INDIA’S INVITATION TO GENERAL MUSHARRAF: A POLICY BLUNDER?
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
The action of the government in revoking the cease fire in Kashmir
with simultaneous invitation to Musharraf for talks is likely to generate
strong views from analysts and the public. There will be allegations that
India’s offer for talks with Musharraf is due to external pressure to
legitimise and strengthen his position in Pakistan while others would feel
that it is a master stroke placing Musharraf in an embarrassing
situation. The views expressed here are that of the author. Director
This article basically dealing with India’s policy on Kashmir may be
read in conjunction with the following papers by the author :
* The Kashmir Drama: The Need for Indian Wariness (www.saag.org/papers2/paper132.html)
* Kashmir is Not Vietnam: Comparison is Absurd (www.saag.org/papers2/paper160.htm)
* India's Ceasefire in Kashmir: A Flawed Policy of Appeasement (www.saag.org/papers2/paper188.htm)
India’s invitation to Pakistan’s CEO and Chief of Army Staff
General Pervez Musharraf, while looking as a dramatic diplomatic stroke
and received well by the international gallery appears to be a flawed
policy on deeper analysis. India could have well avoided and foreseen
Pakistani responses and mindset in approaches to any Indo-Pak dialogue.
Some of the statements by Pak Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar, quoted by
APP and reproduced by PTI on 27 May, 2001 are reflective of Pakistan’s
approach:
* It was a "singular success" of the military government to
make India "unconditionally accept" Pakistan’s offer for
talks on Kashmir and other issues.
* India had invited Musharraf "due to pressure" from the
world.
* "We have reinvigorated the Kashmir issue and made India accept
Pakistan’s stance for a dialogue on the vital issue".
* Musharraf during his visit to India, planned to meet executive
council members of the Hurriyat Conference. "Any denial of
their meeting with the Pakistani delegation will have a negative impact
on the efforts to solve the Kashmir issue".
Dialogue is an essential part of conduct of international
relations. However the dialogue process can move forward only when
both sides approach issues in a rational manner. The Pakistani approach
reflected above is neither rational nor constructive.
India’s policy planners need to appreciate two facts:
* No successful dialogue can take place between a secular pluralistic
India and an Islamic fundamentalist dominated Pakistan. Many in
Pakistan see that any improvement in India- Pak relations will negate
the very strategic rationale for the existence of Pakistan.
* Nehruvian policies in the past in discerning pious intentions of
peace where none exist and riding on high moral horses have and continue
to cause unmitigated problems for India.
This paper will examine the present invitation to Musharraf under three
headings:
- Musharraf’s credibility as a dialogue partner
- Pakistan’s perceptions of India’s talks offer
- Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir
Following the above, India related aspects need an examination to put
the whole issue in perspective, namely:
- The core issue :Proxy war in Kashmir
- Timing of India’s talks offer
- Indian Government imperatives
General Pervez Musharraf’s credibility as a dialogue partner
General Pervez Musharraf is neither the President of Pakistan nor its
Prime Minister. He has no constitutional standing in Pakistan at the
moment. He is only the Chief of the Pakistan Army and a self styled
Chief Executive Officer of what he perceives as the "Pakistani
conglomerate" . Is India right in seeking him as a dialogue
partner?
Further, can India ignore General Musharraf’s credentials which have
consistently indicated an anti-Indian stand and opposed any normalisation
with India:
* Musharraf opposed the Lahore process and repudiated it after the
coup.
* He masterminded and executed the Kargil war against India only two
years ago.
* Declared that Kashmir is not the end, there will be many more
Kashmirs.
* Justified Islamic Jehad against India and Jehad as an instrument of
state policy.
* Actively assisted in the creation of the Taliban.
* Islamic Jehad against India was conceptualised and put into effect
by Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister. Musharraf is believed to have
been Director General of Military Operations then.
Pakistan’s perceptions of India’s talks offer
Pakistani perceptions of India’s talks offer still hover around their
consistent view of India being a "soft state". In the
instant case Pakistani convictions stand further reinforced by their
reading of the Kashmir situation as a result of increased ISI operations
following India’s unilateral ceasefire i.e. Lashkar-e-Toiba and Fedayeen
attacks on Army installations, sabotage in Delhi and increased killings of
civilians in Kashmir Valley especially informers. Pakistan perceives
that its ISI operations of bleeding India have forced the latter to
initiate talks, unconditionally. Pakistanis also perceives that
India feels enfeebled by the prospects that with the summer opening of
passes, it may not be able to control an escalated situation.
