear war with one another.  Therefore, the Governor has indicated that if elected President he will direct a fundamental review of the requirements of American nuclear deterrence and bring down the U.S. nuclear arsenal to the lowest possible number consistent with U.S. national security. "

A careful reading of the various statements made by Mr.Bush and his advisers before his election indicate that their main perceptions are as follows:

* The characterisation of China as a strategic competitor does not imply a downgrading of the importance attached by the US to its relations with China and to the need for strengthening and further developing its economic and political engagement with China.

* Like the Clinton Administration, the Bush administration too views China as a responsible power, which has till now shown a willingness to act within accepted international norms.  At the same time, it views with concern China's policies relating to Taiwan and the South China Sea and the Chinese perception of the US presence in the region as not totally benign and as possibly detrimental to its own interests.

* In its view, there are no signs of any significant upgradation of China's missile capability (ICBMs) vis-à-vis the membere-States of the USA, but is concerned over China's reported upgradation of its capability vis-à-vis Taiwan and other US allies in the region. Such a capability also poses a threat to the US troops based in the region.

* Of greater concern is China's role in assisting North Korea, Pakistan and Iran and possible missile threats to the US and its troops in Asia from North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.  While the new Bush doctrine has been projected as mainly directed against likely missile threats from these rogue states and China has not been projected as a threat, it is believed that the Bush doctrine is directed as much ( if not more) against China as against the rogue states.

One could perceive the contours of the emerging policy of the Bush Administration as follows:

* While continuing to support the one-China policy, it apprehends that any Chinese success in the forcible unification of Taiwan with the mainland could destroy the credibility of the US leadership in the region.  It is, therefore, determined to neutralise Chinese missile capability vis-à-vis Taiwan through the TMD cover for it.

* It contemplates following a policy of political and economic engagement with and strategic containment of China.

* While the engagement would be direct, it would prefer to have surrogates in the implementation of its containment policy. Japan and India assume importance in this regard.

* While it would like Japan to play a more active role, it is at the same time concerned that a militarily legitimised and re-energised Japan could one day assume an adversarial role vis-à-vis the US and rekindle the fears of the other countries of the region, thereby driving them closer to China.

In its eyes, India has the advantage of not posing any of these risks.

Bush's Statement of May 1,2001

The following are the salient points of the speech on the new security paradigm made by President Bush at the National Defence University, Washington, on May 1:

* "Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counter proliferation and defenses.  We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them.  We must work with allies and friends who wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict.  And together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.

* "We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.  Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.

* "We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world.  To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM Treaty.  This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future.  It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.

* "This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies.  We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.

* "I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.  My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces.

* "The Secretary (Mr.Rumsfeld) has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats.  In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after they re-enter the atmosphere.  We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase.  The preliminary work has produced some promising options for advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability.  If based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited, but effective, defenses.  We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses might take.

* "We'll also need to reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia.  Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century.  We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability.  This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years.  It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies and other countries.

* "That's why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.  This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past.  It should be reassuring, rather than threatening.  It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense.  It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability, and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.

* "I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.  We may have areas of difference with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries.  Russia and America both face new threats to security.  Together, we can address today's threats and pursue today's opportunities.  We can explore technologies that have the potential to make us all safer."

How Exactly will the Missle Defence System be Organised?

A study published by the "China Daily" on July 7,2000, projected the NMD, as envisaged by the Clinton Administration, as follows:

* "The objective of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program is to develop and maintain the option to deploy a cost effective, operationally effective system that will protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World threats.

* "The primary mission of National Missile Defense is defense of the United States (all 50 states) against a threat of a limited strategic ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation.  Such a system would also provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from more nuclear capable states.

* "The means to accomplish the NMD mission are as follows:

*"Field an NMD system that meets the ballistic missile threat at the time of a deployment decision.

* "Detect the launch of enemy ballistic missile(s) and track.

* "Continue tracking of ballistic missile(s) using ground based radars.  Engage and destroy the ballistic missile warhead above the earth's atmosphere by force of impact.

* "The National Missile Defense Program was originally a technology development effort.  In 1996, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, NMD was designated a Major Defense Acquisition Program and transitioned to an acquisition effort.  Concurrently, Department of Defence was tasked with developing a deployable system within three years.  This three-year development period was to culminate in the year 2000, when there was to be a DOD Deployment Readiness Review to review technical readiness of NMD elements.  Because the three-year deployment planning period is combined with an additional three-year deployment option, the total effort is referred to as the NMD 3+3 program.  The decision to be made is whether to deploy an NMD system.

