FROM INDIA FIRST TO PAKISTAN FIRST
by B.Raman
The administration of Mr.George Bush Jr, the US
President, has a large number of ex-Pentagon/CIA/DIA hands, who had in the
past closely interacted with the military-intelligence establishment of
Pakistan and, hence, think well of it.
Prominent amongst them are Mr.Dick Cheney, the
Vice-President (ex-Pentagon), Mr.Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary
(ex-Pentagon), Gen. (retd) Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Mr.Richard
Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State (ex-DIA-CIA, decorated by the
Zia-Ul-Haq regime), Mrs.Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of State in
charge of South Asia (ex-CIA), and Mrs.Wendy Chamberlin, Ambassador to
Pakistan (ex-CIA).
It was, therefore, expected that under their influence,
Pakistan would be taken out of the dog house to which it had been
consigned by the Clinton Administration in its last year in office.
The first signal of a more favourable attitude towards
Pakistan, which came in April, 2001, was hardly noticed by Indian
analysts. The annual report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism
during 2000 released by the State Department towards April-end had
strongly highlighted Pakistan's involvement with the Taliban in
Afghanistan and its role in assisting the terrorist groups in Jammu &
Kashmir (J&K).
Subsequently, during the daily press briefings in the
State Department, its spokesman was asked whether the assessment made by
the report presaged the declaration of Pakistan as a State-sponsor of
international terrorism. He replied that this assessment was
actually that of the preceding Administration and that the Bush
Administration had not come across any fresh evidence bearing on it since
it came to office on January 20, 2001.
Like the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration
too lost no opportunity to pay handsome tributes to the success of Indian
democracy, to draw attention to its market potential and to welcome it to
the "head table" as an emerging regional power, which, in its
perception, has to be treated on par with China.
At the same time, there were references to the need not
to let the importance attached to the USA's relations with India come in
the way of a new, sympathetic look at its relations with Pakistan.
"India first, but reinvigorated engagement with Pakistan" became
the refrain in Washington DC.
Thus, a more positive attitude towards Pakistan was
expected even before the terrorist strikes of September 11,2001, in New
York and Washington DC. However, what has shocked, confused and hurt
Indian public opinion is the total post-September 11 turnabout after
Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's self-reinstated and self-extended Chief
of the Army Staff (COAS), self-styled Chief Executive, self-promoted
President and self-proclaimed popular leader, agreed to co-operate with
the US in crushing the Taliban and the set-up of Osama bin Laden's
International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel.
From a suspect, Pakistan became overnight the most
coveted frontline ally of the US in its "war" against
international terrorism. His past sins of commission and omission in
contributing (at the behest of the US, of course) to the creation of Osama
bin Laden's Al Qaeda set-up in the 1980s and of the Taliban post-1994, in
thwarting the efforts of the Clinton Administration to capture bin Laden
and in overthrowing a popularly elected Prime Minister (Mr.Nawaz Sharif)---who
had incurred the wrath of the Army for succumbing to the pressure of
Washington DC to order the Pakistani troops and its jehadi surrogates to
withdraw from the Kargil heights and for agreeing to co-operate with the
US Special Forces for the capture of bin Laden--- were forgotten. In
effect, he became the toast of the Bush Administration.
Gone are the words of praise for India's democracy and
the references to India's role as an emerging regional power. There
is now a greater attention to the sensitivities and concerns of
Pakistan's military dictatorship---whether it be in relation to J & K
or the future dispensation in Afghanistan--- than to those of democratic
India. There is a reluctance to mention, even mildly, Pakistan's
role in sponsoring terrorism in J & K, which has been repeatedly
highlighted in the annual reports of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the
State Department since 1992.
Not only almost all economic and military sanctions have
been removed, but even the reproaches of the past vis-a-vis Pakistan's
clandestine procurement of nuclear and missile technology from China,
North Korea and elsewhere have become muted. From a suspected
State-sponsor of international terrorism, it has become, in the US
projection, a joint standard-bearer in the international "war"
against terrorism.