The statements of Pak Foreign Minister seem to betray these
perceptions. Such a mental approach, which in any case should have
been anticipated by India, hardly provides the setting for an Indo-Pak
dialogue.
Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir
No discernible evidence exist to indicate that Pakistan has changed its
stand on Kashmir. Pak Foreign Minister on 27 May, 2001 claimed that
Kashmir "was not an integral part of India" and it was "not
a territorial dispute" but an issue of "the right of
self-determination of the Kashmiri people."
Significantly, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi on 27 May,
2001 in a Star TV programme "We The People" came out with
observations which the Indian policy planners need to note:
* UN resolutions on Kashmir in terms of self-determination give the
Kashmiris the options to either vote for India or for Pakistan.
* UN resolutions existing do not give Kashmiris the options for an
independent Kashmir. For that option, he maintained, fresh UN
resolutions would be required.
The simple deductions from above stances is that Pakistan is not
interested in any dialogue with India, but to perpetuate its dispute over
Kashmir.
India’s Core Issue for Dialogue: Proxy War in Kashmir
There is a perceptible gap in the enunciation of the ‘core issue’
for an Indo-Pak dialogue. India in any forthcoming dialogue, when it
takes place, must make it unambiguously clear that the ‘core issue' is
cessation of Pakistan’s proxy wars in Kashmir and reining-in of Islamic
Jehadis from Pak bases. If this does not form the ‘core issue’
then it seems India is accepting a position that there is no Pakistani
involvement in Kashmir. This is not true.
If ‘self-determination’ in Kashmir is the ‘core issue’ for
Pakistan, then they should extend this principle to Sind and Baluchistan
too.
The ‘core issue’ in any India-Pakistan dialogue is for
normalisation of relations between the two countries. All other
contentious issues left over by history should be put on the back-burner.
Timing of India’s Talks Offer
The timing of the offer of talks with Pakistan is open to
question. Following factors should have been taken into account:
* In terms of external pressure for talks, it was more on Pakistan
because of its failing economy. Donors were pressing Pakistan and
it should have been made to come out with a workable proposition.
* India could afford to wait till Pak elections in 2002 and then made
an offer for talks.
* India was not losing its grip on the proxy war in Kashmir
Valley. If there was a momentary loss, it was more due to the
ceasefire of over six months by the Government that was not reciprocated
by the major foreign based and Pakistani backed military outfits.
* Inputs of India’s Track II diplomacy and peace-crusading NGOs
composed of retired Admirals and Generals and pacifists can hardly
replace the existing realities. The ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ in a
perverse manner affects these well meaning crusaders.
Indian Government Imperatives
This aspect was discussed in detail in SAAG Paper No 132 of 07. 08.2000
(www.saag.org/papers2/paper132.html).
Additional points which have a bearing on the subject are :
* India’s policy planners can no longer afford to conduct foreign
policy in the Nehruvian mould. The country is not ready to accept
it. If there were any compelling reasons for the talks offer these
should be made clear to the public.
* Facts, not principles, should form the basis of India’s
statecraft. The facts in the Kashmir case indicate Kashmir is
not-negotiable.
* No Indian Government, of any political hue can afford to make
concessions or compromises on Kashmir or any other territorial issue.
Lastly, on this point, the PMO is not the right organ to devise
policies on Kashmir. Kashmir is India’s internal security problem and
all formulations should emerge from the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Ministry of Defence. PMO’s delegating for itself a role in Kashmir
affairs and policy is reminiscent and as injurious as that of Nehruvian
times when Kashmir affairs were being handled by the Ministry of External
Affairs.
Conclusion
India’s offer of talks, unconditionally, with General Pervez Musharraf, is ill-conceived in terms of the timing and the contextual
circumstances. General Pervez Musharraf’s
credentials hardly provide the basis for a purposeful dialogue and a
dialogue partner who can be trusted. Further, he has no
constitutional standing to indulge in inter-state dialogue.
Having maintained for two years the stand that no dialogue with
Pakistan will take place until proxy war in Kashmir is stopped by it, no
ground realities have changed to suggest a change in India’s
stand. The present offer carries connotations that India has been
forced into this change of policy stand by external and military factors.
Historically, India’s pursuit of peace and peaceful processes have
never been fruitful. India seems to others, a state that runs for ‘soft
solutions’ and ‘compromises’ at the drop of a hat. The present
one does not seem to be an exception. It could prove to be a policy
blunder. All that the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks promise is a
"dialogue of the deaf".
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. For further discussion he can be reached
at esdecom@vsnl.com)
