UNITED STATE’S SOUTH ASIA POLICIES POST-GROUND ZERO: AN ANALYSIS
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The turn of the millennium heralded a spring in United States policies
towards South Asia. After half a century of Cold War mind-sets determining
its South Asia policies, in which the United States sought to
strategically balance India by a disproportionate military build-up of
Pakistan, it seemed in 2000 that truth had finally dawned on the United
States. The truth being that the natural power-potential of India
could not be reined by such policies; not even the United States
permissiveness to allow China to build up the nuclear weapons and IRBM armoury of Pakistan.
President Clinton’s recognition of this reality, even though belated,
was widely welcomed in India leading to brave talk by both American and
Indian leaders of the "Natural partnership of shared endeavours"
and of being "natural allies". President Bush and his team
of foreign policy and strategic affairs advisers virtually echoed the same
sentiments in the run up to the Presidential election during 2000 and for
a few months thereafter.
United States Reverses Gears in South Asia: ‘Ground Zero’
(September 11, 2001) when the Islamic Jehadis wreaked their vengeance on
homeland USA itself by barbaric terror, was a defining moment for the
United States and the world in more ways than one. It was for South
Asia too.
‘Ground Zero’ prompted the United States to slowdown the emerging
strategic
partnership between India and USA. United States appeared to reverse gears in South Asia
towards Cold War
reminiscent mind-sets.
However, the trend of United States reversing gears in South Asia was
discerned before Ground Zero. It was analysed by this author in
August 2001 entitled "United States Reverses Gears in South
Asia" (see www.saag.org/papers4/paper303.html).
Ground Zero zoomed the trend of resurrecting
the American failing relationship with Pakistan and once again bestowing
the Cold War era halo of a ‘front-line’ state on it.
The United States subjected South Asia and India
in particular, to the pathetic spectacle of the global power’s
noble and much vaunted "crusade against global terror" being
defiled by association and dependence on the cess-pool of Islamic Jehadi
Terrorism i.e. Pakistan. General Musharraf described Pakistan as the
"fort of Islam" but how could United States policy-makers forget
that Pakistan is the "fort of Islamic Jehadi terrorists".
United States’ policies post-Ground Zero
therefore merit a closer analysis against such a back-drop.
United States Policies Towards Pakistan
Pre-Ground Zero: The overall tenor of the
United States -Pakistan relations can best be illustrated by the
admonishing trip made to Pakistan by President Clinton in March
2000. Never had a foreign leader on Pakistan soil on Pakistani TV
uttered such an admonition.
Pakistan was virtually written off politically
and strategically from American formulations. American think tanks and
policy analysts were describing Pakistan as a "failed state" or
"failing state" and even as a "rogue state". The
economy of Pakistan was floundering due to its pretensions of playing ‘big-power’
games in Afghanistan. Pakistan from 1998 had been refusing US
demands to hand over Osama- bin Laden living in safe sanctuaries provided
by Pakistan’s protege i.e. the Taliban. Sanctions stood imposed by
the United States extending from the nuclear weapons tests related ones to
those related to the military coup and overthrow of democracy by General
Musharraf.
Pakistan till Ground Zero was moving beyond the
pale of US foreign policy.
United States Policies Towards Pakistan Post
Ground Zero: The United States took a
somersault in relation to its Pakistan policies post-Ground Zero.
The United States President and particularly the US Secretary of State
would like the world to believe that Pakistan, the Pakistan Army and the
ISI who created the Taliban, gave sanctuary to Laden and exported Islamic
Jehadi terrorism worldwide from Kashmir to New York and Washington, had
overnight a change of heart. As if, General Musharraf had
received divine guidance to sally forth from his so-called "fort of
Islam" and join in the hunt for "Islamic Jehadi
terrorists". The irony was that the "Islamic Jehadis"
resided within Musharraf’s fort.
Pakistan was overnight christened as a
"front line state". All sanctions were removed and
financial, military and materiel aid was to flow in.
The United States in one swift stroke had
exhibited that "convenience" and "expediency" were
stronger determinants of American policy in South Asia than principles.
United States Takes India for Granted:
As a victim of Pakistan’s state-sponsored Islamic Jehadi terrorism for
nearly 15 years now, India unilaterally declared its readiness to assist
the United States in the crusade against global terrorism. It was
made in the spirit of the "natural partnership of shared endeavours"
and with no quid-pro-quos attached. However, the responses of the
United States indicate that it takes India for granted and that it can
conveniently ignore India’s sensitivities related to the emerging
situation.
