MUSHARRAF: FROM CIA WITH LOVE?
by B.Raman
Some circles in the US see a linkage between the recent high-profile
visit of Mr.Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, to New Delhi,
the unpublicised visit of Mr.George Tenet, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Islamabad where he had an unusually long
meeting with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the self-styled Chief Executive of
Pakistan, and the surprise decision of the Government of India to invite
the General to New Delhi for talks without any longer insisting on the
stoppage of Pakistani support to cross-border terrorism as a pre-condition
for a resumption of the bilateral dialogue at the political level.
Mr.Armitage, who had spent some years of his career in the CIA/DIA and
holds the highest Pakistani civil decoration that could be awarded to a
foreigner for his role during the Afghan war of the 1980s, has a large
circle of friends in the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.
Mr.Tenet had worked for some years as an aide to one of the
Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees before he was nominated by
Mr. Bill Clinton as the Director of the CIA.
Significantly, he was one of the very few ( the Director of the FBI was
another) important appointees of the Clinton Administration to have been
asked by President Bush to continue in his post despite the criticism of
the functioning of the CIA and its failure to detect the preparations for
India's Pokhran II nuclear tests of 1998 by Mr.Bush and his advisers
during the Presidential election campaign last year.
These circles attribute this decision not to disturb Mr.Tenet from his
post to an important behind-the-scene role, which he has reportedly been
playing since last year in working for a rapprochement between the
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel in West Asia and
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Mr. Bush and his senior aides,
who do not want the President to personally play an active mediatory role
in West Asia or elsewhere similar to the high-profile roles played by
Mr.Clinton, reportedly felt that US interests could be better served by
continuing to use the deniable, stealth services of the CIA chief.
It is said that Mr.Tenet was involved in the secret goings-on which
preceded the subsequently-aborted cease-fire between the Government of
India and the Hizbul Mujahideen and in the events preceding and following
the non-initiation of combat operations in Kashmir by the Govt. of India.
He operated directly as well as through Maj.Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani,
who like Gen.Musharraf, was a blue-eyed boy of the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and
who is now a close confidante of the self-styled Chief Executive.
Maj.Gen.Durrani had in the past served as the ISI station chief in
Washington and was responsible for the ISI's liaison with the CIA and the
FBI. Last year, Jamaat-e-Islami circles in Pakistan had alleged that he
had, at the instance of the CIA, played a role, in consultation with
Gen.Musharraf, in persuading the Hizbul Mujahideen to agree to a
cease-fire. However, the whole exercise was sabotaged by Lt.Gen.Mohammad
Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who is a Sudan from
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and had not been consulted by Gen.Musharraf and
Maj.Gen. Durrani. Gen. Musharraf had him subsequently transferred to
Lahore as a Corps Commander.
It is claimed by these circles in the US that the Ramzan initiative of
the Govt. of India (non-initiation of combat operations) was to have been
reciprocated by the General with an order to his troops for restraint
along the Line of Control (LOC) and action to moderate the activities of
the jehadi terrorist organisations in Jammu & Kashmir which, in turn,
would have been reciprocated by India with permission to the Hurriyat
leaders to visit Pakistan.
While the General issued the restraint order to his troops, he
allegedly went back on his word to the CIA to issue a similar restraint
order to the jehadis on the ground that this was being opposed by some of
his Corps Commanders. It is said to be correct that some of his Corps
Commanders and retired military officers such as Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul and
Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, former chiefs of the ISI, had strongly urged that any
restraint by the jehadis should be conditional on progress in a resumed
political dialogue with India.
Lt.Gen.Nasir reportedly even urged that if the dialogue was resumed,
any restraint on the jehadi organisations should be only as a quid pro quo
to a similar restraint by the Govt. of India on the alleged anti-Muslim
activities of the RSS, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Shiv Sena, but
his advice on this issue did not reportedly enjoy the support of other
officers, serving or retired.
It is claimed that in the face of this log jam, Mr.Tenet once again
stealthily stepped into the scene through his recent visit to Islamabad
and worked out a formula, which could be projected by both India and
Pakistan as a vindication of their respective stand hitherto.
Ever since capturing power in October,1999, Gen.Musharraf has been
repeatedly expressing his desire for talks at any place, at any time and
at any level. Even if the forthcoming summit has really been midwifed by
the CIA as claimed, this need not detract from the significance of the
turn of events.
But, one has to keep one's fingers crossed till the summit actually
takes place. Gen.Musharraf, sarcastically called in Pakistan Gen.Retreat,
had in the past repeatedly reversed decisions which were opposed by the
jehadis. If the jehadis outside and inside the army continue to oppose the
summit, it is to be seen whether he would resist their pressure and stick
to his decision to come to India.
The summit would at least provide an opportunity to our Prime Minister
to test the military dictator's sincerity and to judge whether the
reasonableness projected by him is an act of desperation to move Pakistan
out of its continuing diplomatic isolation and economic difficulties or
just one more crafty move to catch India on the wrong foot.
In the past, India had had no qualms about negotiating with Pakistan's
military dictators, but Gen.Musharraf cannot be compared to them:
* The past dictators were either Punjabis or Pakhtoons, who hold the
majority of the posts in the military. Gen.Musharraf is a Mohajir, who
is looked down upon by the Punjabi officers as a Mohajir parvenu.
* As Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, often
points out, the past dictators seized power themselves, but it was
Gen.Musharraf's subordinates who seized power in his absence and made
him the ruler. He, therefore, owes his gratitude to them and cannot
easily over-rule them.
* The past dictators enjoyed absolute power, but Gen. Musharraf is
only the first among equals.
* He has conceded more demands of the Islamic fundamentalists during
his 19 months in office than Gen.Zia. Till now, he has been extremely
amenable to pressure from the Jehadis.
In recent weeks, significant sections of Pakistan's civilian
bureaucracy and, particularly its economic managers, have been coming
round to the view that Pakistan's continued involvement in Afghanistan and
J & K was coming in the way of its economic recovery and that the
harping of the military leadership on the nuclear flashpoint theme in the
hope of thereby internationalising the Kashmir issue was scaring foreign
investors away There has been a dramatic drop in foreign investments since
the General seized power.
The Corps Commanders, however, do not share this perception and
continue to believe in their present policy of keeping Indian security
forces bleeding in J & K in the hope of thereby weakening them and
keeping the jehadis fighting and dying at the hands of the Indian security
forces in order to prevent their returning to Pakistan and talibanising
the country.
India should guard itself against any illusion that the summit could
lead to peace in J&K. What will really lead to peace is better
governance and attention to the grievances of the people in the State ,
effective control of human rights violations by the Security Forces and a
willingness, capability and readiness to take the proxy war to Pakistani
territory.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.
of India, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.
E-mail: corde@vsnl.com
)