* "This decision was to be based on the analysis of the potential ballistic missile threat to the United States, technical readiness of the NMD system for deployment, projected cost to build and operate the NMD system, and other factors including potential environmental impacts of deploying and operating the NMD system.  If the decision is to deploy, then sites would be selected from the range of alternatives studied.  Should the deployment option not be exercised in the year 2000, NMD will continue development of technology enhancements for NMD elements.

* "The NMD system would be a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defense system with a space-based detection system, consisting of five elements:

* "Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs)

* "Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3), which includes: Battle Management, Command, and Control (BMC2), and In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS)

* "X-Band Radars (XBRs)

*"Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR)

* "Defense Support Program satellites/Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

* "All elements of the NMD system would work together to respond to a ballistic missile directed against the United States."

The US media reported on May 3 that despite technical hurdles and promises to consult Russia, China and skeptical allies, the Bush administration was already studying possible deployment of a limited anti-missile defense as early as 2004.  They also reported as follows:

* While no plan or date had been decided, Mr. Rumsfeld was looking at options like stationing 10 fledgling missile interceptors in Alaska in three years, later expanding that battery and perhaps adding sea- and space-based arms.  The proposed "hit-to-kill" interceptors for Alaska have failed two of their last three space tests.

* Other anti-missile batteries based on U.S.Aegis warships might be deployed as early as 2005, but airborne and space-based lasers are believed to be two to five years further behind.

* Mr.Rumsfeld said he was undaunted by the initial failures and that he was studying options given to him by the Pentagon's missile defense office.  "There is no question but that the use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be considered if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of security from ballistic missiles that is desirable for the United States and for our friends and allies," he said.

* He made clear that President Bush felt that the Clinton administration had too narrowly focused on a ground-based defense on remote Shemya Island in Alaska to destroy a limited number of missiles fired by rogue nations or accidentally launched by Russia or China.  "There are somewhat more than several things that had not been fully explored and that we will be discussing in our consultations on Capitol Hill and with our allies and with Russia and with China in the weeks ahead.  The ballistic missile office has developed these options and they are being examined and looked at and they will be discussed during the consultations.

* Costs of the plan revolving around the Alaska base proposed by Mr. Bill Clinton had ranged from $30 billion to $60 billion, but the expanded considerations of the new administration could push that beyond $200 billion.

*Navy officials said that the Navy could have two cruisers armed with up to 50 SM-3 interceptor missiles ready by 2005 at a cost of up to $1.4 billion.  Other defense officials, who also asked not to be identified, said Mr.Rumsfeld was considering missile defense budget increases totaling more than $8 billion in the next several years, much of it for accelerated development of a missile burning laser weapon mounted on a modified Air Force aircraft.

Talking to pressmen before Mr.Bush's speech, Mr.Rumsfeld stated as follows:

* Any initial missile defense deployed by the United States is unlikely to be perfect, but would sow doubt among enemies and dissuade them from attack.

* "What we are talking about here is a new set of capabilities ... to dissuade or deter as well as to defend against a growing threat in the world.  And they need not be 100 percent perfect in my opinion.  And they are certainly unlikely to be in their early stages of evolution.

* "Anyone who believes that you can have a full-blown, perfect system from the beginning, I think, is underestimating the difficulties of doing anything that is technologically challenging."

* The Defense Department should consider not only the unfailing ability to shoot down missiles, but the prospect for deterring missile attacks through creating doubt about the success of launching such a strike. "There are 10 or 12 things that can be explored.  Some of them won't work, some will."

* Mr.Rumsfeld also dismissed concern that U.S. plans to proceed with a missile defense system might increase instability or prompt China to build more intercontinental ballistic missiles that could potentially reach the United States.  "They are going to build more , quite apart from the ABM treaty," he said, noting that China had not signed the treaty.

The feasibility and effectiveness of the missile defence system have been widely doubted in the US itself on the ground that counter-measures to neutralise NMD/TMD are possible; that such counter-measures would be even less expensive than the NMD/TMD; that according to a CIA estimate of 1999, China has already embarked on a programme of counter-measures; such counter-measures should be available to the rogue States too; and that the only net result of deploying the missile system would be to damage even the existing international co-operation towards non-proliferation.  The critics were of the view that while strengthening the existing international co-operation, the US should explore the possibility of destroying the WMD/missile capability of rogue States on the ground even before they could assemble and use them.