India, which has more counter-terrorism expertise than
any other country in the world and which has lost more of its men, women
and children to terrorism ---mostly Pakistan-sponsored--- than the rest of
the world put together, is relegated to an insignificant role.
The actions and statements of Gen.Powell during his
recent visit to Pakistan and India clearly indicate that from an
"India first" policy, the Bush Administration has switched over
to a "Pakistan first" policy.
What should be even more galling to India is that
the active pro-India group in the US Congress has suddenly become quiet
and the non-resident Indian (NRI) community in the US, which played such a
vigorous role in bringing about a positive turnabout in Indo-US relations
during the second term of Mr.Clinton, is finding the doors in Washington
DC not as open to it as they were before September 11.
Humouring and pampering the General and
stabilising his position have become the obsessive preoccupation of
Washington. If India's interests are affected and its sensitivities
hurt, so be it. That is the prevailing mood.
There are still some newspapers such as the "Wall
Street Journal" and some journalists such as Mr.Jim Hoagland, who
seem to feel uncomfortable with the sudden faith in Musharraf and the
Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, but they are in a minority.
The abrupt turnabout has not been preceded by a careful
examination of the advisability and implications of the new policy.
It is a panic reaction in policy-making circles to the events of September
11. Getting at the terrorists responsible and ensuring that they
would not be able to do an encore have become the total preoccupation of
Washington. In its perception, only Pakistan would be able to help it
eradicate the terrorists seeking to hurt the US and any price to Pakistan
is worth paying for achieving this objective .
Another reason for the turnabout is the belief, which
may prove to be misplaced, that helping Musharraf stabilise his
position, even at the cost of democracy in Pakistan, is the only way of
ensuring that there is no Talibanisation of Pakistan and that its nuclear
and missile assets do not fall into the hands of terrorist elements vowed
to act against the US.
Till the US is satisfied that a threat to its security
in US territory from terrorist elements has been considerably reduced, if
not eliminated, there is unlikely to be a re-thinking of its
post-September 11 policy unless it finds that Musharraf's promised
co-operation is not as "unstinted" as he had pledged or he
is overthrown either by a coup or by a public outburst caused by
continuing civilian casualties in Afghanistan and/or by the capture or
death of bin Laden and Mulla Mohammad Omer, the Amir of the Taliban.
At least in the short-term, if not in the medium, India
will, therefore, have to prepare itself to face enhanced threats from a
re-armed Pakistan and due to a less understanding and supportive attitude
from the US on terrorism in J &K.
At the same time, India, without sulking over the
abrupt turnabout in the US attitude, should try to draw advantage from the
enhanced global concerns over terrorism. The US campaign in
Afghanistan, if it succeeds, would have the following spin-off benefits
for India:
* Possible drying-up of the flow of heroin
dollars to the terrorists in India from Afghanistan. However, this
benefit would not be sustained unless action is also taken to dry up the
flow from Myanmar.
* Difficulties likely to be faced by terrorists in the
collection and transfer of funds through banking channels. This
benefit would not be substantial unless India acts, in co-operation with
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, to stop the misuse of the hawala
channels by terrorists and organised crime groups.
* Difficulties faced by the terrorists in J & K in
getting training facilities in Afghan territory.
The first and third benefits would accrue only if the future
administration in Kabul does not come under the control of Pakistan.
The present international coalition against terrorism
led by the US is unwieldy and is unlikely to be effective in the medium
and long terms. India's objective should be to work for the ultimate
formation of a restricted inter-governmental counter-terrorism group
to co-operate through joint intelligence collection and covert operations
against trans-national terrorist groups posing a threat to all these
countries and to prevent weapons of mass destruction falling into their
hands.
Such a group should function clandestinely. In
view of the USA's considerable financial and technological resources,
India need not have any objection to its having the leadership role in
this brains-trust.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com
)