The United States can afford the luxury of
compartmentalising its relationship in South Asia separately for Pakistan
and India. India, however, cannot do that strategically, especially
when Pakistan’s strategic rationale for its existence is India-centric.
Islamic Jehadi terrorism is a global phenomenon
and the current American campaign should have incorporated terrorism in
Kashmir, as it springs from and is operated from Pakistan and by proxy by
the Taliban. No amount of subterfuge explanations by United States
officials can convince Indians that it is a lesser priority. The
Indian Government may be convinced, but Indians are not.
The United States' plea that Pakistan has to be
willy-nilly co-opted and has to be placated to serve America’s
military plans against the Taliban are also unconvincing. The United
States military operations will ultimately have to depend on Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and the Northern Alliance. The half a dozen American
aircraft carriers in the North Arabian Sea provide better and assured
platforms than any bases in Pakistan. In any case Pakistan’s
support of any kind, even limited will be counter-productive for
USA. As for use of Pak air-space, is Pakistan in a position to
inhibit the United States to do so, even without its permission?
Post Ground Zero United States South Asian
Policies - The Adverse Spin-Off: United
States current South Asian policies are not going to reap any benefits for
America, neither in Pakistan nor in India.
In relation to Pakistan, the adverse spinoffs
could take any of the following forms which may affect its very existence:
* Islamic fundamentalist forces may emerge
stronger.
* Pakistan Army’s role could be challenged
both within and without for aiding USA. Civil disturbances could also take place.
* Anti-USA feelings have been strong in
Pakistan. America could emerge as a more heightened hate target.
* Pakistan’s stock in the Islamic world could
go down as it would be perceived as both a traitor and collaborator
against Islamic causes.
For the United States, the adverse spin-offs in
India could be more long range and strategic. With its large
middle-class, politically and internationally aware and vocal, the
Government of India is likely to come under very strong pressures on the
following counts:
* Military Strikes Against Pakistan’s
Terrorist Bases: Responding to United States reluctance to include
Pakistan sponsored terrorist organisations in its strikes, there is
likely to be a ground-swell in India demanding Indian military strikes
against Pakistan based Islamic Jehadis operating in Kashmir. The
irrefutable argument used would be if USA can follow its own agenda in
relation to its terrorist targets, India is fully justified to do
like-wise. Patience in India is really wearing thin.
*Arms Race in South Asia: The United
States inevitably is going to resort to multi million dollars military
aid to Pakistan. India would not, in its right mind, allow the
balance to be affected adversely. An accelerated arms race in
South Asia can be expected.
*American Credibility in India:
Despite all the current assurances that the next phase of the United
States global terrorism campaign would address India’s
concerns, the ultimate outcome could be otherwise. With no time
limit set for the first phase, and the outcome of the first phase also
being doubtful due to United States Islamic appeasement policies India’s
concerns are unlikely to be addressed. American credibility in
India will have a down slide.
*Reversal in India’s Foreign Policy: The
factor above could lead to strident demands amongst the Indian public
for reversal in foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States. This
would be an unfortunate development.
Conclusion: United
States policies in South Asia post-Ground Zero, with specific relation to
Pakistan have been ill-conceived and hastily executed. United States
current policies depend heavily on a big imponderable-can General
Musharraf and Pakistan deliver what USA strategically expects? This stands
analysed by this author as doubtful in a paper "United States
Strategic over evaluation of Pakistan (www.saag.org/papers4/paper313.html).
The noted Australian defence analyst Brian Cloughly, having close
experience with Pakistan Army (stationed in Pakistan twice as a UN military observer
and then Australian Defence Advisor) had in a recent media interview
stated that the ‘present General Musharraf is a great temporiser.’
General Musharraf in his critical address to the
nation justified his joining the US campaign by references to Islamic
religious history that pacts/understandings/agreements arrived on grounds
of expediency can be repudiated (see "President Musharraf
Unmasked" by this author: www.saag.org/papers4/paper324.html).
The conclusion that emerges is that General Musharraf’s commitment to
USA may not be all that enduring and that Pakistan’s value as a
strategic asset to current US policies is doubtful. It could be
disruptive even.
The notable casualty of such a United States
post-Ground Zero South Asia policy is likely to be the emerging United
States-India "natural allies" partnership. The process
could run into impediments. More critically and urgently, the
growing groundswell in India for military strikes against Pakistan-based
and sponsored Islamic Jehadi terrorist outfits operating in Kashmir, can
only be pre-empted by similar US actions against these groups as it
proposes against bin-Laden and the Taliban. .
(Dr. Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and
Strategic Affairs analyst. He can be reached on e-mail for
discussion at esdecom@vsnl.com)