In a report of April, 2000, a group of US scientists and engineers calling themselves the Union of Concerned Scientists said as follows:

* "The planned NMD system could be defeated by technically simple countermeasures.  Such countermeasures would be available to any emerging missile state that deploys a long-range ballistic missile.

* "There are numerous tactics that an attacker could use to counter the planned NMD system.  None of these countermeasures is new; indeed, most of these ideas are as old as ballistic missiles themselves.

* "All countries that have deployed long-range ballistic missiles (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) have developed, produced, and in some cases, deployed, countermeasures for their missiles.  There is no reason to believe that emerging missile states would behave differently, especially when US missile defense development is front-page news.

* "Many highly effective countermeasures require a lower level of technology than that required to build a long-range ballistic missile (or nuclear weapon).  The United States must anticipate that any potentially hostile country developing or acquiring ballistic missiles would have a parallel program to develop or acquire countermeasures to make those missiles effective in the face of US missile defenses. Countermeasure programs could be concealed from US intelligence much more easily than missile programs, and the United States should not assume that a lack of intelligence evidence is evidence that countermeasure programs do not exist.

* Many countermeasures are based on basic physical principles and well-understood technologies.  As a consequence, a vast amount of technical information relevant to building and deploying countermeasures is publicly available.  Any country capable of building a long-range ballistic missile would have the scientific and technical expertise, including people who have worked on missiles for many years, to exploit the available technologies.  Moreover, a great deal of technical information about the planned NMD system and its sensors has been published.  A potential attacker could learn from a variety of open sources enough about the planned NMD system to design countermeasures to defeat it.

* "To determine whether technically simple countermeasures would be effective against the planned NMD system, we examined three potential countermeasures in detail: sub munitions with biological or chemical weapons, nuclear warheads with anti-simulation balloon decoys, and nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds.  We find that any of these would defeat the planned NMD system.  They would either significantly degrade the effectiveness of the defense or make it fail completely. Moreover, these countermeasures would defeat the planned NMD system even if they were anticipated by the United States. And because these countermeasures use readily available materials and straightforward technologies, any emerging missile state could readily construct and employ them.

* "Submunitions with Biological or Chemical Weapons.  To deliver biological or chemical weapons by long-range ballistic missile, an attacker could divide the agent for each missile among a hundred or more small warheads, or submunitions, that would be released shortly after boost phase.  These submunitions would be too numerous for a limited defense -- such as the planned NMD system -- to even attempt to intercept all of them.

* "Our analysis demonstrates that the attacker could readily keep the reentry heating of the submunitions low enough to protect the agents from excessive heat. Moreover, because submunitions would distribute the agent over a large area and disseminate it at low speeds, they would be a more effective means of delivering biological and chemical agents by ballistic missile than would a single large warhead. Thus, an attacker would have a strong incentive to use submunitions, aside from any concerns about missile defenses.

* "Nuclear Weapons with Anti-simulation Balloon Decoys.  Anti-simulation is a powerful tactic in which the attacker disguises the warhead to make it look like a decoy, rather than attempting the more difficult task of making every decoy closely resemble a specific warhead.  To use this tactic, the attacker could place a nuclear warhead in a lightweight balloon made of aluminized mylar and release it along with a large number of similar, but empty balloons.  The balloon containing the warhead could be made indistinguishable from the empty ones to all the defense sensors -- including the ground-based radars, the satellite-based infrared sensors, and the sensors on the kill vehicle.  The defense would therefore need to shoot at all the balloons to prevent the warhead from getting through, but the attacker could deploy so many balloons that the defense would run out of interceptors.

* "Nuclear Weapons with Cooled Shrouds.  The attacker could cover a nuclear warhead with a shroud cooled to a low temperature by liquid nitrogen.  The cooled shroud would reduce the infrared radiation emitted by the warhead by a factor of at least one million.  This would make it nearly impossible for the kill vehicle’s heat-seeking infrared sensors to detect the warhead at a great enough distance to have time to maneuver to hit it. 

