India & Post Ground Zero: Refrain
from scoring brownie points
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
‘Ground Zero’ i.e. the horrific senseless and cowardly attack on
New York’s World Trade Center complex and the attacks on the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001 by Islamic Jehadi terrorists have emerged as the
defining moment for United States foreign policy and so also the
international community’s attitudes. Global terrorism, manifested
by Islamic Jehadi terrorist organisations with their locii in Afghanistan
and Pakistan have now emerged in sharp focus. Why the locii shifted
to Pakistan and Afghanistan was because Pakistan consciously adopted
Islamic Jehadi terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
Impending events in terms of United States military strikes against the
Taliban in Afghanistan have necessitated the United States into coercing
Pakistan into making commitments for provision of all types of assistance
in the American war against global terrorism. Caught in the cleft
stick of being on the right side of the global superpower and of
jettisoning its Islamic Jehadi ally i.e. Taliban, it is debatable as to
how far and for how long will Pakistan walk along with the United States
and cooperate in the elimination of all the Pakistani creations in
Afghanistan, namely, the Taliban, the Islamic Jehadi terrorist training
camps and related infrastructure.
Pakistan’s offer of its airspace to USA, sharing of intelligence and
use of Pakistani bases and logistics has spawned a debate in the Indian media and analysts that with these developments : (1) India has lost out
its strategic importance to the United States (2) Pakistan has re-emerged
as a front line state in US strategy, carrying with it special US
dispensations in favour of Pakistan (3) Consequently, USA is likely to tilt
towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.
While such issues need to be thought about, but it is undignified of a
country like India, its power potential and its aspirations to be a major
power, to permit an obsessive panicky debate carried out through a
Pakistan-centric prism.
The issue on the other hand should be as to how the impending
events will impact on the emerging pattern of United States-India
relationship post-Ground Zero. Objectivity would demand
consideration of factors outlined below.
India needs To be patient and detached: Two weeks have hardly past
since the Black Tuesday of September 11, 2001. The United States has
undergone a traumatic and tragic experience highlighting its
vulnerabilities. The call for massive retaliatory American strikes
are generated by US domestic pressure. To strike the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the prime focus of US
strategists along with other nations on Afghanistan’s periphery.
Pakistan’s acquiescence for provision of aid for US military strikes was
given under duress, enmeshed as it was in contradictions of its own
creation. This is an important point being missed in the current
Indian debate lamenting on re-emergence of a perceived ‘front-line state’
status.
The United States current involvement with Pakistan has received
distorted analysis in India media discussions. At times it has
generated into statistical analysis of how many telephone calls were made
by President Bush to General Musharraf and lesser ones made to PM
Vajpayee. Indian analysts and media could refrain in the current
scene from entering into a ‘brownie-points’ scoring competition with
Pakistan.
India, in the spirit of an emerging strategic relationship with the
United States, was right in offering its unsolicited support to the United
States military campaign. Any criticism of it by opposition
politicians or the media betrays a lack of grasp of India’s national
interests. Having expressed its intentions of support, India should
await whether and when can the United States makes a strategic call on
India.
The lack of such a call forthcoming should not upset India. India
in the developing strategic situation needs to be very patient and take a
detached view. In no way is India’s national interest jeopardised
by American inattention to India and more attention to Pakistan.
Keep expectation levels low: With the initial statements by the US
President and other American officials that the United States had resolved
to destroy global terrorism worldwide, India’s spirits went soaring
high. Right across India’s intellectual spectrum, there was an
euphoric expectation of intensified levels, that at last the time had come
when state-sponsored terrorism against India would also be eliminated.
Indians need to appreciate that while USA has expressed its resolve to
eliminate global terrorism, its current priorities are restricted to
destroy the perpetrators, governments and organisations which inflicted
‘Ground Zero’ attacks on homeland USA. The United States has
also been careful to highlight that the war against global terrorism would
be a long-drawn out affair, probably running into years.
India logically, should therefore keep its expectation levels low in
terms of swift American responses to Indian expectations of elimination of
Islamic Jehadi organisations from Pakistan targetting J&K. USA
would do so if it perceives it furthers US national interests.
Islamic Jehadi Terrorist war in Jammu & Kashmir - Does India need
United States Help?: United States-India relationship should not be
made captive to US help on elimination of the Islamic Jehadi terrorist war
in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). India would then be equating
itself to General Musharraf’s conditionalities for extending Pakistani
assistance to the United States. Those are petty responses of Pygmy
minds.
It is India’s national responsibility to eliminate the Pakistan
sponsored proxy war in J&K. India has the military potential,
and the strike capabilities to do so. India only lacks the political
will to exercise power and command respect. India should follow the
current United States policy of first going in for a military solution of
the situation in J&K and then to be followed by imposition of a
political solution synchronising with India’s national interests.
India does not therefore require United States help to defeat the proxy
war in J&K. Nor can the United States now adopt double standards
on the military tackling of terrorism by India.
United States-India Strategic Relationship Building Process Must
Continue: In the post-‘Ground Zero’ period, so far, the United
States has not given any opportunity, despite its current pre-occupation
with Pakistan, for India to doubt US national intentions i.e. to devalue
the building-up of a strategic US-India relationship. The
indications were that the United States was keen to build
military-to-military relations also between the two countries.
In the coming months, embroiled as it would be with the military
operations in the Afghanistan, United States could perforce be inattentive
in carrying forward this process. However, India on its own initiatives
could carry forward this process. Any unilateralism on this account
should not be politically viewed or analysed as being subservient to the
United States. Such an approach should be viewed as a long term
investment with attractive dividends forthcoming to India in the future,
strategically.
India’s Strategic importance in the United States National Security
Calculus will be a constant: Once "Operation Infinite Justice’
( now changed to enduring freedom) is successfully completed and American
strategic objectives met, the United States will have to revert back
to a review of its South Asia and Asian security politics.
The South Asian power realities, the Asia pacific security environment
and the compulsions of the international geo-political and geo-strategic
situation will offer no better alternative to the United States than to
continue as a constant the strategic importance of India as one of the key
players in the United States Security calculus.
India would be well advised to "lay off" Pakistan and take a
detached view of what USA is currently doing with Pakistan.
Conclusion: Undoubtedly, there would be voices in the US
administration attempting to fit US policies towards Pakistan and
resurrection of a military alliance relationship with Pakistan.
Indicators to this effect were available prior to ‘Ground Zero’,
prompting this author to write a paper entitled "United States
Reverses Gears in South Asia" (www.saag.org/papers4/paper303.html).
Fortunately, Pakistan's grudging acquiescence to US demands to provide
assistance and misplaced initial conditionalities laid by President
Musharraf publicly will change US approaches. If President Musharraf
follows through his Islamic religious history references that Islam allows
reneging on pacts (see "Pakistan President Musharraf Unmasked" www.saag.org/papers4/paper324.html),
the United States would be tempted to discard Pakistan, once it has been
used by the United States in relation to Afghanistan. Analytically, there
is also a big question mark on "If" Pakistan is used.
Under these circumstances, Indian policy analysts, in or out of the
media need not fume and fret that India is not receiving American
attention in the current unfolding crisis facing it or indulge in
statistical analysis of brownie points scored. Major powers do not
solicit attention or importance. Both these flow to them as a
natural consequence of power politics and a national will to use power.
India has an intrinsic strategic importance in its own right.
What it lacks is a political and more importantly a national will to use
power. Once this is developed, India can hope for a more reinforced
United States-India strategic relationship emerging as a natural
consequence.
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for
discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)
