Another Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka ?
by A. K. Verma
The cyclical politics of Sri Lanka are again at cross roads. The
choice before the Sri Lankan Central Government is between expediency and
statesmanship. The majoritarian complexes, as in the past, stand
like an immovable rock limiting the options before the Government.
Like President Premdasa earlier, the Central leadership is again seeking
the company of a strange bed fellow, the JVP this time. A union of
the two might strengthen Sinhala public opinion against the Tamils, but it
will cause no dent on the traditional posture of the Sri Lankan Tamils of
the North and East. How does one then move forward?
An obvious option is that India should be approached to provide its
good offices once again to become an interlocutor between the Sri Lankan
Tamils and the Central Government. The thoughts of some might even
run to seeking a more decisive form of an intervention from India.
The history of ethnic strife in Sri Lanka establishes two facts very
clearly, the uncompromising quest for Ealam on the Tamil side and an equal
determination on the Sinhala side not to succumb to the Tamil
pressure. The Indian policy in the past was based on the fantasy
that it could work out an acceptable middle path between the two extreme
positions. From arms training to Sri Lankan Tamils to Thimpu talks,
to the 1987 Sri Lanka accord and to the activisation of IPKF in Sri Lanka,
the Indian authorities had failed to comprehend that its leverage with the
two adversaries had not been of a magnitude as to give it a decisive role
in the troubles between the two. Believing in the principles of
Panchashila, the thoughts of any kind of intervention in Sri Lankan
affairs should have been taboo for the Indian Government. How did
errors of policy, now widely acknowledged, actually occur?
More than any individual, the mechanism of policy making has to be
blamed. In point of fact, no structured mechanism for making high
level policy decisions existed then, as it perhaps exists not even
today. Decisions were often made on a cue from the top, but usually
that cue was not the distilled product of an informed debate, arising from
options formally presented in the shape of approach papers from persons
who could be identified as experts in their fields. Some time adhoc
core committees would be constituted whose membership would necessarily be
all bureaucrats with individuals qualifying for the membership on the
basis of jobs held in the government. Apart from the fact that such
adhoc dispensations did not bring about the required level of scholarship,
expertise or experience into the consideration of issues, the proceedings
would often be marked by fruitless pursuits of one-man upmanship,
opposition for the sake of opposition and wrangling for being identified
as the most productive participant. Most members might contribute by being
mere mute spectators. They would be none the worse for their
substandard work culture, because setting of standards, commitment,
accountability and supervision were virtues which the system rarely
demanded. For example when the July 87 India SriLanka accord was
signed, there was no study to check whether Prabhakaran was genuinely
ready to give up Ealam and surrender all the arms held by the
Tigers. Again, when it was claimed that the IPKF would be able to
clear the field of the Tigers within a week, the claim was not tested by
independent scrutiny, before being accepted. The irony was that the
decision to air drop troops at certain locations was also taken in
complete isolation, even without an intelligence briefing. The
locations were manned by the Tigers. The paratroopers descending to
the earth were decimated in large numbers. Even the assumption that
Dravidian nationalism and Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism reinforced each
other, on the basis of which many decisions were taken , was a subjective
formulation but no body in the policy making apparatus was willing to
test it empirically or otherwise.
In the core group there were occasions when a member would only be
interested in wrecking the progress being achieved by the rest. As
no minutes of the meetings were officially kept or circulated,
irresponsibility would never become an issue to haunt anyone ever.
Such adhoc committees or core groups as they were sometimes called,
often functioned without being given objectives to be sought, by the
political leadership. At the end of the day the most articulate or
the best informed would be able to carry the group with him but it did not
necessarily mean that his recommendations would be in the best interests
of the country if only because the discussions in the group would have
taken place without laid down policy objectives, options and consideration
of short, mid or long-term impact.
The resulting failure was not only in making an accurate reading of the
Tamil Tiger mind: there was a similar inability to assess the limits of
Sri Lankan concessions on offer to the Tamils. At no time except in
the 1987 Indo Sri Lanka accord, the Sri Lankan authorities agreed to let
Tamils rule in the Eastern Province. The concession made in the
Accord was withdrawn as soon as it came unstuck. Sri Lankans cannot
bear the thought that the port of Trincomalee should come under Tamil
governance and they would try to frustrate such a possibility till the
end.
No new security management exercise seems necessary in India in order
to conclude that Indian involvement, if any, in the ethnic crises on Sri
Lanka must abide by the following parameters:
* The invitation to India has to be from both the sides.
* India must know in advance the ultimate fall back position of
each side and its exit policy.
* Prabhakaran will not settle for less than defacto Ealam in a
designated Tamils territory.
* Is the Sri Lanka Government in a position to get a Sinhala
majority to live with a fully autonomous Tamil territory within an
integrated but federal Sri Lanka structure? The Sinhalas must be
transparent about it.
*The plantation Tamils should have the freedom to stay in their
existing abodes.
India must first be convinced that the two adversaries genuinely feel
the urgency of a political solution. Only then it should offer its
good offices. There is also an absolute need to tighten its national
security management apparatus so that progress or lack of it could be
monitored at every stage in terms of goals set.