* "Many operational and technical factors make the job of the defense more difficult than that of the attacker.  First, the defense must commit to a specific technology and architecture before the attacker does.  This permits the attacker to tailor its countermeasures to the specific defense system.  Second, the job of the defense is technically much more complex and difficult than that of the offense.  This is especially true for defenses using hit-to-kill interceptors, for which there is little margin for error.  Third, the defense must work the first time it is used.  Fourth, the requirements on defense effectiveness are very high for a system intended to defend against nuclear and biological weapons -- much higher than the requirements on offense effectiveness.  These inherent offensive advantages would enable an attacker to compensate for US technical superiority.

* "The planned NMD system would not be effective against an accidental or unauthorized attack from Russia, or an erroneous launch based on false warning of a US attack.  Russia has indicated it would respond to a US NMD deployment by deploying countermeasures on its ballistic missiles.  As a result, if an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous Russian attack should occur, the missiles launched would have countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system.  Moreover, because of the structure of its command system, an unauthorized Russian attack could easily involve 50 or even 500 warheads, which would overwhelm a limited defense.  An erroneous attack would likely be large and would also overwhelm a limited defense.

* "The planned NMD system would not be effective against a Chinese attack.  China has also indicated it would take steps to permit it to penetrate the planned NMD system.  China would likely respond by deploying more long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States.  More significantly, as the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate notes, China has developed numerous countermeasures.  The United States must therefore expect that any Chinese ballistic missile attack -- whether using existing or new missiles -- would be accompanied by effective countermeasures.

* "Long-range missiles would be neither the only nor the optimum means of delivery for an emerging missile state attacking the United States with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.  Other delivery options available to emerging missile states would be less expensive, more reliable, and more accurate than long-range missiles.  Moreover, these means could be covertly developed and employed, so that the United States might be unable to identify the attacker and retaliate. These alternative methods of delivery include cruise missiles or short-range ballistic missiles launched from ships off the US coast,nuclear weapons detonated in a US port while still in a shipping container in a cargo ship, and cars or trucks disseminating chemical or biological agents as they are driven through a city.

* "Available evidence strongly suggests that the Pentagon has greatly underestimated the ability and motivation of emerging missile states to deploy effective countermeasures.  There are strong indications that the Pentagon’s Systems Threat Assessment Requirement (STAR) Document and Operational Requirements Document, which describe the type of threat the NMD system must defend against, underestimate the effectiveness of the countermeasures that an emerging missile state could deploy and thus inaccurately describe the actual threat.  If the threat assessment and requirements documents do not accurately reflect the real-world threat, then an NMD system designed and built to meet these less demanding requirements will fail in the real world.

* "The planned testing program for the NMD system is inadequate to assess the operational effectiveness of the system.  A judgement that the planned NMD system can work against realistic countermeasures must be based on sound analysis of the performance of the planned system against feasible countermeasures designed to defeat it.  Should such an analysis indicate that the NMD system may be able to deal with such countermeasures, a rigorous testing program that incorporates realistic countermeasures should be created to assess the operational effectiveness of the planned NMD system.  The United States should demonstrate that the system could overcome such countermeasures before a deployment decision is made.  Because it may be difficult or impossible to obtain direct information about the countermeasure programs of other states, the United States must rely on other means -- particularly on "red team" programs that develop countermeasures using technology available to emerging missile states -- to assess the countermeasure capabilities of potential attackers. However, existing red team programs are under the financial control and authority of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and thus face a fundamental conflict of interest.  To permit a meaningful assessment of the operational effectiveness of the NMD system, the NMD testing program should be restructured.  The testing program must ensure that the baseline threat is realistically defined by having the STAR document reviewed by an independent panel of qualified experts, conduct tests against the most effective countermeasures that an emerging missile state could reasonably be expected to build, use an independent red team to design and build these countermeasures, and employ them in tests without the defense having advance knowledge of the countermeasure characteristics, conduct enough tests against countermeasures to determine the effectiveness of the system with high confidence, and provide for objective assessment of the design and results of the testing program by an independent standing review committee.

* "Past US missile defense tests against missiles using "countermeasures" did not demonstrate that defenses could defeat such countermeasures.  The United States has conducted several missile defense flight tests of exoatmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors that included decoys or other countermeasures and that have been described as demonstrating that the defense could defeat the countermeasures.  However, in every case in which the defense was able to distinguish the mock warhead from the decoys, it was only because it knew in advance what the distinguishing characteristics of the different objects would be.  These tests reveal nothing about whether the defense could distinguish the warhead in a real attack, in which an attacker could disguise the warhead and deploy decoys that did not have distinguishing characteristics.

* "NMD deployment would result in large security costs to the United States.  By deploying an ineffective NMD system, the United States would stimulate responses that would produce a net decrease in its national security.  Deployment would make it far more difficult to reduce the greatest threat to the security of the United States: an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack from Russia.  Current US and Russian nuclear weapons deployment and operational policies, which remain largely unchanged since the end of the cold war, carry a risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack on the United States.  Today, such an attack poses the gravest threat to the United States: it would likely result in the deaths of millions of Americans.  Even a deliberate nuclear attack by an emerging missile state would result in far fewer deaths and injuries.  If the United States deploys its planned NMD system, Russia is likely to increase its reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy, thereby heightening the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack.  As Russia has made clear, a US NMD deployment would also limit deep reductions in Russian nuclear weapons, thereby insuring that this threat to US security continues into the future.  Deployment would also limit US-Russian cooperation on reducing the dangers posed by Russian nuclear weapons and the risk of theft of Russian nuclear materials.  US deployment will affect both the pace and scale of China’s missile modernization program, and is likely to lead China to build up both faster and to higher levels than it otherwise would.  The adverse implications of NMD deployment by the US would extend beyond the direct responses by Russia and China.  The deployment of the NMD system could seriously impair efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and thus ultimately increase the threat to the United States from these weapons. Controlling proliferation of these weapons requires the cooperation of Russia and China, which, as the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate stated, will be influenced by their perceptions of US ballistic missile defenses. Moreover, as long as the United States and Russia rely on nuclear deterrence, NMD deployment would place a floor on US-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and thereby put at risk the survival of the broader arms control and non-proliferation regimes.  Statements by key US allies reflect their concerns that NMD deployment would decrease international security as well as complicate relations within NATO.

* "Deterrence will continue to be the ultimate line of defense against attacks on the United States by missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.  The United States, in concert with other countries, can reduce the missile threat through a combination of export controls and various cooperative measures.  If a hostile emerging missile state acquires intercontinental-range missiles, the United States can deter their use through the threat of overwhelming retaliation.  If such a state makes an explicit and credible threat to launch a missile attack against the United States, it may be possible to destroy its missiles before they are launched, in accord with the right of self-defense.  The only practical and effective way to address the Russian and Chinese missile threat to the United States is through cooperation, and the deployment of the planned NMD system may limit such cooperation."

Chinese Reaction

There has been a large number of Chinese reactions against the NMD and TMD.  Suffice to cite two of them, which are comprehensive and cover all the points.

The White Paper on national defence issued by the Chinese Government in November 2000 said:

* "In view of the fact that the US is accelerating its efforts for the development and possible deployment of a national missile defense system and space weapons, and that the US and Russia still possess nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy the world many times over, it is China's position that continued nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space are multilateral fora of arms control that should be given more priority than the FMCT negotiations.  Therefore, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should not emphasize the importance of only the FMCT negotiations to the neglect of the issues of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and should, at the minimum, give equal attention to all three issues by carrying out its substantive work in a balanced manner.

* "The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (hereafter referred to as the ABM Treaty) plays a very important role in maintaining the global strategic balance and stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security.  However, in recent years the United States has accelerated its development of a national missile defense system in disregard of the relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty and the opposition of the international community.  China expresses its strong opposition to such moves on the part of the United States, for they will undermine the global strategic balance, severely hamper the nuclear disarmament process and international non-proliferation efforts, jeopardize global peace and regional stability, and may even touch off a new round of arms race.

*"The Resolution on the Preservation of and Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, co-sponsored by China, Russia and Belarus, and adopted at the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly with an overwhelming majority, called upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to refrain from the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of their territories.  It also expressed support for further efforts by the international community to safeguard the inviolability and integrity of the ABM Treaty.  The Resolution is a clear manifestation of the international community's opposition to US efforts to develop and deploy missile defense systems, and of its will to safeguard the ABM Treaty.

* "On July 18,2000, President Jiang Zemin of the PRC and President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a joint statement on anti-missile defense. In the statement, the Presidents reaffirm that the ABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of global strategic stability and international security, and constitutes the basis for a framework of the key international agreements designed to reduce and limit offensive strategic weapons and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Emphasizing that it is totally untenable to press for amending the ABM Treaty on the pretext of so-called missile threats from some countries, the Presidents point out that to amend the text of the ABM Treaty is tantamount to an act of undermining the ABM Treaty and will inevitably bring about a series of negative consequences, and that the country which presses for amending this treaty will have to bear the full responsibility for all these consequences. The Presidents also reiterate that under the current strategic situation, it is of great practical significance to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty.

* "The United States government should earnestly heed the appeal of the international community and stop the development and deployment of missile defense systems that may undermine global strategic stability.  The joint research and development of the theater missile defense (TMD) system by the United States and Japan with a view to deploying it in East Asia will enhance the overall offensive and defensive capability of the US-Japan military alliance to an unprecedented level, which will also far exceed the defensive needs of Japan.  This will touch off a regional arms race and jeopardize security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.  China expresses its profound concern over such a development.

* "China is strongly opposed to the provision of the TMD system, its components and technology, and any such assistance to Taiwan.  China is also strongly against any attempt to incorporate Taiwan in any form into the TMD system by any country."

Briefing pressmen at Beijing on March 14,2001, Sha Zukang, Director- General of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated as follows:

* "China does not want to see a confrontation between China and the US over the NMD issue nor an arms race between the two countries.  We are against NMD, not because we intend to threaten the security of the US with our nuclear weapons.  We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved.

* "China's nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers, and yet China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.  China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security.

* "It is no news that China is opposed to the US NMD program.  For two basic reasons: firstly, we don't believe that NMD is in the interest of international peace and security as a whole; secondly, it will compromise China's security.

* "The US NMD program will have a series of far-reaching negative consequences for the international security environment.  The US NMD program will jeopardize the global strategic balance and stability, and undermine the mutual trust and cooperation among major powers.

* "The significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty lies in the fact that, by prohibiting the deployment of nation-wide missile defense systems, it has maintained the strategic balance between the two nuclear superpowers, and by extension, has maintained the strategic balance among all the nuclear-weapon states.  The US development and possible deployment of NMD will disrupt the existing strategic equilibrium among major powers, and jeopardize the security interest of other countries.  This will undoubtedly arouse suspicion and mistrust among major powers, hampering their coordination and cooperation in international security affairs.

* "The US NMD program will hamper the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race.  As the only remaining superpower, the US already possesses the largest and most advanced arsenal in the world, nuclear and conventional.  In addition, the US pursues a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons.  Under such circumstances, NMD will become a multiplier of the US strategic offensive force.

* "The NMD program is, in essence, an US program of unilateral nuclear expansion, which harbors the inherent danger of triggering an arms race at a higher level.  To be specific, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons.

* "The US NMD program will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and efforts, though the US claims that its development of missile defense systems is intended to counter the increasing threats posed by missile proliferation.

* "I for one, and I don't think I'm alone, do not share the US assessment of the missile threats.  The US has at least over-exaggerated the missile threats from the so- called "countries of concern".  In my view, the development of NMD is tantamount to drinking poison to quench thirst.

* "NMD is not a solution to missile proliferation but will only undercut the very foundation of the international non-proliferation regime, and even stimulate further proliferation of missiles.  The US NMD program will increase the weight of the military factor in international relations in detriment to international peace and security.

* "The international debate around the NMD issue is, in essence, about what kind of international order should be established, and a choice between unipolar and multipolar world.  More and more people have come to realize that the real motive behind the US NMD program is to seek its own absolute security.  Once the NMD is deployed, whether it is effective or not, it would further strengthen the US tendency towards unilateralism, and the tendency to use or threaten to use force.

* "As a result, military factor will play a bigger role in international relations, and huge amount of financial resources and materials that would otherwise be devoted to economic development will be diverted to arms buildup. Under such circumstances, how can a country enjoy real security? How can the world remain stable?

* "The implementation of NMD program by the US will not only undermine global strategic balance and stability, but also disrupt efforts for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.  Moreover, the US also intends to deploy the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system in the region.

* "Though research and development of TMD itself may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM treaty, the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of the TMD that the US is preparing to deploy in Asia? If this TMD can be used as part of NMD and constitute the front deployment of NMD in the region, its negative impact on regional security and stability will be no less than the NMD itself." 

 

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